“Glory to the Heroes!” The Commemoration of the OUN and UPA in the Ukrainian Diaspora

Liam John Hilferty
University of Vermont

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“GLORY TO THE HEROES!” THE COMMEMORATION OF THE OUN AND UPA IN THE UKRAINIAN DIASPORA

A Thesis Presented

by

Liam Hilferty

to

The Faculty of the Graduate College

of

The University of Vermont

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Thesis Examination Committee:

Susanna Schrafstetter, PhD., Advisor
Lutz Kaelber, PhD., Chairperson
Jonathan D. Huener, PhD
Cynthia J. Forehand, PhD., Dean of the Graduate College
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was highly connected with Nazi Germany. After a failed declaration of statehood, their position towards Germany ostensibly changed, marking a shift from collaboration to resistance. The main organ of this resistance was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). However, the OUN and UPA did not openly resist the German occupation of Ukraine as strongly as they claimed. They were more focused on slowing the advance of the Red Army and a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing against Poles in Volhynia.

After the war, millions of displaced Ukrainians found shelter in Displaced Persons camps. Most of these DPs were apolitical workers deported to Germany for forced labor during the war. However, interspersed among their ranks were agitators from the OUN who fled Ukraine during the German retreat. These agitators successfully made nationalist politics part of daily life in the camps, proliferating a mythicized image of the OUN and UPA as heroic resistors of totalitarian rule. This narrative travelled with the postwar émigrés to their new homes, including the United States.

Another factor that helped spread this perception of the OUN and UPA was the clandestine relationship between American intelligence agencies and the former members of the OUN. The Americans used Ukrainian émigrés to spread anti-Soviet and nationalist news throughout Soviet Ukraine, and their Ukrainian collaborators used this opportunity to reinforce the heroic image of the OUN and UPA.

This study uses the monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA in the United States to show how the resistance myth was canonized within the Ukrainian Diaspora, and investigates the methods of narrative building that led to this commemoration.
Acknowledgements

I started working on this thesis after contacting UVM alumnus Mark Alexander and asking a few questions about his own thesis and topics related to it. At the time, my German language knowledge was limited, and I wanted to work on a subject that would allow me to use American intelligence records. Mark was more than happy to help and sent me an article by Lev Golinkin about monuments dedicated to Nazi collaborators in the United States. There was a long list of monuments and different groups, and I eventually narrowed my thesis down to monuments dedicated to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. I communicated with Mark and Lev to gather some background information that helped me with my research, and they were very helpful in finding resources that would get me started. I am thankful to everyone who aided me with my research, and to my committee for their time, patience, and dedication.
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**List of Abbreviations**

- **ABN** – Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
- **AFABN** – American Friends of the ABN
- **AK** – *Armia Krajowa* (Polish Home Army)
- **CIA** – Central Intelligence Agency
- **DP** – Displaced Persons
- **GAO** – Government Accountability Office
- **INS** – Immigration and Naturalization Service
- **NKVD** – *Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del* (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
- **ODFFU** – Organization for the Defense for Four Freedoms of Ukraine
- **ODWU** – Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine
- **OKW** – *Oberkommando Wehrmacht*, German Army High Command
- **OPC** – Office of Policy Coordination
- **OSI** – Office of Special Investigations
- **OUN** – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
- **OUN-B** – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Bandera
- **OUN-M** – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Melnyk
- **ROA** – *Russkaya osvoboditel’naya armiya* (Russian Liberation Army)
- **SB** – *Sluzhba Bezkepy* (OUN Security Service)
- **SD** – *Sicherheitsdienst* (Nazi Security Service)
- **SUM** – Ukrainian Nationalist Youth Organization
- **SUMA** – Ukrainian Nationalist Youth Organization American Branch
- **TsDVR** – Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement
- **UCCA** – Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
- **UHVR** – Supreme Council for the Liberation of Ukraine
- **UINP** – Ukrainian Institute of National Memory
- **UTsK** – Ukrainian Central Committee
- **UNA** – Ukrainian National Association
- **UNC** – Ukrainian National Council
- UNDO – Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance
- UNIS – Ukrainian National Information Service
- UNK – Ukrainian National Committee
- UNR – Ukrainian People’s Republic
- UPA – Ukrainian Insurgent Army
- UUOA – United Ukrainian Organization of America
- UVO – Ukrainian Military Organization
- VJPB – *Vierjahresplanbehörde* (Office of the Four-Year Plan)
- ZCh/OUN – Foreign Section of the OUN
- ZP/UHVR – Foreign Representation of the UHVR
Introduction

On 14 October 2017, the Russian Embassy in Canada tweeted, “There are monuments [sic] to Nazi collaborators in Canada and nobody is doing anything about it.”¹ Three images accompanied the text post. They included a bust of Roman Shukhevych (a Ukrainian nationalist leader), a slab of granite emblazoned with the Ukrainian trident, and a memorial to the Ukrainian-staffed Waffen-SS Galizien in Edmonton, Alberta. The date of the post, 14 October, is the anniversary of the foundation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a nationalist partisan group active in Ukraine during World War II. Reporters dismissed the accusation, attributing it to the rise of “fake news” in the mid-2010s, and noted that the post was a digital extension of Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine, which started in 2014 after the Euromaidan protests and annexation of Crimea.² Although it was dismissed as misinformation, the Russian Embassy’s tweet raised the pertinent question of why these monuments were in Canada. It failed to call attention to similar monuments dedicated to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a radical, right-wing nationalist group in the 20th century, and UPA in the United States. Apart from those in Canada, six monuments are dedicated to these two groups at various sites in the United States.

This tweet and its reception present three key themes surrounding the history of the two Ukrainian nationalist organizations at the center of this thesis. These themes trace their origins back to World War II and have persisted through the 20th century into the modern day. First, this tweet illustrates the legacy of Soviet propaganda, which sought to delegitimize Ukraine as a state by connecting it to Nazism and fascism. As evidenced by this tweet, this trend has been continued by the Russian Federation in the modern day. Second, it shows how the accusations of collaboration and war criminality directed at the OUN and UPA are often dismissed as misinformation or propaganda by the West and the Ukrainian diaspora. Finally, the monuments represent a one-sided historical narrative of organized resistance to the Nazi occupation of Ukraine, which was propagated in the diaspora and eventually became accepted as historical truth. The popularization of this sanitized Ukrainian nationalism in the diaspora in the United States and the resulting monuments are the subject of this thesis.

Although the Russian Embassy’s tweet in 2017 was undoubtedly politically motivated and built upon decades of Soviet propaganda, it addressed a real issue. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the role of the OUN and UPA before and during World War II. This thesis starts by analyzing the nationalist organizations’ political ideology and activities before 1945, showing how the postwar myths about the group diverged from reality. During the 1930s, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists promoted an authoritarian, fascist political program which led them to become highly involved with the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Ukrainian units served in German uniform and aided in conquering key Ukrainian cities. However, shortly after the conquest of L’viv,
two prominent nationalist leaders, Yaroslav Stetsko and Stepan Bandera, were arrested by German authorities in response to their proclamation of Ukrainian statehood. As this thesis will demonstrate, this event seemed to signal the end of German-Ukrainian collaboration, but these leaders quietly encouraged their supporters to join German auxiliary police units, which the Germans then used to perpetrate atrocities against Jews and other civilians in the occupied territory.

In 1943, after the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, the OUN declared its official opposition to the continued German occupation of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was formed to resist all foreign occupation of Ukrainian territory. However, their primary focus was not on the Germans. The UPA instead was more involved in resistance against the Red Army and a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing against Polish civilians living in Western Ukrainian territories. Through the examination of these events, the war criminality of these two groups will become evident, but their ostensible resistance to totalitarianism has created a myth of heroism that has remained pervasive in modern-day Ukraine and diaspora communities in the West and led to their recognition through monuments and memorials.

This thesis aims to address the existence of Ukrainian nationalist monuments in the United States and answer the question of how these monuments came to be in North America. The analysis focuses on postwar developments that contributed to the popularization of Ukrainian nationalism in the diaspora. One of the key findings of this thesis is that nationalist education of Ukrainian youth in Displaced Persons (DP) camps after the war was a central factor in popularizing the heroic legacy of the OUN and UPA.
The purpose of this nationalist education was to prepare future cadres of young Ukrainians to continue the fight for Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union after World War II. When these émigrés left Europe for North America, they carried this nationalist interpretation of their history to their new homes, where it was taken up by an organized diaspora. This thesis shows that the DPs successfully imposed this nationalist identity upon preexisting diaspora organizations after they arrived in North America. Due to the proliferation of nationalist thinking in DP camps, many of the émigrés were loyal to the OUN. Their aggressive efforts to spread nationalist doctrine alienated earlier members of Ukrainian-American diaspora organizations and enabled nationalist thought to be integrated into them. Taking over pre-established diaspora organizations granted the nationalists resources to commemorate the OUN and UPA through monuments.

The role of American intelligence services is important in this history. On the eve of the Cold War, the Western powers sought anti-Communist refugees to produce propaganda and aid them in their goal of delegitimizing the Soviet Union. In doing so, they contacted former members of the OUN with connections in Ukraine and established the Prolog Research Corporation in New York City, a front company that produced nationalist propaganda for distribution throughout Soviet Ukraine. These émigrés were then able to produce nationalist histories about Ukraine to counter Soviet narratives, which contributed to the rehabilitation of the OUN and UPA in these accounts.

Starting in the early 1960s, six monuments to the OUN and UPA were built in the United States. They were sponsored by Ukrainian diaspora organizations and communities and built at resorts or Ukrainian cemeteries. There were essentially two
types of monuments. The earlier memorials, built between 1960 and 1980, were dedicated to heroes of the OUN, many of whom collaborated with the German military during World War II. This thesis argues that they show a continued focus on raising young Ukrainian Americans in the nationalist tradition, a legacy of the nationalist indoctrination that took place in DP camps. The memorials after 1980 generally commemorated the unknown fighters of the UPA who died fighting against the Red Army. They were built in Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox cemeteries and are often incorporated into celebrations during religious holidays. This thesis argues that these monuments are physical manifestations of the sanitized history of these two groups. They represent an acceptance and reinforcement of these myths within the Ukrainian diaspora. These monuments in the United States eventually inspired those in Canada that Russia called attention to in 2017. This commemoration of the OUN and UPA has been ongoing. Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, diaspora nationalists moved back to Ukraine to help build the new nation. As this thesis will show, this led to a new wave of Ukrainian nationalism at home, reinforcing the nationalism in the diaspora. As recently as 2013, a new monument dedicated to the OUN was built in Baraboo, Wisconsin, and nationalist celebrations are held at these monuments annually.

To address the issue of the OUN and UPA’s commemoration, this thesis seeks to reevaluate the legacy of the OUN and UPA by using the most up-to-date historiography of these groups that highlight their problematic past despite their heroic reputation. To achieve its goal of tracing the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the diaspora and the subsequent commemoration of the OUN and UPA, this thesis uses primary sources about former OUN members’ collaboration with Western intelligence agencies,
newspaper articles about the monuments, online news articles about more recent events, and secondary sources about the groups’ 20th-century history to establish context. Most of the primary sources used in this thesis came from online archives, as it was impossible to schedule in-person research appointments resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, it makes extensive use of declassified CIA records from the National Archives Catalog and Mykola Lebed’s personal papers from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. It also uses records pertaining to the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations released under a Freedom of Information Act request from the FBI and a collection of records about this group from the Ukrainian Museum-Archives of Cleveland Displaced Persons Camp Periodicals collection, which is housed at the United States Holocaust Museum. In terms of newspaper sources, this thesis relies primarily on articles from The Ukrainian Weekly, an English-language newspaper published in the United States by the Ukrainian National Association, a Ukrainian fraternal society. This paper provides a bounty of information about diaspora life in the United States, including reports on the commemoration of the monuments. To understand the prewar relationship between the Germans and Ukrainians, this work also makes extensive use of Alfred Rosenberg’s diaries, edited by Jürgen Matthäus and Frank Bajohr.3

There are essentially two dominant historiographical trends concerning this topic. The earlier of the two is older and rather uncritical in its evaluation of the OUN and UPA. Most of this scholarship is written in Ukrainian, which makes research on this topic difficult due to language barriers. However, it also includes English-language scholarship.

produced mainly before the end of the Cold War.\footnote{John Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} edition, (Englewood, Colorado: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990; Oleh Martowych, \textit{The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)}, (Munich: Ukrainian National Information Service, 1950); Myroslav Shkrandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).} Within this body of scholarship, there is a spectrum ranging from apologetic propaganda to serious scholarship that downplays or omits the collaboration of these groups. For example, \textit{The Ukrainian Insurgent Army} by Oleh Martowych represents an unscientific analysis of these two groups, presenting them uncritically as heroes. Meanwhile, Myroslav Shkandrij’s work provides a relatively balanced analysis of Ukrainian nationalism. However, he sometimes slips into this earlier historiographical trend, omitting important events in these groups’ histories.


This heavily researched work documents the origins of Ukrainian nationalism, Bandera and his faction’s activities during World War II, and the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the postwar period. Rossoliński-Liebe effectively shows that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was a movement like other European fascist movements during the 20th century and that the subgroups that emerged from the OUN after the war kept many of their prewar fascist tendencies despite their openly democratic platform. Another significant aspect of this work is Rossoliński-Liebe’s demonstration of the continuity of Bandera’s cult of personality and how this helped perpetuate the heroic myths about the OUN and UPA in the Ukrainian diaspora after the war.

The monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA in Canada have already been the subject of considerable research by historians like John-Paul Himka and Per Anders Rudling. However, the OUN and UPA monuments in the United States have not garnered the same attention. In January 2021, Lev Golinkin wrote an article in *The Forward* titled “Nazi collaborator monuments in the United States,” which first brought the subject of these monuments to public attention. An article by Henry Redman about the monument in Baraboo followed, raising questions about their existence and the

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7 Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera*.
groups they are dedicated to.\textsuperscript{10} However, this did not spark a continued interest in this topic. This thesis is the first academic analysis of the Ukrainian diaspora monuments in the United States. It contributes to the history of the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States and its radicalization by tracking developments in the diaspora after the arrival of Displaced Persons in the United States. This has been covered to some degree in existing literature, such as Vic Satzewich’s \textit{The Ukrainian Diaspora} and Lubomyr Luciuk’s \textit{Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and Memory}.\textsuperscript{11} However, based on primary sources, this thesis can show how the CIA helped some of these nationalists come to the United States and establish themselves, enabling them to take over preexisting diaspora organizations. This analysis also demonstrates that there is some continuity between the prewar ideology of the OUN and its successor groups by focusing on the group’s racial ideology and its use in postwar publications. This thesis will reveal that the monuments in question play a central role in reinforcing the myth of resistance and the legacy of the OUN and UPA as heroes of Ukraine for members of the Ukrainian American diaspora and passing this myth on to the next generation of Ukrainian Americans.

Other notable works central to this thesis include Alexander Dallin’s \textit{German Rule in Russia 1941-1945} and John Armstrong’s foundational text \textit{Ukrainian...
Nationalism. Dallin’s book provides valuable background information about the German occupation of Soviet territories. It helps explain why Ukrainian nationalists believed they could earn a state through collaboration with the German war effort.

Armstrong’s scholarship provides a more focused analysis of the situation in Ukraine and the OUN. However, he tends to provide a more favorable account of the OUN, omitting or downplaying the group’s role in perpetrating atrocities during the war. This weakness was likely the result of source availability and bias. Armstrong could not access Soviet records at his time of writing, relying instead on German documents and interviews with former members of the OUN. He also did not incorporate the testimonies of the survivors of the OUN’s wartime violence.

Understanding the origins of the Ukrainian diaspora and forms of commemoration provides necessary context for this project. Victor Satzewich’s book *The Ukrainian Diaspora* aids with the understanding of how the diaspora community took shape in the United States and Canada. He identifies three waves of Ukrainian emigration to the Americas, with the third coming just after the end of World War II with the arrival of Displaced Persons. This third wave of the Ukrainian diaspora was most involved in commemorating the OUN and UPA, so understanding who they were and how they organized themselves is central to this thesis. The work of Per Anders Rudling helps explain the OUN’s mythmaking and legacy in the modern day, focusing on the efforts to commemorate and rehabilitate Ukrainian nationalists in contemporary Ukraine. His

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forthcoming book, *Tarnished Heroes: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the History Writing and Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine*, will build upon this previous work and explore the politicization of history in Ukraine.\(^\text{14}\) Rudling has also published multiple articles about Ukrainian nationalist monuments in Canada and how they were the product of the Canadian government’s policy of multiculturalism but also inspired by developments in the Ukrainians living south of the border. Finally, James Young’s book *The Stages of Memory: Reflections on Memorial Art, Loss, and the Spaces Between* provides an excellent analysis of commemoration, what drives societies to commemorate people and events, and how that commemoration reinforces a particular image of its subject for future generations.\(^\text{15}\)

This thesis is structured in two main parts consisting of shorter chapters. Part I focuses on the prewar and wartime activities of the OUN and UPA. First, it provides a brief introduction to the OUN and analyzes its ideology. This analysis will show that the OUN was like other European fascist movements of the time and grew increasingly more pro-German throughout the 1930s, culminating in the formal collaboration with the Abwehr after 1938. Then, it briefly shifts focus to provide context about Nazi planning for the war with the Soviet Union, highlighting the factions of the Nazi regime that were sympathetic to the plight of those living under Soviet rule. This section explains why Ukrainian nationalists were hopeful that an alliance with the Germans would lead to


Ukrainian statehood and why they sought collaboration. After this brief explanation, this thesis continues by describing the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, and the role of the OUN in it. It focuses specifically on the capture of L’viv and the Ukrainian nationalist proclamation of statehood, which was a major event that redefined the relationship between the Germans and their Ukrainian collaborators. This new relationship is analyzed in the subsequent chapter, which focuses on the relationship between collaboration and resistance in Ukraine during the war.

Despite the reputation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as a resistance group that faced off against both totalitarian powers in Europe, this chapter will show that the UPA was less involved in resisting the Nazi regime than it was in resisting the Red Army and massacring Polish civilians.

Part II focuses on the postwar era. First, it analyzes the situation of Ukrainians after the war. This analysis will show that millions of Ukrainians were displaced by the violence of World War II and sought refuge in Displaced Persons camps. It will also show that the CIA helped Ukrainian nationalists living in these camps come to the United States as intelligence contacts and protected them from investigation in the 1980s. The relationship between the CIA and Ukrainian nationalists, alongside the nationalist agitation in the camps, helped reinforce the image of the UPA as resistors of Nazi and Soviet control, and the narrative of resistance became a central part of denying collaboration. With an understanding of how Ukrainians came to the Americas after World War II, this project analyzes Ukrainian fraternal associations and how they changed after the third wave of immigration to the United States. It will show that OUN supporters gained prominent positions in these organizations, which helped them spread
their nationalist ideology culminating in the establishment of the monuments. After explaining how the OUN took control of these diaspora organizations, this chapter describes the monuments themselves, how they came to be in the United States, and what they represent. It argues that earlier monuments built at private resorts and estates were meant to commemorate leaders of the movement and represent the vanguard of Ukrainian nationalism, whereas later monuments built in Ukrainian cemeteries served as sites to remember loved ones who died fighting against the Soviet Union. It also shows that many monuments focused on youth education and raising young Ukrainian Americans in the nationalist tradition. The final chapter illustrates that this commemoration continued after Ukrainian independence in 1991, and a revival of nationalism in Ukraine inspired further nationalist commemoration in the diaspora. It concludes by showing that the clash between these narratives and this commemoration have continued into the modern era.

The monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA in the United States present an interesting challenge to historians. They lead one to ask why there are monuments to Nazi collaborators, why they are in the United States, and how these monuments were built. Investigating these questions necessitates further research to understand how narratives take shape with time and how collective memory differs between groups. The analysis of these questions will show that the narratives central to a group identity are difficult to challenge and remain pervasive even when conflicting evidence emerges. The monuments in the United States serve as a focal point for this thesis, which seeks to investigate the commemoration of the OUN and UPA, the historical myths that contributed to the monuments’ dedication, and the continued conflict between Soviet and Ukrainian narratives.
Part I: Wartime Ukraine
Chapter I: Ukrainian Nationalism Before World War II

The first manifestations of 20th-century Ukrainian nationalism emerged in the wake of World War I and the struggle to establish an independent Ukraine in accordance with the Allied Powers’ policy of self-determination. During the war, East and West Ukraine were divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Near the end of the war, both empires crumbled, and a Ukrainian government formed in Kyiv in 1917. In January 1918, the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) declared that it represented a “Free Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People.”16 Dependent on the Germans, the UNR became a signatory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and a German puppet government was formed under Pavlo Skoropads’kyi. Skoropads’kyi retreated with the German Army in December 1918, and he was replaced by the “Directory,” led by Symon Petliura.17 However, this government was also forced to retreat by the Bolshevik Army. Meanwhile, a second Ukrainian state was proclaimed in L’viv in November 1918, called the West Ukrainian National Republic, which soon came under attack from Polish forces. After fleeing west, Petliura’s government and the L’viv government united in a largely symbolic move. In an effort to reclaim Kyiv, Petliura and the other members of the UNR made a deal with the Polish government, promising that Galicia and other parts of West Ukraine would be incorporated into Poland in exchange for military aid against the Bolsheviks. However, in 1921 the Riga Settlement ended the conflict between Poland and the Soviet Union, and Poland assumed control of Galicia and most of Volhynia while

recognizing the sovereignty of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus.\textsuperscript{18} Prior to the Riga Settlement, the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 recognized Romanian authority over Bukovyna and Czechoslovakia received Transcarpathia, or Carpatho-Ukraine. Treaties and settlements after World War I thus divided Ukraine between four powers in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Russia.\textsuperscript{19} It was therefore difficult to forge a uniform Ukrainian identity, and Ukrainian nationalism took different forms based on geographical location.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was an umbrella organization of right-wing integral nationalists founded in 1929 by Yevhen Konovalets, a veteran of the brief conflict with Poland for control over Galicia in the early 1920s. These “integral nationalists” held the nation as supreme, based national solidarity on biological characteristics, romanticized violence, rejected rational thought in favor of “intuitive emotions,” and believed that a charismatic leader embodied the “national will.”\textsuperscript{20} While there were several Ukrainian nationalist organizations throughout the 1920s, Konovalets and other leaders realized their separate struggles were not as effective as one unified effort. Thus in 1929, several organizations met in Vienna and merged to create the OUN. The four main groups were the Group of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (SUM).\textsuperscript{21} The latter two were the most important. Before

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{19} Shkandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 17.  \\
\textsuperscript{21} Satzewich, \textit{The Ukrainian Diaspora}, 64-67.  
\end{flushleft}
founding the OUN, Konovalets led the Ukrainian Military Organization. Under his leadership, the militant structure of the UVO, along with its anti-Polish position, were incorporated into the OUN. SUM contributed ideologically to the OUN. Many of the young SUM members were enamored by the writings of Dmytro Dontsov, a pro-German integral nationalist from East Ukraine who started publishing in the early 1920s.22

Although not all OUN leaders followed Dontsov’s vision of Ukrainian nationalism, his writings inspired OUN theorists.23 These ideologues maintained a highly connected network of publications such as newspapers and journals, and their writing focused on themes of aggression, struggle, national independence, and advocacy for violence as a valuable political tool.24 Myths of a new national rebirth, or palingenesis, and the amalgamation of traditional values with modernism also featured prominently. These ideologues also embraced a biological view of the nation, racial hierarchies like the Nazis’, and antisemitism.25 The OUN’s ideologues never openly identified their movement with fascism, preferring to liken their struggle to that of the Irish Republican Army, but they admired it. The two strongest supporters of fascism within the OUN were Mykola Stsiborsky and Yevhen Onatsky.26 However, fascism is a difficult political phenomenon to define. The 20th century witnessed the rise of several fascist movements, but each movement developed under unique circumstances in their places of origin.

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Therefore, it can be challenging to identify what could be termed as “generic fascism.”27 Some members of the OUN tried to counter the label of fascism by stressing the originality of Ukrainian nationalism.28 This defense was a response to Soviet propaganda linking Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalists” to Nazi Germany, arguing they were tools of the West to be used against the Soviet Union.29 Onatsky, although he admired fascism, argued that the primary reason the OUN was not fascist was that fascism required a state.30 Despite continued denial that the group was fascist or followed the program of National Socialism, certain aspects of the OUN’s rhetoric and actions place the group on the fascist spectrum.

Robert Paxton, a notable scholar of Vichy France and fascism, identified nine ideas or “mobilizing passions” characteristic of fascist movements. They include a sense of overwhelming crisis resistant to traditional responses, the importance of the group over the individual, a victim identity, fear of decline, a “pure” national community, the need for an authoritarian leader, the infallibility of that leader, the romanticization of violence, and a belief in the right of a chosen people to dominate others in a Darwinian struggle for supremacy.31 These mobilizing passions are identifiable within the OUN.

Addressing the first mobilizing passion, the nationalists’ “overwhelming crisis” was Ukraine’s lack of independence. While some groups, like the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), explored legal channels to Ukrainian independence, the

28 Per Anders Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 3.
30 Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 111.
OUN carried out more than 100 terrorist operations and 60 assassination attempts in the early 1930s to draw attention to their movement and advocated violent revolution to claim independence. These activities highlight the group’s embrace of violence and the view that independence was no longer possible through conventional means. The general understanding of the group’s importance over the individual is best conveyed through a quote from nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, then the acting leader of the OUN in Poland, in 1936:

The OUN values the life of its members, values it highly; but—our idea in our understanding is so grand, that when we talk about its realization, not single individuals, nor hundreds, but millions of victims have to be sacrificed in order to realize it.

This statement illustrates the OUN’s understanding of sacrificing oneself for the group’s benefit. The Ukrainian nationalists’ “victim identity” results from Polish and Soviet repression in the interwar period. The OUN’s fear of decline is apparent in criticisms of contemporary experience and calls to return to traditional values or roots. Mykola Stsiborsky’s work *Natsiokratia* praised fascism’s emphasis on tradition while criticizing democracy and communism for their “cult of intellect” and materialism. The belief in a “pure” national community is seen in publications denouncing “mixed marriages” between Ukrainians and any “non-Ukrainians” and reinforcing the superiority of Ukrainian blood. Despite conflict over leadership, the OUN embraced the Nazi concept of *Führerprinzip* and totalitarian rule. This facet of Ukrainian nationalism is especially

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32 Satzewich, *Ukrainian Diaspora*, 67-68.
33 Quoted in Per Anders Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 4.
36 Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 4-5.
evident when examining the cult of personality that developed around Stepan Bandera before and after his death.\textsuperscript{38} Finally, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) violent ethnic cleansing campaign at the end of World War II illustrates the OUN’s belief that Ukrainians had the right to dominate others in a Darwinian struggle.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, the OUN embraced these fascist mobilizing passions and can reasonably be categorized as a fascist movement.

Understanding what Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe calls “the fascist kernel” of Ukrainian nationalism, it is now necessary to analyze the OUN’s activities during the 1930s. While most historians of the OUN prefer the label “integral nationalists,” Rossoliński-Liebe argues that at its core the OUN bore many similarities to other Central and Eastern European fascist movements and therefore should be analyzed as such.\textsuperscript{40} As referenced earlier, the group was a known terrorist organization that was anti-Polish, anti-Soviet, and dedicated to establishing an independent Ukraine. The OUN’s popularity is difficult to gauge, but the best estimates are between 8,000 and 20,000 members on the eve of World War II, with an additional several thousand supporters outside the organization throughout West Ukraine.\textsuperscript{41} Their strategy was to use violence to draw attention to their cause and eventually incite a popular revolution that would become the basis of the new Ukrainian state. One of their primary tactics was the assassination of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{38} For a complete study of the Bandera cult, see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist – Fascism, Genocide, and Cult}, (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{39} Snyder, \textit{The Reconstruction of Nations}, 162.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{40} John Armstrong was the first to label the OUN as an integral nationalist movement and since then most historians have found no issue with this label. However, in recent years scholars like Rossoliński-Liebe, Per Anders Rudling, David Marples, and John Paul-Himka have argued for a reevaluation of this categorization, claiming that it was a fascist movement that requires more nuanced interpretations of its ideology.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{41} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 72.}
Polish politicians whom they deemed anti-Ukrainian. However, political violence was also used against Ukrainian socialists and Ukrainians cooperating with the Polish government. The most high-profile figure the OUN successfully assassinated was Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish Minister of the Interior in 1934. According to a report about Pieracki’s assassination, the OUN killed him while he was on a mission to encourage more Ukrainians to become politically involved and advocate for increased Ukrainian representation in the Sejm.\footnote{“Report on the assassination of Minister Pieracki,” Undated, National Archives at College Park, National Archives and Research Administration (NARA), RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency Files (hereafter, CIA), E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.} However, other explanations suggest that the OUN killed Pieracki in retaliation for the repression of Ukrainian nationalism in Poland.\footnote{Shkandrij, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 38.} Whatever the motivation was, the result was a trial charging some of the leading figures of the OUN with the crime. Included in the list were Stepan Bandera, then acting leader of the OUN in Poland, and Mykola Lebed, who later became head of the OUN’s security service, the \textit{Sluzhba Bezkepy} (SB). The court sentenced both men to death, but their sentences were commuted, and they received life imprisonment. Despite two attempts to free Bandera in 1937 and 1938, both men stayed in a Polish prison until the German army’s advance into Poland freed them in 1939.\footnote{Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 165-166.}

Some significant developments took place while Bandera and Lebed were in prison. First, there was a brief period of self-proclaimed Ukrainian statehood in Carpatho-Ukraine before the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. However, this movement was quickly crushed by the Hungarian army.\footnote{Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 7.} This failed attempt at statehood
has been used as evidence of the OUN’s anti-Nazi resistance and a betrayal by the
Germans for not recognizing the short-lived state’s legitimacy.\textsuperscript{46} However, it was
evidently not a dealbreaker for the nationalists, as collaboration with the Abwehr, the
German military intelligence service, would become an official strategy of the OUN in
1940. Second, on 23 May 1938, Yevhen Konovalets was assassinated by a Soviet agent
in Holland, and the leadership of the OUN fell to his designated successor Andrii
Melnyk, a veteran of the Austro-Hungarian army and Konovalets' chief-of-staff in the
UVO in Galicia.\textsuperscript{47} Melnyk was confirmed as the leader of the OUN at the “Second Great
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists” in Rome (a benefit of the group’s close ties to
Mussolini’s Italy) on 27 August 1939.\textsuperscript{48} Finally, the German invasion of Poland on 1
September 1939 and Poland’s division between the Nazis and the Soviet Union was
crucial. In accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union
invaded from the East as the Germans advanced from the West, dividing the territory
between the two nations. Not only did the German invasion free Bandera and Lebed from
prison, but it also united Ukraine for the first time – under Soviet rule.

After Bandera and Lebed escaped from prison, the OUN split into two factions.
Melnyk and his inner circle were relatively moderate compared to the younger members
of the OUN, and soon he lost control of the more radical elements of the group.\textsuperscript{49} When
the German military’s invasion of Poland freed Bandera from prison, he was able to gain
support from the radical youth with the aid of Yaroslav Stetsko. Stetsko was part of the

\textsuperscript{46} For example, see Oleh Martowych, \textit{The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)}, (Munich: Ukrainian
\textsuperscript{47} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 165; Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 36, 41-42.
\textsuperscript{48} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 75-76, 176.
\textsuperscript{49} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 41-42.
younger generation of the OUN and a Ukrainian nationalist since adolescence.\textsuperscript{50} He became disillusioned with Melnyk’s leadership after his replacement as the organizer of the OUN’s Second Congress.\textsuperscript{51} Two groups emerged from this conflict. Each kept the name OUN, but they were distinguished by whom they followed. Therefore, the faction led by Melnyk became the OUN-M, and the faction led by Bandera became the OUN-B. One of the distinguishing differences between the two movements was the level of collaboration with the Germans they advocated for. Melnyk, the less dynamic of the two leaders, wanted to pursue a longer-term strategy, working with the Germans and gaining their trust until they approved the foundation of a Ukrainian state. Bandera’s faction, the younger and more radical of the two, wanted to start a “Ukrainian National Revolution,” using the Germans to destroy the Soviet Union, then later creating an independent nation in close alliance with the new fascist order in Europe.\textsuperscript{52} The end-goal for each group remained the same, as did the role of collaboration in achieving it.

\textsuperscript{50} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 69,
\textsuperscript{51} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 54-55.
\textsuperscript{52} Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 3.
Chapter II: Germans and Ukrainians on the Eve of Operation Barbarossa

Towards the end of the 1930s, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists became increasingly pro-Nazi Germany. They hoped that a war between Germany and the Soviet Union would create circumstances conducive to a Ukrainian national revolution. As mentioned earlier, the methods of each group for achieving statehood differed regarding the role that collaboration would play. The OUN-M wanted to work with the Germans to establish an independent Ukraine, whereas the OUN-B envisioned a mass movement creating the nation without German help but in alliance with fascist Europe. Both strategies relied on German approval. However, rival factions in the German government had competing visions of the future of Ukraine. Alfred Rosenberg, wartime head of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Ostministerium) and a Baltic German, was sympathetic to the nations occupied by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Adolf Hitler, leader of the Third Reich and the Nazi party, opposed Ukrainian statehood in any form. While it seems evident that Hitler’s policy for Ukraine would take precedence, this was not clear to the Ukrainian nationalists at the time, who were encouraged by the establishment of the Slovak state under Father Jozef Tiso and the Ustaša state under Ante Pavelić. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the plans of the pro-Ukrainian Germans to understand why the OUN saw collaboration as a path to statehood while also considering the Nazis’ actual plans for the territory.

Prior to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Hitler organized two planning committees for operations in Eastern Europe.
Hermann Göring led the Office of the Four-Year Plan (Vierjahresplanbehörde, VJPB) while Alfred Rosenberg headed the Bureau Rosenberg (Dienstelle Rosenberg). Göring and the VJPB were responsible for planning military objectives following guidelines set by Hitler, while Rosenberg and his staff were tasked with organizing the future administrative system of a divided Soviet Union. At times the goals of these two offices conflicted. For example, when Rosenberg suggested the foundation of a Ukrainian university in Kyiv at a meeting on 16 July 1941, Göring protested saying he needed the raw materials for the German war effort. The conflict between the two offices represents the two competing visions of Ukraine’s future. While Göring and his office were more concerned with German military interests, Rosenberg was more of an idealist. Born in Tallinn and educated in Moscow, Rosenberg was the Nazi party’s expert on “the East.” His plans for the future of Eastern Europe highlight some of the reasons Ukrainian nationalists were willing to collaborate during the war.

Rosenberg’s personal history as an émigré made him sympathetic towards anti-Soviet émigré organizations. As such, he had a long-term interest in Ukraine, which he saw as a powerful tool for destroying the Polish and Soviet states. During the Carpatho-Ukraine incident in late 1938, a brief period of Ukrainian statehood as Czechoslovakia broke down, Rosenberg noted in his diary that “some 12-15 years ago” he first brought the issue of Ukrainian independence to the attention of German politics. However,

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55 Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, 19.
56 Matthäus and Bajohr, The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg, 143.
renewed interest was sparked by a map published by Ukrainian nationalists demarcating borders for an independent state. Rosenberg wrote in his diary entry from 18 December 1938 that Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s minister of foreign affairs, mentioned its appearance in Berlin during lunch with Hitler. While Rosenberg’s description of the map is incomplete, it notes that the nationalists drew the hypothetical Ukrainian border extending as far as Warsaw, revealing intentions to incorporate large amounts of Polish territory into an independent Ukraine. Hitler ordered a copy of the map for himself and called on Rosenberg to answer his “several questions.” In this entry from his diary, Rosenberg did not elaborate on what Hitler asked him, but noted that he continued to update Hitler on the Ukrainian situation, forwarding him a memorandum about conflict with the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) shortly after their meeting to discuss the map. The OKW wanted to use a Ukrainian from Polish territory as a liaison between Nazi Germany and Ukrainian nationalists, but Rosenberg’s office wanted to use a Ukrainian from Soviet territory. Rosenberg did not provide any additional information about the specific role envisioned for this position, but it is reasonable to conclude that it would pertain to organizing the Ukrainian population for a revolt or war against Poland and the Soviet Union. While using a Polish Ukrainian made more sense (most politically minded Ukrainians were from Western Ukraine, under Polish control), Rosenberg worried that doing so would harm Polish-German relations. Rosenberg also hoped that using a Soviet Ukrainian would bolster his anti-Russian position. However, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris of the Abwehr warned that this would compromise ongoing operations involving Ukrainian nationalists, and the matter was best left to him and his staff. Rosenberg let the issue settle but noted that the Wehrmacht was challenging the Nazis’ political authority.
through their involvement.\textsuperscript{57} The issue of the Wehrmacht’s, and specifically the 
Abwehr’s, authority to make political decisions would be important to the OUN’s 
ambitions, as seen in the next chapter.

The map in question was likely the \textit{Nationalitätenkarte der Ukraine und 
benachbarten Gebiete} drawn by Volodymyr Kubiiovych, a geographer and Ukrainian 
nationalist with close ties to the OUN-M and close scholarly contacts within Germany.\textsuperscript{58} 
Although he was never an official member of the OUN, Kubiiovych maintained a close 
relationship with the older generation of the group, and despite his lack of political 
experience he later went on to serve as the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee 
(UTsK), the primary Ukrainian collaborative institution in the Generalgouvernement.\textsuperscript{59} 
Kubiiovych’s map is an ethnography of Ukraine and its surrounding territories and draws 
the borders of Ukraine around any region with a significant number of Ukrainians. It is 
difficult to know whether this map is the exact map referred to in Rosenberg’s diary, but 
several factors make it seem likely. First, Kubiiovych’s role in the Generalgouvernement 
suggests he had a longer-term relationship with German political authorities than other 
Ukrainian nationalists. Further, the map in question was published in German, suggesting 
it was meant for a German audience. Finally, the borders of this map match Rosenberg’s 
written description, extending from Warsaw to the Caspian Sea.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Matthäus and Bajohr, \textit{The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg}, 144. 
\textsuperscript{58} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 50. 
\textsuperscript{59} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 50. 
\textsuperscript{60} Volodymyr Kubiiovych, \textit{Nationalitätenkarte der Ukraine und benachbarten Gebiete}, L’viv, 1938. 
\url{https://oshermaps.org/browse-maps?id=100676}. 

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The issue of German relations with the Ukrainian nationalists reemerged in September 1939 after the joint invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As per the agreement in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the territory was divided between the two totalitarian regimes. As mentioned before, this unified East and West Ukraine under Soviet rule, to the disappointment of the nationalists. Rosenberg wrote of the decision that it was “after the Carpatho-Ukraine, the second blow dealt by [the Nazis] to the strongest anti-Moscow force.”

Political plans for the future of the Eastern territories took shape shortly before the German invasion began. Between March 27 and 28 1941, Hitler asked Rosenberg for an update on his connections with émigrés from the East. Rosenberg kept close contact with a network of émigrés and informed Hitler that “administrative posts [were] already being discussed.” He planned to use Pavlo Skoropads’kyi, the one-time Hetman of Ukraine during the German occupation at the end of World War I, and his Cossack allies as their “local knowledge and language skills [could] always be put to use.” Although Skoropads’kyi was never a member of the OUN, his involvement with Rosenberg is important because it reflects the willingness of some branches of the Nazi government to work with émigrés. On 2 April, Hitler and Rosenberg met again, and Rosenberg told Hitler that “three Reich Offices have already approached [his] staff” several times about the economic plans for the East. During these encounters, Rosenberg’s office determined that no clear political plan had taken shape. Thus, after providing Hitler a brief history of the region and explaining the “critical factors” of the situation in the East, Hitler declared

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61 Matthäus and Bajohr, *The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg*, 160.
that he would be creating a new office on the “Russian question,” and Rosenberg would be the head. The real planning then began.

On 16 July 1941, Hitler, Rosenberg, Göring, Wilhelm Keitel, Martin Bormann, and Hans Lammers met to finalize the plans for the future of the East. Rosenberg divided the planned area of conquest into seven regions: Greater Russia, Belarus, the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Don region, the Caucasus, and Turkestan. Ukraine would be the strongest link in a chain of pro-German satellite states encircling a defeated and dismantled Soviet Union. Rosenberg’s plan incorporated historically Ukrainian territory into the German Reich, but as he put it, “the Ukrainians would get such an enormous territory that they could easily leave us a few areas.” However, Rosenberg’s vision needed to wait until after Germany won the war. Therefore, he recommended that Ukraine provide the German war effort raw materials and food during the war, and independent statehood would come when the Germans achieved victory. The new Ukraine would be a strong ally, a great university would be built in Kyiv, and Ukrainian culture would replace Russian. In his imaginings, Rosenberg saw Ukrainian nationalism as a useful organizing force. He believed that encouraging Ukrainian nationalist consciousness to build a state that was dependent on German protection would be beneficial to Germany in the long term, but building this relationship successfully relied

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63 Matthäus and Bajohr, *The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg*, 234.
64 Matthäus and Bajohr, *The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg*, 254.
67 Matthäus, *The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg*, 255.
68 Dallin, *German Rule in Russia*, 109.
on a short war. To ensure German military success, the Nazis planned to relegate Ukraine to an exploitative colonial relationship. On this immediate aim, they could all agree.

The Nazi leaders planned for an exploitative occupation of Ukraine from the outset. Hitler envisioned Ukraine as Germany’s equivalent of British colonial India. As Timothy Snyder notes, Hitler admired Great Britain’s vast empire but could not compete with its Royal Navy. Therefore, he saw Eastern Europe as a potential “Garden of Eden” for the German people. Ukraine had a reputation as the “breadbasket of Europe,” and Hitler wanted to exploit it to avoid similar circumstances to the widespread starvation caused by the British blockade in World War I. In conjunction with his plans to exploit the land for its agricultural value, Hitler planned to use Ukrainians and other non-Russians living in the area as slave laborers. The Ukrainians taken from this territory were to be replaced with ethnic Germans, completing Hitler’s dreams of securing Lebensraum, living space, in the East. The fundamental difference between Hitler and Rosenberg’s competing visions is that Hitler never entertained any interest in Ukrainian statehood.

The debates highlighted in this exchange are illustrative of the disorder and competition between different branches of the Nazi government. While Rosenberg and his staff had their own ideas about the future of the East, mainly a network of collaborationist satellite states, Hitler’s vision focused on economic exploitation and colonial settlement with little room left for the people already living there. The Abwehr

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71 Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, 142.
meanwhile planned pragmatically rather than ideologically, thinking about what would be most useful for the oncoming war with the Soviet Union. However, because the Abwehr was part of the military rather than political structure of Nazi Germany they did not have the authority to make political plans for the future of Ukraine. The lack of coordination between the Abwehr and the political offices of the Nazi government, illustrated by their conflict with Rosenberg over who would represent Ukrainian interests in Berlin, would prove disastrous for Ukrainian nationalists. The Abwehr had no political authority to make deals with the Ukrainians to win their favor, but they did so believing the nationalists’ terms would be acceptable to Hitler after the war in the East was over. The Abwehr’s relationship with Ukrainian nationalists merits further analysis to show why the OUN thought they could earn an independent state through collaboration.

Although they lacked a close relationship with Rosenberg, his plans could have encouraged Ukrainian nationalists’ hopes of establishing a collaborationist state. Despite the group’s insistence that they should strive to achieve independence on their own terms, the OUN-B was highly involved with the Abwehr. In 1938, the Abwehr established an extensive network of military schools to train émigrés in sabotage and intelligence gathering. One such training camp, based in Zakopane, was attended by Mykola Lebed after his release from prison. Along with training, the Abwehr provided funding and weapons to the OUN-B and expected them to support Operation Barbarossa by flanking the Red Army when the invasion began. Some observers suggest that the OUN’s

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72 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 189.
73 “Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Operations,” 6 January 1987, National Archives at College Park, NARA, CIA files, LEBED, Mykola, E ZZ-18, B 80.
74 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 190.
relationship with the Abwehr was not very involved and the product of Soviet propaganda. While it is true that the dynamic between the Germans and Ukrainians was certainly unstable, the cooperation between the two cannot be discounted as mere propaganda, as will become clear below.

The OUN was not the first group considered for collaboration in the East. Initially, German plans focused on reinstalling Pavlo Skoropads’kyi as the head of a future collaborative government due to his close connections with figures such as Göring and Rosenberg. Skoropads’kyi’s ties to Göring and other German military officials dated back to World War I when he served as the Hetman of the German puppet state in Ukraine. However, he was aging and his support base waning, so despite his assurances that he was the best man for the job, the Abwehr recognized he had little tactical value. Therefore, the Abwehr turned to the OUN. The OUN was more closely ideologically aligned with Nazism, and their advocacy for violence made them useful for wartime activity.

As the German military evaluated the usefulness of potential collaborators, both branches of the OUN sought German support for their ongoing struggle against Poland, and they were willing to aid the German war effort through various activities. This shows that both parties, the Germans and the Ukrainians, had different motivations for working with each other. While the Germans needed Ukrainian manpower and information for the oncoming war against the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians needed military training and material support. In early 1941, Ukrainians trained by the Abwehr were organized into

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75 Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 47.
two combat battalions. Roughly 350 soldiers joined Nachtigall, and 330 joined its sister battalion, Roland. In addition to these two official Wehrmacht battalions, the OUN-B independently organized roughly 800 members trained by the Abwehr into “marching groups” (pokhidni hrupy). For the Ukrainians, the role of these units was to advance with the Wehrmacht to prepare formerly Soviet Ukraine for the Ukrainian National Revolution. Led by German and Ukrainian officers, one of the most prominent OUN-B members to join Nachtigall was Roman Shukhevych. A radical nationalist from his youth and staunch advocate for heightened militancy in the OUN, Shukhevych was the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in Nachtigall. Shukhevych’s involvement in collaborative organs of the Nazi military is often whitewashed or overlooked in favor of his time as leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which requires some explanation. Shukhevych and his legacy will be analyzed more thoroughly later in this thesis.

While Rosenberg imagined a vibrant, pro-German Ukrainian buffer state, Hitler’s vision for Ukraine was a colony dominated by ethnic Germans resettled in the East. He had little patience for Rosenberg’s plans. Meanwhile, the Abwehr made promises to the OUN-B concerning their freedom of political activity without having the authority to do so. Working with Ukrainians and guaranteeing them statehood conflicted with Hitler’s racial worldview, which ascribed Ukrainians and other Slavs the status of Untermenschen, or subhumans. Although Hitler placed little value on the people that lived there, he had long-standing plans for the economic role of geographical Ukraine.

78 Rossofinski-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 190.
Ukraine’s role in German economic and political machinations shows why, despite the persuasions of sympathetic Nazi officials, Ukrainian nationalist dreams of statehood through collaboration were ultimately unfeasible.
Chapter III: The OUN and Operation Barbarossa

In the early hours of 22 June 1941, the German military launched its attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler’s armies employed the blitzkrieg strategy used to destroy Poland, hoping for a quick victory over the Soviet Union. During the German invasion, the battalions organized by the Abwehr, Nachtigall and Roland, advanced with the Wehrmacht. Nachtigall, led by the prominent Ukrainian nationalist Roman Shukhevych, played a substantial role in the capture of L’viv. The OUN-B’s “marching groups” (pokhidni hrupi) advanced with the German army, distributing Bandera’s instructions for the “Ukrainian National Revolution,” a pamphlet titled “The Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime.” This document outlined plans for the revolution and identified the “enemies of Ukraine,” including Russians, Poles, and Jews. The OUN-M had made similar preparations but focused their efforts on pushing east towards Kyiv. The most formative part of the OUN’s participation in Operation Barbarossa was the proclamation of Ukrainian statehood delivered by Yaroslav Stetsko on 30 June 1941. In the wake of this announcement, nationalist celebrations were held throughout the Ukrainian territories, often accompanied by pogroms of Jews. This announcement also redefined German-Ukrainian relations for the rest of World War II.

The German army and Nachtigall marched into L’viv on the morning of 30 June 1941. That evening at 8:00, the OUN-B called an assembly in the building of the Prosvita Society, a Ukrainian cultural organization founded in the 19th century. German authorities

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81 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 11.
prevented Bandera from entering the Ukrainian territories during the invasion citing security concerns, so Stetsko delivered the proclamation of statehood in his stead. Stetsko announced that Bandera would lead the new state as Providnyk, and Stetsko would serve as the prime minister. The capital would be Kyiv, and the new nation would work closely with “National Socialist Great Germany, which, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, is creating a new Europe and the world, and is helping the Ukrainian nation liberate itself from Muscovite occupation.”

The meeting ended with a fascist salute to Adolf Hitler, Stepan Bandera, and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, a prominent Ukrainian Catholic religious leader. The initial proclamation was relatively uneventful, but its consequences are essential to understanding the OUN-B’s legacy.

First, members of Nachtigall broadcasted information about the proclamation from a captured radio station, glorifying the German military as liberators who had made independence possible. Ivan Hryn’okh, the chaplain of Nachtigall and a member of the OUN-B, also read a pastoral letter written by Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi supporting the new government. These actions helped spread awareness of the proclamation throughout Western Ukraine, and widespread nationalist celebrations followed. In conjunction with these nationalist celebrations, pogroms took place throughout the territories now under German control. The worst pogroms happened in L’viv, starting on 1 July 1941.

Whether these pogroms were directly related to the proclamation or not, in the early hours of 1 July, members of Nachtigall and Ukrainian militiamen gathered in anticipation of anti-Jewish violence. The impetus for the pogroms was the discovery of

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83 Quoted in Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 198-199.
84 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 200, 219-221.
the bodies of thousands of Soviet prisoners.85 Dieter Pohl estimates that between the four Soviet prisons in L’viv, the Soviet secret police (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD) shot 5,300 prisoners.86 Other scholars estimate that the number was much lower, placing it between 2,800 and 4,000 Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews killed by the NKVD.87 Regardless of the number of prisoners the Soviets executed, these killings were central to the outbreak of pogroms on 1 July.88 The longstanding myth of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” prominent in Nazi and OUN propaganda, was used to justify pogroms as a reaction to Soviet crimes. Over the next two days, L’viv’s Jewish community was forced to carry the bodies out of the prisons, wash them, and bury them. When their task was complete, they would be shot or beaten to death. Estimates of the number of Jews killed during these pogroms vary widely, but most estimates are between 2,000 and 8,000 victims.89

The L’viv pogroms rippled across Ukraine, inspiring between 35 and 140 pogroms throughout West Ukraine, meaning the total number of victims is likely much higher.90 These later pogroms were dubbed the “Petliura Days,” named for the Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura, who was assassinated by a Jewish man in 1926. Local Ukrainians were the perpetrators of these pogroms, but they were encouraged by the Germans and nationalists, who used historic prejudices against the Jews to galvanize the mob.91 Two

87 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 204.
89 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 212.
90 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 219.
other pogroms comparable to the L’viv pogroms occurred in Ternopil and Zolochiv. In Ternopil, Sonderkommando 4b, a unit that was part of Einsatzgruppe C, recorded that 600 Jews were killed in a pogrom that they “inspired.” In Zolochiv, Einsatzkommando 6 organized the pogrom.\footnote{Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944, 59.} The local Ukrainian population in both locations carried out the killings, but the German troops played a role in stirring up antisemitic sentiment, relying on longstanding prejudices and the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism.

Antisemitism had long been a cornerstone of OUN ideology, as evidenced by the group’s writings from before the outbreak of the war. As Wendy Lower notes, it was exploited to “curry favor with the Nazis, improve their own conditions, and settle scores with foes.”\footnote{Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 94} Although the earliest publications of the group advocated for Jewish emancipation and equal political rights, the OUN used anti-Jewish stereotypes when describing their conflict with Poland as early as 1931. The article “How and For What We Are Fighting the Poles” described the Cossack Uprising of the 17th century, which was led by Ukrainian nationalist hero Bohdan Khmelnyts’kyi and targeted Jews for their perceived role as oppressors of Ukrainians. The article called for a similar uprising against Polish rule, ending, “Let us smash the windows of taverns, break up the vodka bottles, and drive the Jews from the village.”\footnote{Quoted in Marco Carrynyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929-1947,” Nationalities Papers 39, no. 3 (2011): 320.} From this point forward, the OUN’s position on the “Jewish Question” became increasingly radical. Early suggestions included Zionist emigration to Palestine, and by 1941 Stetsko advocated for the
“expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine.”95 The evolution of the OUN’s murderous antisemitism shows that it was a well-established part of their ideology before the outbreak of pogroms in L’viv in early July 1941.

Members of the OUN have since tried to distance themselves from the pogroms in West Ukraine during the Summer of 1941. However, these arguments are often unconvincing. For example, during the 1960 West German investigation into Theodor Oberländer (the German commanding officer of Nachtigall), Ivan Hryn’okh claimed that he never saw anti-Jewish violence during his time in L’viv. When confronted with other eyewitness testimonies, he said that he could not deny the pogroms took place, only that he never saw or heard anything while in L'viv.96 Many published denials of Ukrainian participation use uncertainty as a defense. One argument suggests that the OUN-B could not possibly organize the militias and carry out a pogrom between the time they arrived on 30 June and the morning of 1 July.97 This argument ignores the distribution of the OUN-B’s “Struggle and Activities,” which was smuggled into Ukraine in early May 1941 and identified Jews as an enemy of Ukraine.98 Further, historians like Jeffrey Burds have shown through cross-examination of Ukrainian militia ID cards and photographs of the pogroms that the militia members undoubtedly perpetrated acts of anti-Jewish violence.99 Alexander Dallin also noted the “considerable initiative” of the Banderites in organizing anti-Jewish violence during the early days of the German occupation of

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95 Quoted in Carrynyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth,” 338.
97 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 65-66.
99 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 201.
This evidence substantially weakens the denials of Ukrainian participation in the L’viv pogroms.

It is also important to note the German reactions to Stetsko’s announcement. Two Abwehr officers, Hans Koch and Wilhelm Ernst zu Eikern, attended the meeting. Arriving late, they did not initially know the purpose of the meeting. When it concluded, the two officers reminded the assembly that although they welcomed the celebration of liberation from the Soviets, only Hitler had the authority to grant Ukraine statehood. However, the two men never thought Ukrainian statehood was an impossibility; instead, they believed the OUN-B’s move to be “premature and awkward.” Why the OUN-B chose to declare statehood in L’viv rather than waiting until the Germans conquered Kyiv is an interesting question, but it was likely because they wanted to preempt any similar plans the OUN-M might have had. This assumption is reasonable given the similar preparations the Melnykites made on the eve of the German invasion. It could also have been the product of a misunderstanding between the OUN-B and the Abwehr concerning the Abwehr’s degree of political authority. In exchange for the Banderites’ collaboration and the right to organize the economic structure of Ukraine, the Abwehr promised the OUN-B complete freedom in terms of political activity and organization. However, as noted previously, the Abwehr did not have the political authority to negotiate this deal, and although they were confident that sympathetic Germans like Rosenberg would support an independent Ukraine after the war, no such plan existed in

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100 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 119.
101 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepán Bandera, 199-200
102 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 120.
103 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepán Bandera, 243.
104 Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 75
German high politics. Finally, the last explanation suggests that the OUN-B was issuing a \textit{fait accompli} to the Germans.\textsuperscript{105} Essentially, supporters of this argument claim that the OUN-B only used the Germans to force the Soviets out, and after the conquest of L’viv, they challenged German authority by declaring independence. This argument rests on the denial of Ukrainian participation during the L’viv pogroms and the German retaliation against the OUN-B roughly a week later, after news of the proclamation reached Berlin and angered top Nazi politicians.

Stetsko’s “government” was allowed to operate for about a week. Alongside the mass persecution of L’viv’s Jews, they targeted rivals of the OUN-B and killed members of the OUN-M in the streets. German soldiers helped the OUN-B eliminate their political opponents, who were often denounced for their connections to Jews.\textsuperscript{106} One example was the assassination of Mykola Stsiborsky, one of the OUN-M’s top ideologists who was married to a Jewish woman.\textsuperscript{107} Also notable was the violence against Polish intelligentsia, whom the Germans targeted for their connection to Polish culture. Mykola Lebed, the head of the OUN-B’s security service, provided the names and addresses of these Poles to the German authorities.\textsuperscript{108} By providing the addresses of the Polish intelligentsia to the German authorities, Lebed continued a trend of Ukrainian collaboration that started after the invasion of Poland in 1939. The Germans employed a “divide and conquer” strategy in the East and gave Ukrainians preferential treatment in

\textsuperscript{105} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 82.
\textsuperscript{106} Lower, \textit{Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine}, 182
the Generalgouvernement. The Ukrainians were then free to attack Polish elites whom they blamed for the repression of Ukrainian nationalism during the interwar period.  

In his week as Bandera’s prime minister, Stetsko also sent several letters to the other fascist leaders of Europe professing Ukraine’s loyalty to the fascist new world order. Among the recipients of Stetsko’s letters were Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Francisco Franco, and Ante Pavelić (the leader of the Croatian Ustaše movement). Stetsko’s outreach to other European fascist movements shows that the OUN-B’s proclamation of statehood was not a challenge to German authority, but an attempt to establish Ukrainian independence under German auspices and receive international recognition as part of the new Fascist order in Europe.

Despite the close collaboration between the OUN-B and the German army during the conquest of L’viv, German military authorities soon demanded that Stetsko rescind the proclamation, suggesting that the OUN-B serve a role similar to Kubiiovych’s UTsK instead. Kubiiovych was the mapmaker from the second chapter, and after the German invasion of Poland he became the head of the UTsK, the primary Ukrainian collaborationist organ in the Generalgouvernement. Kubiiovych and the UTsK represented Ukrainian interests in the region but possessed no real political authority. Stetsko refused and, along with Bandera, was taken as a special political prisoner (Ehrenhäftling) on 5 July 1941. However, the Germans did not throw them in prison. Bandera and Stetsko were confined to house arrest, but they could still conduct their

111 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 248.
political activities from this position. Bandera remained active in Berlin while Stetsko traveled to Kraków to transfer control of the OUN-B to Mykola Lebed.\footnote{Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 83.} Further, the OUN-B headquarters in L’viv remained open for several weeks, suggesting the German crackdown on Bandera and Stetsko was not a total deterioration of the relationship between the two sides.\footnote{Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 Zhyttiepys,” \textit{Harvard Ukrainian Studies} 23, no. 3/4 (December 1999): 151.}

While the arrest of two prominent leaders of the OUN-B was undoubtedly related to their refusal to cede political control to the Germans, it could also be seen as a measure to temper the chaos of the early occupation as the Germans prepared to install a civil administration in Ukraine. The first indicator of this is that Bandera and Stetsko were not immediately thrown in prison, rather placed under house arrest in Berlin. It was only after their continued refusal to rescind the proclamation of statehood that they were sent to Sachsenhausen and stayed in the \textit{Zellenbau}, a prison block reserved for high-profile political prisoners.\footnote{Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Holocaust Amnesia: The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of the Jews,” in \textit{The German Yearbook of Contemporary Studies, Vol. 1: Holocaust and Memory in Europe}, ed. Thomas Schlemmer and Alan E. Steinweis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016): 112.} Another important factor to consider is that the Nazis took similar actions against Horia Sima, the leader of the Romanian Iron Guard, following his failed coup against the collaborationist government led by Ion Antonescu.\footnote{Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 252.} Historians can view Stetsko and Bandera’s arrest through a similar lens. In this case, the Germans were frustrated that they could not completely control the OUN-B and their violence. To reestablish order in Ukraine and prepare the territory for a German civilian administration
the revolutionary violence of the OUN-B needed to be controlled, and the German army sought to do so by arresting the leaders of the movement.

Bandera and Stetsko’s arrest is often represented as a break between the OUN-B and the Germans. However, the two leaders secretly hoped throughout July and August that the German authorities would reverse their policy towards the Nationalists. Even after the OUN-B adopted an officially anti-German position in September 1941, the hope that the Germans would change their minds remained, and Banderite leaders encouraged their members to join the Nazis’ auxiliary police and military units en masse in March 1942.

Supporters and defenders of the OUN-B argued that this action against their leaders represented a betrayal by the Germans and marked the shift from a pro-German to anti-German stance. For example, Taras Hunczak argued that “the OUN-B crossed its Rubicon in the very first days of the German-Soviet War, placing it in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the Germans.” Despite their arrest and the insistence that an independent Ukraine could only form after a revolutionary uprising, on 14 August 1941, Bandera and Stetsko noted they cooperated with the Germans “not out of fear or opportunism” but because a close relationship with Nazi Germany was paramount to Ukrainian independence. Stetsko’s Zhyttiepys, a short autobiography he wrote after his arrest, acknowledged his intention to continue working with the Germans. He wrote:

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116 Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 61.
117 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 257.
The Ukrainian national army, which will stand guard at Ukraine’s borders, will hold the front against invasion by Moscow, and Germany will have a secure eastern border so that it can establish order among other peoples, which, unlike Ukraine, are hostile to her.\textsuperscript{120} This quote reaffirms the Ukrainian support for Germany during the war and contradicts the assessment of Stetsko’s and Bandera’s goals as anti-German. However, although the Banderites were still willing to work with the Germans, the Nazis would no longer tolerate the disorderly violence displayed by the OUN-B’s attacks on the OUN-M. By September 1941, Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich Security Main Office instructed the German military to designate all members of the OUN-B as enemies of Germany, and mass arrests ensued.\textsuperscript{121} The immediate justification for this mass action against the OUN-B appears to be their organized violence against the OUN-M, but this was merely the final straw in addition to Bandera and Stetsko’s refusal to rescind the proclamation of state.\textsuperscript{122} While the Germans acted against the OUN-B, surviving members of the OUN-M stepped up to fill the power vacuum created in the wake of this repression. The OUN-M was able to preserve a positive relationship with the German occupiers longer than their revolutionary counterparts, but this partnership also had its limits.

While the OUN-B focused its efforts on West Ukraine, the OUN-M was busy spreading the tenets of Ukrainian nationalism in eastern territories. They acted quickly after Stetsko’s arrest, and on 26 July, the newspaper \textit{Rohantyns’ke Slovo} republished an article by Melnyk, the leader of the OUN-M, titled “Ukraine and the New Order in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} The English translation of this document was found in Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews,” 171. The article also provides the original Ukrainian and the German translation of Stetsko’s \textit{zhyttiepis}.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 248.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 98.
\end{itemize}
Europe.” In one section of the article, Melnyk writes, “We collaborate closely with
Germany and invest everything in this collaboration: our heart, feelings, all of our
creativity, life and blood.” This statement is consistent with the Melnyk
organization’s policy of earning a state through collaboration with the Germans as
outlined in the first chapter.

Although the group was much smaller and generally politically impotent, the
weakening of the OUN-B through mass arrests created a space for the OUN-M to step in
as willing administrators. Another factor enabling the OUN-M to step in was the lack of
political organization in East Ukraine due to harsh Soviet repression before the war. In
Kyiv, the Melnykites were able to install one of their members, a historian of Soviet
Ukraine named Oleksander Ohloblyn, as *Hilfsbürgermeister* two or three days after the
Germans arrived. Oleh Olzhych, one of the OUN-M’s chief ideologues, organized the
Ukrainian National Council (UNC) shortly after, which he hoped would become the
nucleus of a future Ukrainian government. Although they gained several
administrative positions, the OUN-M quickly learned that the Germans would not allow
the revitalization of Ukrainian culture. Radio broadcasts and newspapers ignored the
efforts of the UNC, and Ukrainian-language newspapers like *Uкраїns’ke Slovo*
experienced heavy censorship. For example, the occupying Germans placed limits on
how often certain papers could be published, how they referred to the Germans, and
banned reference to Ukraine as a state rather than a territory. Further, after Erich Koch

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was appointed as Reichskommissar, he refused to allow any branch of the Ukrainian Central Committee into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.\textsuperscript{128} The Ukrainian Central Committee was a German-sponsored Ukrainian organization in the Generalgouvernement led by Volodomir Kubiiovych, the mapmaker and nationalist who first caught the Germans attention in 1938. The Melnykites were able to maintain their administrative positions and publications for roughly two months before the repression of the OUN-B extended to include any expressions of Ukrainian nationalism. In late November 1941, the Germans began arresting and executing members of both branches of the OUN.\textsuperscript{129} The shift in German attitudes towards Ukrainian nationalism can be attributed to the installation of a civil administration and the appointment of Erich Koch to the position of Reichskommissar.

Koch’s appointment as Reichskommissar was a total defeat for Rosenberg’s vision of Ukraine. Koch was a fervent Nazi, and although he was subordinate to the Ostministerium, he represented a constant challenge to Rosenberg’s plans. Initially the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Koch was accustomed to answering only to Hitler. He fully believed in Hitler’s colonial expansion into Ukraine and the Nazi ideology of racial supremacy.\textsuperscript{130} Koch famously once said, “If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table as me, I must have him shot.”\textsuperscript{131} This statement summarizes well Koch’s brutal view of the German occupation of Ukraine, and there was no room for a Ukrainian identity in his Reichskommissariat, let alone nationalist expressions of this identity. The

\textsuperscript{128} Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 51.
\textsuperscript{129} Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 52.
\textsuperscript{130} Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 36.
\textsuperscript{131} Quoted in Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 37; for more on Koch, see Armin Fuhrer, Erich Koch, Hitler brauner Zar: Gauleiter von Ostpreußen und Reichskommissar der Ukraine, (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 2010).
brutal administration of the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine helps explain the repression of Ukrainian nationalism after the switch to a civil administration.

Through this analysis, some of the complexities of the OUN’s collaboration become clearer. Although the Germans were happy to work with the Ukrainians during the invasion of the Soviet Union, once they occupied the territory, they were less tolerant of nationalist expressions. The OUN-B’s violence and the Germans’ inability to control them led to the harsh repression of the group, and while the OUN-M obtained a few administrative positions in the German administration, their role was quickly limited. However, the repression of Ukrainian nationalism under German rule did not result in a complete break in their relationship. Both factions of the OUN hoped that the Germans would change their mind about the possibility of an independent Ukraine and continued to collaborate with them. Although the OUN’s collaboration with the Nazis was a significant part of their experience during World War II, this part of their history is often overlooked in favor of the narrative of their heroic resistance to both major European totalitarian regimes: the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. In the next chapter, the complex factors of resistance and collaboration will be analyzed to gain a more complete perspective of the history of the OUN.
Chapter IV: Collaboration and Resistance

By the autumn of 1941, the relationship between the Germans and the Ukrainians had dramatically changed. The repression of Ukrainian nationalism suggested that future collaboration with the Germans would be unlikely. However, this was not the case. Between 1941 and 1943, Ukrainian nationalists from both branches of the OUN served in German auxiliary military and police battalions. Although they could no longer openly express their political views, this collaboration was part of an official policy of the OUN to gain the weapons and training needed for a national revolution. In 1943, after the German defeat at Stalingrad, thousands of auxiliaries deserted and joined partisan movements. The most notable of these organizations was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which is often mythicized as a heroic resistor of both the Nazis and the Soviets. However, further analysis of the relationship between the Germans and Ukrainians reveals a spectrum of collaboration and resistance. It is important to note that collaboration was more common than resistance, but both have their place in the nationalist historical canon.

After Yaroslav Stetsko refused to rescind the proclamation of Ukrainian statehood, OUN-B members serving in Nachtigall came into conflict with their German officers. After the conquest of L’viv, Nachtigall advanced with the Wehrmacht as far east as Vinnitsia. On 13 August 1941, German authorities ordered them to withdraw and return to Neuhammer in Silesia, and they were later demobilized and sent to Frankfurt an der Oder.132 While there, the soldiers of Nachtigall were reorganized as

Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201. Roman Shukhevych, a militant OUN-B member and the highest-ranking Ukrainian in Nachtigall, retained his command, and of the original 300 members of Nachtigall, only 15 declined to sign a new year-long contract with the Germans. The Germans stationed this new battalion in Belarus and, on 16 February 1942, tasked them with “anti-partisan actions.” Veterans and nationalist historians of the unit portrayed Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 and its leader, Shukhevych as a protective force dedicated to preventing atrocities against the local population. In reality, German auxiliary police units perpetrated mass violence against the people they allegedly protected.

It is essential to note that anti-partisan actions under German command included reprisals in the wake of partisan attacks and massacres of civilians. The label “anti-partisan” was often a euphemism for the murder of Jews during the war. The conflation of Jews with partisans was produced by what Waitman Beorn refers to as “Jew-Bolshevik-partisan calculus.” Building on the long-standing Judeo-Bolshevik myth, which falsely asserts that all Jews were communists, this “Jew-Bolshevik calculus” argues that if all Jews were communists and all communists were partisans then all Jews must therefore be partisans. This fact is illustrated by the disproportionate ratio between German and partisan losses. According to Per Anders Rudling, reports of anti-partisan units’ losses in comparison to “bandits” and “bandit helpers” places the casualty ratio at 1:52. When one includes Jews executed as “suspected bandits,” the ratio jumps to

134 Rudling, “The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine,” 49.
135 This information was found in Per Anders Rudling’s article “The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine,” 39. For more on Beorn’s original argument see Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 95.
This data illustrates that most of the units’ victims were Jews. However, it also reflects civilian losses categorized as “suspected bandits” and “bandit helpers.” These factors together illustrate the role of the auxiliary police in perpetrating massacres of civilian populations.

While the Germans reorganized their Ukrainian collaborators into police units in early 1942, the OUN-B reshaped its political platform. The nationalists hoped to appeal to the Western Allies by distancing themselves from fascism to appear more democratic because they believed Germany would win the war against the Soviet Union but lose to Great Britain and the United States. In these circumstances, it would be up to the Western democracies to decide the future of Ukraine. In April 1942, the OUN-B held its “Second Congress.” From this point forward, their propaganda espoused the values of democracy and humanitarianism. They ordered their members not to take part in anti-Jewish actions but maintained that Jews were the tools of Russian Bolshevism, meaning their attitude towards Jews was unchanged. Contemporary observers were aware that although the nationalists ostensibly reshaped their platform, there was little actual change. For example, Jakub Erlichman, a Jewish man who hid with a Ukrainian peasant family during the winter of 1942-1943, noted his skepticism in his diary. He wrote of their new platform, “One must wonder and ask themself if these are the same nationalists who, only a short time ago, in their writing propagated hate and misanthropy.”

137 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 261.
Nationalists’ reorientation was superficial, it is necessary for understanding the historiography of the UPA and Ukrainian resistance during World War II.

The OUN-M was also involved in the formation of auxiliary police battalions. As mentioned earlier, the Melnykites were involved in the conquest of Kyiv and its political organization afterward. In the wake of the repression of the OUN-B in Galicia, they provided manpower for the auxiliary police. Although they mainly served as translators, the OUN-M successfully formed at least one collaborationist unit called the Bukovinian Battalion, or Schutzmannschaft Battalion 118, and OUN-M members later volunteered for service in the German-led Waffen-SS Galizien. Originally one of the OUN-M’s marching groups, the Bukovinian Battalion perpetrated multiple massacres on their way to Kyiv. The first occurred on 5 July 1941 in the village of Milliieve/ Mille, where the Battalion killed around 120 Jews. Another example can be seen in Berdychiv, where the unit aided the German execution of 12,000 Jews on 15 September 1941. Karel Berkhoff argues that due to the timing of their arrival in Kyiv, it is certain that at least some of the members of the Bukovinian Battalion were present during the Babyn Yar massacre. Due to the legacy of the OUN as a resistance organization, the role of Ukrainians at Babyn Yar remains a sensitive topic in the historiography of the subject. However, it is a necessary event to understand when discussing the history of the OUN.

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140 Berkhoff, Basic Historical Narrative of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center, 66.
141 Berkhoff, Basic Historical Narrative of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center, 65.
In mid-September, several explosives rigged by the retreating Soviets set Kyiv ablaze. After the week-long fire was under control, the Nazi security service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) ordered Jews living in the city to report for registration. On 26 September 1941, around 30,000 Jews registered with the Nazi authorities.\textsuperscript{142} Three days later, the Kyivan Jews and their non-Jewish relatives gathered at a designated street corner in Kyiv’s Lukianivka district. Both the assembled Jews and their Ukrainian neighbors expected they were waiting for deportation. As the day progressed, the assembled men, women, and children slowly made their way through the city toward Babyn Yar.\textsuperscript{143} The mood among non-Jewish observers was mixed. According to Karel Berkhoff, most of those who recorded what they saw that day felt terrible as German authorities and their collaborators forced the Jews out of their homes. However, they also noted that among their neighbors, many were “watching this exodus with a happy face.”\textsuperscript{144} When the procession reached the intersection of Melnyk and Puhachov streets, the Germans sent the non-Jewish onlookers home, and gunfire could be heard in the distance.\textsuperscript{145}

The September 1941 massacre at Babyn Yar was carried out primarily by Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppen C, but the auxiliary police assisted. Accounts from survivors and German officers provide insight into the role of non-German police during the Babyn Yar massacre. This includes the members of the Bukovinian Battalion


\textsuperscript{143} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 65.

\textsuperscript{144} Berkhoff, \textit{Basic Historical Narrative of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center}, 76.

\textsuperscript{145} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 67.
and Melnykites serving as translators in Sonderkommando 4a.\textsuperscript{146} According to a former member of the Sonderkommando, Ukrainian police “received, undressed, pushed, and kicked” the Jews as they arrived at the killing site.\textsuperscript{147} This observation corroborates survivor testimony, which also notes the cruelty of the Ukrainian auxiliaries. For example, Dina Pronicheva, a survivor of Babyn Yar, noted that the police “undressed people completely, and while doing so beat them terribly, wherever and however they could.”\textsuperscript{148} Despite the role of these OUN-M members during the massacre at Babyn Yar, some accounts overlook their collaboration. John Armstrong’s foundational work Ukrainian Nationalism makes no mention of Babyn Yar although it notes the arrival of OUN-M troops in Kyiv in September 1941. Instead, it focuses on the role of Melnykites in administrative organization.\textsuperscript{149} Other works overlook the collaboration of the OUN-M because the Nazis executed other Melnykites at Babyn Yar later during the war. On 3 January 1942, the German security services expressed concerns that the OUN-M could not be trusted. In February 1942, around 600 Melnykites were arrested and executed at Babyn Yar.\textsuperscript{150} In Myroslav Shkandrij’s book Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956, this event and descriptions of anti-Jewish violence before the massacres in the diary of a Ukrainian author named Dokia Humenna are the only references to Babyn Yar.\textsuperscript{151} Shkandrij’s work illustrates the tendency to overlook

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\textsuperscript{146} Berkhoff, Basic Historical Narrative of the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial Center, 65.
\textsuperscript{147} Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 68.
\textsuperscript{148} Quoted in Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 68.
\textsuperscript{149} Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 101-104.
\textsuperscript{150} Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 61-62.
\textsuperscript{151} Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism, 258-260.
\end{flushright}
Ukrainians’ role as perpetrators and focus on their victimhood, but when read alongside other texts, it helps show that Ukrainians fell into both categories during the war.

Understanding how collaboration evolved from the first weeks of the war with the Soviet Union and the forms it took after the repression of Ukrainian nationalism, it is necessary to understand why individual Ukrainians were willing to work with the Germans. The role of Ukrainians in the *Schutzmannschaft* battalions described above was the most common form of collaboration during the Holocaust, and the purpose of these groups was to compensate for a shortage of German personnel in the occupied territories. Their ostensible purpose was peacekeeping, but as mentioned above, they also played a role in the oppression of civilians. Due to the Germans’ earlier experience with the nationalists, they distrusted Ukrainians seeking to join the auxiliary police and often stationed them away from Ukraine, guarding factories or warehouses and policing Jewish ghettos. While the Germans sought to compensate for the shortage of personnel by recruiting locals into the police units, locals often had personal motivations for collaborating. Many viewed working for the Germans as a path to a better quality of life as police service promised livable wages, better food rations, and access to land when the war was over. For those with nationalist motivations, collaborating with the German administration provided opportunities to strengthen their movements through training and access to weapons, two things that the nationalists lacked. The training and weapons gained through collaboration with the Germans would prove useful during

152 Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust*, 27.
154 Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust*, 68.
155 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 75; Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 64.
the organization of partisan movements. To understand the transition from collaboration
to resistance, it is necessary to consider the nature of the German occupation and how it
changed Ukrainian views of the Germans.

As the German occupation of Ukraine continued, attitudes toward the Germans
slowly shifted. While many Ukrainians initially greeted the German army as a liberating
force that drove out the oppressive Soviets, public opinion turned against them as the war
progressed. One of the main reasons for this shift was the implementation of the
Ostarbeiter (east worker) program. Through this policy, Ukrainians were sent to
Germany to compensate for the labor shortage caused by the war. The first cohorts of
workers left Ukraine voluntarily in December 1941, and the program began in earnest in
early 1942. Propaganda convinced these Ukrainians that better wages and living
conditions awaited them in the Reich. There was also a genuine sense of curiosity about
life in Germany among the early volunteers.¹⁵⁶ However, when the workers arrived, they
found poor living conditions, abusive foremen, and terrible working conditions. By
September 1942, there were no more volunteers for the program.¹⁵⁷ After volunteers
became scarce, the German administrators started a harsh “recruitment” campaign to
meet the necessary number of workers.

Deportations were not only to fulfill workers’ quotas; they also allowed native
authorities to settle old scores and the Germans used them to punish local populations in
the wake of partisan attacks. For example, these collections often targeted Poles,

communists, the elderly, and malnourished children.\textsuperscript{158} In the face of the deportations, individual resistance took shape. For example, some people would not show up for deportations when summoned or self-inflict injuries to make themself ineligible for work.\textsuperscript{159} Self-mutilation became a mass phenomenon with over 1,000 young Ukrainians intentionally injuring themselves between February 1942 and January 1943. Due to the exceptions for married couples and women with children younger than twelve, young people rushed to marriage and motherhood to avoid forced labor.\textsuperscript{160} Near the war’s end, Ukrainian police started warning family members and friends so they could flee before a deportation action.\textsuperscript{161} Another way to avoid forced labor was to join the local police or flee to the woods and join the partisans.\textsuperscript{162} These methods of avoiding deportation were a far more common form of resistance to German oppression than the armed resistance idealized by Ukrainian historiography.

The primary resistance organization in Ukraine during World War II was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The group was initially called the Polis’ka Sich and formed under the leadership of Taras “Bulba” Borovets’, a retired non-commissioned officer of the Polish army and the operator of a stone quarry in the Kostopil’ region, in 1941. The UPA initially served as the militant arm of the remnants of the UNR, the self-proclaimed Ukrainian government-in-exile, and was unrelated to the OUN.\textsuperscript{163} Although the UPA started before the outbreak of World War II, they could not act freely until the

\textsuperscript{158} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 260.
\textsuperscript{159} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 269.
\textsuperscript{160} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 271.
\textsuperscript{161} Berkhoff, \textit{Harvest of Despair}, 272.
\textsuperscript{162} Dean, \textit{Collaboration in the Holocaust}, 112-114.
\textsuperscript{163} Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 98.
German invasion of the Soviet Union. The group worked with the Germans during Operation Barbarossa combatting Soviet stragglers and partisans. The Germans ordered Borovets’ to dissolve the UPA in November 1941 during their repression of Ukrainian nationalism, but Borovets’ refused and took refuge in the woods and swamps of southern Belorussia. This refusal can be seen as a form of resistance itself. However, the Germans were unbothered by the continued presence of the UPA if they did not threaten German interests in Ukraine. Between 1941 and 1943, the UPA acted only against the Red Army, representing informal collaboration built on a mutual understanding of the Soviets as their primary enemy.\footnote{Armstrong, \textit{Ukrainian Nationalism}, 98-100.}

By Spring 1943, there were three separate partisan movements in Ukraine. The first was Borovets’ UPA, followed by partisan movements led by the OUN-B and OUN-M independent of Borovets’ operations. With the recognition that the Germans may lose the war, resistance groups became more active after the Battle of Stalingrad. After the German defeat at Stalingrad, nationalists in the police units deserted by the thousands to join the partisan movements. In March 1943 alone, roughly 6,000 Ukrainians deserted the auxiliary police, bringing their weapons and training with them.\footnote{Dean, \textit{Collaboration in the Holocaust}, 145.} Although desertion can be seen as a form of resistance, it is worthwhile to note that this was also when the year-long contracts each serviceman signed with the Germans expired.

With the Germans retreating and the Red Army advancing, Borovets’ believed a united struggle against the Soviets would be more effective than three disparate movements, and the leaders of each partisan unit met to negotiate a merger of their
organizations in Spring 1943.166 Although the Melnykites were willing to agree, the Banderites refused subordination to any leadership other than their own. The Melnyk and Borovets’ groups worked together for a time, but the larger Bandera group hunted down their units and forced them to join or destroyed them. After the OUN-B eliminated or incorporated the remnants of the Melnyk-Borovets’ group, the Banderites usurped the title of UPA and with it the legacy of Borovets’ earlier actions.167 According to estimates from German reports, the UPA had around 40,000 active members in 1943.168 They also enjoyed support from Ukrainian villagers who were not official members of the group, although this support waned with time.169 However, despite their reputation as resisters of the Nazis and the Soviets, the UPA focused more on opposing the advancing Red Army than attacking the retreating Germans.170 Most of the UPA’s actions against the Germans involved interrupting labor deportations, acquiring weapons and supplies, and preventing the Germans from seizing the local population’s food.171 One reason the UPA avoided attacking the Germans was the risk of reprisal shootings carried out against Ukrainian civilians living under the German occupation.172 Another factor was the partisans’ preoccupation with a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing against Polish civilians living in Volhynia.

Shortly after Bandera’s UPA destroyed other Ukrainian nationalist resistance groups, they embarked on a campaign of terror in the formerly Polish territory of

166 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 150.
170 Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 143.
172 Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust*, 145.
Volhynia. In April 1943, Mykola Lebed, the acting leader of the OUN after the Germans imprisoned Bandera, ordered the UPA “to cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population.”

By “revolutionary territory,” Lebed meant any region the nationalists believed should be part of a future Ukrainian state. These orders were carried out by Roman Shukhevych and the UPA, targeting Polish civilians living in Volhynia and East Galicia from early 1943 until July 1944. As mentioned above, several of these partisans had served in German auxiliary military and police units, and in the attacks against Poles in 1943, they used the training and experience of their German service to perpetrate these massacres. The pattern of the Nationalists’ attacks was generally the same from place to place. In the early morning, partisans would encircle a Polish settlement. As people went to work in the fields, the UPA would kill them with axes, sickles, knives, and other melee weapons to avoid making noise and alerting the rest of the town. Then they advanced on the settlement, shooting those that tried to flee and forcing the rest into barns or churches, which were then burned down with the victims inside. The bodies of Poles were often arranged in gruesome displays to scare any survivors who returned into leaving for good. While in some cases, the UPA enlisted local Ukrainians to help with the massacres, the locals often helped their Polish neighbors hide or escape. During this period, the UPA murdered an estimated forty to sixty thousand Poles in Volhynia, along with several Jews who managed to survive the Germans’ waves of ethnic cleansings in Winter 1942.

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173 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, 165.
Germany’s defeat became increasingly likely as the war progressed into its final years. Meanwhile, the OUN realized they now needed to appeal to Western democracies for the future of Ukraine. This was a continuation of the policy set forth in the Second Congress in April 1942, but this new strategy called for a rejection of the group’s earlier fascist platform. For the sake of these future negotiations with the West, Mykola Lebed, Roman Shukhevych, and other leaders of the OUN-B and UPA met in July 1944, uniting the OUN and UPA under a new umbrella organization called the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Ukraine (UHVR). Based in the Carpathian Mountains, the UHVR served as an underground government that sought to tie the disparate strands of Ukrainian nationalism together, and the UPA served as its army. Former members of the Bandera group, specifically Lebed and Hryn’okh, formed the dominant faction in the UHVR. To appeal to the West, the UHVR was ostensibly pro-democracy. However, in late 1944, the Germans tried to reestablish ties with the nationalists, and to a certain degree they were successful.

After his release from Sachsenhausen in September 1944, Bandera was held under house arrest in Berlin. Once again, despite being officially a prisoner, Bandera was able to move freely around the city. He requested a meeting with German authorities in October, after which he met with SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger. Berger suggested to Bandera that he work with Andrei Vlasov, the leader of the German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army (ROA), but Bandera refused. According to Rossoliński-Liebe, this refusal was not because Bandera opposed working with the

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176 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 265.
Germans, but rather because Bandera refused to work with Vlasov whom he viewed as a Russian imperialist.\textsuperscript{177} Bandera continued to work with the Germans in a limited capacity from this point forward, joining the Ukrainian National Committee (UNK) alongside Melnyk (Bandera’s rival), Skoropads’kyi (the leader of the Hetmanate movement), and Kubiiovych (the leader of the UTsK). The UNK served as an exclusively Ukrainian alternative to Vlasov’s group, which nullified Bandera’s initial reservations. As the leaders of the UNK, the Germans expected each member to order their support base in Ukraine to continue fighting the Red Army. In December 1944, Bandera sent orders to Shukhevych and the UPA instructing them to continue fighting the Soviets from the rear.\textsuperscript{178} Shortly after this, Bandera traveled back to Berlin with his family, and in late January or early February 1945 they “escaped” and went to Vienna. From there he traveled to Prague and later Innsbruck to evade the advancing Red Army.\textsuperscript{179} As the Red Army advanced through Ukraine and the German army retreated, several Ukrainian nationalists followed suit to avoid “Soviet justice.” This mass exodus out of Ukraine resulted in a significant number of Ukrainian displaced persons after World War II, which had lasting consequences for the historiography of this subject.

This chapter highlights the complicated nature of collaboration and resistance in Ukraine during World War II. The Nationalists, although disenchanted with the German occupiers after the arrests of Bandera and Stetsko, continued to work with them through their membership in auxiliary police units and hoped that the Germans would reverse

\textsuperscript{177} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 286.
\textsuperscript{178} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 287.
\textsuperscript{179} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 288.
their policy towards Ukrainian statehood. Others chose to serve in these auxiliaries for personal motivations such as security. Meanwhile, the exploitative nature of the German occupation led individual Ukrainians to find independent ways to resist. These individual forms of resistance were more common than the organized resistance often associated with the OUN-UPA. Although the OUN-UPA had several thousand supporters, compared to only a few thousand individual resistors, and is represented as the largest partisan group active in Eastern Europe and resistors of both totalitarian regimes, this chapter has shown that they avoided acting against the German army until the late stages of the war. When they did attack the Germans, their action was limited with a clear goal, such as gaining food or supplies. This decision was partially because they feared reprisal against Ukrainian civilians, but it was also due to the group’s focus on the Soviet Union as the primary enemy of Ukraine and its preoccupation with the violent ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia. Understanding this complicated issue, it is necessary to turn to the postwar developments in the Ukrainian nationalist movement and how the myth of the OUN-UPA became canonized among the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States and Canada.
Part II: Postwar Developments
Chapter V: Nationalist Reorganization After the War

In the wake of the destruction caused by the Second World War and the Holocaust, Europe faced a massive refugee crisis. After Nazi Germany’s defeat, the Allies found themselves confronted with over 10 million civilian refugees, an overwhelming number of which had been deported from the East as Ostarbeiter. Many Eastern Europeans who fled from the Red Army with the Wehrmacht were interspersed among these refugees. This group included agitators from both factions of the OUN. The Allies’ temporary solution to the displaced persons crisis was establishing camps where refugees could await repatriation or emigration. In these Displaced Persons camps, nationalist agitators could proliferate mythicized accounts of the actions of the OUN and UPA during the war. The nationalist political proselytizing in the camps concerned the Western Allies’ political leaders, who wanted to avoid provoking the Soviet Union as the Cold War started to unfold. However, it also caught the attention of Western intelligence agencies that sought contacts with connections in or information about the USSR. These intelligence groups started creating networks of anti-Soviet informants, including nationalists who fought alongside the Germans during the war. These nationalists often wanted to avoid repatriation to the Soviet Union and sought to emigrate to the West instead. This movement led to the export of Ukrainian nationalism and its integration into the identity of the Ukrainian diaspora. This identity incorporated the heroic myth of

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resistance, and challenges to this myth were met with vitriol. The refusal to accept challenges to the established narrative of the OUN and UPA led to the acceptance of an inaccurate historical record.

Immediately after the war, roughly two million Ukrainians were in the western occupation zones of Germany as Displaced Persons (DPs). Most returned to the Soviet Union by choice or forced repatriation under the Yalta Agreement. After 1945, around 200,000 Ukrainian Displaced Persons remained in Germany, and 30-40% refused to return to the USSR because they feared Soviet rule. Some feared repatriation because of their membership in the OUN-UPA. Others feared it because they remembered the suffering of Ukrainians during the Holodomor, the Great Famine of 1932-1933 engineered by the Stalinist regime, and the deportations during the Great Terror of 1937-1938, and saw a chance to escape Soviet rule. As mentioned above, a significant number of Displaced Persons were former Ostbarbeiter, slave laborers deported from the East by the occupying German army to compensate for the labor shortage caused by conscription. Most Ukrainians during World War II focused more on their survival and formed regional identities based on territorial distinctions and local communities rather than nationality or political identity. Due to their preoccupation with survival, most deportees were apolitical upon their arrival in DP camps. However, within the camps, politics were part of everyday life. Among the Ukrainian DP community, a spectrum of political organizations tried to win the other refugees over to their faction. Some of the

182 Lubomyr Luciuk, Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and Memory, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000): 5
183 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 230.
most active political proselytizers were the agents of the OUN-B, who never gave up their belief in authoritarian, one-party politics. They used their platform in the camps to turn the apolitical DPs into nationalist émigrés, and United States Military Intelligence estimated that up to 80% of Ukrainian DPs were loyal to Bandera by 1948.

Jans-Hinnerk Antons identified at least seven reasons why nationalism was able to take root in the DP camps. First, a significant percentage of Ukrainians who chose to stay in the camps did so out of fear of Soviet rule. Due to their political activity before the war or the fact they had been in Germany during it, these DPs refused to return to the USSR to avoid “Soviet justice.” Therefore, the nationalist identity taking shape in the DP camps was, at its core, anti-Soviet. Second, choosing to stay in the camps meant these Displaced Persons rejected a “Russian” or “Soviet” identity. Antons argues that “[claiming] Ukrainian nationality was a reasonable way to highlight anti-Soviet victim status.” The third reason for the growth of a Ukrainian nationalist identity was the German promotion of non-Russian identities for Ostarbeiters, which was part of their “divide and conquer” strategy in the East, where they promoted ethnonationalist identities to undermine support for the Soviet war effort. Antons’ fourth explanation suggests that displacement generates concerns about belonging and identity, and his fifth reason is that the DPs’ inability to find work in the camps gave them plenty of leisure time to explore this identity. The sixth reason Antons provides is the ethnic homogeneity of the camps’ populations in contrast to the Ukrainian region’s social, regional, and religious diversity.

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184 Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, 97-98.
185 Breitman and Goda, *Hitler’s Shadow*, 78.
The final reason for nationalist proliferation was the ability of the OUN-B to spread its ideas in a stable environment for the first time. Alongside these factors, schools, press, and self-administration within the camps contributed to the formation of a nationalist identity.187

These factors were most common at DP camps in the British and American zones of occupation, such as those in Goslar, Eversheide, Bielefeld, Bathorn, Minden, Osnabrück, and Hannover.188 Among the most significant components of political life in the Ukrainian Displaced Persons camps were aspects such as schooling, religion, and cultural education that were brought under nationalist control. Even Christmas, which was traditionally celebrated with a religious purpose, became a primarily nationalist holiday.189 In the cultural sphere, nationalists promoted traditional Ukrainian plays from the nineteenth century and the Ukrainian language over others.190 The most crucial element of nation-building was the education system, which focused on the nationalist education of Ukrainian youths. Students said their history lessons started with the medieval Kyivan kingdom until the present, and throughout this narrative there was always an enemy, whether they be Tartars, Russians, or Poles.191 Violence and struggle were common themes throughout this historical narrative.

Because education was so important, a significant development was the reconstitution of the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (SUM). The SUM was one of the

original groups mentioned in the first chapter that helped form the OUN in 1929, and in July 1946, it was refounded as the youth branch of the OUN-B. Roughly 18% of all Ukrainian youth in Germany were members of SUM. Like other aspects of nationalization in the DP camps, the SUM was exported to regions that the DPs settled after the war, including the United States.\textsuperscript{192} The purpose of involving the youth in the nationalist movement was to ensure its future, and one of the most fundamental elements of this was to impress upon its young members the importance of Ukraine’s independence struggle so they may continue it.

While the OUN-B politicized life in the Displaced Persons camps, the Western Allies secretly sought support amongst its occupants. The Cold War was beginning, and the United States and Great Britain searched for contacts with information about the Soviet Union. To avoid directly provoking the USSR, the Western Allies typically avoided working with Belarussian, Russian, and Ukrainian contacts, choosing to instead use agents from Soviet satellite states rather than territories directly incorporated into the USSR.\textsuperscript{193} Despite this, American military intelligence contacted the OUN-B in mid-1945 with the help of the Gehlen Organization, a network of former German intelligence officers formed with US approval that sought to avoid postwar retribution by selling their secrets to the West.\textsuperscript{194} Among the most high-profile members of the OUN who interested these intelligence agencies were Stepan Bandera and Mykola Lebed.

\textsuperscript{192} Antons, “The Nation in a Nutshell?,” 195-196.
\textsuperscript{193} Katalin Kádár Lynn, ed., \textit{The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/ Free Europe Committee}, (Saint Helena: Helena History Press, 2013): 49.
\textsuperscript{194} Jeffrey Burds, “The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-48” \textit{The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies}, no. 1505 (January 2001): 12; For more about the Gehlen Organization, see
Shortly after the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Ukraine’s (UHVR) founding in 1944, its leadership assigned Mykola Lebed to be the Foreign Minister of the Foreign Representation of the UHVR (ZP/UHVR), a branch of the UHVR meant to operate outside Ukraine and seek foreign support for the UPA’s struggle against the Soviet Union. This organization was ostensibly dedicated to democratic principles, which they believed would help them earn Western support. Alongside Lebed, Ivan Hryn’okh, the former chaplain of Nachtigall, became the President of the ZP/UHVR, and Yuri Lopatynsky, another former member of Nachtigall, served as its representative of the UPA.195 Per their efforts to find Western support for Ukraine, Lebed first approached American Intelligence Services in February 1947. This decision created a rift between the ZP/UHVR, the OUN-B, and more specifically, between Bandera and Lebed.196

Although he was now a leading member of the UHVR, Lebed retained his membership in the OUN-B. However, when he independently offered assistance to the Americans, Lebed indirectly challenged Bandera’s authority as Providnyk, or supreme leader. The conflict continued to escalate as Bandera accused the UHVR of pandering to Western powers with their democratic rhetoric. Bandera’s criticism of the UHVR was not unfounded, given their ostensible praise of democracy while they followed few democratic principles.197 In response, Lebed and Hryn’okh argued that “only the


195 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 77.
197 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 324-325.
Ukrainian people [have] the right to choose who shall govern them,” and they would never accept Bandera’s authoritarian leadership. Shortly after this exchange, the two organizations cut ties, and members of the UHVR were ejected from the OUN and vice versa.

After the CIA agreed to work with Lebed, the UHVR became American Intelligence Services’ primary contact among the Ukrainian community. Although the OUN was more popular among Displaced Persons, the Americans evaluated the reliability of both organizations and determined that Lebed’s group was the more trustworthy of the two. They were the only diaspora organization that maintained contact with the homeland and, therefore, the only ones who could provide information about the situation in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Bandera’s contacts sold outdated reports from 1944 or 1945 with doctored dates, making them look more recent than they were. Due to these factors, the Americans found Bandera’s group untrustworthy and considered Lebed’s organization a more authentic representative of the Ukrainian people. From this point forward, Lebed and the UHVR would work with the CIA on a clandestine operation called CARTEL. The name of this project changed several times over the years until it was finally known as Operation AERODYNAMIC. The purpose of this program was to use anti-Soviet Ukrainian émigrés living in Soviet Ukraine to gather intelligence to send

198 “Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, Project ICON” 20 October 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, AERODYNAMIC: Operation, vol. 9, f 1.
199 “Chief of Station Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, Project ICON” 20 October 1948, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, AERODYNAMIC: Operation, vol. 9, f 1.
back to the United States while also disseminating American propaganda in the operational area.200

Bandera first caught the attention of American intelligence agents in September 1945. However, they had little direct contact with him, encountering more often the myth of Bandera carried to Germany by UPA fighters trying to escape the Soviets.201 In a United States intelligence report on Bandera from October 1947, he is described as “the spiritual leader and national hero of all Ukrainians.”202 The report also notes that at times Bandera’s reputation “approaches the status of a mythical figure” as few Ukrainians had seen or met him.203 After he fled Berlin, Bandera spent much of his time in hiding after the war, fearing Soviet agents that may try to arrest or assassinate him. Because he could not return to Ukraine and wanted to exercise control over the DPs, Bandera created a new branch of the OUN in Vienna in February 1945 called the Foreign Section OUN (ZCh/OUN). This group originally functioned outside of but parallel to the UHVR, with many of its members belonging to both groups. The ZCh/OUN was a refounding of the OUN-B that was meant to be the foundation of Bandera’s “dictatorship-in-exile,” which could be brought to Ukraine after liberation.204 To do so, Bandera needed to build a support base outside Ukraine, and he was relatively successful in gaining support within the DP camps. In 1948, the ZCh/OUN had an estimated 5,000 members in Western Europe, and 70% lived in the camps.205 To gain support among other anti-Soviet diaspora

200 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 86.
201 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 79-80.
202 “BANDERA, Stephen,” 5 October 1947, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, BANDERA, STEFAN.
203 “BANDERA, Stephen,” 5 October 1947, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, BANDERA, STEFAN.
204 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 77.
205 Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 313.
groups, Bandera’s group created another organization: the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN).

After the war ended, Bandera and the ZCh/OUN tasked Yaroslav Stetsko, his would-be prime minister who delivered the Ukrainian proclamation of statehood, with creating an organization representing a broad coalition of anti-Soviet émigrés from Eastern Europe. The result was the foundation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) on 16 April 1946.206 This organization brought together several former members of Eastern European far-right movements, uniting them against the “prison of nations,” the Soviet Union.207 Although Stetsko and the ABN were based in Munich, he first contacted the Americans through their Military Attaché in Paris in 1948. During this meeting, Stetsko sought “American assistance in arranging for the escape of the commanding general of the UPA.”208 The Americans were uninterested, evidenced by the fact that Roman Shukhevych, the general in question, died in Ukraine in 1950, killing himself to avoid arrest by the Soviet police.209 In a later meeting in 1949, Stetsko introduced himself as the prime minister of Ukraine, the leader of the UHVR (which was actually headed by Mykola Lebed, the former head of the OUN-B’s SB), and the leader of the UPA. He aimed to secure American funding and training for 20 Ukrainian radio operators who could then be parachuted into Soviet Ukraine. Once there, they would aid UPA couriers with sending information back to the West. The Army did not act on this

206 Rossoiński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 323.
207 Rossoiński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 324.
208 “Information about Yaroslav Stetsko from Herman Baun’s little black notebook,” 27 March 1952, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
information but passed it on to the CIA.\textsuperscript{210} The CIA wanted to see what their contacts in Lebed’s group, with whom they had worked with since 1948, knew about Stetsko and if he knew about the collaboration between the CIA and the UHVR.

Upon meeting with their UHVR contacts, the CIA found that not only did Stetsko not know anything about their ongoing operations, but he also could not deliver the information he said he could. Ivan Hryn’okh, the former chaplain of Nachtigall and now a member of the UHVR, informed the CIA that “Stetsko [was] never even [a] member much less leader of UHVR or UPA.”\textsuperscript{211} Hryn’okh further explained that due to his role in the ABN, Stetsko was temporarily granted honorary membership in the UHVR, but this status was revoked in early 1949 after the disagreements between Bandera and Lebed. In terms of Stetsko’s popularity in Ukraine, Hryn’okh informed the CIA that he and Bandera represented the “pre-42 Ukrainian political attitude of ultra-nationalism on Nazi pattern and mono-party govt [sic] by force.”\textsuperscript{212} According to two other contacts, this form of politics had lost support in Ukraine due to the brutality of the German occupation, and Ukrainians now wanted a representative government. In this report, the CIA further concluded that the security of the Stetsko/ Bandera group was poor, as the CIA’s contacts were aware of the meetings between the OUN-B and Americans in Paris before the CIA asked about them. They also concluded that even though Stetsko claimed to have couriers providing him with information from Ukraine, the CIA’s UHVR contacts were the only

\textsuperscript{210} “To Munich, Karlruhe From Special Operations,” 1 July 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
\textsuperscript{211} “From Munich to Special Operations,” 16 July 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
\textsuperscript{212} “From Munich to Special Operations,” 16 July 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
people who had successfully travelled from Ukraine to Germany since 1947, showing Stetsko’s claims to be false. This misinformation made Stetsko unreliable to the CIA, so they did not pursue him or the ABN as an intelligence asset. However, the ABN did gain some popularity among anti-Communist diaspora communities, which allowed them to continue operating.

One of the strategies used by the ABN was publication. In September 1949, they started a monthly journal called the *ABN Korrespondenz*, which they used to publish anti-Soviet news. Originally published in German, English and French editions of the journal appeared in 1950 and 1952, respectively. The journal remained in circulation until 1958. The *Korrespondenz* also offered updates on the UPA’s struggle within Ukraine and the historical background of this struggle. These accounts were highly propagandistic, exaggerating the efforts of the UPA to bring hope to other nationalist resistance movements. Traces of the OUN-B’s Nazi-inspired ideology appeared in the journal, with statements such as “To every nation its free independent state! To every state its natural ethnographic borders!” The December 1952 edition of the English-language journal featured articles from prominent nationalist leaders like Bandera. Another article, written by a former Bulgarian minister named Christo Stateff, complained of the Soviets’ use of “fascism” to discredit nationalist movements like the ABN. As noted earlier, the ABN was formed from the remnants of several disparate Eastern European far-right

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213 “Message concerning CARTELS information on Yaroslav Stetsko,” 16 July 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
movements, so in this case, the label of fascism was not entirely propagandistic. Through publications like the Korrespondenz, the ABN proliferated nationalist news to gain support among anti-Communist émigrés and politicians.

One of the results of the ABN’s activities in the postwar period was the appearance of an American offshoot called the American Friends of the ABN (AFABN). Founded on 4 May 1952, the American Friends of the ABN believed that the Western democracies had a duty to support the ABN in their struggle against the Soviet Union.216 At the group’s founding meeting in New York City, roughly 4,000 people attended, including anti-Soviet émigrés from 15 different nations, representatives of the United States Congress, and “leading Americans,” such as Representative Ralph W. Gwinn of New York and Representative O.K. Armstrong of Missouri.217 General Ferenc Farkas de Kisbarnak, leader of the Hungarian Freedom Movement and Stetsko’s deputy, attended the meeting as a representative of the Central Committee of the ABN. During the war, Farkas commanded the 4th Army Corps. In June 1944, Hitler awarded him the Iron Cross for his service. After Miklós Horthy, the wartime dictator of Hungary, resigned, Farkas remained in the service of the German-appointed Arrow Cross government, and he presided over a trial in late 1944 that sentenced several non-fascist officers and civilians to death.218 At the May 1952 conference, Farkas gave a militant speech against the Soviet Union, calling for the union of revolutionary movements and the desertion of those serving in the Red Army. He described how the Hungarians started working with the

218 “Comment on General Farcas,” Undated, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 126, STETSKO, YAROSLAV.
UPA near the war’s end, providing an example of the union he sought. Farkas claimed that the Third World War had already begun, and the only reason it was not an open conflict was the Soviet Union’s cowardice. Farkas also expressed his belief that it was only through Western support for these revolutionary forces that the Soviet Union would be defeated. The spread of ABN influence to the United States and Farkas’s speech demonstrate how prewar far-right movements rechanneled their energies toward anti-Communist agitation without changing much of their ideology.

After World War II, the Soviets wanted to extradite Bandera and try him for war crimes and requested American assistance in this endeavor in 1946. However, the Americans wanted to cultivate a relationship with the UHVR, Lebed’s ostensibly democratic organization, and feared that Bandera’s extradition would compromise their negotiation efforts. Therefore, the American intelligence agents were caught between appeasing their wartime Soviet ally and cultivating a new relationship with anti-Soviet Ukrainians living in Germany. Their solution was to search for Bandera, but not intensively. They also determined that if they could locate Bandera, he should be discretely informed so he could “escape.” Bandera, therefore, moved around the American zone of occupation frequently, never staying in one place for too long. Due to Bandera’s reputation and the popularity of the OUN in the DP camps, the Americans

221 “Report form AB-51, Amzon to AB-43, Munich regarding Stefan Bandera,” 28 October 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, BANDERA, STEFAN.
222 “Report form AB-51, Amzon to AB-43, Munich regarding Stefan Bandera,” 28 October 1946, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 6, BANDERA, STEFAN.
were interested in working with the Ukrainian nationalists. However, this was difficult because the Gehlen Organization carefully controlled information about the group and their contacts. Therefore, American intelligence sought to build their own intelligence networks among the Ukrainians. The most important connection between the United States and Ukrainian nationalism was the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Mykola Lebed. Richard Breitman and Norman J.W. Goda wrote on this topic in their collaborative work *Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War*. The analysis presented here differs from Breitman and Goda’s work by focusing more on how this relationship responded to challenges such as accusations of war criminality from other Ukrainian émigrés and news reports linking Lebed to a 1985 Government Accountability Office report about Nazi collaborators in the United States.

In October 1949, Lebed immigrated to the United States with his family under the assumed name Roman Turan. There were two reasons for his move to the United States. First, after the split with the OUN, Bandera ordered his agents to assassinate Lebed. Therefore, Lebed had to “go into complete hiding several times.” The second reason was monetary. Lebed was the only leading member of the UHVR who was not financially independent, instead relying on a monthly stipend from the organization. By 1949, the group’s treasury was empty, and Lebed could no longer afford to live in Germany. Upon his arrival in the US, Lebed applied for citizenship using his real name. When word

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224 “Munich to Special Operations, RE MUNI 263 (IN 21451), MUNI 264 (IN 21450) and MGK 1879,” 18 May 1949, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
of Lebed’s presence spread among the Ukrainian community in New York, the CIA received multiple reports informing them that he was “one of the most important Bandera terrorists” and responsible for the “wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Polish, and Jewish [sic].” An example of one such Ukrainian informant was Peter Jablon or Jablon-Jarowyz.

During the war, Peter Jablon had been a member of the OUN and afterward became involved in espionage and smuggling in the United States, Canada, and South America. In February 1950, an informant advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that Jablon would be willing to provide information about the OUN. Jablon provided investigators with a general history of the OUN from its formation in 1929 until the beginning of the German occupation, as well as limited information about the foundation of the Sluzhba Bezpeky, the OUN’s security service of which Lebed was the head. In February 1951, Jablon met with the FBI again to provide information about Lebed. Jablon heard from an unidentified contact that Lebed was working with American Intelligence Services and felt it necessary to say that he felt Lebed was using them to his own ends. He qualified this opinion by claiming that “Lebed would learn more from American Intelligence agencies than he would make available to them.” The FBI passed this information to the CIA, who dismissed Jablon’s suspicions due to his personal dislike of Lebed.

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225 “James E. Riley to Director,” 7 June 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
227 “Report made by James W. Ryan regarding Mykola Lebed,” 2 February 1951, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
When he arrived in the United States, one of Lebed’s initial tasks was to develop plans for disseminating propaganda among Ukrainians in Germany, Ukraine, and the United States. Along these lines, the CIA asked him to make plans to use radio and newspapers. According to a report from December 1949, Lebed came up with several ideas but no specific plans for their execution. For his radio plans, he recommended a mobile station in either Germany, Austria, or another friendly country bordering the USSR, with 16 personnel assigned various duties. The radio would broadcast newspapers, other materials like economic and scientific journals, and Ukrainian music records. The CIA noted that Lebed’s plan for a Ukrainian-language newspaper was also not very definite. He suggested they plan to publish a weekly 6–8-page paper, which either he or Hryn’okh would edit. It would be distributed among Ukrainians in the “various countries.” The newspaper would cover general news from around the world but more specifically focus on anti-Soviet events and news about Ukrainians living in the diaspora.228 Although Lebed’s ideas lacked specificity at this stage, they set the stage for one of the most significant components of Operation AERODYNAMIC: the Prolog Research Corporation.

Lebed’s plans for the publication of anti-Soviet materials and their distribution throughout Europe interested the CIA. In April 1950, representatives from the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the covert operation wing of the CIA, met with Lebed to inform him that they could provide “limited assistance which would permit his organization to (a) continue and intensify its anti-Soviet activities in Germany, and (b)

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However, this idea would be short-lived as the UPA slowly dwindled to nothing. After Roman Shukhevych killed himself in March 1950 to avoid arrest, only a few dozen UPA fighters were left in Ukraine. By 1954, the Soviets had repressed the Ukrainian independence movement, and Lebed lost contact with the UHVR. For the next few years, AERODYNAMIC was kept afloat by Lebed and a small Ukrainian study group based in New York. This study group became the core of the Prolog Research Corporation, officially starting in 1956. Prolog specialized in Ukrainian-language “periodicals and selected books and pamphlets which [sought] to exploit and increase nationalist and other dissident tendencies in the Soviet Ukraine.” They used academics in the Ukrainian diaspora to produce nationalist and anti-Soviet materials for distribution in Soviet Ukraine. Lebed served as the vice-president of this organization until 1975, when he retired and then took an advisory role on the board of the company. Despite his bitter rivalry with Bandera, Lebed had an interest in promoting a mythicized history of the OUN and UPA to sanitize his own past as the wartime leader of the OUN and one of the organizers of the UPA. Prolog continued to operate until 1992, at which point it was no longer necessary due to Ukraine’s independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation revealed the role the CIA played

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229 “Memorandum For: DG II, Comments on a meeting held with Mr. Nicolai Lebed, Foreign Minister of the ZPUHVR, Saturday 1 April 1950, at which were present REDACTED (OSO) and REDACTED (OPC),” 4 April 1950, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-19, B 9, AERODYNAMIC: Operation, vol. 9, f 6.
231 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 88.
234 “Retirement of Mykola Lebed,” 24 March 1975, NARA RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
in helping suspected war criminals come to the United States after World War II, putting Lebed’s relationship with the CIA under a microscope.

On 28 June 1985, the GAO published a report about former Nazis or Axis collaborators who immigrated to the United States and the degree to which they were aided by American intelligence agencies, including the CIA. They reviewed the immigration records of 114 Europeans and identified 12 who were Nazis or Axis collaborators. Of these 12, five received assistance during their immigration process, and four of these five assisted American intelligence groups.235 “Subject D” of this report matches the description of Lebed, noting his involvement in the assassination of the Polish minister Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934 and later cooperation with the Germans. The report also provided information about Lebed’s initial difficulties when he came to the United States and how the CIA protected him from deportation in these circumstances.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first became aware of Lebed’s questionable past in 1951, two years after he moved to the United States. Of particular concern was Lebed’s conviction as a political assassin. They started an investigation into Lebed and informed the CIA that the investigation’s results could lead to Lebed’s deportation. The CIA responded by invoking Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, which allows the agency to bring up to 100 individuals annually to the United States in the name of national security.236 In their communications with the INS, the CIA justified keeping Lebed in the States due to his “inestimable value to this Agency,” and the Pieracki trial

236 Comptroller General, “Nazis and Axis Collaborators were used to further U.S. Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe,” 34.
was “largely influenced by political factors.” However, after the publication of the GAO report, newspapers started speculating about who “Subject D” could be. Within a year, the Village Voice linked Lebed to the description provided by the report and published an article titled “To Catch a Nazi.”

The article described Lebed as a “high-ranking Nazi collaborator, an alleged war criminal whose cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency allowed him to enter this country in 1949 and later become a U.S. citizen.” A subsequent article appeared in the New York Times, and Lebed was reportedly harassed and threatened by people who read these articles. In March, Lebed met with CIA representatives to discuss dealing with these allegations. Lebed and his advisors wanted to pursue a libel case, and a rather vocal Ukrainian community advocated for legal action too, but two of the three law firms Lebed consulted determined that it would be “unproductive.” The CIA advised him to write to the concerned newspapers instead and ask them to retract the article and correct the published information. They also suggested that Lebed find a well-respected Ukrainian academic to clear his name through “a scholarly study explaining Lebed’s role in the OUN organization during World War II.” The CIA wanted to avoid a legal battle to protect the secrecy of AERODYNAMIC and ensure the future of the operation. The beginning of an Office of Special Investigations’ (OSI) inquiry further exacerbated anxieties about AERODYNAMIC’s exposure, but ultimately the OSI dropped the case.

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237 “Allen W. Dulles to Argyle R. Mackey, Subject: Mykola Lebed,” 5 May 1942, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
238 Joe Conason, “To Catch a Nazi,” The Village Voice 31, no. 6 (February 11, 1986): 17.
239 “Update on Mykola Lebed’s Situation,” 25 March 1986, NARA, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 80, LEBED, MYKOLA.
because they could not find evidence linking Lebed to war crimes. Although Lebed avoided deportation, other Ukrainians living in the United States were not as lucky. An example of one such individual is John Demjanjuk.

Starting in the mid-1970s, the OSI started searching for individuals who immigrated to the United States after World War II and were granted entry after lying about their connections to or collaboration with the Nazis. The impetus for these investigations was a list of over 70 alleged war criminals living in the United States in 1975. The list was sent to Republican senator Jacob Javits by the communist editor of The Ukrainian Daily News, Michael Hanasiuk. Hanasiuk had reportedly retrieved the list from Soviet Kyiv during one of his frequent visits there. Upon receiving this list, Javits, a long-standing supporter of Soviet Jewry, forwarded it to INS investigator Sam Zutty. Zutty trimmed the list from 70 to 9 names, including two Ukrainians: Feodor Fedorenko and John Demjanjuk. Federenko’s trial started in 1978, and after a complicated legal battle, he lost his United States citizenship in January 1981. This ruling came roughly around the same time that the investigation of Demjanjuk started.

The Demjanjuk Case became far more infamous than Federenko’s, partially due to the highly publicized nature of the trial. John Demjanjuk came to the United States as a displaced person in February 1952. During World War II, he was conscripted into the Red Army and taken as a Prisoner of War. To avoid imprisonment and harsh conditions

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240 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 91.
242 Douglas, The Right Wrong Man, 34.
in a German POW camp, Demjanjuk agreed to train as an auxiliary at Trawniki. After he completed his training at Trawniki, Demjanjuk spent the rest of the war as a camp guard at Sobibór. After the war, he lived a quiet life in Cleveland, Ohio, until the INS investigation of the mid-1970s identified him as a notorious Treblinka guard whose sadistic treatment of prisoners earned him the moniker “Ivan Grozny” or “Ivan the Terrible.” The only issue with the INS’s discovery was that Demjanjuk never served in Treblinka. However, because Demjanjuk lied about his past and did not have the CIA protecting him, he lost his United States citizenship in June 1981. After this, he was extradited to Israel and tried for crimes against humanity. The court found Demjanjuk guilty and sentenced him to death. However, Demjanjuk appealed on the grounds of mistaken identity, and upon the discovery of the real Ivan Grozny, a Treblinka guard named Ivan Marchenko who died fighting Yugoslavian partisans near the end of the war, the court overturned Demjanjuk’s case in July 1993. Although he was never a member of the OUN or UPA, Demjanjuk’s time as a camp guard in Sobibór, his misidentification as “Ivan the Terrible,” and the common accusation of collaboration generated a defensive response among the Ukrainian community. The reaction of the diaspora community reflects the unwillingness of its members to recognize Ukrainian collaboration of any sort due to their opposition of Soviet propaganda and the pervasiveness of the resistance myth.

244 Douglas, The Right Wrong Man, 38.
245 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 172-173.
246 Douglas, The Right Wrong Man, 96.
Many Ukrainians in the Greater Cleveland area labeled the Demjanjuk Case a Soviet intrigue. They believed the USSR framed Demjanjuk as a concentration camp guard to implicate Ukrainians as war criminals and drive a wedge between Jewish and Ukrainian communities, two of the most dissident minority groups in the Soviet Union.247 The dismissal of wartime collaboration with the Nazis as Soviet propaganda was a common way of dealing with an uncomfortable past within the Ukrainian diaspora. In the diaspora, Ukraine’s history was written in direct contrast to Soviet historiography. Using the same theme of “struggle” employed by Soviet historians, diaspora historians described Ukraine’s history as a constant struggle for independence rather than a struggle between classes. Per Anders Rudling notes that self-victimization and martyrdom were vital components of this narrative and left little space for critiques.248 This open denial of historical controversies was reinforced by the commemoration of Ukrainian nationalist heroes among the Ukrainian American community.

The chaos of World War II displaced millions of people, including around two million Ukrainians. Although many of these Displaced Persons were repatriated to their country of origin, around 200,000 Ukrainians chose to stay in DP camps because they feared returning to the Soviet Union. Nationalist politics became pervasive within the DP camps, with an estimated 80% of DPs supporting the OUN-B. The anti-Soviet nature of Ukrainian nationalism interested American intelligence, who then sought to establish contact with DPs who may have information about the USSR. Disappointed with the

247 “Demjanjuk testifies he was never concentration-camp guard,” *The Ukrainian Weekly* 88, no. 10 (March 8, 1981): 3.
unreliability of the OUN-B, the Americans chose to work instead with Lebed’s UHVR and maintained a successful relationship with this group until the 1990s. However, the OSI’s investigations into alleged war criminals threatened to expose this relationship and created discord in the Ukrainian diaspora community. The Demjanjuk Case was the most high-profile of these prosecutions and generated protests from the Ukrainian community, who believed the search for war criminals was related to the Soviet Union’s attempts to discredit Ukraine. To further understand the backlash to the accusation of war criminality, it is important to understand how the diaspora commemorated the OUN and UPA in the postwar era, which will be analyzed in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter VI: Commemoration and Mythmaking in the Postwar Era

In the wake of World War II, over 100,000 Ukrainian Displaced Persons resettled in North America. These new émigrés spent the immediate postwar period in Displaced Persons camps, where nationalist politics were pervasive and up to 80% of the camps’ inhabitants were loyal to Stepan Bandera and the OUN. When these DPs resettled in the United States, they wanted to become involved in the preexisting Ukrainian diaspora communities and organizations there. However, the older generations of the Ukrainian diaspora were hesitant to accept the newcomers due to their radical politics and wanted to keep them out of leadership positions in these groups. The DPs, in turn, did not think the American Ukrainians understood what it meant to be a “real” Ukrainian because they had lived abroad for so long. Therefore, when the DPs tried to join preexisting diaspora organizations, they conflicted with their American compatriots. Those loyal to the OUN wanted to join the leadership of these groups to reinvigorate Ukraine’s struggle for independence abroad. In the organizations they were successful in doing so, their radical nationalism alienated earlier members who then left in protest. The spread of Ukrainian nationalism among the American diaspora meant that the myth of the OUN and UPA became more pervasive, uplifting figures like Roman Shukhevych as heroes while omitting their collaboration with the German military. The canonization of this myth and the cult of heroes associated with it led to the commemoration of the OUN and UPA through monument building, which in turn reinforced these historical myths. These

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249 Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora*, 102.
monuments became sites of nationalist ritualization and celebration, which also helped reaffirm the diaspora’s views on the OUN and UPA.

Before covering the monuments to the OUN and UPA in the United States, it is necessary to be familiar with the organizations that built them. After the arrival of the Displaced Persons, different conflicts arose as these refugees became more involved in diaspora life in their host countries. Left-leaning diaspora organizations frowned upon the newcomers, suspicious of their reluctance to return to Soviet Ukraine after the war. To them, this was evidence that nationalists were knowingly trying to bring “quislings” to Canada and the United States. The common accusation of collaboration, in turn, generated a victim identity among the DPs, promoting a widespread denial of any form of collaboration, which worked its way into the group identity.\(^{250}\) For right-wing or nationalist organizations in Canada and the United States, initially, there was hope that the newcomers would reinvigorate Ukrainian cultural life. However, as they learned more about the politics of the Displaced Persons, they too became increasingly hostile. As the newcomers tried to integrate into their new communities, they faced opponents who believed they were too inexperienced in their new homes to participate in these organizations fully. The newcomers, in turn, believed they were more qualified than those who had been in the United States longer because the new immigrants had “the only right idea of what a Ukrainian was.”\(^{251}\) Lubomyr Luciuk, a Professor in the Department of Politics and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada, claimed this created two separate diaspora identities, each with its own conception of what makes

\(^{250}\) Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 103.
\(^{251}\) Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 103-04.
a “real Ukrainian.” Alongside the conflict with preexisting diaspora organizations, the competition between the different branches of the OUN was exported to the United States and Canada. Generally, they tried to join preexisting organizations and force their political agendas upon them, alienating earlier members unfamiliar with this rivalry. If they could not gain control of a particular organization, they would create their own.

The preeminent Ukrainian diaspora organization in the United States was the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), founded in 1940. The UCCA was a legacy of an earlier group, the United Ukrainian Organizations of America (UUAO), which disbanded due to accusations of pro-German or fascist sympathies. The UCCA’s purpose was to appeal to a broader audience. As an umbrella organization, the UCCA hosted several different interest groups. However, some of these groups fell under nationalist influences after World War II. For example, the Organization for the Defense for Four Freedoms of Ukraine (ODFFU) was founded in 1946 as a continuation of the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine (ODWU). The ODWU was an OUN offshoot that started in the USA shortly after Yevhen Konovalets’ visit in 1929. The postwar ODFFU was part of the UCCA, and it represented a continuation of the prewar ideology of the OUN and was politically and ideologically aligned with Bandera. This organization was a direct result of DPs and the politicization of camp life. At a meeting of the ODFFU in 1949, “third wave” diaspora members outvoted the older generation,

252 Luciuk, Searching For Place, xx.
253 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 105.
254 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 132. Satzewich makes a mistake here with the acronym for the United Ukrainian Organizations of America. He writes “UOAA” rather than “UUOA” and does not mention the organization’s full name. The correct acronym was found in Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations 1884-1954. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991): 284, cited initially by Satzewich.
which resulted in the “U.S. members departure.” A similar event would take place roughly 30 years later at the Thirteenth Congress of the UCCA, where a Banderite faction called the Liberation Front succeeded in gaining most of the executive board positions in the UCCA. The Liberation Front justified its takeover of the UCCA by claiming that the democratic model of the organization was ineffective. The result was over 20 organizations leaving the UCCA in protest. These examples help demonstrate how nationalism became a relatively influential part of diaspora life, which enabled the commemoration and canonization of the OUN, UPA, and their heroes.

In the early 1950s, Ukrainian diaspora organizations started purchasing property in the “borscht belt,” a region of the Catskills known for its resorts which were a popular vacation spot for New York City Jews between the 1920s and 1960s. In 1952, the Ukrainian National Association (UNA) purchased a resort in Kerhonkson, New York. The UNA is a Ukrainian fraternal association founded in the late 1890s as the Ruthenian National Union, and they changed the name to UNA in 1914 to promote a distinctly Ukrainian identity. The resort had eight buildings, including a clubhouse, a private doctor’s former “Health Home,” and two cottages. The entire property was 250 acres and functioned as a nursing home, vacation resort, and children’s camp. Several other diaspora groups followed suit, including the American branch of the SUM (SUMA), the nationalist youth group that restarted in 1946 in the DP camps. Opened in 1955, the

257 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, 43.
258 “Ukrainian National Ass’n Resort in the Catskills,” Ukrainian Weekly 21, no. 6 (February 16, 1953): 2.
SUMA camp in Ellenville, New York, became the home of the first OUN monument in the United States.

Over the weekend of 21-22 July 1962, more than 3,000 people attended a nationalist gathering held at the SUMA camp in Ellenville to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the UPA.259 Among the celebrations was the dedication of a monument commemorating the “Heroes of Ukraine.” The monument represented “the four periods of Ukrainian statehood,” with busts of Symon Petliura, the short-term leader of the Ukrainian National Republic, Yevhen Konovalets, the founder of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, the leader of the revolutionary branch of the OUN, and Roman Shukhevych, the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in Nachtigall and later the commanding general of the UPA.260 The monument itself bears the inscription “Glory to the Heroes.” Mykhailo Chereshniovsky, an established Ukrainian American sculptor and veteran of the UPA, designed the memorial.261 The Ukrainian Liberation Front, the Banderite faction within the UCCA that would take over the group in 1980, sponsored the celebrations. They included two masses, one Catholic and one Orthodox, a parade of several Ukrainian American organizations, a special dinner, and several speeches throughout the day. Among those in attendance were Lev Dobriansky, chairman of the UCCA and keynote speaker; Eugene Losynsky, president of the ODFFU; Ignatius M. Billinsky, chairman of the AFABN and one of Lebed’s AERODYNAMIC contacts; Lev

261 “Observance of 20th Anniversary of UPA Held in Ellenville,” 1; Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 410.
Futala and P. Tybor of the Ukrainian National Aid Association; Bohdan Krawchiw of Svoboda (a Banderite newspaper); Walter Klawnsnik of the Ukrainian American War Veterans Association (a group honoring veterans of the UPA and SS-Galician Division); and Dr. B. Stebelsky from Canada. Dobriansky, Losynsky, Billinsky, and Futala supported the results of the 13th Congress of the UCCA in 1980, and the groups they represented were known for their admiration of the OUN-B.

While these representatives illustrate the broad support for the OUN and UPA from a variety of organizations, it is important to remember that the commemoration of the OUN and UPA at the SUMA camp was primarily a continuation of the nationalist education of Ukrainian youth. Every year since the monument in Ellenville was built, it has been the site of celebration for the “Day of Heroes,” a Ukrainian holiday celebrated on May 23 that recognize the Heroes of Ukraine. These celebrations are sponsored by the ODFFU, and in the United States they usually take place over the Fourth of July weekend.262 The Day of Heroes started in 1941 under the auspices of the OUN-B to recognize “contemporary Ukrainian heroes who had given their lives for an independent Ukraine under both Polish and Communist occupations and to encourage the rebirth and future development of the Ukrainian heroic spirit.”263 Due to its focus on rebirth and the future, the fact that this celebration is hosted at a youth summer camp is important. It shows the continuity between the efforts at nationalist education by SUM in the DP camps and modern trends of nationalist celebration. It also shows that the youth are still


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an essential element of nationalist commemoration. While the main celebration is held at the Ellenville SUMA, there are also celebrations hosted by the SUMA in Boston and presumably other sites in the United States.

Thus far, this chapter has established how nationalism became part of diaspora life and where the nationalists built their monuments, but the question of why the diaspora needed to commemorate the OUN, the UPA, and its cult of heroes remains open. To understand the monument-building of the OUN and UPA, it is necessary to understand the events behind this commemoration. The four nationalist leaders enshrined in the Ellenville Heroes’ Monument all died an early death either by assassination or by their own hands: Petliura was killed in France, 1926; Konovalets in Holland, 1938; Shukhevych took his own life in Ukraine, 1950; and Bandera was assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich, 1959. After their deaths, each of these individuals achieved martyr status among nationalists because they all died due to their involvement in Ukraine’s struggle for independence. As martyrs, they gained an almost religious following. Evidencing this, a diaspora newspaper from the United Kingdom wrote of Bandera’s death, “that 15 October would ‘remain forever a day of mourning for the whole Ukrainian nation, exactly like the anniversaries of the deaths of Symon Petliura, Ievhen Konovalets’, and Taras Chuprynka [Roman Shukhevych].’”  

264 Bandera’s death was the most recent among these four Ukrainian leaders and, therefore, can be seen as the primary impetus for commemorating them. One of the first indications that the Ukrainian diaspora community felt a need to honor Bandera was an article in The Ukrainian

264 Quoted in Rossoliński-Liebe, Stepan Bandera, 410.
Weekly, a UNA sponsored diaspora newspaper, in December 1959. The article described the next steps of the ZCh/OUN as they moved on without Bandera’s leadership, and one of the steps they intended to take was “To create a ‘Stepan Bandera Liberation Fund’ as well as to erect a monument of him to perpetuate his memory.”265 While the article likely references a different monument, it shows that Ukrainian diaspora communities considered preserving Bandera’s legacy as important. Understanding commemoration as a way to preserve the legacy of the diaspora’s heroes, other monuments can be evaluated using this framework.

There was a brief hiatus between the establishment of the Ellenville monument and the other monuments in the United States, but in the late 1970s and early 1980s, monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA appeared more often. In 1977, the same year that Feodor Federenko’s role as a Nazi collaborator was discovered, a monument dedicated to Oleh Olzhych, an OUN-M ideologist who died in Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp in 1944, was built in Lehighton, Pennsylvania, designed once again by Chereshniovsky.266 Olzhych was a long-standing member of the OUN, joining in 1929 when it was founded. He espoused the tenets of radical, authoritarian Ukrainian nationalism between 1935-1941. Olzhych denounced liberalism for the “chaos of freethinking,” and linked it to European “cosmopolitanism,” a common euphemism for Jewish influence. He also criticized communism as a “dead theory,” and conservatism for its outdated nature. His writings were guided primarily by Italian Fascism, but he was

also influenced by German Nazism. This monument was built at the Ukrainian Homestead of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU), a nationalist Ukrainian organization established in 1929 after Yevhen Konovalets visited the United States and reestablished after the war as the Melnykite counterpart of the ODFFU. Soil from Symon Petliura’s, Konovalets’, and Andrii Melnyk’s gravesites were placed inside the monument’s base, tying Olzhych, like the Heroes’ Monument, to influential Ukrainian nationalist leaders. The chairman of the monument committee, Yaroslav Haywas, was the leader of the OUN-M until 1973. He also led the Melnykite marching groups during the first days of Operation Barbarossa. Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych, Haywas’s successor as leader of the OUN-M, gave a speech at the celebration. Notably absent from the monument’s commemoration were the members of the UCCA who spoke in Ellenville in 1962, likely because of the continued agitation between the different factions of the OUN.

The Ukrainian Homestead, which hosts the Olzhych monument, was founded in 1957, and from the beginning was dedicated to the memory of Olzhych. Every year, it hosts a Ukrainian cultural folk festival featuring Ukrainian dances, singers, musicians, arts, and crafts vendors. The Homestead is also open to the community, and the site of weekend trips by Ukrainian youth organizations, including SUMA. The chapel at the

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268 “Unveil Statue of Olzhych in Lehighton,” 8.
270 Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt*, 264.
Homestead also hosts weekly masses and celebrations of important religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter. The presence of a monument dedicated to a prominent leader of the OUN-M at an important community site demonstrates how these monuments serve as a social glue that ties the diaspora to the sanitized history of the OUN.

Between 1982 and 1989, three other monuments to the OUN and UPA were built in the United States. However, these monuments were not displayed on the grounds of an organization’s headquarters or at a children’s summer camp. The monuments were built in Ukrainian cemeteries in Parma, Ohio; South Bound Brook, New Jersey; and Hamptonburgh, New York. Not only did these monuments come later, but they also served a different purpose from the monuments in Ellenville and Lehighton. Busts of nationalist heroes or leaders are absent from these sites. Aside from their size and nationalist symbolism, they are almost indistinguishable from other grave markers in these cemeteries.

To understand how these monuments differ from their predecessors it is essential to remember the events concerning the Ukrainian community in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukrainian camp guard in Treblinka, lost his citizenship in 1981, and he was subsequently extradited to the Soviet Union and executed. Fedorenko’s trial ended the same year that John Demjanjuk’s denaturalization trial began, and the high-profile nature of the trial undoubtedly affected the Ukrainian émigré community. The protests during the 1986 investigation into Lebed were a product of the Demjanjuk

case and help illustrate the diaspora community’s objection to the accusation of war criminality. The investigations into the wartime activity of Ukrainians created a victim identity in the diaspora, which meant they had to confront their history or embrace comforting myths. These monuments represent a decision to embrace a comforting myth based on personal connections rather than facing the complicated history of a larger group.

The monument in Parma was the first to be dedicated entirely to the UPA. Built in 1982 at Saint Peter and Paul Ukrainian Catholic Cemetery (now St. Andrew’s), the monument consists of a 13-foot-tall slab of granite crowned with a cross that reads “Eternal Glory to the UPA” and emblazoned with the tryzub, the Ukrainian trident. There is no connection at the site tying this monument to the OUN, aside from the UPA’s role as the OUN’s paramilitary. Another interesting factor is that no specific organization sponsored the monument; the funds were donated by the Greater Cleveland community. They raised around $30,000 for the monument.275 The site is a memorial dedicated to loved ones who died in the UPA’s struggle against the Soviet Union. As such, it can also be seen as an attempt to move forward from the infighting endemic to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, proposing instead a narrative of unified resistance to Soviet rule. This monument also represents a popularization of the UPA among the diaspora community, and with this popularization, the group’s mythologization.

On 29 April 1984, another monument dedicated to the UPA appeared at St. Andrew’s Ukrainian Orthodox Church in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. Unlike the

Parma monument, the dedication of the monument in South Bound Brook received considerable fanfare. One reason for this could be the reputation of the planning committee and keynote speakers. Mykola Lebed was one of the members of the monument’s planning committee, and its dedication was led by Metropolitan Mstyslav, the ecclesiastical head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, and Dr. Ivan Hryn’okh, the former chaplain of Nachtigall and Lebed’s colleague in the ZP/UHVR and Operation AERODYNAMIC. Lebed’s involvement may seem striking at first, given his conflict with Bandera. However, it is necessary to remember that he had his own interests in sanitizing the UPA’s past, as he was the one who ordered the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia in 1943. The ceremony’s attendants included “hundreds of former Ukrainian soldiers, uniformed representatives of youth organizations and members of the Ukrainian community.”

Unlike previous monuments, this memorial was designed by Bohdan Domanyk and executed by the architect Bohdan Gerulak rather than Chereshniiovsky. The granite slab is engraved with a tryzub and the words “In Memory of the Unknown Soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1942-1952” on both sides. During this gathering, Hryn’okh delivered a speech recalling a similar occasion in which he blessed the graves of soldiers who died during the Independence War of 1917-1922. On that occasion, wreaths of thorns were symbolically laid on those graves, and during this speech, Hryn’okh said, “Now, over 40 years later… I stand before the graves of the men who gave their lives for Ukraine, and I do not have the strength to bring you heaven-scented live flowers from Ukraine, for our land grows thorns.”

277 Kolomayets, “Unveil memorial to unknown UPA soldiers,” 16.
two occasions of commemoration, Hryn’okh linked the two separate independence struggles, playing into the historiographical trend that posits Ukrainian history as one of constant struggle and victimhood. By commemorating the UPA as a group rather than uplifting specific leaders, this monument also delivered a message of unity that obscures the OUN’s history of infighting and rivalry.

The final UPA monument of the 1980s was built in Hamptonburgh, New York, in 1989 at Holy Spirit Ukrainian Catholic Cemetery. Not much information is available about this monument. The cemetery is the site of an annual pilgrimage among the Ukrainian Catholic community, which takes place every June. During the annual pilgrimage of 1989, Bishop Basil Losten dedicated the monument to “known and unknown heroes, those who gave their lives for freedom in Ukraine.”278 Since its dedication, the monument has been included as part of the pilgrimage, and a panakhyda, or memorial service, is held at the site annually. This act of remembrance is valued by the Ukrainian Catholic community and has persisted into the modern day.

To contextualize the commemoration of the OUN and UPA in the Ukrainian diaspora, it is necessary to look at the efforts of the Ukrainian Canadian diaspora. There are four total monuments dedicated to Ukrainian collaborators in Canada. Two of these monuments are in Edmonton, Alberta, and two can be found in Oakville, Ontario. These cities are in the two provinces with the highest concentrations of Ukrainian Canadians. In 2016, Ukrainian Canadians were 27% of the population in Alberta and 28% of the

population in Ontario. The two Edmonton monuments, one dedicated to Roman
Shukhevych and the other to the Waffen-SS *Galizien* division, were products of
nationalist efforts to take advantage of Canada’s multiculturalism policy, which started in
the early 1970s.

According to Per Anders Rudling, the nationalists involved in planning the sites
in Canada sought to “present national identity as authentic Ukrainian cultural
heritage.” The rise of Quebecois nationalism and agitation by pro-nationalist Ukrainian
groups in the early 1970s led Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to announce a new policy of
multiculturalism. This program would provide state funding to ethnic groups that wanted
to preserve their cultural history in Canada. Political lobbying by pro-OUN diaspora
organizations similar to those in the United States allowed these nationalist groups to take
advantage of available state funding and build sites dedicated to important figures in the
OUN and UPA. This is notably different from the memorial sites in the United States,
which were all privately funded. The site dedicated to Shukhevych was finished in 1973
and became the Ukrainian Youth Complex. Its founders hoped would “raise and harden a
new generation of fighters for the liberation of Ukraine. [It invokes] the name and
activities of gen. [sic] Chuprynka, St[epan] Bandera, and other outstanding Ukrainian
activists and path breakers on the road to liberation.”

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281 Rudling, “Multiculturalism, memory, and ritualization,” 740.
282 Rudling, “Multiculturalism, memory, and ritualization,” 744.
283 Rudling, “Multiculturalism, memory, and ritualization,” 745.
United States, this new youth complex was established with the goal of raising Ukrainian youth in the radical nationalist tradition.

The second monument in Edmonton was dedicated to Ukrainian veterans, including fighters of the UPA and the Waffen-SS Galizien, a collaborationist division of the Waffen-SS that included several volunteers from the OUN-M. According to Olesya Khromeychuk, many of these volunteers saw the Galizien division as an alternative to the OUN-B-led UPA, and over 80,000 Ukrainians volunteered for service in 1943.  

Although Galizien was undoubtedly a collaborationist institution, many former members of this division were able to immigrate to the West because it was difficult to prove they had committed war crimes. Khromeychuk argues that this was because the unit formed late in the war and was reportedly not part of any actions against civilians or Jews. However, this unit was responsible for the Huta Pieniacka massacre, which took place on 24 February 1944. Khromeychuk also makes the point that if one were to compare volunteers and conscripts, they would find that volunteers were often part of earlier groups that perpetrated atrocities.

The last of these Canadian monuments were built in 1988 in Oakville, Ontario. The first monument was dedicated to the “Fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine,” and served as a cenotaph for fallen soldiers of the UPA and members of the Waffen-SS.

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284 Khromeychuk, “Undetermined” Ukrainians, 54.
285 Per Anders Rudling, “‘They Defended Ukraine’: The 14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) Revisited,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 3 (4 September 2012): 348
286 Khromeychuk, “Undetermined” Ukrainians, 63.
The second monument bears the image of a Ukrainian insurgent and a *tryzub*, and is inscribed “Eternal glory to the soldiers of the UPA: For Ukraine, for Freedom, for the people.”288 The purpose and function of these monuments was therefore similar to the UPA monuments in the United States, which actually inspired the monuments in Oakville.289 These trends reflect the broader issue of commemoration in the Ukrainian diaspora and the connectivity between groups in the United States and Canada.

The monuments dedicated to the UPA represent the popularization of the group’s mythical past. While the monuments in Ellenville and Lehighton were established by organizations representing the vanguard of Ukrainian nationalism in the United States, these gravesite memorials are part of a communal effort to remember their loved ones who died fighting for the UPA. Although they are less political, these monuments reinforce historical myths about the OUN and UPA while ignoring the problematic histories of these groups. Understanding how these myths developed in the diaspora is essential to interpreting what the monuments represent. To properly understand the myths behind the monuments, this thesis will analyze published accounts of the OUN and UPA’s history, and how the narratives these accounts provide have remained part of the diaspora’s understanding of the groups’ histories.

While the whitewashing of the OUN-UPA started during the war, one of the earliest published defenses of the UPA in the diaspora appeared in 1950. This was the year that the Ukrainian Information Service published *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)* by Oleh Martowych, which provides a favorable account of Ukrainian resistance

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to the Soviets and Germans during the war. This document is an indirect appeal to the United States to support the UPA’s continued struggle against the Soviet Union, and various factors evidence this. First and foremost, it was written in English. Most UPA documents or histories at the time appeared in Ukrainian, such as Mykola Lebed’s *UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*. Another noteworthy characteristic of the piece is that it references famous American historical figures and politicians. For example, on the table of contents page, Martowych presents the following Benjamin Franklin quote: “Our cause is the cause of all mankind, and we are fighting for their liberty in defending our own.”

By selecting this quote, Martowych relates the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to that of the American revolutionaries. A more direct comparison of the two can be found later in the text when Martowych writes, “Ukrainian insurgents, these simple people, akin to American Revolutionary heroes, have been accepted as bandits, ‘fascist hirelings,’ ‘SS-men,’ etc. by certain organs of the American democratic press.”

Martowych’s history of the Ukrainian nationalist struggle continues its appeal to the West by emphasizing Ukrainians’ naturally democratic character. He argues, “By nature, the Ukrainians are true democrats and opponents of all forms of dictatorship and tyranny.” He continues in this vein, arguing that the historical struggle for Ukrainian independence is an unbroken conflict between progressive Ukrainian heroes against oppressive Russian tyrants. A necessary note is that among these “progressives” was Bohdan Khmelnys’kyi, the Cossack leader whose rebellion targeted Jews as the agents

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291 Martowych, *UPA*, 63.  
of Polish landlords, killing roughly 10,000 in violent pogroms.\textsuperscript{293} However, Martowych omits that from the text, focusing instead on themes of democracy, independence, and Ukrainian victimization.

Martowych also fails to mention Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with the Nazis, participation in the massacres of Jews, and the UPA’s ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles in the last years of the war. What he does write about is either exaggerated or false. Martowych claims that Ukrainians took advantage of the chaos during Operation Barbarossa to capture several key Ukrainian cities independently.\textsuperscript{294} He also supports the theory that Stetsko’s proclamation of Ukrainian statehood was a \textit{fait accompli} and that the nationalists were cleverly using the Germans to their own ends. However, as shown in previous chapters, it is unlikely that this was the case.

Martowych skips any analysis of the German-Ukrainian conflict between 1941 and 1943, moving his study from Stetsko and Bandera’s arrest to the foundation of the UPA. This decision ignores two years of German occupation and obfuscates the collaboration of prominent Ukrainian leaders with the Nazis. Martowych makes an interesting choice when presenting his counterevidence to claims of collaboration. The documents used to illustrate Ukrainian resistance to the Nazis appeared near the end of or after the war. This factor suggests that either Martowych did not have access to public statements from before 1943 that illustrated the UPA’s anti-German orientation, or those

\textsuperscript{293} Rossoliński-Liebe, \textit{Stepan Bandera}, 59.
\textsuperscript{294} Martowych, \textit{UPA}, 10.
documents did not exist. Whatever the case may be, this raises questions about the veracity of Martowych’s claims.

After dismissing accusations of collaboration, Martowych focuses on the UPA’s struggle against the Soviet Union. He argues that they try to undercut the strength of the UPA by misusing or misrepresenting history, liquidating their intelligentsia, censoring Ukrainian press outlets, and intimidating the populace. Here he uses themes of heroism and suffering when describing the Ukrainians’ situation. For example, he consistently presents the UPA as outgunned, outmanned, but able to achieve small victories through sheer determination alone.295 It also alludes to the group’s heroic character, asserting that even against incredible odds, the UPA would not surrender.

To combat accusations of antisemitism or participation in pogroms, Martowych claims that the UPA helped save Jews during the Holocaust by enlisting them in the “Ukrainian Red Cross.”296 Other scholars note that this was not unlike German selections, in which Jews with a particular skill or talent were allowed to live.297 Martowych’s emphasis on Jewish membership in the UPA is not an uncommon way for the group’s defenders to counter the accusation of antisemitism, and this defense will reappear later in this thesis.

The final notable part of Martowych’s piece is his defense of Ukrainian nationalist leaders. He argues that their characterization as collaborators was purely the product of Soviet propaganda, and the rest of the world press was buying into a

296 Martowych, *UPA*, 56.
falsehood. After the end of the war, the rhetoric of the Soviet propaganda changed from describing the nationalists as “hirelings of German Nazi fascists” to indicting them as Western spies.\footnote{Martowych, \textit{UPA}, 62.} Martowych denies any association with the Western powers, although the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist movements were trying to earn their support, and Lebed and the ZP/UHVR were in the early stages of Operation AERODYNAMIC.\footnote{For more on this, see Jeffrey Burds, “The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948.”}

More public and contemporaneous defenses of the OUN and UPA appeared in diaspora newspapers. For example, in the same issue of \textit{The Ukrainian Weekly} that announced the dedication of the 1982 memorial to UPA fighters in Parma, several articles related to the legacy of the OUN and UPA. On the front page, one of the headlines reads, “Post runs UNIS director’s letter refuting article on OUN-Nazi link.” This article describes an open letter by Katherine Chumachenko, the director of the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), the same organization which published Martowych’s \textit{UPA} in 1950. Chumachenko’s letter addressed a recent article written by Thomas O’Toole, a staff writer for the Washington Post. O’Toole’s article focused on a short section of John Loftus’s book \textit{The Belarus Secret} that referred to the OUN and their connection to the Nazis during World War II. Chumachenko’s letter to O’Toole tried to discredit his work, claiming that the collaboration between the OUN and the Nazis was poorly researched and that even suggesting such a link existed was ahistorical because the OUN was founded in 1929 and therefore could not have been “Nazi-sponsored.” She further argues that Bandera and Stetsko were sent to Auschwitz, “hardly the way the
Nazis would treat their collaborators.”300 These newspaper articles demonstrate that the monuments were only the most visible part of a much broader effort of canonizing these historical myths.

The accusation that O’Toole’s article was ahistorical for suggesting an OUN-Nazi connection is demonstrably false because, as shown in previous chapters, the OUN was highly connected to the Abwehr and received German funding on the eve of World War II. Chumachenko herself makes historical mistakes in her attack on O’Toole by arguing that the OUN and UPA fought both the Nazis and the Soviets and saying that Bandera and Stetsko went to Auschwitz. They were actually imprisoned in Sachsenhausen in the Zellenbau, a barracks reserved for high-profile political prisoners, and subsequently released in 1944 to organize support for the German war effort.301 Regarding Chumachenko’s statement that this was “hardly the way the Nazis would treat their collaborators,” this thesis has shown that Bandera and Stetsko were not the only Nazi collaborators imprisoned in the Zellenbau when the Nazis could not control them. These defenses are illustrative of the Ukrainian community’s attempts to deny collaboration with the Nazis during World War II, and other articles referring to the UPA and OUN highlight the importance of these two groups in the diaspora’s collective memory.

Another source concerning the UPA in this issue of The Ukrainian Weekly was the obituary of UPA veteran Yuri Lopatynsky, who changed his name to George after he immigrated to the United States. Lopatynsky was the head of the Organization of UPA

300 “Post runs UNIS director’s letter refuting article on OUN-Nazi link,” The Ukrainian Weekly, 50, no. 48 (November 28, 1982): 4.
301 Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust,” 10.
Veterans, a former lieutenant-colonel of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and a member of Prolog’s board of directors. Lopatynsky’s obituary describes the UPA as partisans who struggled “against both the Nazis and the Red Army in a bid to secure independence for Ukraine.” What Lopatynsky’s obituary failed to mention was his membership in the Nachtigall Battalion that aided the German invasion of the USSR and the conquest of L’viv. This analysis of the UPA illustrates the emphasis placed on resistance rather than its members’ collaboration with German auxiliary police and military units. The other article pertained to a commemorative conference in New York City examining the legacy of the UPA after World War II in connection to ongoing celebrations of the group’s anniversary. The panel at the conference included Mykola Lebed, Myroslaw Prokop, and Taras Hunczak, all of whom were allegedly experts on the OUN and UPA. Hunczak is a professor emeritus at Rutgers University and has written extensively on the topic of 20th-century Ukraine. He was likely invited to the conference to add credibility to the conference’s board of speakers. Lebed’s talk focused on the “Organization of Anti-German Opposition by the OUN, 1941-1943,” Prokop spoke on “The Development of the OUN Platform During the German Occupation of Ukraine and the Political Platform of the UPA, and Hunczak focused on “The UPA in German, Bolshevik, Polish and Western Documents and Appraisals.” This conference illustrates the role that diaspora activists played in preserving the image of the OUN and UPA as resistors of German rule rather

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than their willing collaborators and how they used academics like Hunczak to add legitimacy to their claims.

By recognizing specific leaders in the OUN, the monuments in Ellenville and Lehighton reflect the political nature of this nationalist identity and a clear goal of raising Ukrainian youth in the spirit of this identity. In contrast, the monuments to unknown heroes are a place for everyday members of the diaspora to remember their fallen loved ones. This type of monument also projected an image of unity, covering up years of internal conflict and rivalry in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. However, they also help reinforce to the diaspora the heroic nature of these unknown soldiers without questioning their role during the war. The narrative supporting the image of the OUN and UPA as heroes of Ukraine was the product of nationalist mythmaking that took place in the diaspora. This nationalist narrative was shaped in opposition to Soviet accounts of the groups’ history that sought to delegitimize Ukrainian sovereignty by highlighting Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis during World War II. The commemoration of the OUN and UPA and the competition between these two narratives continues today, and their development since independence will be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter VII: Developments since Independence

After the commemoration efforts of the 1980s, there were several noteworthy developments related to this topic. As the Soviet Union broke down, Ukraine became an independent state on 24 August 1991. A few months later the Cold War officially ended. However, this did not end the opposition within the diaspora to Soviet historiography concerning Ukraine, nor did it signal the end of the commemoration of the OUN and UPA. Since independence, Ukraine has endeavored to separate itself from Russia, and central to these efforts is historical writing. By crafting an official state history, the government of Ukraine sought to create a shared identity that could encompass both East and West Ukrainians. However, one of the focal points of this official history was the OUN-UPA and their reputation as resistors of totalitarianism. This view ignores or downplays atrocities committed by members of the OUN and UPA during World War II, and remains pervasive in modern Ukraine and in the diaspora.

After World War II, the OUN-UPA was a taboo topic in the Soviet Union. When it garnered attention in Soviet historiography, its purpose was to counter émigré accounts that argued the OUN-UPA fought for Ukrainian independence. Soviet historians argued that the “bourgeois nationalists” were tools of fascism during World War II and the West after.³⁰⁴ An example of one such text is V. Cherednychenko’s Collaborationists. Published in 1975, this book presents itself as a history of the OUN-UPA from the groups

founding in 1929 until Cherednychenko’s time of writing. However, it tends to exaggerate the degree of collaboration between the Ukrainians and the Germans and reduces the nationalists to mindless agents of “world imperialism.” Cherednychenko’s text is illustrative of broader trends in Soviet historiography, and it is necessary to understand more recent historiographical trends.

Cherednychenko’s book Collaborationists is organized into three short chapters. The first covers the prewar relationship between the OUN and the Abwehr, and the second chapter focuses on the invasion of L'viv and the OUN's wartime collaboration with the Germans. Finally, the third brings the history of the OUN into the postwar period and tracks the development of the relationship between the group and Western intelligence. However, Cherednychenko’s work is limited in sources and ignores key events that marked changes in the OUN’s relationship with the Germans. While the diaspora produced one-sided histories of the group’s resistance to totalitarianism, historians like Cherednychenko produced biased accounts of their collaboration. The result is two competing narratives focused more on contradicting the opposing viewpoint than incorporating this complicated debate into a new, more holistic history.

Another tendency in Soviet, and even modern Russian, historiography is to present the history of Russia and Ukraine as one. In an article from July 2021, Vladimir Putin, the current president of Russia, traced the origins of the modern Russian and Ukrainian states back to the Kyivan Rus’. Although this article was published in 2021, this line of thinking dates back to the Soviet Union. While it introduced the West to this

305 Vitalii Cherednychenko, Collaborationists, translated by Igor Puchkov, (Kyiv: Politvidav Ukraine, 1975).
theory, in Russia this article presented nothing new. He argued that after the breakdown of the Kyivan state, a divergence started to separate the former peoples of this medieval state. Putin also argues that Ukrainian leaders attempted to reunite with Moscow during this period of separation. Putin provides the example of the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnyts’kyi, who led a rebellion against Polish-Lithuanian rule in the 17th century. During his rebellion, Khmelnyts’kyi asked for Moscow’s aid as partners, which Putin represented as a request to rejoin the Tsarist empire. While Ukrainian historians like Martowych, who was discussed in the previous chapter, presented Khmelnyts’kyi as a progressive fighting for Ukrainian independence, Putin argues that Khmelnyts’kyi’s rebellion was for the purpose of reuniting with Muscovy.306 This example highlights how the same figure played separate roles in Ukrainian and Russian historiography.

Putin’s article also repeats the accusations leveled towards Ukrainian nationalists in Cherednychenko’s work. He portrays Symon Petliura, the revolutionary leader of Ukraine after World War I, as a traitor who sold the nation to the Poles in exchange for their support against Russia. He also depicts the OUN-UPA and Bandera as Nazi collaborators who enabled the oppressive occupation of the region during World War II. Putin also repeats Cherednychenko’s mistakes concerning Ukrainian agency. This article describes the creation of the modern Ukrainian state as a Soviet endeavor, which ignores the efforts of Ukrainians to found a state on their own after World War I. Putin refuses to accept that the Ukrainian identity in Ukraine today is legitimate, describing it as a “forced

change of identity” and part of an “anti-Russia” project.\(^{307}\) He argues that the West is responsible for Ukraine’s anti-Russian line, repeating Cherednichenko’s ideas about Ukrainian nationalists working as Western spies.

As the Soviets tried to depict the OUN-UPA as fascist collaborators, the Ukrainian diaspora’s historians worked to create an image of heroic freedom fighters. With each side trying to discredit the other, the truth about the OUN-UPA became increasingly obfuscated. When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the diaspora’s version of events and the Soviet systems of information control collided. There was also a large movement of Ukrainians living in the diaspora to Ukraine. Among those who returned to Ukraine were Jarosława Stetsko, the widow of Yaroslav Stetsko, and Yuri Shukhevych, the son of UPA and Nachtigall officer Roman Shukhevych. Stetsko continued her husband’s political activism, returning to Ukraine in 1991 and founding a far-right nationalist party based on the OUN called the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. She later served as a representative of the Verkhovna Rada until her death in 2003.\(^{308}\) Shukhevych established himself as the leader of the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self Defense (UNA-UNSO), a far-right paramilitary organization.\(^{309}\) In this way, the radical nationalism of the diaspora now influenced politics within newly independent Ukraine, which sought to distance itself from official Soviet historiography and establish a national memory in opposition to Soviet claims. Part of the necessity of a shared history was to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian state


that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As noted by Per Anders Rudling, modern Ukraine is a highly divided region in terms of historical memory and interpretation. For Western Ukrainians, the period of Soviet rule was one of foreign domination, with Moscow representing a colonizing force and Ukraine a colonized territory. However, Eastern Ukrainians see their region’s history as linked to that of Russia due to the long periods of shared history and belonging to the same state.310 This division came to a head during the “Orange Revolution” of 2004-2005 when Ukraine faced dissolution as the Donets’k Oblast’ sought to create an independent federation. However, a compromise was reached, and Viktor Yushchenko became president of Ukraine. Under Yushchenko’s presidency, an official narrative of Ukrainian history started to take shape, and the myth of the OUN-UPA was central to these efforts.

During his term as Ukraine’s third president, which lasted from 2005 until 2010, Yushchenko sought to create a common Ukrainian identity by promoting an official national history. As part of these efforts, he created the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP). The UINP served as an organ for the politicization of history, and one of the main topics they sought to control the narrative of was the history of the OUN-UPA. A critical component of this mission was the role played by Volodymyr Viatrovych.311 Yushchenko appointed Viatrovych as the UINP archivist in 2008, but Viatrovych had already contributed significantly to the nationalist retelling of history. Viatrovych is a member of the L’viv-based Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement (TsDVR), which is funded by private diaspora organizations in the United

310 Rudling, “Managing Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” 100.
311 Rudling, “Managing Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” 104.
States that want to depict the soldiers of the OUN-UPA as liberators from foreign oppression. He kept his narrative of the OUN-UPA’s wartime activities in line with the nationalist version of events that first appeared in the diaspora. A topic Viatrovych paid particular attention to was the organization’s relationship with Jews. Like Martowych, Viatrovych called attention to Jewish membership in the OUN-UPA as counterevidence of accusations of antisemitism. By omitting evidence from Holocaust survivors, German, and Soviet documents, Viatrovych painted a picture of OUN-UPA and Jewish collaboration against totalitarianism. He also uncritically used forgeries from OUN-UPA veterans, such as the Stella Krentzbach/Krenzbach letter to the *Ukrainian Echo* titled “I Owe My Life to the UPA,” written by Petro Mirchuk, a veteran of the OUN.

Historians such as John-Paul Himka and Per Anders Rudling have shown that Viatrovych’s memory management is built upon a one-sided view of the OUN-UPA and lacks a comprehensive picture of the group’s history.

Although Viatrovych lost his post at the UINP following the election of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, he was appointed director of the Institute after Yanukovych lost power in 2014 following the Euromaidan demonstrations. During his time outside of the government spotlight, Viatrovych was not inactive. From 2010 to 2011, he was a visiting

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scholar at Harvard’s Ukrainian Research Institute, working extensively with the Mykola Lebed collection there.316 After his time at Harvard, Viatrovych went on a speaking tour in the United States and Canada, discussing the role of civil society in preserving national memory and the “return to the methods of the criminal Soviet regime” in Ukraine.317 In 2013 Viatrovych also wrote an article titled “The Polish-Ukrainian Memory Monologue” for the Kyiv Post, which explained the 1943 massacres of Poles as part of a broader conflict between the UPA and the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK). He acknowledged that the UPA undoubtedly committed war crimes against Polish civilians but then wrote, “Military crimes were an inherent part of World War II. There are plenty of reasons to accuse all participating armies of them.”318 Regardless of Viatrovych’s intent, this statement trivializes the crimes committed by the UPA against Polish civilians. After Viatrovych was appointed director of the UINP in 2014, he continued his rehabilitation of the OUN-UPA, helping draft “de-communization” laws outlawing criticism of the group and prohibiting the falsification of WWII history.319 Another step of Ukraine’s de-communization that Viatrovych contributed to was the renaming of streets and plazas in major Ukrainian cities, changing the names from Soviet-associated titles to Ukrainian nationalist ones, such as the change in Kyiv from “Moskovs’kyi

316 Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA, and the Holocaust,” 37.
319 Rudling, “Memory Management,” 117.
Prospekt” (Moscow Avenue) to Prospekt Bandery (Bandera Avenue) in 2016.\textsuperscript{320} This politicization of the OUN-UPA’s history makes challenging the official narrative about the group difficult.

The promotion of aggressive nationalism in Ukraine also fueled the nationalism in the diaspora. Among other factors, this led to the erection of at least one more monument in the United States. In 2013, a new monument appeared in Baraboo, Wisconsin. Modeled on the monument in Ellenville, the Baraboo monument has the same four busts of Petliura, Konovalets, Shukhevych, and Bandera flanking a large \textit{tryzub}. Also like the monument in Ellenville, this monument is hosted by a SUMA camp in Baraboo. The monument’s dedication ceremony was on 30 June 2013, the 72\textsuperscript{nd} anniversary of Stetsko’s ill-fated proclamation of Ukrainian statehood. In a speech during the monument’s dedication, Pavlo Bandriwsky, the president of the SUMA Chicago branch, reminded the ceremony’s attendants of their mission to preserve Ukraine’s “true history” and the ongoing struggle for Ukraine’s freedom against “oligarchic clans” who view Ukraine as “an opportunistic territory to be exploited for their personal monetary gains and vicious lust for power.”\textsuperscript{321} The themes of sacrifice, martyrdom, and heroism also appeared in Bandriwsky’s speech, and although he recognizes the OUN’s collaboration with the Germans briefly, referring to them as “former partners,” the theme of resistance once again takes priority.

\textsuperscript{320} Rudling, “Memory Management,” 118.
As noted by Henry Redman in the *Wisconsin Examiner*, the monuments to the OUN-UPA in the United States are generally unobtrusive. He wrote of the 2013 ceremony in Baraboo, “While Bandriwsky wanted Ukrainian teenagers from Chicago to know about the men honored by the statues, his organization left the residents of Baraboo, where the statues are located, in the dark [about the monuments].” While this statement connotates some sinister motive behind the commemoration of the OUN and UPA, it seems more likely that the broader community of Baraboo was uninvolved in the monument-planning process and the modern members of SUMA have simply made the myth of the OUN-UPA their reality. Once again, the monuments at the SUMA camp in Baraboo serve the purpose of youth education and shaping the views of young Ukrainian Americans. Among the main goals for each year’s camp sessions is for attendees to “learn about the Heroes of Ukraine.” This goal was made clear in Bandriwsky’s speech, as he said, “We want our children who come here to camp, summer or winter, to know the history of our heroes.” This aim of nationalist youth education illustrates how historical myths about the OUN and UPA are present in today’s diaspora, which helps historians understand how they developed in Ukraine.

The commemoration and defense of the OUN-UPA as Heroes of Ukraine has not gone unchallenged. In 2005, when the United States appointed Myron Kuropas, a Ukrainian-American historian who consistently downplayed the antisemitism of the

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323 “Starshyj Camp 2021 Registration,” Glue Up, (July 2021): https://app.glueup.com/event%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%80%d1%88%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%96%d1%96%d1%80-2021-34766/.
324 Bandriwsky, “Dedication of the Monuments.”
organization, as a delegate to the inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko, there was a vocal outcry from the American Jewish community. Upon his return from Kyiv, Kuropas refused to rescind past statements about the role of Jews in the persecution of Ukrainians under Soviet rule and the allegation that Jewish organizations use the accusation of antisemitism to raise money. He said, “My conclusion after all this has been… look, you [Jews] need the Ukrainians to kick around, because this is how you raise money, because ‘The antisemites are coming, the antisemites are coming, so we’re in danger.’” These statements echo those he made during the trial of John Demjanjuk in the 1980s, when he played a significant role in raising money for Demjanjuk’s defense. Although Kuropas is not a Holocaust denier and acknowledges Ukrainian collaboration during World War II, he justifies this wartime collaboration by citing the common association between Jews and Communists of the time, claiming the Ukrainians had a right to be angry. This echoes the Judeo-Bolshevik myth that pervaded OUN propaganda during the war. The groups outraged over the decision to send Kuropas to Ukraine demanded to know who chose him to be a member of the delegation, and the answer to that question is still unclear. A State Department representative, Richard Boucher, said “I think that’s really a White House question. It was a White House delegation that did accompany us.” The White House, in turn, said they were unaware of Kuropas’s views before sending him.

A more recent example of pushback from the United States are the articles that recognized these sites as monuments to Nazi collaborators. The journalist Lev Golinkin

was at the forefront of the effort to bring attention to this issue, and his article about Nazi collaborator monuments in the United States inspired later articles like Henry Redman’s report on the monument in Baraboo. However, aside from these two journalists, the monuments to the OUN and UPA in the United States have not garnered much attention from the press or academics. More often, pushback comes from Jewish communities protesting commemoration efforts in Ukraine.

An example from Ukraine can be found in 2017, in the wake of Viatrovych’s efforts to rename streets in Kyiv after Ukrainian nationalist heroes. In response to the renaming of these thoroughfares, the Simon Wiesenthal Center issued a statement that said:

We absolutely oppose and condemn any attempt to turn murderers in the service of the Nazis into Ukrainian heroes. Such a policy is not only an insult to the memory of their innocent victims, but an affront to human dignity and historical truth.328

Similarly, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) has denounced the commemoration of Ukrainian heroes who were complicit in the murder of Jews. During celebrations of Symon Petliura in October 2017, the WJC objected to the description of him as an “honest man,” saying instead that he was a “cruel barbarian, indisputably responsible for pogroms in which 35,000-45,000 Jews were murdered.”329 They also issued a statement in 2019 following the dedication of a monument to Shukhevych in Ivano-Frankivsk, saying, “We urge the government of Ukraine and the city of Ivano-Frankivsk to step back

and seriously consider the disgraceful nature of this practice, and the ultimate disrespect and dishonor it demonstrates to the Jewish Community.”

The controversial history of the OUN-UPA remains the purview of professional historians. The nationalization of DP camp life led to the export of Ukrainian nationalism to the United States, where its members found new avenues to influence through diaspora organizations. The OUN influence in these groups canonized an inaccurate narrative of Ukrainian resistance, propagated by diaspora academics and publishing organs like the Prolog Research Corporation. Key moments such as the assassination of Stepan Bandera and the OSI’s prosecution of post-WWII Ukrainian immigrants as war criminals challenged this narrative, which created an identity crisis within the diaspora community. These events, coupled with the accusation of collaboration, led to the commemoration of the OUN and UPA through monuments, physical representations of the resistance myth where nationalists could take shelter in the narratives they built for themselves.

As James Young notes, modern efforts of memorialization and commemoration are often “fraught with argument, division, and competing agendas.”331 While it is true that the legacies of the OUN and UPA remain controversial and disputed, these debates were not incorporated into the monument planning. Monument planners selected a single narrative, emphasizing Ukrainian victimhood and resistance while ignoring the OUN and UPA’s crimes against others. They also ignored the bitter infighting between the

disparate factions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, promoting instead a legacy of unity and shared identity. As theorist Sigmund Giedion notes, the drive to create monuments is unavoidable because the “demand for monumentality cannot… be suppressed.”\textsuperscript{332} This means that the commemoration of the OUN and UPA among the diaspora community is likely to continue. It is also likely to continue given the present political situation in Ukraine. The whitewashing of the OUN-UPA’s activities was met with opposition from the Soviets, who chose to focus their narrative on the period of the OUN’s formal collaboration with the Nazis. This challenge to the diaspora’s history of the OUN-UPA had a lasting effect, as they chose to entrench themselves deeper in the resistance myth while dismissing the Soviets’ accusations as propaganda. These efforts of delegitimizing Ukraine are ongoing, as evidenced by the Russian Embassy’s tweet about the Canadian monuments in 2017 and the recent article by Vladimir Putin. The opposition to the Russian narrative has become institutionalized in contemporary Ukraine, where state-sponsored organizations managed history to craft a shared Ukrainian identity in opposition to previous Soviet histories. American institutions are also complicit in this mythmaking. From the start of Mykola Lebed’s relationship with the CIA, the United States has allowed former Nazi collaborators to reshape the history of the OUN-UPA. This trend continued during Lebed’s time at Prolog and into the 2000s when the US government sent Kuropas to the inauguration of Yushchenko and Viatrovykh worked at Harvard. This politicization and control of history have led to

\textsuperscript{332} Quoted in Young, \textit{The Stages of Memory}, 13.
widespread acceptance of the resistance myth in Ukraine and, without redress, will continue to hinder Holocaust awareness in the nation.
Conclusion

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have enjoyed a legacy as heroic resisters of totalitarianism since the end of World War II. However, as this thesis has shown, the degree of resistance to the German occupation of Ukraine was limited, while their collaboration with the Nazis was extensive. Members of the OUN trained with German intelligence units starting in 1938. In 1941, the Ukrainians trained by the Abwehr aided the German Army with its invasion of the Soviet Union. Nazi authorities ordered the arrest of OUN-B leaders Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko shortly after the conquest of L’viv, but this did not end Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. The OUN secretly encouraged its members to continue working with German authorities in auxiliary police battalions like Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, which was led by the militant Roman Shukhevych. Only after the Germans started to lose the war in 1943, in the wake of the Battle of Stalingrad, did the OUN resist the German occupation. Even after this, the focus of the OUN and UPA was less on attacking the retreating German army and more on slowing the advance of the Soviets. Concurrently, they perpetrated a violent ethnic cleansing campaign against Polish civilians living in territories the nationalists considered Ukrainian and aided German authorities through their participation in the Holocaust.

Despite these factors, the OUN and UPA emerged from World War II as heroes in Ukrainian historiography. Sanitized accounts of the groups’ activities and doctored evidence produced during the war helped reinforce the image of the OUN-UPA as a resistance force. With an ostensibly democratic platform, veterans of the OUN-UPA like
Mykola Lebed and Ivan Hryn’okh earned the trust of American intelligence agencies like the CIA. This clandestine relationship helped them move to the United States, where they continued to publish nationalist histories that reinforced the resistance myth. Alongside these published histories was a politically active diaspora, which at its core was anti-Soviet. When confronted by Soviet accounts accusing the OUN-UPA of collaboration with fascist forces, the diaspora responded with vehement denials based on the nationalist myth of the group proliferated in the Displaced Persons camps after World War II. This defense extended to Ukrainians who were not members of the OUN or UPA as well, as evidenced by the outcry from the diaspora during the trial of John Demjanjuk. Challenges to the official narrative about the OUN-UPA produced a need to reinforce the myth of resistance, which was embodied by the group’s commemoration through monuments. Alongside the monuments emerged ritualized commemoration of these groups on important Ukrainian holidays, such as the Heroes’ Holiday, and efforts to educate Ukrainian American youth in the nationalist tradition.

The monuments dedicated to the OUN-UPA represent the popularization of the resistance myth and the need to reinforce it for future generations. The role of youth organizations was crucial for these efforts, as they were directly responsible for the nationalist indoctrination of young Ukrainian Americans at the SUMA camps where these monuments are. Politically active diaspora organizations with nationalist influences built three of these monuments, while parish communities built the other three. This trend reflects the dichotomy of remembrance within the Ukrainian diaspora. While three of the monuments represent the efforts of the vanguard of Ukrainian nationalism to preserve the legacy of their heroes, the other three represent communal efforts to remember loved
ones who died fighting against the Soviet Union. Similarly in Canada, monuments at
Ukrainian youth centers served the purpose of national education under the guise of
cultural preservation, and public memorials to unknown fighters recognized their
sacrifices. While these monuments serve different purposes, they reinforce the same
myths of resistance while providing physical manifestations of the denial of
collaboration. These monuments also provide a view into the wider issue of
commemorating Nazi collaborators among different diasporas, as there are also
monuments to Belarussian, Lithuanian, Russian, and French collaborators in the United
States as well.333 This issue is not confined to the US, as monuments to Nazi
collaborators can also be found throughout Europe, Australia, Canada, and India.334

Without a fuller understanding of the history of the OUN-UPA, the
commemoration of this group is likely to continue. This is evidenced by more recent
attempts to recognize the OUN and UPA as heroes in modern Ukraine and continued
commemoration of these groups in the United States. These efforts are shaped by the
perceived need to create a shared national identity around resistance and struggle. A
striking facet of this narrative is that it proposes a legacy of unity in the Ukrainian
nationalist movement even though the history of this movement is marked by bitter
infighting and rivalries. They also seek to counter Russian narratives that continue to be
influenced by Soviet propaganda. After the opening of independent Ukraine, nationalists
in the diaspora travelled back to help build their young nation. This reintroduced the

334 Lev Golinkin, “How many monuments honor fascists, Nazis, and murderers of Jews? You’ll be
honor-fascists-nazis-and-murderers-of-jews-youll-be/.
mythicized historical account of the OUN and UPA to Ukrainians who lived under Soviet rule for decades. Although they were more frequent in the early 2000s, the legislative protections for the OUN and UPA passed in the 2010s prevent a critical reevaluation of these groups. This represents a politicization of history that hinders the research of controversial topics for fear of prosecution. The nationalization of history in turn inspired further developments in the United States, evidenced by the continued commemoration of these groups through yearly summer camps celebrating their legacy, holidays, and the new monument in Baraboo. The recent attempts to commemorate the OUN and UPA have been met with resistance from Jewish organizations who decry the commemoration of Nazi collaborators around the world. However, without document-based research countering the official narrative of the groups, it is unlikely that their status in Ukraine will change.

At the same time, Ukraine has recently shown signs that it is willing to back away from its commemoration of the OUN and UPA. When Volodymyr Zelensky was elected president in 2019, he dismissed Viatrovych, the historian who controversially campaigned to rehabilitate the OUN and UPA in Ukrainian national memory.335 When the Ukrainian ambassador to Germany Andrij Melnyk said that Stepan Bandera was “not a mass murderer of Jews and Poles,” Kyiv distanced themselves from this statement. He also said Banderites were uninvolved in the Holocaust and any connection between the two was the product of Russian propaganda. Kyiv responded by saying that this was

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Melnyk’s personal opinion and did not reflect the position of Ukraine’s other foreign ministers. Melnyk was also dismissed from his position by Zelensky shortly after this statement. This recent event shows that Ukraine is starting to come to terms with elements of its controversial past.

Amid the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine War, and Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, it is necessary to challenge preconceived notions of Ukrainian history. One of the justifications Moscow provided for its invasion was the “denazification” of Ukraine. This justification builds upon several decades of Soviet historiography that branded Ukraine and Ukrainians as fascist collaborators and agents of Western powers. This justification is entirely propagandistic, but like most effective propaganda contains a seed of truth. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were certainly fascist collaborators, but they do not exist in modern Ukraine. However, the staunch defense of these organizations, especially among far-right and neo-Nazi groups, remains an issue that Ukraine and Ukrainians abroad must address if they are to move forward from this history.

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Appendix

(Figure 1) Map marking monuments dedicated to the OUN and UPA across the United States and Canada, created by the author.

(Figure 2) “The Heroes Monument” in Ellenville, New York. Photo credit to Moss Robeson.