The Muslim Brotherhood: How its Troubled History Suggests that it Will Not merely Survive but Thrive in the Twenty-First Century

Ben Morris Lindstrom-Ives

University of Vermont
The Muslim Brotherhood: How its Troubled History Suggests that it Will Not Merely Survive but Thrive in the Twenty-first Century

by

Ben Morris Lindstrom-Ives

University of Vermont

Honors College Committee

College of Arts and Sciences

Department of Global Studies
Abstract:

My thesis is that from its foundation in 1928 the social, religious, and ideological views officially propounded and supported by the Muslim Brotherhood have been an uneasy synthesis of violently opposing social, political, and spiritual views embraced by the more influential and articulate theorists and operatives within its ranks and that these varying views are broadly representative of the profound social, religious, and political divisions that have characterized the evolution of Egyptian society since the 19th century. My thesis will argue that the ways in which the radically opposed approaches of various theorists and operatives active within the Brotherhood have been instrumental in promoting ideological positions that have at key moments in recent Egyptian history resulted in rancorous, nearly crippling, discord within the organization itself and have on a number of critical occasions inspired unofficially sanctioned violence in the public sphere.

Statement of the Problem

My thesis will argue that the heated and often violent ideological and spiritual disputes within the ranks of the Brotherhood have played a critical role in the inability of the organization to present, promote, and organize a coherent ideological vision and that these disputes played a vital role in preventing the creation of a political apparatus acceptable to a majority of the most influential wielders of power in Egyptian society. My thesis will argue that the Brotherhood’s ever-shifting, ideological program and the often violent departures from it on the part of its members have brought it into repeated conflict with the Egyptian military establishment and
negatively impacted its relations with the administrations of three Egyptian leaders - Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-70), Anwar el-Sadat (1970-81) and, ironically, that of Muhammed Morsi, whom it brought to power as President in 2012. My thesis will argue that the inherent organic weaknesses and fractures, present in the organization from its beginnings, were predictive of the organization’s ultimate failure to endure as a viable legal political and social entity.

My thesis is that the shifts in policy in the Muslim Brotherhood that have characterized the organization from its inception are themselves representative of fractures present in Egyptian society long before independence from Britain was granted in 1952. Those fractures are vividly illustrated in the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) the most influential theorist of the Brotherhood during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser. A radical Muslim, Qutb, whose opinions remain potent for millions of Muslims today, was frank in his comprehensive dismissal of the social, political, and religious views espoused by Europe and the United States. Qutb argued forcefully that all such values and considerations must be “eliminated” from Egyptian society and the violent opposition to them as prescribed in a radicalized version of traditional Muslim belief (“jihad”) was entirely justified in achieving that goal.

Qutb’s radically conservative interpretation of traditional Islam and the manner in which he pursued its adoption by the membership of the Brotherhood was by no means universally approved by its membership. The most articulate opposition to it was eventually formulated by Hassan al-Hudaybi, the second “General Guide,” or leader of the Brotherhood, who assumed power after the assassination of the Brotherhood’s official founder Hassan al-Banna in 1949. Al-Hudaybi regarded himself as a realist who rejected the radical interpretation of Islam that Sayyid Qutb was deeply invested in promoting. In contrast to Qutb, Al- Hudaybi, a devout Muslim
himself, argued that the notion of “gradual Islamization,” one that prescribed cooperation with the administrations of Gamal Abdel Nasser, was not merely desirable but necessary to guarantee the survival of the Brotherhood as a functioning social and political entity.

My thesis will argue that the opposing philosophies of these two thinkers provide in broad terms an explanation for the extreme polarity of thought and action that have characterized the Brotherhood since its inception. The thesis will argue that the waxing and waning of the power of individuals adhering to one faction or the other within the organization, and the organization’s inability to contain the more radical elements of its membership, were directly responsible for the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981. My thesis will argue that the Brotherhood’s often confused and contradictory policies ultimately resulted in a vexed relationship with the administration of President Hosni Mubarak. It will argue that those same policies were instrumental in the organization’s inability to provide a coherent overall vision and political apparatus acceptable to various Egyptian elites following its triumph at the polls and the election of Muhammed Morsi in 2012. It will argue that the Brotherhood, now legally disbanded, but spiritually intact in the minds of millions of Egyptians, is likely to survive and evolve into forms as yet undefined and that those evolved forms, most likely radically conservative in nature, will provide platforms for the ongoing battle for the soul of Egypt and its people.
Introduction

My thesis will be examining several important themes in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The first theme of the thesis is an analysis of the Brotherhood’s troubled coexistence with the Egyptian Government. Regime by regime from the beginning of the Gamal Abdel Nasser Presidency in 1954 up to the election of Abd Fateh el-Sisi in 2013, these presidential regimes ultimately wielded different attitudes and policies towards the rank and file and leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of these changes can be explained through the processes of ideological ‘polarization’ in the leadership of the organization. From the moment of its foundation in 1928 in Ismailia Egypt by Hasan al-Banna up to the present day, the once united Brotherhood evolved into ‘many’ different factions and splinter groups. Al-Banna would serve as the First Murshid or leader of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1928 until his untimely assassination in 1949. Moreover, my thesis argues that despite its many structural and leadership changes, along with the differing policies of repression and accommodation as exemplified by the different Egyptian presidencies, the Brotherhood is an organization that through its persistence and sheer adaptability continues to survive to the present day.

Following the death of the Brotherhood’s first (Murshid) leader Hasan al-Banna in 1949, the Brotherhood would undergo many significant structural and political changes. Prior to the death of its First Murshid, rifts and divisions were already developing in the leadership of the Brotherhood. Some members of the organization wanted the Brotherhood to become more openly involved in politics, while others sought to preserve its status solely as a benevolent society or a charitable organization. This along with many other debates in the leadership of the
Brotherhood can explain the massive increase of factionalism and ‘ideological’ polarization which occurred in the organization during its early history. Ultimately the leadership of the organization would be passed on to its second Murshid Hassan al-Hudaybi. Al-Hudaybi, a former jurist in the Cairo judicial system, would also become the ‘defacto’ leader of the ‘moderate’ factions of the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi as leader of the organization held the Brotherhood’s goal of eventually creating and establishing an Islamic state or Caliphate in Egypt. From al-Hudaybi’s perspective, however, an Islamic State could only be created through joint accommodation and cooperation with not only the Egyptian Government, but also with all tenets of modern society. Al-Hudaybi’s willingness to cooperate with the Egyptian Government, is reflective of the fact that he sincerely believed that ‘Islamization’ of the Egyptian state could only be made possible through peaceful and popular consent amongst its citizens.

By contrast the radical Islamic philosopher and theologist Sayyid Qutb, became the leader of the ‘radical’ and ‘jihadist’ factions of the Brotherhood. Having lived and traveled in the United States for two years on a student sponsored trip from Cairo University from 1947-49, Qutb would develop very significant attitudes and beliefs towards the United States and the ‘West,’ concluding that both areas of the world were entering into serious moral decay, having evolved into what Qutb called ‘apostate’ states. This meant in turn that Qutb believed that the former colonial powers of Great Britain and the United States were by nature cancerous, and that they sought to spread all the evil and corrupt tenets of ‘modernity’ and secularism to Egypt and the greater Muslim World. Moreover, Qutb believed that ‘any’ form of organized government was blasphemous by nature, and that only God (Allah) could be worshipped as a
sovereign. This sacred ‘sovereignty’ which Qutb envisioned was broken and betrayed by modern day governments in their worship of leaders which in turn marked versions of idolatry.

From Qutb’s perspective Europe and particularly the United States had evolved into the realm of ‘Jahilliya’ universal ignorance. Therefore, the only solution to guarantee the creation of a new ‘Caliphate’ in Egypt from Qutb’s perspective was to wage ‘Jihad’ a Holy Crusade on the behalf of all Muslims against the United States and the ‘West.’ From Qutb’s perspective, all possibilities of negotiation and peace with the United States and the ‘West’ had been eliminated, and he fervently believed that Jihad was the ‘only’ viable option for the world’s (Umma) Muslim community. Qutb’s radical espousal of ‘domestic’ and ‘global’ Jihad against all vestiges of secularism and modern life in Egypt along with the rest of the Muslim world, would lead to two major developments in the organization. Qutb’s radical factions would help lead the Muslim Brotherhood to face 16 years of unprecedented persecution under the Nasser Presidency from 1954 to 1970. Having been sentenced to prison along with Murshid Hassan al-Hudaybi following President Nasser’s assassination attempt by Brotherhood member Muhammed Abdel Latif in Manshiya Square in Alexandria in 1954, the Brotherhood would face its first major period of repression. Resulting in the illegallization and arrest of tens of thousand of Brotherhood and Islamist individuals, Nasser’s massive persecution of the Brotherhood and its associated Islamist groups in Egypt would further strengthen the development of radical factions and splinter groups in the Brotherhood. These original splits which were created in the early 1950s, would ‘never’ be resolved in the organization’s history. The story of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Gamal Abdel Nasser era from 1954 to 1970 would prove to be the single most important epoch in the organization’s history. Once created and established as a benevolent society under the foundation
of Hasan al-Banna in 1928, by the time of the Free Officers Revolution of 1952-54 which led to a coup de tat against King Farouk and the appointment of Muhammed Naguib as the first president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood would cease to be a united organization and would never recover from its massive growth of factionalism.

The very ‘survivability’ of the Brotherhood and its factions today, can be largely attributed to its sheer adaptability and persistence over the course of sixty years. Despite the many changes which the Brotherhood underwent during periods of oppression and accommodation under the regimes of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar el-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Muhammed Morsi, and Abd Fateh el-Sisi, the Brotherhood has been able to continuously adapt to these changes by the work of its own internal mechanisms and forces, along with its continued engagement with Egyptian politics. Much of the success and strong coherency of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood today can be attributed to its strong organic connection to Egyptian Society as seen in terms of its growth and persistence.

The Brotherhood upon its foundation by its First Murshid Hassan al-Banna in Ismailia Egypt in 1928, was originally created as a grassroots movement/benevolent society. The Brotherhood’s original mission was to help aid Egypt’s rural poor through the construction of benevolent/societal institutions such as hospitals, schools, madrases (Quranic schools) and mosques. Due largely to its successful work as a benevolent society in Egypt along with growing protests against Zionist settlements in the British Mandate of Palestine, membership in the Brotherhood would increase from around 800 in 1936 to 200,000 by 1938. By 1938, the Brotherhood was for the first time in its history truly engaged in politics. Formally functioning as a benevolent society, the Brotherhood would become increasingly involved in the realm of
Islamic politics and Arab Nationalism both inside and outside of Egypt. The Brotherhood’s growth and expansion needless to say was greatly aided by the ‘Palestinian Uprisings’ of 1938 which was led by Palestinian nationalists who were protesting the influx of Zionist settlers into the British Mandate of Palestine, and for its support of full Egyptian independence from Great Britain.

From this moment on during the Brotherhood’s expansion and its ever more influential role in politics, the organization would arguably evolve in the course of its history as the most influential and powerful Islamist political organization in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim World. The moment that the Brotherhood became ‘political’ in the late 1930s, created a variety of consequences for the organization. Significantly it would transform the organization’s status from a charitable organization not unlike that of the Red Cross, to one which would play an increasingly influential role in the politics and societal institutions of Egypt.

The legacy of the Brotherhood’s success and endearing impact in the world today, can be attributed most recently to the 2012 Egyptian Presidential Election of Muhammed Morsi. Winning around 51% of the Egyptian popular vote following President Mubarak’s overthrow in 2011, the Brotherhood was at this time the most well organized political unit in Egypt. Despite many years of constant changes and polarization in the leadership of the ‘Ikhwan’, Morsi’s faction of the Brotherhood would prove itself to be incredibly well organized, despite a long history of decentralization in the Brotherhood leadership. Holding a strong grassroots connection to the Egyptian nation with its strong aid of Egypt’s rural poor and its advancement of potential Islamic democracy, the Brotherhood gained and received significant support among the majority of the Egyptian people.
Today Egypt has an approximately 95% Sunni Muslim population, many of whom would have most likely wanted to have seen some form of Shari’a embodied in the laws and Constitution of Egypt. Much of Morsi and the Brotherhood’s overall success in winning the Presidential Election of 2012 can be attributed to the Brotherhood’s strong support and promise of reestablishing Islamic values, values which many Egyptians had not seen properly implemented since the end of the Anwar el-Sadat era in 1981. Due, however, to Morsi’s broadening of executive powers, his unspecified terms of the degree to which he would apply elements of Shari’a in the new constitution, his rampant alienation of the nation’s millions of Coptic Christians and liberals, along with a lack of technocrats and intelligentsia in his office, Morsi’s one year term in power would soon come to an end. This conclusion was made possible by a massive coup de tat staged by the Egyptian Military under the coordination of General Abd Fateh el-Sisi on July 3, 2013. General Sisi was elected as Egypt’s sixth President on June 8 2014, and as of last week former President Muhammed Morsi was sentenced to twenty years in Prison by an Egyptian Tribunal Court.

Despite Morsi’s failure to retain his power as the first Islamist President in Egypt, the Brotherhood nonetheless holds a special legacy in the country today which has contributed to its very survival. Because of the Brotherhood’s ability to adapt, evolve, and diversify, it is an organization which is bound to survive to the present day. Despite many years of oppression and illegallization as exemplified by the Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hosni Mubarak, and Abd Fateh el-Sisi regimes, it has managed to stay coherent because of its many factions and splinter groups, along with its success working as a benevolent society. Despite the fact that the leadership of the
Muslim Brotherhood became heavily ‘decentralized’ after the death of its First Murshid Hasan al-Banna in 1949, its very ‘polarization’ has arguably contributed to its survivability today.

In order to better understand the history and politics of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood today, one must examine the origins of the Brotherhood during the early life of its First Murshid Hasan al-Banna. Born in 1906 in al-Mahmudiyya, Egypt, al-Banna would grow up in an Egypt which was ruled under full occupation by the British Empire. During his early teen years al-Banna witnessed much of the corruption associated the British including the strict educational laws which prevented all Egyptian men from completing their education by the age of 12, and the economic apartheid that he witnessed between the livelihoods of everyday Egyptian in contrast with that of colonial officials. This and other factors, drew al-Banna ever more closely to allying himself with the ‘nationalist’ movements of this time such as Egyptian patriot Saad Zaghloul’s Wafd Revolution of 1919. Al-Banna was one among millions of other Egyptians sought to gain and receive full independence from the British Empire’s Condominium of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The great nationalistic and revolutionary sentiment which occurred in Egypt at this time, would inspire al-Banna to join and become increasingly involved with local Ikhwans (Islamic Brotherhoods) in Al-Mahmudiyya. These activist groups which shared similar goals to the Wafdist and other nationalist movements of Egypt, would help greatly influence and shape the thought of al-Banna, and consequentially inspired him to create the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimuna) in Ismailia in 1928.
I.

The Origins of the Muslim Brotherhood

During Hasan al-Banna’s pre-teen years, strong revolutionary sentiment would develop in Egypt, and this would soon culminate in the formation of nationalist movements. In November, 1918, the month the Armistice ending the First World War was signed at Compiegne, France, the so-called “Egyptian Revolution of 1919” that would eventually lead to Egyptian independence in 1922, began when a delegation of Egyptian nationalists led by Saad Zaghloul, who in support of the notion of Egyptian independence, would soon find the Wafd (“delegation”) Party, asking High Commissioner Reginald Wingate to end the British Protectorate in Egypt and Sudan. Zaghloul requested that the delegation act as representatives to the next peace conference scheduled to take place in Paris, and requested further that the delegation be allowed to travel to London and make its case in person to representatives of the British government. Wingate refused Zaghloul’s request.

In March, 1919, Zaghloul and his colleagues responded to the refusal with protests, speeches, and printed material that resulted in the arrest of Zaghloul and two other Wafd leaders in early March, 1919, and resulted in their exile to Malta. The arrests provoked widespread outrage among the Egyptian populace. During the last two weeks of March protests against British rule occurred in a number of towns - actions that British authorities met with force. The
properties of large landowners were plundered, whole villages were burned down. Thirteen year old Hasan al-Banna participated in these protests. [7]

Zaghloul was soon released and traveled to Paris to present the case for Egyptian independence to representatives of the Allied countries. Like Indochinese leader Ho Chi Mihn, who with associates was presenting a case for the independence of French Indochina during the same period, Zaghloul was largely ignored. Meanwhile, by July 25, some 800 Egyptians had been killed in the protests and some 1,600 others wounded. As a result of the unrest and the resulting deaths, in December, 1919, the British government in London despatched a Commission of Inquiry that would come to be known as the “Milner Mission,” named for Alfred Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies and former member of Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s wartime cabinet. In 1920 Zaghloul met with Milner on several occasions. Although they reached an understanding of sorts, Zaghloul was uneasy about the manner in which any agreement he signed would go down with the Egyptian public. In February, 1921 the findings of Lord Milner’s mission were published. Milner and his colleagues decided that in the postwar climate, in which numerous French and English colonies around the world were clamoring for independence, the Egyptian Protectorate was unsustainable and ought to be abandoned.

On February 28, 1922 the British government issued a “Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence” - a declaration that ended the British Protectorate over Egypt and granted Egypt nominal independence. The key word is “nominal” in that the agreement was saddled with several important caveats, the most important of which were 1) The declaration did
not extend to Sudan, which would remain under the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, and 2) British military forces would continue to be stationed on Egyptian soil.

In April, 1923, as a result of Britain’s dissolution of its Protectorate over Egypt, a new Egyptian Constitution was promulgated by a thirty member legislative committee that included representatives of all Egyptian political parties and the leaders of important national movements. The Constitution mandated a balance of power between the executive branch of government and the legislative branch. It made the Cabinet answerable to Parliament, but allowed the king to dissolve Parliament - a provision that would be invoked by the King on numerous occasions. Parliament was, however, granted the right to convene on its own if it was not called on to do so on a scheduled date. Superficially, the situation appeared to be positive and workable. In fact, continued British presence in Egypt complicated a situation that would have been complex even without British involvement. Egyptian governance, overseen by the British, would now be divided in a three-way division of power between political factions favoring the progressive Wafd Party on the one hand and those supporting the Egyptian monarchy on the other. [8]

In 1923 before graduating from the school at Damanhur, al-Banna was initiated into the Hassafiya Brotherhood. The Hasafis believed in the importance of dreams and the power of prayer and Qur’anic recitation. They were strictly intolerant of expressions of ecstasy or the mingling of the sexes. Al-Banna would later claim that the Hassafiya Brotherhood was the nucleus or forerunner of the Brotherhood. That year, al-Banna graduated from the school at Damanhur at the first of his class. In 1923, against his father’s wishes, 17-year-old Hassan al-Banna chose not to pursue advanced religious education and moved to Cairo where he enrolled at Dar al-’Ulum, a progressive teachers college. In the following year, Zaghhloul, having returned
from exile, became Prime Minster and the Wafíd Party won 90% of the seats in the Egyptian Parliament. Nevertheless, civil unrest continued and Zaghour was forced to leave the office of Prime Minster. In 1926, he was elected president of the Egyptian Parliament and was able to exert a degree of control over extreme Egyptian nationalists until his death in 1927.

In that same year, during his last year at Dar al-‘Ulum, Hasan al-Banna joined Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimeen (“Young Men’s Muslim Association”) and published more than 15 articles in the organization’s journal Majallat al-Fath. Al-Banna applied for a position as an Arabic instructor at a primary school in Ismailia, headquarters of the British-owned Suez Canal Company, located on the west bank of the Suez Canal, about 70 miles northeast of Cairo. Ismailia was two towns in one, the European quarter with its neat villas, tree-lined streets, and handsome gardens housing the higher echelon employees of the Suez Canal Company. At the edge of the desert stood the other Ismailia, the squalid, overcrowded native quarters, home to ordinary Canal workers. Al-Banna’s experience of the sharp divisions in the makeup of the town exercised a profound influence on his political and religious development. His contact with British administrators and other foreign nationals and the manner in which their modern, and in al-Banna’s view, decadent behavior and ideas were having a detrimental effect on traditional Muslim doctrine and practice left him deeply unsettled. Al-Banna was appalled at the contrast between the luxurious lifestyle led by the British administrators and the miserable conditions of their employees. Nevertheless, he took his role as teacher very seriously. [9]

Al-Banna’s negative attitude towards life in the Canal Zone was matched by his disapproval of the liberal and secular thrust of the Wafíd leadership of Egypt. With that attitude in
mind, Al-Banna preached in various mosques, clubs, and coffee houses in the Zone about the decadence he saw all around him and he actively promulgated the notion of Islamic renewal. At about this time, Al-Banna developed a close relationship with Muhibb al-din al-Khatib (1886-1969), a leading proponent of Salafism and owner of the Salafi Publishing House in Cairo. Another influence on al-Banna’s philosophy during this period was another leading Salafist, Syrian writer and Islamic reformer, Rashid Rida (1865-1935), editor and publisher of the Salafist oriented Islamic magazine “al-Manar” published from 1898 to 1935. Al-Banna was sufficiently impressed by Rida’s teaching and by the magazine itself that he arranged for it to continue publication for several years after Rida’s death in 1935.

According to al-Banna’s later testimony, on March 28, 1928, six Egyptian laborers, employed by various Suez Canal companies - persons less educated and of a lower social class than he - having become aware of al-Banna’s conservative views as a result of his preaching and speechmaking, met with him. Like al-Banna, they were deeply disturbed at the manner in which Egyptians and Muslims generally were treated by the British, and they proposed the creation of a charitable institution that would promote Muslim values. Their proposal was accepted by al-Banna and the organization that would evolve into the “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun,” or “Muslim Brotherhood,” was founded. Within a short time, they opened an evening school for workers, some of whom would eventually rise to positions of power and influence in the Brotherhood. There can be little doubt that the founding members were deeply influenced by al-Banna’s conservative Salafist philosophy. Clearly, from the outset, al-Banna saw himself not merely as the director of a charitable organization but as an Islamic teacher whose thought was derived from some of the most conservative strains of Islam. [10]
Although the family situation into which al-Banna was born was not overtly political, the pervasive anti-British sentiment that prevailed among the Egyptian populace at the time of his birth undoubtedly played a part in his education and spiritual formation. Al-Banna’s early immersion in Qur’anic studies exerted a powerful influence over the eventual course of his life. His youthful membership in Islamic societies strengthened his faith and provided him with an introduction to organizational politics that would be of great use to him later on. His early engagement in anti-British protests sharpened the anti-colonial stance that would eventually become one of the elements of Muslim Brotherhood ideology. His involvement with the Hassafiya Brotherhood would by his own admission provided him with a model for the eventual creation of the Brotherhood. The skills he learned as a member of the Jam’iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimeen and as a contributor to the journal it published sharpened those perceptions. Likewise, al-Banna’s exposure to the social situation that prevailed in the Canal Zone - one characterized by the unapologetic practice of apartheid - combined with his exposure to the notions of Salafist “Islamic renewal,” deepened and clarified his antipathy toward British rule and enlarged his understanding of, and sympathy toward, Egypt’s ignorant and downtrodden lower classes. Al-Banna’s efforts to enlighten, educate, and support those classes - all within the context of a deeply conservative and mystically-tinged version of Islamic dogma - would become the primary stated objective of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the “Muslim Brotherhood.” Al-Banna’s unstinting devotion to that program would become the most important engine of the organization’s early success.
The Muslim Brotherhood from 1928 to 1949

Within two years of its foundation the Muslim Brotherhood, under the masterful leadership of Hasan al-Banna, proved a great success. By 1930 al-Banna and his colleagues managed to collect enough money from members of the Brotherhood, local merchants, and remarkably, the Suez Canal Company to build a mosque and several schools in which religious training was strictly conservative. When the Brotherhood’s activities and the building of the mosque and the schools attracted favorable mention in the Egyptian press, al-Banna promoted the creation of a magazine, the official organ of the Brotherhood, the editorship of which he turned over to Cairo publisher Mihibb al-din al-Khatib. [11]

Despite its seemingly harmless charitable activities in the Canal Zone and in Cairo, the Brotherhood provoked criticism virtually from the moment it was founded, and as its projects met with greater and greater success, criticism of it and its founder steadily mounted. Some authorities suggest that the Brotherhood’s engagement with politics began in 1932 when a committee formed by al-Banna drafted a letter to the Minister of the Interior suggesting steps that would eliminate legal prostitution in Egypt.

By some al-Banna was held to be a republican working in secret against King Fuad. Others accused him of being a Wafdist, working against the administration of Prime Minister
Isma’il Sidqi, Prime Minister of Egypt from 1930 to 1933, and a sworn enemy of the Wafd and the Egyptian left. Critics argued that in accepting funds from the Suez Canal Company, al-Banna had revealed himself to be a stooge of the British and their European imperialist cronies. Some Coptic Christians accused him of attempting to foment sectarian violence, and a local shaykh maintained that al-Banna was encouraging members of the Brotherhood to worship him in the place of Allah. Although it is a measure of al-Banna’s skill that he was eventually able to defend himself and his organization against the charges, their virulence and sheer variety testify to the Brotherhood’s polarizing effect on public opinion, even in its formative years. [12]

In 1932 al-Banna married a woman chosen by his mother from a pious merchant family. Although al-Banna almost never spoke of her in public and scarcely mentions her in his Memoirs, her presence in his life is said to have stabilized his day-to-day life and in freeing him from the threat of female temptation (finat al-nisa’) served to insulate him from the possibility of scandal. She would ultimately bear him two sons and six daughters, two of whom would die young. Later in that same year, at al-Banna’s request, the headquarters of the Brotherhood were moved to the ground floor of a house al-Banna had rented for his family in Cairo, and from that point the capital city would become the focus and main target of Brotherhood activities.

At about this time al-Banna was recorded as saying of the Brotherhood, “Our ideology is guided by the Book of God and the life of his Prophet... In us is every goodness.” Judging from this statement, it would appear that al-Banna’s strategy was to insulate the Brotherhood from criticism and persuade the Egyptian populace that persons or organizations that rejected the aims
and activities of the Brotherhood were not merely impeding the aims of a charitable organization but were in fact rejecting virtue or “goodness.” [13]

From the beginning al-Banna was careful to maintain close control of Brotherhood activities. The new headquarters attracted the attention of the inhabitants of the neighborhood, the news of its presence spread quickly, and al-Banna soon found himself preaching to and instructing the poor of the neighborhood and beyond who were “without learning and the will for it.”

Despite al-Banna’s claims, it was in Cairo that he and the Brotherhood experienced and weathered its first wave of internal discord. While al-Banna was still in the Canal Zone, his younger brother, ‘Abd al-Rahman and a number of his friends had created a small Islamic association, Jam‘iyyat al-Hadara al-Islamiyya, or “Islamic Culture Society.” After the move to Cairo, al-Banna, at his brother’s request, was asked to finance the organization via a monthly stipend from Brotherhood funds. The Brothers in Ismailia strongly objected to al-Banna’s nepotism and the transfer of funds to the capital. As a result, the disagreement between al-Banna and the Ismailia Brothers became the first genuine challenge to al-Banna’s stewardship. Although the issue was evidently resolved within months, it would seem that ill-feeling about the outcome endured long afterward.

These minor setbacks notwithstanding, it was in Cairo that the Brotherhood, under al-Banna’s very able leadership, that it was transformed from a benevolent society with pronounced Sufi elements to a social movement with the attributes of a mass political party. Al-Banna was the primary architect of this transformation, one which he tirelessly supported in speeches, writings, conferences, rallies, and demonstrations. Employing themes that derived from Sufism
and Salafi reform, which emphasized devotion, obedience to Muslim law and tradition, al-Banna fashioned a movement that was profoundly spiritual, generously inclusive, and intensely populist, a potent combination of characteristics that to a considerable degree would insulate the organization from potential attacks by its enemies. Faith in Islam and the notion of performing “good” works were the notions that propelled the Brotherhood and were its fundamental strength, and no one was more aware of that fact than the organization’s creator, Hasan al-Banna.

The period from 1930 to 1936 was one of growth and expansion of the Brotherhood’s activities in Egypt. Although the Brotherhood was prohibited by law from engaging in politics, in 1934 the stipulation that the organization should not be involved in politics was dropped from the Brotherhood’s “General Law of the Society.” Meanwhile, it took up the cause of Muslims at home and abroad, and it was the organization’s outreach to Muslims in other countries, and in British-controlled Palestine in particular, that finally brought its activities to the attention of British intelligence. In March, 1936 al-Banna and the Brotherhood arranged for a visit of a large delegation from a well-known charitable organization based in Beirut, *Jam‘iyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya* (“The Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association.”) About the visit of the Makassed group a member of the “Special Section,” the security element of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, wrote that while he did not believe that at that time the Brotherhood was “in any way dangerous,” he characterized the underlying thrust of the organization with what in retrospect seems to have been remarkable foresight: “I consider that the “Moslem Brethren Society” will in the course of time be in a position to produce a reckless and heedless generation
who will not abstain from selling their lives cheap and whose best wish would be to die as martyrs for the sake of God and their country.” Ironically, it was in the month following the visit of the Makassed group that an event occurred that was destined to transform the Brotherhood from a relatively small domestic charitable organization into a very credible force in the politics of the Middle East. [15]

On April 15, 1936 the Palestinian Arab Revolt against British rule in Palestine and mass Jewish immigration began when a Jewish truck convoy traveling on the road from Nablus, 30 miles north of Jerusalem, to the nearby village of Tulkarm was attacked. Two drivers were shot, one dying immediately, the other dying five days later. The assailants were Arabs, probably members of the anti-Zionist Qassamite organization. The next day, gunmen affiliated with the pro-Zionist Irgun shot and killed two Arab workers sleeping in a hut near Petah Tikva and a three year cycle of violence that would eventually claim the lives of over 5,000 Arabs, over 300 Jews, and nearly 300 British soldiers and administrators began. Over 15,000, more than ten percent of the adult male Palestinian Arab population were killed, wounded, or exiled. Thousands of Arabs would be held without trial in unsanitary and overcrowded prison camps.

Not surprisingly, al-Banna threw the full support of the Brotherhood firmly behind the Palestinians. Employing political rallies, propaganda, and fundraising, the Brotherhood, with al-Banna at the helm, was able to transform the Palestinian struggle into a pan-Islamic concern. The Brotherhood organized mass rallies and initiated fund raising campaigns for the relief of displaced Palestinian Arabs. It dispatched petitions to political and religious leaders throughout the Middle East and Europe. It published pamphlets and an anti-Zionist booklet entitled \textit{al-Nar}
wa-l-dimar fi filastin ("War and Destruction in Palestine.") It called for a boycott of Jewish owned businesses in Egypt, claiming that Egypt was collaborating with the Zionist enemy and, more critically, it organized its own paramilitary unit.

All these activities did not go unnoticed by the intelligence arm of the Egyptian government and its British overlords. In July, 1936 the police invaded Muslim Brotherhood headquarters. Hasan al-Banna was arrested briefly, but the British ambassador ordered his release, arguing correctly that imprisoning al-Banna would only further radicalize the Brotherhood rank and make al-Banna a martyr. The Palestinian uprising per se came to an end in 1939, but the conclusion of the conflict did little more than set the stage for the eight decades of violence that would follow.

On December 22, 1936, in the midst of the Palestinian uprising, growing Egyptian unrest, and in the wake of Adolph Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland the previous March, the British found it prudent to become a signatory of the ratification of a document entitled the “Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.” Under the terms of the Treaty, the terms of which were settled in London on August 26, 1936, Great Britain was required to withdraw all its troops from Egypt except those necessary to protect the Suez Canal and its surroundings. Britain was allowed to keep 10,000 troops and auxiliary personnel to get the job done. The specified term of the Treaty was set at 20 years. With Hitler’s actions in Europe and fascist Italy’s involvement in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in neighboring Ethiopia, King Farouk and the Egyptian administration feared that Egypt would be drawn into the fighting. With that possibility in mind, the Treaty stated that in case of war Britain would come to Egypt’s defense and train its army.
Predictably, al-Banna and the other members of the Brotherhood were openly hostile to an agreement that permitted British military on Egyptian soil until well past mid-century, and their displeasure over it, combined with British actions in Palestine provoked an unprecedented surge in Brotherhood membership, particularly after al-Banna wrote a letter to King Farouk and Egyptian government officials telling them that they must “follow the path of Islam and to reject everything western.” [16]

Before the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in 1936, the Brotherhood claimed only about 800 members. By 1938 the membership had grown to an astonishing 200,000. By that time al-Banna no longer felt compelled to argue that the Brotherhood possessed no political agenda. In an address to the Student Section of the Brotherhood in March of that year, he posed the question: “Tell me, Brothers: if Islam is something other than politics, society, economy and culture...?” and elsewhere he declared that “Islam is worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and action, prayer and *jihad*...” In May, a few months later, he announced the publication of a new weekly, *al-Nadhir*, “The Warner,” the editorial policy of which would be “based on the principles of the Muslim Brothers.”[17]

For some members of the Brotherhood, al-Banna’s admitted entry into the realm of politics was a thrilling development. In June, 1938 a group of members, inspired by al-Banna’s notion of *jihad* took the streets of Cairo and clashed with police - a confrontation that ended in their arrest. Nervous about the event, and fearful of repercussions it might engender, al-Banna banned the Brotherhood members who had been arrested from any future leadership role - an action that would prove to be significant in the annals of the Brotherhood when, shortly
thereafter, disaffected members of the group formed a splinter group Shabab Sayyidna Muhammad, “The Youth of Our Lord Muhammad.” The Shabab would eventually split from the Brotherhood, setting a precedent for factionalism in the organization that would become one of the defining characteristics of its history. Although al-Banna was clearly unnerved by the police involvement and the alienation of the members of the group, he was determined to steer the Brotherhood into its new role. In January, 1939, at the Fifth General Conference of the Brotherhood, he announced that the Brotherhood was in fact a political entity, but fearing that his speech might draw too close attention from the authorities, he refrained from announcing a specific agenda. He did, however, feel confident enough to issue a rallying cry in which he spoke of the future and of the historic destiny he envisioned for himself as leader of the Brotherhood:

“At that time... Muslim Brothers, three hundred battalions, each one equipped with faith and belief, intellectually with science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend the skies with you and to conquer every obstinate tyrant. God willing, I will do it.” [18]

In September, 1939, some nine months after al-Banna delivered his speech at the Conference, Britain in line with its treaty obligations, declared war on Germany. The Egyptian government, with King Farouk as its figurehead, refused to follow suit and merely broke off relations with Hitler’s government. The government did impose martial law, invoked censorship of radio and the press and arrested a number of figures who it believed harbored pro-Axis
sentiments. Despite al-Banna’s admissions to the contrary, the Brotherhood was not “political” in the sense that it was not an official political party, and because of that it managed to avoid government harassment. [19]

In June, 1940, Fascist Italy entered the war and Mussolini declared his intention of removing the British from Egypt. To that end, he dispatched bombers to destroy a few relatively unimportant targets, and the Egyptian government severed relations with the Italian government. In February, 1941 German forces under the command of General Erwin Rommel, invaded North Africa, an act that prompted considerable anxiety on the part of the Egyptian government, which resulted in a crackdown on real and supposed Axis sympathizers. In late 1940 or early 1941, the Egyptian Ministry of Education learned that in 1939, the Brotherhood had accepted funds from the German legation in Cairo, presumably to aid it in its war against Zionists. As a result of these allegations, which evidently had some basis in truth, in February, 1941, al-Banna, who over the previous decade had maintained his position as an employee of the Egyptian Ministry of Education, was ordered to Quena, a remote village in Upper Egypt, about 40 miles north of Luxor. Seemingly, al-Banna went willingly. In fact, his allies, some of them influential members of the Egyptian Parliament, immediately went to work and eventually persuaded Education Minister Husayn Haykal to rescind the order.

Although al-Banna returned to Cairo, his freedom did not last long. On October, 1941, al-Banna, along with other leading members of the Brotherhood, were arrested after al-Banna gave a public speech attacking British imperialism and calling for the government adoption of shariah law. The Brotherhood was banned for the first but hardly the last time in its history. A public
uproar ensued and when petitions bearing 11,000 signatures were presented to the government, al-Banna and his associates, against the advice of the British, were released.

In late 1941 and early 1942 anger at the British presence in Egypt, fueled in part by poor harvests and food shortages, erupted in rowdy demonstration by students who streamed down the street shouting, “Advance Rommel! Advance Rommel!” Appalled and deeply concerned the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, following protocol of a sort, reportedly asked King Farouk, who was about to celebrate his 22nd birthday, to annul the government of Hussein Sirri Pasha. In Lampson’s view, the Sirri government had left Nazi elements at liberty, had done little to check Nazi propaganda, and had allowed students to demonstrate in favor of Rommel. The only solution was for Farouk to annul the Sirri government and install a pro-British Wafd regime.

Farouk hesitated. On the night of February 4, acting on Lampson’s orders, British troops and tanks surrounded Farouk’s residence, Abdeen Palace. Fearing that Lampson might simply throw him into jail if he did not get his way, Farouk capitulated and appointed a Wafdist government, headed by Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha. Al-Banna and the membership of the Brotherhood were appalled, an attitude very much in line with that of the majority of the Egyptian populace.

Undeterred, al-Banna decided that joining the new Wafd government was a better strategy than opposing it. But his strategy was doomed to fail. When in March, 1942, al-Banna stood for Parliament in Ismailia in the Canal Zone, the city in which the Brotherhood was created, the Prime Minister informed him that if he did not step down, he would be arrested along with any other member of the Brotherhood who sought a seat in Parliament.
Understanding that his actions would provoke deep bitterness, Prime Minister al-Nahhas offered al-Banna a deal. If al-Banna would publish an open letter in support of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Wafdist government, al-Nahhas promised to crack down on prostitution and the drinking of alcohol and pave the way for the Brotherhood’s projects. With no alternative in view, al-Banna did as he was asked.

The Secret Apparatus was created as the clandestine and militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood by Saleh el-Asmawi in 1942. This unit became largely responsible for many of the Brotherhood’s clandestine operations against the Egyptian Government. Over the next three years al-Banna and his colleagues, closely watched by the Wafd government and the British, and forced to abandon any overt political engagement, pursued their charity and educational work to the degree that wartime conditions allowed. At the same time, the work of the organization’s “Secret Apparatus” continued. In 1944 the Apparatus began to infiltrate the Egyptian Communist Party, which the Muslim Brothers considered an enemy political entity. In the meantime from the perspective of the Egyptian government and its British overseer, al-Banna and the Brothers remained a threat. By mid-1943, al-Banna was so convinced that the British intended to exile him, that he wrote a farewell message to his followers. [21]

When in 1945 new parliamentary elections were held, al-Banna, secure in the belief that the popularity of the Brotherhood would prevail at the polls, stood for Parliament along with five members of the Brotherhood. Thanks to the extra-legal efforts of the Wafd government, the elections bids of al-Banna and the other Brotherhood candidates were defeated. Al-Banna and several members of the Brotherhood were briefly detained. At that point al-Banna was still an
Arabic teacher in the employee of the Education Ministry, so to punish him and remove him from Cairo, the Ministry transferred him to a school beyond Giza. Al-Banna resigned.

Despite these setbacks, the Brotherhood flourished after the conclusion of the Second World War. In al-Banna’s view the end of that conflict was a signal to summon all the resources of the Brotherhood in an effort to eradicate British influence in Egypt. Thanks to its increasingly expert propaganda efforts and its well-organized “Rover Scouts,” who marched the streets chanting “Allahu akbar lillah al-hamd!” (“God is great and praise be to him!”) the fame of and respect for the Brotherhood steadily expanded. At the same time, al-Banna worked hard to organize and arm the Brotherhood’s military wing, known as “The Secret Apparatus” (“al-jihaz.”) Under his supervision, caches of arms that were left over from the war and arms purchased from dealers were soon being employed in attacks on British installations, Egyptian government officials, and government offices.

Although al-Banna remained the nominal head of the Brotherhood, the very size of the organization at that point - some estimates put its membership at half a million - worked against his ability to exercise control over it. Struggling to maintain his leadership role, al-Banna, responding to pressure from the more militantly Islamist factions of the organization, and called on the government to prepare for jihad against British rule. During the same period, elements of the “Rover Scouts” and al-jihaz engaged in street battles with Wafdist and communists, and in March, 1946, some 50 students were killed in police clashes with British authorities. On May 31 and on June 8 conflicts between rival supporters of the Wafd Party and supporters of the Brotherhood occurred. Wafd officials placed the Brotherhood under surveillance. Al-Banna responded by urging Prime Minister Sidqi to end the persecution of the Brotherhood.
That, however, was not the only challenge the Brotherhood was facing at this time. By May, 1946, factionalism within the rank and file of the organization resulted in accusations of immorality and incompetence on the part of some Brotherhood officials, and expulsions from the Brotherhood followed. One of those expelled was a childhood friend of al-Banna’s, Ahmad al-Sukkari, with whom he had worked in the organization since its inception. Meanwhile, violent street confrontations between Wafd and Brotherhood activists continued. In one incident al-Banna was almost killed when a bomb went off near him. The mounting violence culminated in the riots at Cairo on November 25, 1946, in which thousands of students battled with soldiers and police.[22]

In July, 1947 an example of the manner in which members of the Muslim Brotherhood could be persuaded to involve themselves in actions with persons embracing ideas antithetical to their own occurred in when a group of 18 junior Egyptian Army Officers were arrested and charged with planning a coup d’etat in which they planned to kill the Army Chief of Staff ‘Aziz al-Misri. The group included officers Abd al-Mun’in, Abd al-Ra’uf, a Muslim Brother, and Rashad Muhanna, who was sympathetic to the aims of the Brotherhood.

In October, 1947, al-Banna, struggling to maintain his hold on the leadership of the Brotherhood, in which factionalism was becoming ever more evident, focused his attention on the deteriorating situation in Palestine and ordered the Muslim Brothers to prepare for jihad against the Zionist enemy. Accordingly, in March, 1948, as the chaos continued in Egypt, the first group of Brotherhood volunteers arrived in Syria. Following the British withdrawal from Palestine in May, 1948, members of the Brotherhood, probably with al-Banna’s approval,
launched attacks and set off bombs in Jewish homes, stores, and Jewish owned cinemas. In one attack 20 Jewish persons were killed, and in another attack 29 died. Via these acts, the Brotherhood set a precedent that would establish itself as a full-fledged terrorist organization.

On November 15, 1948 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested in a jeep carrying enough explosive “to blow up a whole quarter of Cairo.” Police investigators discovered maps, documents, and drawings indicating plans for further assassinations, for the bombing of department stores and public and foreign institutions in Cairo and Alexandria. Not surprisingly, the Egyptian government and its British overseers concluded that al-Banna and the Brotherhood were plotting revolution. On December 8, 1948, the Egyptian government ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood, the second time in its 20 year history that it had been banned. The Brotherhood headquarters were searched and everyone present was arrested - except, somewhat mysteriously, for Hasan al-Banna, a fact that made al-Banna deeply anxious about the government’s specific intentions toward him.

As head of the Brotherhood, al-Banna argued for a revocation of the dissolution decree, and when he was rebuffed, he turned defiant, claiming that the Brothers were in fact “the people” and that the people could not be destroyed by a mere decree. Three weeks after the raid, Egyptian Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi was assassinated by a young member of the Brotherhood. Al-banna claimed to have had no foreknowledge of the attack, and it was a measure of the manner in which his leadership had deteriorated that he was probably telling the truth. The violence continued. Hundreds of Muslim Brothers were arrested and many were tortured. [24]
In the first week of February, 1949, Egyptian government officials announced that the Brotherhood contained a “suicide squadron” made up of some 200 men who were willing to sacrifice their lives to *jihad*. In view of subsequent events it seems possible that these revelations were a critical turning point. On February 12, 1949, after being summoned somewhat mysteriously to the headquarters of the Young Men’s Muslim Association in Cairo, al-Banna departed and was shot as he was stepping into a taxi. Minutes later, he lay dead in the street, the victim of an unknown assassin, most likely a member of the Egyptian government secret police. The mammoth, unwieldy, and uncontrollable organization that he had left behind resembled only in the most superficial way the organization which he had created in Ismailia in 1928. [25]
III.

The Brotherhood Interregnum 1949-1952

For the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, the assassination of al-Banna, which it had most likely engineered, was a positive development in that it removed a powerful and increasingly dangerous critic from its midst. Having banned the Brotherhood from any public engagements in politics, it had succeeded in destroying its charismatic leader an act which it assumed, or at least hoped, would leave the organization incapable of any coherent political activity. Although that supposition would ultimately prove to be without substance, with al-Banna out of the way, the Hadi Government believed that it could now focus its attention on other issues - the threats from radical splinter groups which had broken away from the Brotherhood, the opposition of the Egyptian Communist Party, and the challenges inherent in fashioning a lasting peace with Israel that would be acceptable to the Egyptian populous.

For a large majority of the Brotherhood membership the assassination of al-Banna, the creator of the organization, its Murshid, was a stunning development that left it leaderless, in disarray, and adrift. But the mourning, for those who did mourn, was not prolonged. The organization needed a head and both the leadership and the rank in file understood that the person ultimately chosen to play that role would be hugely influential in determining not only the political and social thrust of the Brotherhood but the ultimate fate of the organization itself.
Predictably, a host of candidates, all of them close associates of al-Banna, but each of them adhering to a particular ideological point of view, began to maneuver, negotiate, and position himself in the hope of assuming the leadership. The first and most probable successor to the post of Murshid was the Deputy Leader of the organization Salih al-‘Ashmawi, who had been head of the Brotherhood’s “Secret Apparatus” for some time. According to the Brotherhood’s constitution, in the absence of a fully approved Murshid, al-‘Ashmawi, was al-Banna’s designated successor. All those concerned, however, understood that to choose al-‘Ashmawi as a leader would have its drawbacks. The Deputy Leader believed that the way ahead for the Brotherhood lay in its clandestine operations, and no one doubted that choosing him as leader would steer the organization along a path that would brand it as a terrorist entity and ultimately deny it reconciliation with the government. The other strong candidates included al-Banna’s brother ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, his brother-in-law ‘Abd al-Hakim‘Abidin, who served as the Brotherhood’s “Secretary General,” respected cleric Shaykh Hasan al-Baquiri, and Mustafa Mu’min who led the Brotherhood’s student organization. With Egypt still under martial law, and the Brotherhood still banned, the choice of the right leader was an issue of utmost importance. The importance of making the right choice became particularly acute in May 1949 when a group of Brothers attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi. By July some 4,000 Brotherhood members were under arrest. With both the case of the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi and that of the so-called “Jeep Case” terrorist attack being heard in the military criminal courts, the leadership decided it wise to allow al-‘Ashmawi to preside over the day-to-day affairs of the Brotherhood for the time being, but with considerable oversight, and denying him for the moment at least the title Murshid. [26]
The al-Nuqrashi trial ended on April 25, 1950. The Prime Minister’s killer was sentenced to death but the Brotherhood as a whole escaped condemnation. In regard to the “Jeep Case,” Brotherhood lawyers argued, revealingly, that the organization as a whole “could not be held liable for the acts of individual members, who ‘misunderstood their training.’” This was not the first time the Brotherhood had disavowed the terrorist acts of its members, and it would hardly be the last. But the strategy worked. On March 17, 1951, the presiding judges announced that “a criminal conspiracy to overthrow the form of government” was “without foundation.” The lawyers found that the authorities had extracted confessions with coercion. The success of the Brotherhood lawyers in convincing the judges that the organization was not in essence a terrorist movement was a key factor in restoring its public image and in paving the way for its return to legal status. [27]

Meanwhile, the jockeying for power within the Brotherhood continued. On May 1, 1951 martial law in Egypt came to an end, the organization proclaimed its continued existence, its financial assets and property were restored, and the leadership renewed its attention to anointing a new leader. All concerned now understood that restoring the reputation of the Brotherhood in the eyes of the public and in the eyes of the government hinged on choosing a leader who had not been one of al-Banna’s inner circle and was, as a result, removed from the factionalism that threatened to tear the organization apart. A compromise candidate, one at least provisionally acceptable to all parties was needed, and attention was soon directed to an eminent member of the Egyptian judiciary, Chancellor of the Court of Appeals, Hasan al-Hudaybi.

Al-Hudaybi, age 60, a Cairo native, had been a friend and a close, if unofficial, advisor to al-Banna since the early years of the Second World War. Never a part of the Brotherhood
leadership’s inner sanctum, well-connected in government - his brother was chief of staff in King
Farouk’s household - and a proponent of non-violence in the pursuit of achieving political goals,
al-Hudaybi was seen by many as being a man with a “clean slate” behind which the Brotherhood
might refashion itself. On first being approached, al-Hudaybi rejected the notion of becoming
head of the Brotherhood, but he soon relented and allowed his candidacy, which was not in
accordance with the constitution of the Brotherhood, to go forward. Nevertheless, Hudaybi was
eventually chosen as leader and was anointed Murshid. [28]

Inevitably, in view of the rampant factionalism that was now one of the Brotherhood’s
most notable characteristics, al-Hudaybi’s election and the principles he immediately began to
promote provoked profound dissatisfaction both among members of the leadership elite and
among the rank and file of the organization. One of al-Hudaybi’s first demands was that the
“Secret Apparatus” be dissolved, a decision that put him at odds with Salih al-‘Ashmawi, who
had ceded power to him. When ordered to disband al-‘Ashmawi and his devoted followers in the
“Secret Apparatus,” whose espousal of jihad in the place of negotiation was recognized by all
concerned, appeared to comply with the order but in fact continued to act as if no order had been
issued. As events would soon demonstrate, al-‘Ashmawi and his followers were not the only
group to voice their objections to al-Hudaybi’s leadership. Al-Hudaybi’s close connections with
King Farouk and his circle provoked criticism from many members of the organization, and
members of the Egyptian government became increasingly troubled by al-Hudaybi’s potential
influence on government policy. [29]
The first major crisis in al-Hudaybi’s leadership came in 1951, soon after his election as *Murshid*. When Egyptian Prime Minister al-Nahhas declared the termination of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Convention of 1899, trouble was inevitable. Taking advantage of the move, Salih al-‘Ashmawi called on his Brothers and the members of the “Secret Apparatus” to support the removal of British troops from Egyptian soil. In late January, 1952, violent protests against the British presence in Egypt broke out in Ismailia. When British commander Brigadier Kenneth Exham issued a warning to the Egyptian policemen, who had been aiding the protestors, to surrender their weapons and leave the Canal Zone, officials of the Ismailia government refused to comply, and that refusal was seconded by Egyptian Interior Minister, Fouad Sergeddin. In response 7,000 British soldiers, equipped with tanks and machine guns, surrounded the Governate buildings and police barracks. Armed only with rifles, the policemen refused to surrender. Commander Exham ordered his troops to open fire on the buildings. For two hours, until they ran out of ammunition, the policemen continued to fight. When the firing finally died down and the policemen surrendered, 50 of their number lay dead, eight were wounded, and the rest were arrested. [30]

On the following day, in Cairo a crowd of protestors marched to al-Azhar University, then to the office of the Prime Minister, and finally to Abdeen Palace, where they demanded that Egypt sever relations with Britain and voiced their disapproval of King Farouk. They then proceeded to downtown Cairo, where the vandalizing, looting and burning of shops, particularly those specializing in the sale of European goods, began. Some 750 buildings, including the country’s Opera House, Shepheard’s Hotel, banks, restaurants, cinemas, and nightclubs were burned to the ground. When the riot finally died down, 76 of the Egyptian rioters lay dead. While
al-Hudaybi firmly denied that the Brotherhood had taken any part in the events of “Black Saturday,” the Brotherhood membership and the Egyptian government alike, understood that it was a lie. [31]
The Muslim Brotherhood in The Nasser Era

Part one

In no period in its history, until the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2014, did the Muslim Brotherhood experience a greater degree of oppression than it did under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser during the sixteen year period from 1954 to 1970. During that era the Brotherhood was a banned organization. No positive mention of it was allowed in the Egyptian press, its leaders were closely surveilled by Nasser’s security services. Any member of the Brotherhood who dared to make any public statement on its behalf of the organization stood the risk of being arrested, tortured, and held without trial. For that reason very little is known about the secret dealings and power shifts that occurred within the Brotherhood’s leadership and its rank and file from 1954 to 1970. Because all activities on behalf of the Brotherhood were illegal, reports of Brotherhood activities that did appear in the press were confined to reports of terrorist activities allegedly involving members of the Brotherhood and the arrests of Brotherhood members the Nasser government deemed responsible for those acts. Always wary of the manner in which letters, memoranda, memoirs and other documents relating to the activities of the banned organization might come back to haunt them during a future change of regime, and living
in fear of prosecution, Brotherhood members left almost no records of the inner workings of the organization during the 1954-1970 period. Despite this largely successful campaign of oppression, the Brotherhood remained a vibrant, well-organized organization - a fact made manifest by the rapidity with which it sprang back to life during the regime of President Anwar al-Sadat (1970 to 1981.)

Although almost nothing is known about the inner workings of the outlawed organization during the Nasser era, an account of Nasser’s Pan-Arabist, anti-Islamic polices is essential to an understanding of how those policies served to clarify the goals of the banned organization and how those goals ultimately acted as a springboard for the creation of what would eventually become the single most influential Muslim organization in the world — a position it would maintain until the early decades of the 21st century. Viewed from a certain perspective, it could be argued that no other figure in modern Egyptian history was more influential in creating the Muslim Brotherhood, as it would exist 40 years in the future, than Gamal Abdel Nasser.

It was shortly after the Cairo riots of 1952 that a relatively unknown 34-year-old Lt. Colonel in the Egyptian Army, stepped onto the stage of history. Born in Alexandria in 1918, the son of a postal worker, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was from his childhood years attracted to the notion of political action. At the youthful age of 11, he took part in protests against the annulment of the 1923 Egyptian Constitution by Prime Minister Isma’il Sidqi. Arrested, he spent the night in jail for his involvement. At age 17, he led a student demonstration against Britain’s continued presence in Egyptian affairs, an action that resulted in the deaths of two students and almost ended Nasser’s life when a police bullet grazed his skull.
In July, 1938, Nasser graduated from the Egyptian Royal Military Academy, where he became friends with a number of fellow students, which included Nasser’s future colleague and supporter, Anwar al-Sadat, who shared his disgust when, in 1942, British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampton surrounded King Farouk’s palace and ordered him to dismiss the government of Prime Minister Hussein Pasha, whom Lampton believed was dangerously sympathetic to the Axis powers. By 1943 Hassan al-Banna, in the interest of extending Brotherhood influence in the military, authorized Mahmud Labib, a retired Army officer, to create a clandestine society within the army that promoted nationalistic goals, rather than focusing on religious ones, and did not insist that those who participated be members of the Brotherhood. Nasser and a number of his fellow officers joined in 1943-1944. Over the next four years they circulated pamphlets, some in the name of the Al-Dubat al-Ahrar, or “Free Officers, in which they asserted the solidarity of the army with all those who supported the end of British rule. [32]

In 1948, as a result of the assassination of respected Judge Ahmed El-Khazindar, President of the Court of Appeal, on his way to work - a terrorist act for which the Egyptian government found the Brotherhood responsible - the Brotherhood was pronounced illegal and the activities of its members were banned. By that time Nasser, who had played his part as an officer in the Arab-Israeli War, had become something of a celebrity when he and the brigade he commanded endured a three month siege in the so-called “Faluja Pocket,” and refused to surrender. By the time Nasser returned to Egypt in 1949, he and his fellow “Free Officers,” disgusted by the outcome of the Arab/Israeli conflict, had decided that the British and their puppet, King Farouk, had to be removed. Their intentions did not go unnoticed by the Egyptian
government. While denying any involvement in the shadowy “Free Officers” group, Nasser redoubled his efforts to strengthen and unify it. [33]

In late 1949 Nasser formed a “coordinating committee” within the Free Officers Movement, and in the following year was appointed the leader of it. Egyptian Army General Muhammad Naguib, a hero of the Arab-Israeli War, secretly joined the group and would soon be assigned a key role in carrying out its goals. During the same period, Nasser resumed his contacts with the now banned Muslim Brotherhood and encouraged its cooperation in carrying out the goals of the “Free Officers” movement. His aim was to solidify the allegiance of Army officers with Brotherhood ties, and his efforts in that regard met with success, one of his converts being Muslim Brotherhood insider ‘Abd al-Mun‘im ‘Abd al-Ra‘uf.[34]

In January, 1950 the Wafd Party was returned to power in Egypt, its victory to a great degree guaranteed by the absence of participation on the part of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. On October 11, 1951 the Wafd government abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which had given Britain control over the Suez Canal until 1956, triggering mass demonstrations in support of Egyptian independence. When Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi objected to Brotherhood involvement in the demonstrations, his actions were read by the Brotherhood rank and file as being sympathetic to King Farouk and his faction, and again brought his leadership into question. On January 25, British forces launched an attack on an Egyptian police station in the Canal Zone and a firefight ensued. In Cairo, the next day, the “Black Saturday” riots broke out and much of downtown Cairo was burned. Increasingly frustrated, determined to strike a blow at King Farouk’s royalist faction, Nasser and an accomplice, Hassan Ibrahim, took to the streets and attacked Royalist Army General Hussein Sirri Amer with submachine guns as
Amer drove through the streets of Cairo. Nasser and Ibrahim succeeded only in wounding an innocent female passerby. [35]

In May, 1952 Nasser learned that King Farouk had in his possession the names of the members of the Free Officers movement and that the king intended to have Nasser and his colleagues in the movement arrested. Nasser ordered Free Officer Zakaria Mohieddin to plan a takeover of the government by army units allied with the Free Officers. For the next three months Nasser moved cautiously, but in mid-July he informed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and the leadership of the communist Democratic Movement for National Liberation of the events that were about to occur. He likewise informed the British and American governments of the intention on the part of the Free Officers to overthrow King Farouk’s Egyptian government, and both the British and the Americans agreed not to intervene. By then, the policy of the United States had moved well away from support for King Farouk - so much so that the Central Intelligence Agency had in place a project to overthrow him. Nevertheless, State Department officials insisted that Farouk be deposed with dignity. [36]

On the morning of July 23, the operation to depose King Farouk and the Egyptian government was initiated. Nasser and General Abdel Hakim Amer drove around Cairo and arrested key Royalist military commanders. Joined by an artillery unit, they proceeded to Military Headquarters and arrested Army Chief of Staff, Hussein Sirri Amer, whom Nasser had attempted to kill in January, 1950. Soon afterward all government buildings, radio stations, and police stations in Cairo were under Free Officer control. At 7:30 A.M., as Free Officer aircraft
patrolled the skies over the capital, a radio broadcast informed Egyptians that a revolution, a “Blessed Movement,” under the leadership of General Naguib, had taken control of the country. The voice announcing these developments was that of Nasser’s colleague, Anwar al-Sadat.

On July 24, the newly formed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), with General Naguib as its leader, met with former Prime Minister Ali Maher to ask Maher to form a government and communicate RCC demands to King Farouk, who was in Alexandria. The next day, Naguib led a group of RCC members, including Nasser, to Alexandria to supervise the ousting of Farouk. Some members wanted the King to be put on trial. Others simply wanted him to abdicate and leave the country. Naguib and Nasser, in accordance with the agreement they had made with British and U.S. officials, supported the notion of exile. It was agreed that Farouk would abdicate, name his son as successor, and leave the country. On July 26, King Farouk abdicated and his baby son, Ahmed Fuad, was proclaimed King Fuad II. Farouk and his family left Egypt by boat. [37]

On September 17, 1952, two months after Farouk’s departure, the government of Ali Maher was forced to resign, and General Naguib was appointed Prime Minister. In January, 1953, overcoming opposition from Naguib, Nasser banned all political parties other than his own, to which he gave the name “Liberation Rally.” Despite the dissolution order, Nasser remained the only RCC member who still favored holding elections. Although outvoted by his colleagues, Nasser remained in favor of holding an election in 1956. In March, Nasser led an Egyptian delegation negotiating the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal. In June, 1953, he took control of the Interior Ministry and ousted Naguib loyalist Sulayman Hafez. He then
pressured Naguib to conclude the abolition of the monarchy. On June 18, 1953, Naguib complied with the request, declaring the end of the Egyptian and Sudanese monarchy and the establishment of “The Republic of Egypt” with Naguib as its first president. [38]

From June, 1953, to February, 1954, Naguib continued to resist policies suggested by Nasser. When he refused to accept the land reform decrees expanding land ownership to Egypt’s peasantry favored by Nasser along with his ban on political parties, while moving ever closer to the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser decided that Naguib would have to be removed, though how exactly that was to be accomplished remained to be seen. Much of this debate came about when, Naguib protested Nasser’s proposal to completely shut down the Muslim Brotherhood by January of 1954. Furthermore, a strong rivalry would develop between the two individuals for control of the leadership of the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council). During the same period spokesmen for the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization’s banned status notwithstanding, had become increasingly vocal in their criticism of the new regime. On January 12, 1954, Brotherhood Murshid al-Hudaybi was arrested along with the person who had increasingly become recognized as the prime theorist and spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, scholar and writer, Sayiid Qutb (pronounced “kut.”) As future events would demonstrate, no person other than Hasan al-Banna would exercise a greater influence over the policies, actions, and future of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood in The Nasser Era

Part Two

By far, the single most important influence on the formation and evolution of Brotherhood ideology during the Nasser period were the writings of jailed Egyptian philosopher Sayyid Qutb, a thinker whose beliefs resonate in the Muslim world today with much greater power than they did half a century ago. The argument could be made that Nasser’s suppression of the Brotherhood and its treatment of ideologue Sayyid Qutb, were instrumental in creating the Muslim Brotherhood as it would come to exist in the early decades of the 21st century. It is interesting to note that Mohamed Atta, architect of the 9/11 attacks on New York’s World Trade Center, was both a loyal member of the Muslim Brotherhood and devotee of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. A notable fact is that Qutb’s exiled brother, Muhammad Qutb, who shared the philosophy of his illustrious sibling, was the teacher of Osama bin Laden during the legendary terrorist leader’s formative years in Saudi Arabia. Qutb, a teacher by profession, was the key ideological theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Born in the village of Musha, Upper Egypt, in 1906, the son of a landowner and estate manager, Qutb spent a largely uneventful childhood in a home steeped in piety. By the time he was a teenager, he could recite large portions of the Qur-an. In about 1929 Qutb moved from his home village of Musha to Cairo where he enrolled in a British-style school, where he remained until 1933, when, like Hasan al-Bana, he was hired as a teacher by the Ministry of Public Education. In that same year, he found a publisher for his first book, a literary study, Mahammat al-Sha’ir fi’l-Hayah wa Shi’r al-Jil al-Hadir (“The Task of the Poet in Life and the Poetry of the Contemporary Generation.”) In 1935, he published another literary study, al-Shati al-Majhul (“The Unknown Beach”) [39]

As Qutb and his literary works became better known, his extremely conservative religious views and his increasingly pointed criticism of the Egyptian government began to draw the attention of certain officials at the Egyptian Ministry of Education. In an effort to deflect any trouble that might arise, Qutb’s friends arranged for him to visit the United States, ostensibly to study American educational practices. Qutb traveled to the USA and remained there almost two years. He paid visits to Wilson’s Teachers College in Washington, D.C., Stanford University, and spent several months at the Colorado State College of Education (which ultimately become the University of Northern Colorado.)

The life Qutb discovered in America left him profoundly appalled and shaken. About his stay there, he would eventually write, “Humanity makes the gravest of errors and risks losing its account of morals, if it makes America its example.” He added “This great America: What is its worth in the scale of human values? And what does it add to the moral account of humanity?”
A bachelor, and a somewhat panicky, sexually repressed prude, Qutb was fascinated by American girls. He noted their “seductive capacity” and commented on their “thirsty lips... round breasts... full buttocks... shapely thighs... [and] sleek legs.” About a student dance he attended in Greeley, Colorado, he would write: “They [American students] danced to the tunes of the gramophone, and the dance floor was replete with tapping feet, enticing legs, arms wrapped around waists, lips pressed to lips, and chests pressed to chests. The atmosphere is full of desire.”

Naive to the point of blindness about a country with tens of thousands of churches which the Christian faithful attended every Sunday, Qutb would rashly claim that Americans attended church only on holidays, and were “numb to faith in religion... [and]... spiritual values.” He would make no secret of his racism. About American blacks, he would write that “jazz was the music that the Negroes invented to satisfy their primitive inclinations, as well as their desire to be noisy on the one hand and to excite bestial tendencies on the other.” In much the same way that puritan notions of decadence had energized and polarized the political climate of England in the early 17th century - a climate that eventually gave birth to the English Revolution - Qutb’s moralizing about the decay of the West, and the corruption of the United States in particular, would reinforce his support of the notion of “jihad” as a purifying force, devoted to the sweeping away of corruption. [39]

Qutb was still in the United States when, in February, 1949, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated. Profoundly upset by the murder, Qutb wrote and published his first non-literary work, Al-Adala al-Ijima’iyya fi-l-Islam (“Social Justice in Islam”) a tract whose conservative views on matters pertaining to faith and society coincided with those of the most conservative
elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. He clearly viewed Egypt’s monarchist government as being un-Islamic, pro-Western, and corrupt. He espoused the notion of a “just dictatorship” that would grant political liberties only to the “virtuous.” [40]

Making no secret of his contempt for King Farouk, Qutb quickly established himself as being the primary socio-religious theorist of the Brotherhood and established ties with Brotherhood Murshid, Hasan al-Hudaybi. Nasser, who had little interest in organized religion, took notice of Qutb’s influence, visited him frequently at his home during the period leading up to the Young Officers coup, and invited him to lecture at the officers’ club in the Zamalik neighborhood of Cairo. Nasser pretended to share Qutb’s views, but as his future actions would demonstrate, the attentions he paid amounted to little more than a ruse to gain Qutb’s support. What Qutb and his associates failed to grasp was that Nasser had no intention whatsoever of allowing Muslim theorists to dictate the policies of the new government.

When the coup finally occurred in July, 1952, Qutb applauded the move and threw his support firmly behind the Free Officers in the belief that they would eventually embrace the notion of an Islamic Egyptian nation, governed by Shariah law. On January 23, 1953, eager to curry favor with Qutb, Nasser arranged to have him appointed Secretary-General of Nasser’s “Liberation Rally.” Only then did Qutb realize his philosophy and Nasser’s aims were hopelessly at odds. Qutb resigned in disgust. Less than a month later, having decided to withdraw his support for Nasser’s revolution, Qutb was enrolled in the Muslim Brotherhood. [41]

Nasser was not pleased with Qutb’s change of heart, and on January 12, the split between the two men was irreversibly determined when Nasser ordered the arrest of Qutb and al-Hudaybi
for speaking out against Nasser’s government. The Brotherhood was declared to be an illegal political organization and was closed down. On March 28, however, Naguib managed to free Qutb and al-Hudaybi and have the shutdown order repealed - a move that only reinforced Nasser’s determination to oust Naguib, whom the Young Officers had brought to power. When in early February, 1954, Naguib learned that his colleagues in the RCC had held an official meeting without inviting him, he understood that his fate had been determined. He resigned, Nasser had him placed under arrest, and the RCC proclaimed Nasser its Chairman and appointed him Prime Minister. [42]

Naguib, however, was a military hero. As such, he commanded the loyalty of many army officers. When those officers threatened to mutiny, Nasser supporters in the army arrested them, an event that provoked huge demonstrations on the streets of Cairo. Hundreds of thousands of protestors, many of them Brotherhood members, called in secret to the street by Qutb and Brotherhood Murshid al-Hudaybi, demanded the reinstatement of Naguib as Prime Minister and called for Nasser’s arrest. Much to Nasser’s chagrin, the demonstrations produced a fracture within the RCC. Nasser’s associate, Khaled Mohieddin, demanded Naguib’s release and return to the presidency. Forced to comply with the demand, Nasser consented but delayed Naguib’s reinstatement for a week - until March 4 - allowing him enough time to promote his RCC colleague Abdel Hakim Amer to the office of military Chief of Staff and Commander of the Armed Forces, a post previously held by deposed President Naguib. It was a daring and extremely clever power play - and it worked. [43]

A few days later, on March 5, 1954, Nasser’s security forces arrested thousands of persons who had participated in the recent demonstrations, a large proportion of them
Brotherhood members. At the same time, to counter criticism of the move, Nasser announced his intention to end restrictions on political parties and issued a decree that mandated the withdrawal of the Free Officers’ involvement with politics. As events would soon demonstrate, it was a brilliant maneuver. Those elements of Egyptian society that had benefited to some degree from the Free Officers’ coup - peasants, workers, and shopkeepers - were in no way pleased at the prospective departure of the Free Officers from politics, and they soon took their objections to the street. Within days, joined by thousands of peasants, one million transport workers went on strike and marched on Cairo. President Naguib, who meanwhile had been returned to power by Nasser, ordered a crackdown on the protestors, but the heads of the security forces, who had lost all confidence in General Naguib, refused to carry out his orders. [44]

On March 29, 1954, in response to what he termed the “impulse of the street,” Nasser announced the revocation of the decrees of March 5 that would have restored the old political parties. At the same time, perfectly judging the impact of the move, he banned the RCC from involvement in politics. Nasser then enacted the crackdown he had been waiting for. He ordered the dismissal or arrest of hundreds of Naguib’s supporters in the military. He ordered Khaled Mohieddin, the colleague who had turned against him during the protests, exiled to Switzerland with the meaningless task of representing the RCC abroad. By then, hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood were already in custody, and hundreds more were now jailed. Humiliated and profoundly appalled by the manner in which Nasser had treated the Brotherhood, members of the organization began to plot the assassination of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although Sayyid Qutb was probably involved in the planning of the proposed murder, the degree of his involvement would remain a matter of dispute [45]
By October, the plan to execute Nasser was well-developed. All that was lacking was the opportunity. On October 26, 1954 Muslim Brother Mohammed Abdel Latif joined the crowd in Alexandria’s Manshiya Square to hear Nasser deliver a speech in celebration of the British military withdrawal which was being broadcast to the Arab world via radio. Latif managed to move to a position just 25 feet from where Nasser was standing. He pulled out a gun and fired eight shots, none of which struck Nasser. Panic ensued. Latif was seized and placed under arrest. Nasser, who had not stirred from the podium, appealed for calm. With extraordinary aplomb, he turned to the crowd and addressed it and his radio audience: “My countrymen,” he said, “my blood spills for you and Egypt. I will live for your sake and die for the sake of your honor and freedom. Let them kill me. It does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honor, and freedom in you. If Gamal Abdel Nasser should die, each of you shall be Gamal Abdel Nasser... Gamal Abdel Nasser is of you and from you and he is willing to sacrifice his life for the nation.” The crowd roared in approval and the radio audience throughout the Arab world was electrified.

On October 29, 1954 in response to the “Manshiya Square Incident,” Nasser denounced Hasan al-Hudaybi, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming that the Brotherhood was responsible for the assassination attempt. Articles in the Nasser-dominated Egyptian press maintained, correctly, that the attack on Nasser’s life was the work of the Muslim Brotherhood’s paramilitary organization al-johaz al-sirri (“The Secret Apparatus.”) Acting on this premise, Nasser ordered perhaps the greatest political crackdown in modern Egyptian history. Naguib was removed from the Presidency and again placed under house arrest. Although because of his
popularity, he would never be tried or sentenced, 140 officers loyal to him were dismissed from the military. As a result of the attempt on Nasser’s life, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was rounded up and charged before “People’s Tribunals.” With Salah Salim, Hussein Shafei, and future President of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat acting as judges 1,100 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were charged and jailed. Among them were Brotherhood Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb. An additional 1,000 were jailed without being charged. Al-Hudaybi was arrested, and on November 18, Qutb was arrested at his home in Helwan. On November 22, Qutb was forced to testify against Hudaybi and Naguib about their plans to overthrow the government. As a result of the arrests, Gamal Abdel Nasser became the undisputed leader of Egypt. [47]

Nasser made sure that the wheels of justice moved quickly. On December 4, 1954, seven members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb, were condemned to death. Three days later, the sentences were carried out, all that is except for those of al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb, whose sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. To promote himself and his “Liberation Rally,” and to reinforce his position as leader of Egypt, Nasser gave speeches all over the country. Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim Hafez, the leading Arab singers of the era, wrote and performed songs praising Nasser. [48]

During the period 1954-1955, understanding that attacks by the Palestinian fedayeen on Israeli military and civil installations were on the increase and that the Egyptian military was unprepared to engage in another war with the Jewish State, Nasser made peace overtures to the Israeli leadership, but his efforts eventually came to nothing. Meanwhile, Sayyid Qutb, who on some level had engaged in a plan to have Nasser assassinated, remained in jail, undergoing
periodic episodes of torture. The torture would continue over the next decade and it would seem that Qutb’s periodic visits to the prison hospital during that period were a result of them. Despite the viciousness of the treatment Qutb received, he was allowed to write. In 1954 Qutb published the first installment of what will prove to be a highly influential commentary on the Qur’an, Fi Zilal al-Quran (“In the Shade of the Qur’an”), a work that would eventually extend to an extraordinary 30 volumes. [49]

During the five year period 1954-1959, with Nasser at the height of his power and influence and most of its most effective members imprisoned, the Brotherhood was able to do little to influence policy or otherwise effect social and political change in Egypt. On February 28, 1955, with the aim of suppressing raids by the Palestinian fedayeen, Israeli troops attacked the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip. Understanding the relative weakness of the Egyptian military, Nasser did not retaliate, and his failure to do so elicited a good deal of criticism from the Egyptian public. In response to the attacks, Nasser ordered a blockade of Egyptian shipping through the Straits of Tiran and restricted the use of Israeli airspace over the Gulf of Aqaba.

During that period of tension the Central Treaty Organization, that would come to be known as the “Baghdad Pact,” came into being. Supported by the United States and designed along the lines of NATO, the organization was designed to limit the territorial designs of the Soviet Union. Nasser was in no way enthusiastic to cooperate with it, viewing the “Pact” as a threat to his efforts to remove the British from Egypt. (The “Pact,” never firmly coherent, would be severely damaged after Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1954, and the organization would cease to exist after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.) [50]
Now regarded as a hero in what was rapidly becoming a post-colonial world, Nasser was greeted at the Bandung Conference of 25 Asian and African states, which met in April, 1955, as the leading spokesman of the Arabs. He argued the case for the independence of the French North African colonies, the Palestinian “right of return,” and the implementation of UN resolutions in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In September, encouraged by his popularity, Nasser decisively turned his back on the U.S. supported “Baghdad Pact” and to the considerable chagrin of the United States and Israel, concluded a 320 million dollar arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which included 150 Mig-15 jets, 50 Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, 230 T-34 tanks, and 200 BTR-152 armored personnel carriers - acquisitions that placed Egypt’s offensive posture on a par with that of Israel. Buoyed by the popular reception to the purchase and determined more than ever to realize his modernizing “revolution,” Nasser engineered the creation of a new Egyptian constitution that established a single-party system under the auspices of the National Union (NU), a reconfiguration of his “Liberation Rally.” Unsurprisingly, on June 23, 1956, the NU nominated him by an overwhelming majority as its candidate for president. Al-Hudaybi, Qutb, and the underground leadership were appalled, but they were helpless to prevent it. [51] 

In July, 1956, as a result of the Czech arms deal, American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles decided that the American offer to fund the building of the Aswan Dam ought to be withdrawn. Eisenhower, much to his later regret, agreed with Dulles. On July 19, 1956, the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their offer to finance the Aswan Dam Project. On July 26, 1956, furious at this development, Nasser delivered a speech at Alexandria in which he denounced “British Imperialism,” and announced that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal and that funds derived from the seizure of it would be used to fund the Aswan Dam. In the same
speech, he announced that he was closing the Canal to Israeli shipping. The speech, played and
replayed throughout the Arab world propelled Nasser to an unprecedented height of popularity. It
did not, however, go down well with Britain, France, and Israel, who regarded the move as a
gross violation of the international agreement that Nasser signed in October, 1954. In London,
Paris, and Jerusalem government officials began to lay plans to have Nasser removed. [52]

On September 21, 1956 the Israelis remilitarized the “al-Auja Demilitarized Zone” in the
Negev, on the Egyptian border, about 30 miles south of the Rafa strip, of Gaza. A few days later,
recognizing the provocative nature of the move, the United Nations Security Council met and
adopted a resolution that recognized Egypt’s right to control the Canal as long as it continued to
allow the passage through it of foreign ships. The Israelis, who regarded the banning of their
ships through the Canal tantamount to an act of war, decided to act. On October 29, 1956 Israeli
forces crossed the Sinai Peninsula, overwhelmed Egyptian Army posts, and established forward
positions. About 2,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed and about 5,000 taken prisoner. Two days
later, British and French planes bombarded Egyptian airfields in the Canal Zone. Nasser ordered
the Egyptian Army to withdraw from Sinai and regroup along the Canal and ordered the sinking
or disabling of 49 ships at the Canal’s entrance. Fearing invasion, he arranged for the distribution
of 400,000 rifles to Egyptian civilian volunteers. [53]

Realizing that the fighting would focus on Port Said, Nasser rushed there to support his
troops. By the time he arrived, Egyptian forces were at the point of being overwhelmed and the
commander at Port Said was considering surrender when Nasser ordered him to keep on fighting.
The Egyptian Army troops and the Port Said militia put up a strong resistance, but they were
ultimately defeated. Between 750 and 1,000 Egyptian fighters died in the conflict. President Eisenhower was furious at the manner in which France, Britain, and Israel had conveniently left the United States in the dark about the joint Egyptian incursion, and he supported UN resolutions that demanded British and French withdrawal and mandated a UN “Emergency Force” to be stationed at Sinai. Although by the end of 1956, French and British forces would withdraw from Sinai, Israeli forces would not leave until March, 1957. In the meantime, Nasser, whose popularity had suffered as a result of the debacle at Port Said, imposed strict regulations for residence in Egypt, rules that primarily effected British and French Nationals and Jews with foreign nationality. Many Jewish families, seeing no future for themselves in Egypt, would leave the country for good. [54]

In January, 1957 Nasser signed a military pact with Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia - a move that did not go down well with the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower, consumed as always by the perceived threat of the Soviet Union, propounded the “Eisenhower Doctrine” in which he pledged to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East. Although Nasser was avowedly anti-communist, the Eisenhower administration viewed Nasser’s pro-Arabism in the region to be a threat to pro-Western countries. In April, 1957 relations between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan deteriorated abruptly when Hussein publicly blamed Nasser for supporting two coup attempts against him. In response, Nasser accused Hussein of being “a tool of the imperialists.” At about the same time, King Saud, fearful of Nasser’s growing influence and its implied threat to Saud family dominance in Saudi Arabia, and very much under the influence of representatives of the Eisenhower administration, began to have doubts about his relationship with Nasser’s government.
In the midst of these events, Qutb, al-Hudaybi and other Brotherhood members remained in prison where they were abused and tortured. On June 1, 1957, a group of imprisoned Brothers went on strike. They refused to report their work at hard labor, and the response of prison officials was swift. Wardens opened fire on the prisoners, killed 21, and wounded many more. Qutb and al-Hudaybi were horrified, but they were powerless. Despite these setbacks, Nasser’s “Pan-Arabism” was becoming the dominant ideology in the Arab World, and Nasser, bolstered by his perceived “victory” over the forces of imperialism in the successful seizure of the Canal, had become a bonafide hero in the Arab world. [55]

 Despite his popularity and his “Pan-Arabist” stance, Nasser’s only remaining ally in the Middle East was Syria. Disturbed by the massing of Turkish troops along its border, the leftist government of Syria asked Nasser for help. In September, 1957, Nasser responded by dispatching Egyptian Army troops to Syria. As the political situation in Syria became increasingly volatile, delegations from Syria arrived in Egypt demanding immediate unification with Egypt. Nasser refused the offer, but, as events would soon demonstrate, was inspired by it. By the end of 1957 Nasser had succeeded in nationalizing all British and French assets in Egypt and many Egyptian companies as well, and some of his policies had a positive effect on the Egyptian economy. At last, in response to the withdrawal of US financial support, Nasser decided to cooperate with the Soviets to build the Aswan Dam. [56]

 In January, 1958 a new delegation from Syria arrived in Cairo and informed Nasser that a communist takeover in Syria under the leadership of Khalid Bakhdash was imminent. Nasser
agreed that the best course of action would be to form a political union with Syria, with the provision that he be named president of the new political entity. Syrian President Shikri al-Quwatli agreed to Nasser’s terms. On February 1, 1958 Nasser announced the creation of the United Arab Republic. He ordered a crackdown on communist officials in Syria and dismissed many of them from their posts. The response of the Arab world was euphoric. Three weeks after the announcement was made, Nasser paid a surprise visit to Damascus to celebrate the creation of the new Republic and was welcomed by crowds numbering in the thousands. On March 4, he addressed a massive rally in Damascus and waved a check given by the Saudis to Abdel Hamid Sarraj to shoot down the plane that had carried Nasser to Syria. [57]

Riding a wave of popularity in Egypt and abroad, on March 5, 1958, Nasser announced the dissolution of all political parties and established a provisional UAR constitution and a new National Assembly that would be made up of 400 delegates from Egypt and 200 from Syria. He then left for Moscow to meet with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who urged him not to outlaw the communists in Egypt. Nasser refused and Khrushchev, in the name of diplomacy, dropped the subject. As a result of the bad publicity arising from the bungled attack on Nasser’s life on the part of the Saudis, King Saud was forced to step aside in favor of his brother, King Faisal, who hated Nasser and was much less interested in pan-Arab unity than he was pan-Muslim unity. [58]

In Lebanon the creation of the United Arab Republic had provoked political dissension in Lebanon that by May, 1958 resulted in civil strife. One faction wanted Lebanon to join the UAR, the other did not. Nasser offered limited aid to the faction in Lebanon supportive of the UAR, but
he understood that Lebanon, with its large Christian population, was a complicated situation, to say the least, and kept his involvement to a minimum. [59]

In July two Iraqi Army officers overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and the next day the country’s anti-Nasser Prime Minister was killed. Nasser immediately recognized the new government and stated that any attack on Iraq was tantamount to an attack on the UAR. Nasser now felt confident that the Iraqi coup had made the notion of “pan-Arab” unity more feasible than ever. The Eisenhower administration was now deeply alarmed, and on July 15, 1958, in response to calls for aid from the governments of Lebanon and Jordan for European/American intervention to prevent their countries from falling into Nasser’s hands, Eisenhower ordered US Marines to Lebanon. At the same time the British government dispatched special forces to Jordan.

In Autumn, 1958 Nasser moved to increase his grip on Syria, but coup leader, Abdel Karim Qasim, was successful in opposing him. Playing, as always, to the “Egyptian Street,” Nasser clamped down on Egyptian communists, a number of whom were arrested, including his old comrade Khaled Mohieddin, whom Nasser had allowed to return to Egypt in 1956. Meanwhile, Nasser continued to issue provocative statements about the ongoing tension with Israel and the need for its utter destruction: “We are awaiting aggression by Israel and any supporters of Israel. We will make it a decisive battle and get rid of Israel once and for all... This is the dream of every Arab.” [60]

By December, 1958, Nasser’s authority in Syria was faltering, not least because he possessed only a superficial understanding of Syrian issues. As the situation grew increasingly
desperate, Nasser met with opposition leaders and bluntly informed them that he was the elected president of the UAR, and if they did not accept his authority, they were free to “walk away.” Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt continued its largely underground existence. In 1959 the Brotherhood Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi gave Qutb responsibility for the Brothers still confined in prisons and concentration camps. Qutb circulated commentaries on the Qur’an, the object of which were to point out the “un-Islamic,” and in Qutb’s view criminal, policies of Nasser’s government. [61]

In 1960, aware of the fact that the Brotherhood, though deeply compromised, remained a potent underground force, Nasser nationalized the Egyptian press and initiated several reforms in institutions such as al-Azhar university, the de facto leading authority on Islamic issues in the Muslim world, to ensure its intellectual and spiritual dominance over the Brotherhood and the fervent, profoundly conservative Wahhabist ideology that found favor with the Saudis. At the same time, determined to limit the power of the al-Azhar clerics, he insisted that they issue a fatwa that admitted Shia, Alawites and Druze - groups al-Azhar scholars had traditionally viewed as heretics - into mainstream Islam. [62]

In July, 1961, in an effort to consolidate his influence in Syria, Nasser nationalized wide sectors of the Syrian economy - a move that did not find favor with elements of the Syrian Army. On September 28, 1961 Syrian anti-UAR army commanders launched a coup in Damascus and declared Syria’s removal from the United Arab Republic. Nasser reacted by dispatching special forces to Latakia to block the coup and to reinforce support for his policies within Syria, but he
understood the dangers of pitting Arab against Arab on the battlefield and was eventually compelled to recognize the new Syrian government.

In October, 1961, with the leaders of the Brotherhood still in prison, Nasser embarked on a major nationalization program in Egypt, believing that the total adoption of socialism was the answer to Egypt’s problems. As a result, government ownership of Egyptian businesses would reach 51% by 1962. Needless to say, the Muslim Brotherhood was violently opposed to the nationalizations, which they believed only served to increase Nasser’s power. Grasping this, Nasser ordered the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of Islamists, including many military officers. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood remained active in promoting dissent and resistance to Nasser’s government, resulting at times in unforeseen consequences. In 1962, with the consent of Hudaybi, former Muslim Brother ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Fattah and Zainab al-Ghazali of the Muslim Sisters formed an Islamic study group for which Qutb supplied a course of readings. By March, 1965, the splinter group would have 200 fighters training in clandestine camps, using weapons purchased with funds from exiles from Nasser’s Egypt. [63]

Despite resistance to his socialist program, Nasser was determined to proceed with his social revolution. In his 1962 National Charter, Nasser called for universal health care, affordable housing, vocational schools, increased rights for women, and the widening of the Suez Canal to accommodate larger ships. Concerned about resistance to his policies in the ranks of the military, Nasser attempted to wrest control of the army from Abdel Hakim Amer, who responded by threatening Nasser with an army revolt if he persisted. When a coup d’etat in North Yemen
occurred, engineered by a Nasser supporter, Nasser intervened in the resulting civil war, involving the Egyptian army in a political quagmire that would not end until 1967, at which point Nasser would refer to it as a “miscalculation.” [64]

By 1962 Nasser had been diagnosed with diabetes, was often in pain and had grown increasingly dependent on painkillers. In May, 1964 Nasser initiated the creation of the Palestine Liberation organization and made Egypt a haven for anti-colonialist agitators and fighters. In that same month, in regard to Israel and the Jews, Nasser was quoted in the German National Zeitung newspaper as having said: “no person, even the most simple one, takes seriously the lie of the six million Jews that were murdered.” Before the end of 1962, he was elected president of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which included Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and India. [65]

In 1964 Sayyid Qutb, still imprisoned, suffered a heat attack. At the behest of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Abdul Salam Arif, who was close to Nasser and an admirer of Qutb, the philosopher was released from prison. Leary of engaging in politics, Qutb proceeded to oversee the publication of his work, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (“Milestones”) a short book of 160 pages based on his 30 volume Qur’an, Fi Zilal al-Quran. [66]

In “Milestones” Qutb issued a fundamentalist call to arms addressed to all faithful Muslims who rejected Western values, and by implication dismissed Nasser’s socialist program. Qutb argued eloquently for the remaking of the world in which the Qur’an was the ultimate authority. Of particular concern to Qutb was the notion of Jahiliyyah, which could be translated as meaning “universal ignorance,” a term that referred to the era before Muhammad arrived and became the “Messenger of God,” in which the world resided in spiritual darkness.
Qutb believed that the world of the 20th century, including a large proportion of Muslim society, had returned to a condition of jahiliyyah. As Qutb wrote in “Milestones”: “Thus the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations, due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against God’s authority.” He added, “Islam’s way of life is unique... Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of God alone.” The book, which criticized the European concept of democracy, the collectivist ideology of the members of the communist bloc, and by implication Nasser’s socialism, went through five printings in six months. [67]

On March 25, 1965 Nasser was reelected to a second term as UAR president. Within months of his election, he learned that certain elements of the Brotherhood were discussing various scenarios to kill him and that weapons had been purchased to see the plan through. In August, 1965, Nasser government spokesmen revealed what they claimed were details of the planned coup and ordered the arrest of some 18,000 persons, a majority of them affiliated with the Brotherhood. Between 100 and 200 were in detained in prison. Many would be tortured. A total of 38 would be killed while in custody. [68]

Sayyid Qutb, who had been told of the plan but remained doubtful about the wisdom of carrying it out, and Zaynab al-Ghazali were among the arrested and put on trial. Many of the sentiments Qutb expressed in “Milestones” and other works were entered into court testimony to support the thesis that he was a dangerous man. To strengthen their case, Egyptian authorities tortured one of Qutb’s followers ‘Ali al-’Ashmawi and forced to implicate Qutb and all the
others involved in the plot. Qutb and six other members of the Brotherhood were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. [69]

On August 29, 1966 Qutb, age 59, was executed by hanging. After Qutb’s death the ulema of Al-Azhar University, acting on orders from Nasser, placed Qutb on their index of heresy, and declared him “munharif” (“deviant.”) Inspired by Qutb’s martyrdom, 15-year-old Ayman al-Zawahiri - future lieutenant of Osama bin Laden, and future leader of al-Qaeda - and four other secondary school students worked to create an “underground” political cell, “devoted to overthrowing the government and establishing an Islamist state. The stated aim of the cell was “to put Qutb’s vision into action.” [70]

In May, 1967 the Soviet Union issued warnings to Nasser of an impending attack on Syria and Nasser, ill and no longer dependable in his judgments, deployed his troops on the Sinai border with Israel. On May 19, he expelled U.N. peacekeepers stationed in the Sinai. On May 23, he closed the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping. On June 5, 1967, in response to these actions, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt and “The Six Day War,” which would lead to the overwhelming defeat of Egyptian forces, began. While the Israelis would suffer between 750 and 990 killed, the conflict would claim the lives of a minimum of about 15,000 - 20,000 Egyptian fighters (although some estimates are much higher), Jordan would lose 6,000, Syria 2,500. Israel captured Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. [71]

On June 9, 1967, as a result of the devastating loss, Nasser appeared on television and resigned as president, but protests in his favor soon provoked him to withdraw the resignation.
Ten days later, a temporarily reinvigorated Nasser named himself Prime Minister. On July 11, 1967, with the Egyptian populace and a majority of the Egyptian Army behind him, Nasser replaced General Amer and named himself Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. [72]

Amer, however, did not go quietly. In August, 1967, he plotted to overthrow Nasser. When, the next month, the plot was discovered, Amer committed suicide and Nasser proceeded to purge the army of opponents to his regime. In November, 1967 Nasser accepted UN Resolution 242 which called for Israel’s withdrawal from territories acquired during the war and at the same time approved raids designed to harass Israeli forces. [73]

In March, 1968 Nasser offered Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement arms and funds and urged Arafat to work for the creation of a Palestinian state. In so doing, he turned over the Palestine question to Arafat and the PLO. In March, 1969, as a result of continued Egyptian provocation, the war between Israel and Egypt resumed and Nasser was as bellicose in his statements as ever, “We have to go along a road covered with blood. We have no other alternative. For us it is a matter of life and death, a matter of living and existing.” In 1970 Nasser, by then a very ill man, accepted the United States-sponsored Rogers Plan to end the hostilities, which called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, but was rejected by Israel, by Jordan, the PLO, and most Arab states. On September 28, 1970 Nasser suffered a heart attack and died several hours later. [74]
Following President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death in 1970, Army General Anwar el-Sadat was elected the President of Egypt. Over the course of eleven years from 1970 to 1981, major changes would occur in the evolution of the structure and leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Following Hasan Al-Hudaybi’s death in 1973, the leadership of the organization would be passed on to Umar al-Tilmisani. President Sadat would play a significant role in the development of the Brotherhood by liberalizing laws which had violently suppressed the existence of Islamist groups in Egypt. As part of Sadat’s policy of ‘infitna,’ he would greatly loosen controls over the Brotherhood, which would eventually lead to full legalization of the organization.

Sadat’s “infitna” policies would have a twofold impact on the development and evolution of the Brotherhood. Significantly, the organization would be given permission to participate in Egypt’s legal and governmental institutions, and its members were allowed to become more ‘participatory’ members of civic society. These changes would be effected by the creation of Islamist Student unions, the spread of Islamist media through the publication of newspapers and magazines, and by the appearance and increasing popularity of lessons and sermons provided by Imams (Muslim religious leaders) on television and radio. These structural and social changes would inevitably produce serious consequences for both the development of the Brotherhood and the security of the Egyptian State.
From 1970 to 1978 Sadat’s policies of ‘Infitah’ would become increasingly influential in Egypt. As members became more ‘radicalized,’ the internal discipline and integrity of the Brotherhood as a whole would become increasingly unstable. From the perspective of the more ‘radical’ members of the Brotherhood, the leadership under Murshid al-Tilmisani would be too cooperative with the Egyptian Government, and decided that ‘jihad’ was the only viable solution to their problems. This attitude led to the development of many splinter groups within the Brotherhood, which would soon wage Holy War against the Egyptian Government.

After Nasser’s death, his stalwart lieutenant and supporter since the early stages of the “Young Officers” movement, Anwar al-Sadat, was elected President of Egypt. Born on Christmas Day, 1918, six weeks after the end of World War I, to a poor family in the Nile Delta village of Mit Abu al-Kumm, he was one of 14 children, born to an Upper Egyptian father, a petty bureaucrat who spoke English, and a Sudanese mother. At age seven, having attended a Coptic school, young Sadat moved to Cairo with his parents. After graduating from high school, he took advantage of the Wafd party’s opening of the Royal Military Academy in Cairo to young men of poor backgrounds, and was accepted as a cadet. At the Academy he became fast friends with fellow cadet, Gamal Abdel Nasser, with whom he graduated in 1938. Closely allied with Nasser in the clandestine “Young Officer Movement” in the early 1940’s, he was eventually imprisoned by British authorities for having attempted to obtain the help of the Axis powers in expelling the British from Egypt.

Sadat allied himself with Nasser during the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Appointed Minister of State in 1954, Sadat remained close to Nasser throughout the latter’s presidency.
Sadat was appointed vice-president in December, 1969, some nine months before Nasser’s death. Scholars generally agree that Sadat’s successful elevation to the presidency after Nasser’s death was largely a result of the notion that as a transitional figure, he could be easily manipulated. Those who doubted his capacity and his ambition were soon proved wrong. Shortly after becoming President, Sadat ordered the arrest of two high-ranking officers in the Nasser government, Vice President Ali Sabri, and Interior Minister Sharawy Gomaa, who headed Egypt’s secret police, both of whom represented a threat to his presidency. Sadat enjoyed a surge of popularity when the Aswan High Dam was formally inaugurated in January, 1971. [75]

On May 15, 1971, seven months to the day after he assumed the reins of power, President Sadat, having shored up his support among the Egyptian political and military elite, announced his “Corrective Revolution,” which began with the purging of the government of its devoted Nasserists and a show of support for Egypt’s Islamists, whom he believed would support him in his campaign to steer Egypt away from Nasser’s socialist model and transform the Egyptian economy into one that fully embraced free enterprise. A new constitution was introduced, Article Two of which declared Shariah to be the chief source of legislation. The country was renamed “The Arab Republic of Egypt.” Sadat initiated a program that over a period of four years would grant a general amnesty to exiled or imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood and would close the concentration camps in which thousands of Islamists, many of them members and supporters of the Brotherhood, had been jailed. In return, Sadat required that the leadership of the Brotherhood renounce violence and, despite the fact that the Brotherhood would not elect a new Murshid until the death of Hassan al-Hudaybi in November, 1973, the informal leadership
complied with this request. In the meantime, on May 27, 1971, judging it wise to appease the pro-Nasserists who remained in the government, Sadat signed a “Treaty of Friendship” with Leonid Brezhnev’s U.S.S.R. [76]

Although Sadat was deeply invested in the notion of transforming the Egyptian economy, he was equally invested in reclaiming Egyptian territory lost to Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. As a result of President Nixon’s summit meeting with Brezhnev in May, 1972, the Brezhnev government cautioned Sadat not to go to war with Israel. Sadat’s response was to break the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, signed the previous year.

By the summer of 1973 Sadat’s plans for a surprise attack on Israel were well-advanced. Working in close conjunction with President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, the two leaders had managed to glean support for the planned attack from the Arab League, the Non-Alligned Movement, and the Organization of African Unity. The plan would involve simultaneous attacks on Israeli territory by the Syrian Army and an attack by Egyptian armed forces on Israeli army units in occupied Sinai. The date the two leaders chose for the attack was October 6, 1973, one which coincided with the Israeli celebration of Yom Kippur, the “Day of Atonement,” the holiest day of the year for the Jewish people. [77]

In the first days of a war that would last three weeks, Egyptian forces enjoyed a stunning early success. Moving quickly, they annihilated Israel’s defensive “Bar-Lev” line. But they moved too quickly, advancing beyond a point at which they could depend on their own air cover - a fact that opened up the possibility of an Israeli counter-attack. In command of a tank division, General Ariel Sharon crossed the border and reached Suez. Meanwhile, in response to an Israeli appeal for help, President Nixon awarded Israel $2.2 billion in emergency aid and arranged for
an airlift of 23,000 tons of supplies and weaponry to the country - an act that several days into
the war would provoke OPEC (The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to impose
an embargo on the sale of oil to the United States and other countries that supported Israel.

A U.N. resolution brokered by the U.S. and the Soviet Union called for an end to
hostilities. As a result of United Nations Security Council “Resolution 340” most of the heavy
fighting on the Egyptian front ended on October 26. A military disengagement treaty that would
come to be known as the “Sinai I” agreement would be signed by representatives of Egypt and
Israel on January 18, 1974. On March 5, 1974 Israel withdrew its troops from the west side of
the Suez Canal, and on March 12, OPEC announced the end of the oil embargo against the
United States. In terms of the loss of human life, the war was costly to all three countries
involved. Israel lost around 2,500 soldiers. Although Egypt and Syria lost perhaps three times as
many, Sadat emerged from the conflict a hero to the Egyptian people, with support for his anti-
Nasserist, pro-Islamist “Corrective Revolution” much enforced. But approval of Sadat’s program
was far from universal. Many young Islamists, inspired by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, were
violently opposed to it, and many of those opposed made clear their philosophical orientation in
various writings printed in Brotherhood publications. While the Brotherhood, officially,
maintained its acceptance of the Sadat regime, Brotherhood ideologues were allowed to print
tracts and articles that viewed it with profound skepticism and gave voice to frankly Qutb-
inspired Islamist opinions, producing an ever-widening rift between radical and conservative
elements in the organization. These radical voices would soon play a part in provoking violent
political action. [78]
In early 1974, 41-year-old Salih Sirriya, who had become close to Murshid al-Hudaybi before the latter’s death in the previous year, devised a desperate plan to overthrow Sadat’s government. Siriyya was the leader of a radical Muslim Brotherhood offshoot called The Islamic Liberation Party, which viewed Sadat as being a godless official presiding over a godless government. On April 18, acting on the belief that the murder of Sadat and his colleagues, who were scheduled to pass by the Military Academy at Heliopolis in a presidential cortege, would trigger a spontaneous popular uprising that would create an Islamist state, Siriyya and a fellow believer organized an ambush, which was quickly quashed. Sirriya was arrested, put on trial, and executed. If nothing else, the Heliopolis incident persuaded Sadat that dangers arising from various Brotherhood splinter groups were all too real. One group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an umbrella organization for several militant Islamic student groups would form in the mid 1970’s.

In its early years, the organization was active primarily on Egypt’s university campuses, its members for the most part students. At that time the Egyptian student movement was dominated by the leftwing followers of President Nasser and various Marxist groups. Once Anwar Sadat became President, both the Nasserist and the Islamist student organizations gained in influence, but gradually the Islamist philosophy began to prevail, resulting in the adoption of the hijab and burqa by women students and the creation of separate university classes for men and women students. As the adoption of Islamist traditions and philosophy became more dominant, the members of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya became progressively more militant. In time the organization would elect Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman, the so-called “Blind Sheikh” as spiritual leader. These developments created an ever-deepening rift between the radicalized students and the more conservative elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually, the break
would become so dramatic that the rupture between the two organizations could not be healed. Omar Abdel-Rahman would steer al-Gama onto an increasingly violent path that would ultimately involve him personally. Eventually, having moved to the United States in 1991, Abdel-Rahman would be convicted to life imprisonment for helping to plan the bombing of the World Trade Center and involvement in the planning of the so-called “New York City Bomb Plot” of February, 1993. [79]

In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, President Nixon, by then caught up in the Watergate Scandal, supported Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s efforts to stabilize U.S. relations with Egypt. In early 1975, the U.S. offered Sadat technical support in removing the 15 cargo ships known as “The Yellow Fleet,” which had blocked the Suez Canal since the 1967 “Six Day War.” The Canal re-opened on May 24, 1975. The following September, as a result of Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy,” the second and final Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement (“Sinai II”) was signed, and peace between Egypt and Israel was formally acknowledged.

Buoyed by his surging popularity, Sadat redoubled his efforts to impose his “infitah” program on Egypt and its people. His government removed commercial restraints from Egyptian businesses, particularly those with interests abroad and encouraged private investment. It urged Egyptian workers to seek opportunities outside the country, in the Gulf states particularly, calculating, accurately as it turned out, that remittances sent back home would soon allow members of Egypt’s middle class to achieve an unprecedented standard of living. What the government failed to foresee was that workers dispatched to the Gulf states, many of them with little education, would be exposed to the more conservative religious views of the inhabitants,
including those of hyper-conservative Saudi Arabia. These contacts, combined with Sadat’s pro-Islamist policies at home, produced a gradual tilt in Egypt, away from Nasser’s modernizing, socialist vision to one in which Islamist philosophy became increasingly dominant. The effect of this shift would be particularly felt among Egypt’s poor classes, who, as the passage of time would prove, benefitted only marginally from Sadat’s “infitah.”[80]

In 1976 the Sadat government abrogated its “Treaty of Friendship” with the Soviet Union. By that time Sadat’s fervent embrace of the notion of an Islamist, albeit a modern Islamist, Egyptian state had become ever more apparent. He ordered Egypt’s state-run television to interrupt its programming five times a day with Salat, the Muslim call to prayer, and a degree of self-censorship in favor of Islamic values which came into play on the part of television and radio programmers. More and more, Sadat emphasized that his first name was ‘Mohamed’ not ‘Anwar,’ and styled himself the guardian of the faith.’ He supported apostasy laws and declared himself leader of “an Islamic pious country.” He promoted religious schools and expanded the budget of Al-Azhar. He welcomed leading Muslim scholars and commentators to participate in radio and television programming and supported the notion of shariah as the basis of Egyptian jurisprudence. He allowed the Brotherhood’s old newspaper the Call (Al-Dawaa) to be reissued, and the editors took full advantage of the opportunity to publish articles that were at the same time anti-Western and pro-Muslim. Eventually, Sadat’s policies produced a profound effect. In gradual steps the predominantly liberal and tolerant atmosphere that had characterized Egypt’s upper and middle classes in the 1950’s and 1960’s was replaced by one in which conservative Islam became the key influence. [81]
Although the Brotherhood declared itself pleased with these developments, the leadership did not believe that they went far enough. Brotherhood leaders petitioned Parliament to ban the sale of alcohol and supported Koranic punishments of the sort practiced in Saudi Arabia - the cutting off of the hands of thieves, execution by stoning for women found guilty of marital infidelity. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood widened and deepened its social, charitable, and by implication political, outreach, which, increasingly, won the allegiance of Egypt’s underprivileged classes. At the same time, it welcomed the enrollment of many businessmen who had begun to profit from Sadat’s economic liberalization policies who were eager to express their faith in Islam by supporting the Brotherhood. The primary message the Brotherhood promoted was relatively simple. Democratic government was fine as long as it understood that shariah was the only authority acceptable to the true Muslim. In time many Egyptians would come to blame Sadat’s “infitah” for not controlling inflation and for allowing corruption to flourish. [82]

By way of response, the Sadat government granted permission to the Brotherhood to publish its monthly newspaper, Al-Da’wa (“The Invitation to Islam.”) The reborn and refashioned journal displayed an increased level of religious zealotry and anti-Western bias that was a departure from the stance it had taken during al-Banna’s time. Typical articles included: “The Revival of Islam,” “The Intellectual Invasion from the West,” “Secularism is the Conspiracy from the West Against the Islamic East.” Over the next four years, until it was shut down in 1981, its circulation would reach 100,000. [83][84]

Meanwhile, the youth of Egypt, raised in an Islamist atmosphere that was in many cases more conservative than that in which their parents grew up, became more restive. Although the
Brotherhood consistently rejected revolutionary and terrorist violence in its public pronouncements, the rank and file of the Brothers themselves were increasingly frustrated about souring economic conditions. Sadat, for his part, took steps to alleviate the situation. In 1976, he entered into negotiations with the World Bank in an effort to ease the country’s increasingly dire economic situation. The Bank criticized the Sadat government’s subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil and the bonuses and pay increases that it granted to government employees.

In January, 1977 the Sadat government announced an end to the subsidies, which resulted in immediate price increases of up to 50%. On January 18-19, 1977, violence erupted. In a series of conflicts that would come to be known as the “Bread Riots,” millions took to the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities, burning, looting, cursing Sadat, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, chanting in some cases “Ya batal el-‘obur, fen el-futur?” (“Hero of the Crossing, where is our bread?”) the “Crossing” a reference to the crossing of the Suez Canal to attack Israeli forces in the Sinai in 1973. Rioters invaded and looted the casinos and night clubs of Giza. Two were burned to the ground. In Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere police fought the crowds with shotguns and small caliber weapons. When an employee of the Health Ministry in Cairo was questioned about the rioting, he replied “Violence is wrong, but what else can these people do?” [85]

Sadat eventually imposed a martial law curfew and threatened to shoot violators, but the rioting ended only when his government announced that the subsidies would be reinstated. By the time that happened 79 people had died in the violence, between 500 and 700 were reported injured, and over 1,000 were arrested. Sadat blamed communist agitators for the violence. He held a referendum in which he promoted “tough new anti-riot measures” and claimed,
questionably, that 99.42% of Egyptian voters approved of them. In the end the fuel and food subsidies remained in place.

The riots were a turning point in the government’s relationship with the Brotherhood, and further soured its already tenuous connection with Egypt’s Islamic-oriented youth. In gradual steps the Brotherhood withdrew its support for Sadat’s regime. The editors of the Brotherhood organ Al-Da’wa made clear their support of the Islamic student movement. Members of the Brotherhood were invited to speak at large gatherings organized by students on Muslim holidays. When the Sadat government acted to curtail the activities of the students, criticism of the government on the part of the Brotherhood became even more acute. More than ever the leaders of the Brotherhood were eager to join the political fray. Sadat, however, was unwilling to allow this, going so far as to create a “Political Parties Law” that prohibited the existence of political parties based on religion. [86]

Ignoring the increasing virulence of the criticism being directed toward him and his government, Sadat continued his efforts to move Egypt toward a free market economy and at the same time sought to clarify the role he envisioned for Egypt on the international scene. On November 19, 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader to visit Israel. It was a bold and highly controversial move that would have enormous consequences for the Sadat government and for the history of Egypt and the Middle East as a whole.

On the one hand, it led to an invitation on the part of U.S. President Jimmy Carter to engage in peace talks with the Israelis at Camp David. On the other, it profoundly disgusted a large percentage of the rank and file of the Brotherhood and pumped renewed energy into the
radical Islamic groups, both within and outside the Brotherhood, who had come to regard Sadat as an incompetent enemy of Islamic values. The Brotherhood called for a campaign to boycott Israeli banks, trade, and any sort of business relationship that benefited Israel. Membership in radical Islamic groups such as Shebab al-Muhammed and Tafkir W’al Hijra soared. Tanzim al-Jihad was formed as the result of a merger of two clusters of Islamist groups, a Cairo branch under Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, who was a devoted follower of the ideas of Qutb, and an upper Egypt branch under Karam Zuhdi. Of particular importance was al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (“The Islamic Group”) whose spiritual leader was Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel-Rahman, the so-called “Blind Sheikh.” [87]

On January 16, 1979, Shah Reza Pahlavi fled Iran and two weeks later, on February 1, 1979 Islamic cleric Ruhollah Khomeini returned in triumph to the country. Although Khomeini was a Shia with few supporters in Egypt, the Muslim world was electrified by the success of a Muslim cleric who, the previous November had declared “With people’s revolutionary rage, the king will be ousted and a democratic state, Islamic Republic, will be established.” Members of Khomeini’s circle were deeply influenced by the writings of Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb. Qutb’s puritanical, anti-Western influence would soon be revealed when the Khomeini government introduced shariah, mandated an Islamic dress code, enforced for both men and women by Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Women would not be allowed to wear shorts and would be compelled to cover their hair. Alcohol and western films would be banned. Music other than religious or martial music would not be played on the radio and on television. For Egypt’s
increasingly restless youth, the Khomeini Islamist revolution demonstrated at the very least that “people power” could succeed in toppling governments. [88]

In September, 1978 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat traveled to the U.S.A to sign the historic “Camp David Accords” for which both men would soon be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. While President Jimmy Carter and his administration luxuriated in the stunning diplomatic success that they had engineered, disapproval of the accords resounded not only in Egypt but throughout the Muslim world. The Arab League suspended Egypt from the organization (It would not be readmitted as a member until 1989.) While some Egyptians greeted the accords with relief, the rank and file of the Brotherhood were deeply displeased and the leaders of the organization made clear their anger in the pages of Al-Da’wa. The tone of the newspaper articles appearing in the journal became increasingly antisemitic, anti-Christian, anti-secularist, and anti-American.

For many of Egypt’s most notable writers the photograph of Sadat and Begin shaking hands was profoundly disquieting. Ahmad Fouad Nigm, Egypt’s most popular satirist poet, wrote his most memorable poems, critical of Sadat, at that time. Nizar Kabbani, the Arab world’s most famous poet over the previous five decades, lamented the fall of Egypt, the Arab world’s ‘land of dignity’, after ‘the Great Nasser’ in the hands of a ‘slave’ (Sadat). Ahmed Bhaa El-Din, ex-editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram, described his ‘shock, disbelief, and pain’ at viewing the process. As for the radical Islamists, they were horrified at the notion that their President had entered into a peace agreement with the despised Jews. For many of them, as one authority would ultimately
phrase it, the signing of the Camp David Agreement made Sadat “the eternal enemy who had sold out to the infidels.” [89]

On November 4, 1979 the “Hostage Crisis” began in Teheran when 52 American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage by a group of Iranian students. The crisis would endure for 444 days and President Carter’s entirely ineffectual handling of it would provoke a profound change in the perception of the United States in the Middle East and around the world. However distasteful an uprising among shiahs in Iran might be for the average Egyptian, the lesson was clear. “People power” could alter the course of history. Sadat and his government did not ignore the lesson. In 1980, in an effort to blunt criticism of his regime, Sadat arranged for the Egyptian Constitution to be amended to state that shari’ah was henceforth “the main source of all legislation.” Meanwhile, in March, 1980, Sadat, in a gesture designed to provoke Khomeini and his government, granted asylum to the ailing and much maligned Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. When the Shah died in Egypt on July 27, 1980, Sadat granted him given a state funeral. [90]

By late 1980, members of various Islamist groups in Egypt had decided that Sadat had failed Egypt, failed Islam, and had to go. Abbud al-Zumar, who was simultaneously a colonel in the military intelligence wing of the Egyptian Army and chief strategist of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (“El-Jihad al-Islamy al-Masryun”) concocted a plan to murder Sadat and his colleagues, take over Army headquarters and incite “a popular uprising against secular authority all over the country” - El Jihad being the splinter organization that had arisen from the merger of two clusters
of Islamist groups, one run by Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, the other by Karam Zuhdi, the leadership of which had long decided that the much more conservative approach of the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer relevant.

In February, 1981, alerted to al-Zumar’s plan by the arrest of an operative carrying crucial information on his person, Sadat ordered the arrest of some 1,500 people suspected of actively opposing his regime. All non-government press was banned, and the Muslim Brotherhood monthly newspaper Al-Da’wa was shut down. Aware of resistance to his rule on the part of the Coptic community over his Islamizing policies, Sadat exiled Coptic Pope Shenouda. [91]

In late September, 1981, the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman, spiritual leader of the “Islamic Group” allegedly issue a fatwa giving permission to any believing Muslim to assassinate President Anwar Sadat. Although details are few and the evidence is contradictory, it would seem that members of al-Jihad and the al-Gama‘ah groups worked together to some degree on a plan to see the assassination plan through. On October 6, 1981, during a victory parade in Cairo, celebrating the eighth anniversary of the Crossing of the Nile by Egyptian forces during the Yom Kippur War, a four man assassination squad, led by Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, who had been a member of Islamic Jihad since the mid-1970’s, leapt from a military truck, raced to the stands where Sadat and his colleagues were seated, took aim at Sadat and fired his automatic rifle until the bullets in the clip were exhausted. [92]
During the course of the Hosni Mubarak regime from 1981 to 2011, significant changes would occur in the structure and leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its relationship with the Egyptian Government. Initially extending and supporting President Anwar Sadat’s ‘infitnah’ liberalization policies which permitted greater representation of Islamist activist groups in the Egyptian Parliament and in its universities, these policies soon became challenged by the Hosni Mubarak regime. From roughly 1993 to 2000, the Egyptian Government would become increasingly involved in a series of conflicts with the Muslim Brotherhood and its associated Islamist groups. In these conflicts terrorism in Egypt would increase, as would the frequency of assassinations, and increased casualties on the part of both Islamists and agents of the Mubarak Government, developments that would lead to an ever more severe crackdown on the Brotherhood. Despite the increasingly anarchic environment which developed in Egypt in the early 1990’s, the Brotherhood would retain strong representation in the Parliament, maintain a significant role in benevolent/relief projects throughout the country, and survived relatively intact. As always, however, for obvious reasons, the details of the inner working of the Brotherhood were conducted under a veil of sworn secrecy, with the result that information about the policies of the organization and their implementation would remain largely obscure. The
details remain obscure, as President Mubarak would choose in the latter years of his Presidency to shut down the organization much the same way that President Gamal Abdel Nasser did from 1954-70.

Mubarak’s unanticipated rise to power was a result of the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. On the day Sadat was murdered, Vice-President Mubarak was standing near the President and was injured in the hand by a stray bullet. Eight days later, he was sworn in as the Fourth president of Egypt. Born on May 4, 1928 - the year the Muslim Brotherhood was founded - in Kafr El-Meselha in the Monufia Governate in the Nile Delta, Mubarak grew up in the region. Although details of his early life are little known, records reveal that he graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1949 and subsequently attended the Egyptian Air Force Academy, where he earned his commission as a flight officer on March 13, 1950. He served as a flight instructor at the Academy from 1952 to 1959. In 1958 Mubarak married Suzanne Thabet, the daughter of Egyptian pediatrician Saleh Thabet and Welsh-born Lily May Palmer. Suzanne Mubarak would ultimately give birth to two sons.

From February, 1959 to June, 1961, Mubarak lived in the Soviet Union, where he received pilot training instruction in Moscow and Kyrgyzstan. On his return to Egypt, he quickly rose in the ranks and was named commander of the Air Force Academy in 1967. Never a smoker or a drinker, Mubarak earned the reputation of being a highly disciplined, physically fit officer who often began his day with a workout at the gym or a game of squash. His discipline and devotion to duty were exemplary, and his commanding officers took notice. He was appointed Air Force Chief of Staff in 1969. In 1972 President Anwar el-Sadat appointed him Deputy Minister of War and Commander in Chief of Egyptian military forces. Mubarak was given much,
perhaps unwarranted, credit for the Egyptian Army’s initially successful attack on Israeli forward positions in the Sinai in October, 1973. In recognition of his services, President Sadat appointed him Vice-President of Egypt in April, 1975. Mubarak took temporary control of the country after Sadat’s death, was soon approved as successor to Sadat by the Egyptian Parliament, and his appointment as President was ratified in a national election. Mubarak took office on October 14, 1981, eight days after President Sadat’s assassination. [93]

One of Mubarak’s first acts as President was to tighten Presidential control over the Mabahith Amn ad-Dawla, the Egyptian State Security Investigations Service, and instruct it to focus its attention on Egypt’s radical Islamist organizations. Thousands of arrests followed. Once Mubarak was convinced, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood had not been directly involved in the Sadat assassination, Mubarak chose a path of conciliation with it. As scholar Carrie Rosefsky Wickham pointed out, “From the beginning, Mubarak balanced accommodationist and repressive strategies, mixing the expected sweep of arrests in retaliation for Sadat’s 1981 assassination and surprising gestures of conciliation.” Mubarak released Murshid Umar Tilmisani and hundreds of other Brotherhood members who had been detained during the final years of the Sadat regime.

As events would soon demonstrate, the policy of the Mubarak regime in regard to the Brotherhood from the beginning was one of “carrot and stick.” While the Mubarak regime denied, and would continue to deny, the Muslim Brotherhood legal sanction and forbid its members from gathering in public assemblies, it decided it prudent to allow the Brotherhood to publish books and articles in support of benign Brotherhood objectives. As Wickham points out,
“The first three years of the Mubarak era were relatively calm, with both the regime and the opposition seeking to avoid a resumption of the cycle of protest and repression that culminated in Sadat’s assassination.”

Underestimating perhaps the force of opinion that the organization represented, Mubarak gave permission to the organization to publish two newspapers *Liwa’al-Islam* (“The Banner of Islam”) and al-l’tisam (“Adherence”). Most critically perhaps, it allowed the Brotherhood to pursue its aims as a social and charitable organization. As events would demonstrate, one of the primary objectives of the Mubarak administration from its earliest days was to forestall the sort of mass movement that had toppled the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi in February, 1979 - an event that had shaken the Islamic world to its core. As scholar Annette Ranko has pointed out, “While it [the Mubarak regime] affirmed the nobility of the organization’s commitment in the realm of religion, morals, and spirituality, it .... sought to present the Brother’s as unable to deliver in the realm of politics.” [94]

Efforts on the part of the Mubarak regime to brand the Brotherhood as being politically ineffective failed to succeed. In May, 1984, during the Egyptian Parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood entered into a strategic alliance with the secular Wafd Party a development designed to move the organization out of the shadow of quasi-legal activity. To a modest degree the change in strategy proved a success and somewhat insulated it from the activities of more violently inclined Islamist groups with which it maintained relations, and which now became more active. On November 23, 1985 *EgyptAir* Flight 648, en route from Athens to Cairo was hijacked by three Abu Nidal terrorists. Although 60 people, most of them Egyptians, died when
Egyptian commandos stormed the aircraft in Malta, the Mubarak administration was careful to differentiate this attack from the activities of the Brotherhood and found others to blame. This was so much the case that when Mubarak, the only candidate, ran for President in 1987 the central leadership of the Brotherhood under its Murhsid Umar al-Tilmisani supported him and he was re-elected to a second six-year term.

In that election, the Brotherhood, having joined forces with the Socialist Labor Party to form an alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Islam) won 56 seats in Parliament, 36 of which went to Brotherhood members. As Muslim scholar Mamoun al-Hudeibi pointed out in the Muslim quarterly Liwa’ al-Islam, the Brotherhood’s participation in the elections was an extension of the organization’s original ‘D’awa’ social mission, as exemplified in the teachings of the Brotherhood’s first Murshid, Hassan al-Banna. Murshid Umar al-Tilmisani made the case for Brotherhood participation in the election in an unequivocal statement of the organization’s shift in policy: “When the Brotherhood talks of politics, they don’t speak as political men but as Islamic Duah(messengers of the Da’Wa, or call to God)… we don’t work for ourselves, we work for God.” Predictably, the ideological pact between the Socialist Labor Party and the Brotherhood began to wear thin. The conflation of Muslim fundamentalist teachings and political politics that argued for the adoption of strict Sharia law found little favor in the ranks of the Socialists, and the alliance did not long endure.

Although the Mubarak regime was largely successful in controlling the more radical elements of the Brotherhood in Egypt, it was less successful in preventing the creation of
Islamist groups whose philosophy was in conflict with it and with the Brotherhood’s officially stated aims. Dissatisfaction led to religiopolitical schisms within the Brotherhood and in organizations outside Egypt that neither the Mubarak regime nor the Brotherhood itself could prevent. In 1987 fifty-year-old quadriplegic, Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian Islamist teacher and sermonizer, whose family had fled Palestine in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and who had attended Al-Azhar University in Cairo, whose intellectual formations had been much influenced by the teachings of Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb, became along with fellow Palestinian refugee Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, the founder of Hamas, which would take control of the Gaza Strip in 2005 and in so doing alter the history of the Middle East. [95]

When in August, 1990, the Gulf War began in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Mubarak seized the opportunity to improve Egyptian ties to the United States, a move in no manner approved by the Brotherhood leadership and its rank and file. Nevertheless, Egyptian troops were some of the first to land in Saudi Arabia in preparation for “Operation Desert Storm,” and the Mubarak regime ultimately reaped a very large financial reward for its contribution to the operation. It also served to alienate those members of the Brotherhood who had sought to maintain a neutral political stance in regard to Egypt’s relations with the United States, with the result that Islamist violence on the part of various splinter groups, with ties formal or otherwise to the Brotherhood, increase in frequency.

Beginning in 1992, armed bands of Islamists, focusing their activities in the more remote parts of the country, attacked government offices and outposts. The most blatant and significant of the attacks was the murder of Egyptian secular intellectual and writer Faraj Fuda on June 8,
1992, two weeks after he was pronounced an apostate by Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, a prominent member of the ulema of Al-Azhar University. The splinter group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya claimed responsibility for the murder, added that they were nearly carrying out Al-Azhar’s sentence against Fudah. What suspicions the Mubarak regime may have entertained about Brotherhood involvement in the Fuda murder were sidelined to degree by the role the Brotherhood played in mobilizing rescue operations in the wake of the Cairo earthquake on October 12, 1992. The alleged torture of political prisoners, many of them Brotherhood members, soon became a controversial issue. In July a U.S. based human-rights group, Middle East Watch, issued a 200 page report that maintained that the Mubarak regime regularly employed torture during the interrogation of prisoners. Interior Minister Galal el-Shami was quoted as saying that he was not prepared to comment on the group’s alleged findings. [96]

In 1993 Mubarak, the unique candidate on the ballot, was elected to a third six-year term as President. From the beginning of his presidency, his regime had engaged in a balancing act of allowing the Brotherhood to exist as a charitable organization while clamping down on its more radical elements. Mubarak’s war against the radicals would eventually result in over 17,000 arrests and over 1,000 casualties. The frequency of Assassination attempts on the part of groups with Brotherhood connections, official or otherwise, on the lives of the Minister of Information, the Minister of the Interior, the Prime Minister, provided evidence of the exceedingly complex duel nature of the Brotherhood itself, a situation that had existed from its foundation but which now became more pronounced. While Brotherhood officials worked hard to achieve legitimacy
in the public as a moderating force, their deeply conservative stated philosophy provided inspiration to radical elements within and without the Brotherhood that had ceased to believe that the organization’s aims were in any a sufficient response to the dilemmas faced by the Muslim world.

The influence of the Brotherhood leadership’s adherence to a deeply conservative interpretation of Islam, combined with the organization’s ever-mounting influence as a moderate though potent presence on the Egyptian political and professional scene became a matter of increasing concern for the Mubarak regime. The growing popularity of the Brotherhood with the public, in part a result of the organization’s work in aiding victims of flooding in Upper Egypt, eventually persuaded Mubarak to curb Brotherhood’s activities. Mubarak’s strategy was two-fold. On the one hand, he instigated a crackdown on Brotherhood members that resulted in hundreds of arrests. On the other, he approved the tactic of enforcing “Law 100,” which interfered with the involvement of Islamic and Brotherhood candidates in the election procedures of key professional syndicates. [97]

The crackdown on the Brotherhood inevitably provoked reprisals on the part of members of the organization and members of splinter groups that maintained an uneasy, unofficial alliance with elements of it. On April 9, 1994 Major General Ra’uf Khayrat, an assistant director of Egypt’s State Security Investigations Service [SSI], who was conducting a campaign against radical Islamists, was killed in front of his home with a bomb thrown by a member of the
Gama’a al-Islamiyya. As a result, the crackdown on Islamists and human rights defenders intensified. Unable to punish the perpetrators of Khayrat’s murder, Mubarak ordered the arrests of 41 lawyers involved in human rights activities, including 32-year-old lawyer ‘Abd al-Harith Mohammad Madani, who was allegedly tortured so severely that he died while in police custody. A protest over Madani’s death, organized by the Egyptian Bar Association, resulted in a new round of arrests. [98]

Increasingly concerned about the Islamist challenge to his rule, Mubarak attempted to temper criticism of his regime by demonstrating his devotion to the notion of Islamic justice. In response to a request from al-Azhar University that the government clarify its policies in regard to censorship of the print and electronic media, Mubarak turned over the tasks of censoring radio and television broadcasts and mandated that its decisions be binding on the Ministry of Culture. Both the leadership and the rank and file regarded the move as a triumph for Islamism, and some Brotherhood officials boasted of the manner in which they believed that the coming Islamic state would reduce the six-million strong Egyptian Coptic community to the status of a subordinate community.

A further demonstration of the increasing influence of the Brotherhood came during the The International Conference on Population and Development which met in Cairo from September 5 to September, 13, 1994, when the Brotherhood, claiming that the conference had been financed and inspired by the United States and other “enemies of Islam,” condemned it as
“satanic” and challenged the ulema of Al-Azhar to do the same. On September 17, the ulema complied, condemning the conference for its “assumption that population increases created poverty, and for its working principle that accepted the legitimacy of sexual relations outside marriage.” Both attacks represented blatant challenges to the Mubarak administration’s close relations with the United States, and its attitude toward birth control. As if to underline the notion that respect for Islamic and Islamic justice must reign supreme, on October 14, 1994 an Islamic militant stabbed 82-year-old Egyptian novelist and Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz in the neck and almost killed him, allegedly because of allegorical references to Islamic prophets that the author had made in his writings. [99]

Clearly, by the beginning of 1995, Islamic militants, some closely allied to the Brotherhood, had gained increased confidence in the notion that violence could achieve Islamist ends. On June 26, 1995 Egyptian Islamic Jihad gunmen attacked President Mubarak’s bulletproof limousine as he arrived at an Organization of African Unity conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Mubarak, who was not injured in the attack, returned to Egypt immediately. He ordered scores of Brotherhood operatives detained in successive waves of arrests. Among the detained were former members of Parliament, university professors, the officials of various associations allied with the Brotherhood, and businessmen. The defendants were tried in military court and 54 of them received sentences of up to five years. Two Brotherhood officials - ‘Isam al-‘Iryan, a former member of Parliament and Assistant Secretary General of the Egyptian Doctor’s Association, and ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abu-I-Futuh, Secretary General of the Doctor’s
Association, and Secretary General of the Federation of Arab Doctors, were found guilty of providing financial assistance to terrorists and of using their Brotherhood connections to aid Islamic militants operating abroad. Both men were sentenced to 5 years of hard labor.

For the Mubarak regime the arrests, trials, and convictions accomplished two important goals. First, they allowed the Mubarak-controlled media to characterize the Brotherhood as being an organization devoted to violent political change. Second, the harsh sentences functioned as a warning to Brotherhood members from Egypt’s professional classes, who formed the backbone of the Brotherhood’s educated elite. The arrests, trials, and convictions of Brotherhood members were the first elements of a pattern of repression that would characterize the policy of the Mubarak regime toward the organization over the next 5 years. [100]

Despite these arrests and convictions of Muslim Brothers tied to Islamic militant groups, the Brotherhood leadership remained in its own way defiant. As the crackdown was in progress, the Fifth Murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mustafa Mashhur, who would guide the organization from 1996 until his death in 2002, published *Jihad is the Way*, the last of a five volume work entitled The Laws of Da’wa. The aim of the work, frankly stated, was to inspire and advance the global conquest of Islam as a religion, to reestablish an Islamic Caliphate, and to inspire all Muslims with a sense of duty to wage war with Israel. “It should be known that jihad and preparation towards jihad are not only for the purpose of fending off assaults and attacks of Allah’s enemies from Muslims, but are also for the purpose of realizing the great task of
establishing an Islamic state and strengthening the religion and spreading it around the world.” [101]

Despite the Brotherhood’s alleged devotion to the notion of jihad, the leaders of the more radical Islamist groups continued to view and characterize the Brotherhood as being an old-fashioned appeaser of whatever dictator it happened to find itself serving under. On September 18, 1995 the Mideast Mirror website published an article that dealt with a story published in Islamic Jihad’s magazine Al Mujahidoon, in which Ayman Zawahiri, future aid to Osama bin Laden, was quoted as saying that the Brotherhood “continues to adhere to its failed and deviant methods.” Zawahiri urged the organization to stop “appeasing” the government and take the “correct decision” of declaring jihad. “When that happens, they will find that we are the closest and most supportive of people to them.”

Well aware of Mashhur’s work, the Mubarak regime renewed its efforts to curb the Islamist influence in the country. Undoubtedly regretting the power that it had granted al-Azhar in 1994, the Mubarak regime moved to curb the influence of the ulema. In January, 1996, it mandated that some 10,000 private mosques, and over 6,000 educational institutions, ranging from primary schools, Koran classes, to branches of the university, which served the needs of some 1.25 million students, be placed under the control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf), denying in so doing al-Azhar control over them. In a further step, in April, 1996, the Mubarak-controlled Egyptian House of Representatives passed a law prohibiting any
charitable organization from receiving foreign funds, the obvious intent of the restriction being to close off the flow of money from Islamic associations in the Gulf. [102]

As a result of these legal strictures, the Brotherhood entered a period of retrenchment in regard to its overt involvement in politics - a development that predictably did not go down well with many of the “rising stars” of the organization, who increasingly viewed the Brotherhood leadership as being willfully blind to political reality and all too accepting of the restrictions that the Mubarak regime had placed upon it. The growing dissension among the ranks of the Brotherhood came to a head when 83-year-old Brotherhood Murshid Hamid Abu Nasr died in January, 1996. At Nasr’s funeral, Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, son of second Brotherhood Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi, the Brotherhood’s official spokesman and power behind the throne, announced the appointment of a new “Supreme Guide,” 76-year-old Mustafa Mashhur. A veteran of the organization, Mashhur had spent about 18 years in prison during the Nasser years. Nevertheless, his appointment to the office of Murshid provoked anger among the middle generation leaders of the organization, who felt that accepted elective procedures had been sidestepped.

Another development in the Brotherhood organization that many of the rank and file found equally distressing was the announcement on the part of a prominent group of middle generation leaders that they intended to form a new party, the Wasat (“Center”) Party, to be
headed by a 38-year-old Islamist engineer Abu-l-‘Ila Madi. According to Madi, the new party would embody “a civic platform based on Islamic faith, which believes in pluralism and alternations of power.” In other words, the breakaway group was accusing the leadership of the Brotherhood not merely of high-handedness in its management of Brotherhood affairs but of blindness and deafness in regard to political and social realities.

In principle, The Wasat Party held a strong endorsement of equal rights and citizenship for men and non-Muslims. According to its founder Abu -I ‘Ila Madi and the part platform, “They also elaborated on the party’s agenda, which they pointedly described as a “human interpretation of Islam open to discussion in various seminars and workshops sponsored by secular civil society groups.” The problems which the Al-Wasta Party would face, however, is that many of its former secular supporters including the journalist Salah Isa of El-Qahira Magazine criticized the organization the party’s support of the elevation of Sha’ria. According to Isa, “We must open a democratic space for engagement with the Islamists in order to encourage their moderation. We welcomed the Wasat Party, seeing it as the most important trend toward moderation in the Islamic trend, because its platform is based on citizenship not religion. I can accept the idea of a shared identity rooted in Arab-Islamic civilization, but if you say that that we have to apply Islamic judicial rulings, that is a problem.” The Wasat ultimately represented a political coalition established by the Middle generation leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who objected to ideological rigidity of the Brotherhood’s more conservative members. Members who would object to any for of women’s suffrage, or the full civil and legal protection of women and Christian minorities in Egypt. Ultimately the effort to form the Wasat Party would fail, however, as only six of the original twelve members of the Wasat Committee signed the National Charter.
This failure to form a secular coalition inevitably made the Brotherhood even more prone to criticism from the Egyptian public and government, leading to the arrests of many Wasat members. This crisis was made largely possible because of the fact that Madi’s more ‘moderate’ Islamist group would come into conflict with Mamoun al-Hudeibi’s more ‘conservative’ Islamist followers, which would contribute to the failure of creating a more ‘moderate’ political platform for the Brotherhood.[102]
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Era

Part Two

On April 3, 1996 Madi and two colleagues were among 13 Brotherhood leaders arrested for “belonging to an illegal organization.” As always, the arrests provoked profound soul-searching in the ranks of the organization. Meanwhile, the Mubarak-controlled media justified the arrests as being a necessary step toward curbing Islamist violence - a notion that was given a large fund of support when on April 19, 1996 Islamic militants shot dead 18 Greek tourists, many of them elderly, and wounded 14, outside a Cairo hotel. Although no organization initially claimed responsibility for the attack, it had all the earmarks of Gama’a al-Islamiya involvement. Although no link between the attack and the leadership of the Wasat party as a whole, the accused leaders of the breakaway organization suffered as a result of it. In August, 1996, eight members of Wasat received prison sentences, and five, including the three founding members, were acquitted. In response to the conclusion of the trial, Brotherhood spokesmen al-Hudaybi ordered all Brotherhood members to resign from the Wasat Party or face expulsion from the
Brotherhood. Despite the injunctions issued by the Brotherhood leadership in regard to Wasat Party membership, the Mubarak government continued its crackdown on Brotherhood members. In December police arrested 240 people Mubarak Government officials who were members of violent Islamic splinter groups. The government claimed that 200 of them, were members of the Islamist “Koutbin” group and that there were members of “secret political cells,” allied to the Brotherhood. [103]

By mid-1997 the low-level war between the Mubarak regime and the radical Islamist parties in Egypt had resulted in over 1,000 casualties, including extremists and police. It had damaged the tourist industry, depriving the country of billions of dollars in foreign exchange, events that left the Mubarak regime looking ineffectual and desperate in the eyes of many, perhaps most, Egyptians - an opinion that was strongly reinforced on September 18, 1997 when Islamic militants shot and killed 10 people, including 6 German tourists, outside Cairo’s Egyptian Museum. The attack sent shockwaves through the Mubarak government and the Brotherhood, but the worst was yet to come.

On November 17, 1997 Islamist terrorists, most likely acting on orders from the exiled leaders of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, attacked tourists at Deir el-Bahri (“Hatshepsut’s Tomb”), in Egypt’s “Valley of the Kings,” killing 62 people, most of them tourists (36 Swiss, 10 Japanese, 6 from the United Kingdom, 4 from Germany, 2 from Columbia) and 4 Egyptians - a massacre that produced revulsion in all but the most militant elements of Egyptian society. The response on the
part of the Egyptian populace was immediate. To the disappointment of the al-Gama’a leadership, the Brotherhood, political parties, religious leaders, and civil society organizations condemned the attack and called on the government to escalate the confrontation against terrorism. In response al-Gama’a al-Islamiya leader Refa’i Ahmed Taha claimed that the killings had been a mistake, that the intention had been merely to take the tourists hostage. Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, jailed in the United States, blamed the Israelis for the massacre. Ayman Zawahiri, at that point deeply involved in plans with his colleague, Osama bin Laden, to bomb U.S. embassies in East Africa, claimed that the attack had been perpetrated by the Egyptian police. Mubarak, for his part, placed part of the blame for the attacks on Great Britain, which had offered asylum to Egyptian Islamist leaders - all to no avail in altering Egyptian public opinion in regard to the incident. As future events would indicate, it was a turning point for the radical Islamist groups that would effectively deny them decisive influence in the eventual assumption of power by the Brotherhood in 2012. [104]

On October 5, 1999 Mubarak was elected for a fourth term as President. Buoyed up by his success in an election in which he was the only candidate but helpless in regard to controlling the activities of outlawed Islamist groups operating both outside Egypt and within Egyptian borders, Mubarak focused his attention on harassing members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak actively chose to suppress the Brotherhood because of their connections to other ‘umbrella’ Islamist groups such as Gammiya Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In other words from the Government’s perspective the Brotherhood was increasingly evolving into a
cancerous entity, one which held many branches and radical splinter groups within Egypt. In the wake of his election, Mubarak ordered the arrest of a group of 20 Brotherhood leaders, active in various professional associations, who were meeting at Maadi, in southern Cairo. The 16 men, which included doctors, lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, and veterinarians, were charged with “belonging to a secret outlawed group” that was “planning to overthrow the system of government.” Following a lengthy show trial, the Supreme Military Court sentenced three of the men to 5 years in prison. Twelve of the men were sentenced to 3 years in prison. Five of the men were declared innocent.

In October, 2000, in the hope of burnishing his reputation as an enemy of radical Islamism and a proponent of peace with Israel, Mubarak hosted an emergency summit meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Attending were U.S. President Bill Clinton, Chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, King Abdullah of Jordan, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. In April, 2001, before the upcoming elections, Mubarak, employing the same sort of tactics that he had adopted in the late 1990’s, authorized the arrest of dozens of Brotherhood activists, a number of whom were running for office in the “Shura Council,” the upper house of the Egyptian House of Representatives. His aim, successful to a degree, was to limit the presence of persons allied to the Brotherhood in that body. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood won 17 seats in the People’s Assembly, making it the largest opposition faction in Egypt. [105]
On September 11, 2001 the entire world was shaken when Al-Qaeda operatives launched four separate attacks on the United States, which resulted in the loss of some 3,000 lives, including the 19 airplane hijackers. Although the attacks were met with jubilation in some parts of the Middle East, most leaders in the region believed it prudent to condemn them, the single exception being Saddam Hussein, who was quoted as saying “the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity.” [106]

As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. President Bush announced his “War on Terror,” which ultimately resulted in the initiation of what would come to be known as the “Iraq War” on March 20, 2003. Although Mubarak had fully supported the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait during the Gulf War of 1990, he was deeply apprehensive about the American invasion of Iraq, presumably designed to locate and destroy Saddam Hussein’s alleged “weapons of mass destruction.” On March 31, Mubarak gave an interview on CNN in which he predicted that the invasion would create “one hundred bin Ladens.” [107]

As the Iraq War dragged on, opposition to the American occupying forces in the country provoked criticism of the operation throughout the Islamic world. In Egypt popular resistance to Mubarak, viewed by many Islamists as a servant of the United States, grew steadily. On February 26, 2005, Mubarak caused an uproar when he proposed to amend “Article 76” of the Egyptian Constitution which would allow candidates to participate in presidential elections without being first nominated by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. Street protests by the Kefaya
(“Enough”) Movement, which opposed Mubarak, drew hundreds of protestors across Egypt into the street. In response, Mubarak relented and asked Parliament to amend the Egyptian Constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections. The elections of September 7, 2005 were marked by violence when Kefaya demonstrators were attacked by Mubarak supporters and government plainclothes men while riot police looked on. Mubarak prevailed in the election, but so did the Brotherhood, which, despite the continued illegal status of the organization, managed to win 88 seats by running candidates as independents. Deeply displeased with the performance of Ayman Nour, who had come in second in the presidential race with 7% of the vote as the candidate of the El-Ghad (“Tomorrow Party”) Mubarak officials accused him of forgery, put him on trial, and saw to it that he was sentenced to five years of hard labor. The U.S. based non-governmental watchdog organization Freedom House reported that the Mubarak government was rife with corruption, but concluded that Mubarak lacked the will to do anything about it. Meanwhile, the success of the Brotherhood in the elections had sent the leaders of the organizations renewed confidence. During the election they had felt compelled to downplay their traditional support of the notion of Egypt adopting sharia law, but the electoral success now emboldened them to give voice to at least one aspect of the organization’s innate conservatism. On October 23, 2005, Muhammed Mahdi Akkef, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, echoing comments recently made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, insisted that the Jewish Genocide during World War II was, simply, a “myth.” On December 6, the Brotherhood Leadership felt sufficiently emboldened to accuse the Mubarak Government of jailing more than 1,250 Brotherhood Members in retaliation for the organization’s success at the polls. [108]
In 2006, an increasingly desperate Mubarak announced that he intended to retain his role as President of Egypt for the rest of his life, and in yet another effort to block Brotherhood influence, he moved to postpone local elections for two years. In July, 2007, Mubarak’s campaign against the Brotherhood and the Islamists was given a measure of support when seven key leaders of the Islamic charity known as the “Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development” (HLF), the largest Islamic charity operating in the United States, went on trial for “terrorist activities.” In December, 2001, the United States government had designated the HLF a terrorist organization, seized its assets, and terminated the organization. One defendant in the 2007 trial was partially acquitted and there was a hung jury on all other charges. One of the incriminating documents discovered during the FBI investigation that resulted in the trial was “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” a work of 18 pages written by Muslim Brotherhood operative Mohamed Akram, which envisioned the gradual Islamization of the United States by peaceful means with the goal of creating a “global Islamic state.” In a 2008 retrial of HLF leaders who, according to U.S. authorities were the subjects of “the largest terrorism financing prosecution in American history” found the defendants guilty on all charges. In 2009 the founders of the HLF were given sentences ranging from 15 to 65 years for funneling $12 million to Hamas. [109]

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the Mubarak regime found itself increasingly under fire, not least via the Internet, for what critics characterized as blatant civil rights abuses. On June 6, 2010, 28-year-old Khaled Mohamed Saeed, who had posted a video online that purportedly showed police
officers and drug dealers working together, was arrested by two police officers at a cybercafe in Alexandria. Multiple witnesses would testify that shortly thereafter, the two officers beat Saeed to death. Post mortem images of Saeed’s battered body “went viral” over the Internet and anger against the Mubarak regime, which was held responsible for the killing, began to build. Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian entrepreneur and internet activist created the Facebook page “We Are Khalid Said,” which soon attracted as many as 400,000 followers. [110]

On December 17, 2010 one of the most remarkable events in the modern history of the Middle East began when a 26-year-old Tunisian fruit and vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire after police confiscated his cart because he did not have a permit. Bouazizi, who would come to be known as the Tunisian “Burning Man,” later died of his injuries and protests against the Tunisian government soon spread nationwide. The so-called “Arab Spring,” which would utterly transform the region, had begun. In Egypt, inspired by the events in Tunisia, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood urged its members to demonstrate against the fraudulent 2010 elections. [111]

and elsewhere, protesting against the Mubarak regime. Fifteen thousand protestors flooded into Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Police used water cannons and tear gas in an attempt to make the crowd disperse, but members of it fought back with stones, eventually forcing the police to retreat. Three protestors were killed in the clashes. On January 28, 2011 huge demonstrations in Cairo resulted in massive looting and arson. The police withdrew and prisons were broken into. [112]

Over the next six days the protests continued and turned increasingly violent In Suez protestors set fire to a government building. On January 27, a day on which about 600 protestors were arrested in Cairo, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed El-Baradei, who was emerging as the key challenger to the rule of President Mubarak, returned to Egypt to join the youth-led protests that had spread across Egypt. On the same day, spokesmen for the Muslim Brotherhood announced that it fully supported the protests. On the following day, January 28, a day on which arson and looting were widespread in the Egyptian capital, twenty members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Brotherhood spokesman Essam el-Erian and Muhamed Morsi, were arrested and transported to Wadi Natrun prison in the Western Desert. Much of the country was now in open revolt against Mubarak’s rule. Mubarak deployed army units to quell the protests and imposed a near total media and communications blackout.

On January 29 Mubarak dismissed his cabinet and appointed Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief, and Mubarak’s closest aide, Vice-President. On January 30, the Muslim Brotherhood repeated its demands for Mubarak’s resignation. The United States Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton called for “an orderly transition” to a more democratic Egypt, but did not
ask Mubarak to step down. As Mubarak’s grip on power steadily eroded, the army became increasingly recognized as being the ultimate arbiter of Egyptian affairs. On January 31, Morsi and other members of the Brotherhood were released by local residents after guards at Wadi Natrun prison abandoned their stations, as did prison guards across the country.

Over the three day period from February 1 to February 3, Mubarak announced that he would not contest the presidential election due in September. The announcement had come in the wake of violent clashes with police. Pro-Mubarak supporters, armed with knives and rocks moved into Tahrir Square in an effort to rout the anti-Mubarak protestors. On February 4, 2011 hundreds of thousands of protestors crowded into Tahrir Square to call for the ouster of Mubarak. On February 10, 2011, Mubarak delivered a defiant speech in which he said that he would delegate authority to Vice-President Omar Suleiman, but refused to step down. On February 11, after nearly 30 years in power, Mubarak resigned as President of Egypt. When Vice-President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had turned over control of the government to the military tens of thousands of protestors in Tahrir Square roared their approval. [113]
IX.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Arab Spring, and Mohammed Morsi

On February 13, in response to the forced removal of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, and the growth of the Arab Spring movement in Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Government dissolved Egypt’s Constitution and Parliament on February 13 in order to respond to the protestors’ growing demands to permit a constitutional referendum. The Council announced that it would hold power for six months or until elections could be held. At that time greater demands were made to create specific timetables for the upcoming elections. [114]

On February 28, 2011 the General Prosecutor of Egypt issued an order prohibiting former President Hosni Mubarak and his family from leaving Egypt. Mubarak and the rest of his family were placed under house arrest at the Presidential Palace in Sharm el-Sheikh. On March 2, 2011 the Supreme Council announced that a Constitutional Referendum was scheduled for March 19. The day after the scheduled constitutional referendum was announced, Ahmed Shafik resigned as Prime Minister. Shafik was soon replaced by Essam Sharaf, who would act as the interim Prime Minister from March 3 to November 21, 2011. [115]

On March 6, as activist demonstrations accelerated in Egypt, protestors raided national and regional State Security Intelligence Headquarters in Cairo and Alexandria. During the raid at Nasser City Headquarters in Cairo, protestors discovered rooms full of videotapes, documents,
and other information that gave details of mass surveillance, massive detentions, and vote rigging during the Mubarak era. Three days later in response to the increasing number of riots and demonstrations, the Egyptian Army conducted a massive crackdown on protestors in Cairo’s Midan Tahrir (Tahrir Square), arresting, and eventually torturing, many protestors. [116]

On March 19, 2011 the Constitutional Referendum for the new Egyptian Government was held. Approximately 45,000,000 Egyptians were eligible to vote. The security presence insuring a fair count including 28,000 soldiers and 8,000 police officers. With a turnout of 41.2% of registered voters, the referendum was approved by a 77.27% majority. On April 12, Mubarak was hospitalized at Sharm el-Sheikh. The next day a prosecutor appointed by Mubarak ordered Mubarak and his sons to be detained for 15 days for questioning about allegations of corruption and abuse of power. As the Arab Spring continued to strengthen and gain momentum in Egypt, violence continued between Muslim and Christian minorities. On May 7, 2011, a series of ethnically-based riots took place in the impoverished Imbaba neighborhood of Giza. In this series of attacks three Coptic churches were burned, and many Coptic-run shops and businesses were vandalized by Salafi Muslims, some of them members of the Brotherhood.

Over the course of the next month Mubarak increasingly became a scapegoat for all the ills of Egyptian society, a development that culminated in the removal of his name from all public institutions. On May 24, he was ordered to stand trial for the alleged murder of protestors. Four days later on May 28, Mubarak was found guilty by a Cairo Administrative court for damaging the Egyptian economy, and was fined $33.6 Million. On June 6, 2011 the “Freedom and Justice Party” was officially founded in Egypt. The first candidate it promoted to run in the
2012 Egyptian presidential election was 61-year-old Khairat el-Shater, a “Deputy Supreme Guide” of the Muslim Brotherhood. Exiled as a dissident after the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, al-Shater left for England. After returning to Egypt in the 1980’s, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1995 he became head of the Brotherhood’s Cairo branch. By the first decade of the 21st century, he was considered to be the primary financier and principle strategist of the Brotherhood. [117]

On August, 3, 2011 the trial of Hosni Mubarak, his sons Gamal and Alaa, and former Minister of the Interior Habib al-Adly, and six former top police officials, began in Cairo. The procedures were broadcast on national television, but the judge hearing the court ordered the cameras to be turned off in the belief that the former President being displayed lying on a bed inside a glass cage was not in the “public interest.” On September 5 four senior officers who had been expected to testify against Mubarak denied that Mubarak ordered Egyptian Forces to use live ammunition. Violence erupted inside and outside of the courtroom. The trial resumed in December and lasted until January, 2012. Official charges were placed against President Mubarak and his family. On May, 30, 2012, Mubarak’s sons were charged with insider trading and corruption in regard to the selling of the al-Watany Bank, which prosecutors claimed provided them with $400 Million. [118]

On June 2, 2012, Mubarak was found guilty of not stopping the killing of protestors by Egyptian forces. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the same time, however, the court found him not guilty of ordering a crackdown on Egyptian protestors. All other charges, including those concerning profiteering and economic fraud, were dropped. Mubarak’s sons and the police officials were found innocent of the charges of murder because of a lack of evidence.
Thousands of protestors flooded into the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities to voice their objections to the sentences. [119]

On June 30, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, an electrical engineer and academic, prevailed in the Egyptian election with a 51.8% share of the popular vote against former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik to become the first Egyptian Islamist leader to be elected President. Born on August 8, 1951, the eldest of five siblings in El-Adwah, Sharqia Governate, in Northern Egypt, Morsi was raised in a largely rural environment. His father was a farmer, his mother a housewife. Growing up in the country, Morsi remembered “being taken to school on the back of a donkey.” Despite his rather modest background, Morsi was a very bright and ambitious student. In 1975, at age 24, he graduated from Cairo University with a bachelors degree in electrical engineering. Three years later he earned a masters degree from the same institution. Just as Sayyid Qutb had done in the 1940’s, Morsi received a government scholarship that allowed him to travel to the United States and continue his education.

By the early 1980’s Morsi had settled in the Los Angeles area. He obtained a Ph.D in Material Sciences from the University of Southern California in 1982. After obtaining his Ph.D., Morsi was hired as an assistant professor at California State University at Northridge. He remained at Northridge from 1982 to 1985. In 1985 he was appointed head of the Engineering Department at Zagazig University, 50 miles north of Cairo, where he would remain employed until 2011. [120]
In 2000, Morsi was elected as a member of Parliament as an Independent candidate. From 2000 to 2011 he served as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Office. In 2010 he was quoted as saying that he doubted that the 9/11 attacks had occurred as they were reported on television: “...when you come and tell me that the plane hit the tower like a knife in butter...then you are insulting us...How did the plane cut through the steel like this? Likewise, he questioned the involvement of Al-Qaida in the attacks, and cast doubt on the official U.S. account of the incident. In a speech during a rally in his hometown, Morsi was reported to have encouraged Egyptian families to “nurse their children and grandchildren on hatred of the Jews and Zionists.” In a television interview, Morsi referred to Zionists as “bloodsuckers,” “descendants of apes and pigs,” and “warmongers.”

In 2012 he was elected by the Brotherhood as the head of the newly founded Freedom and Justice Party. On June 30, 2012, he was elected President of Egypt. On the same day, he announced that he would work to free Umar abd al-Rahman, the “Blind Shaykh,” mastermind of the first World Trade Center attacks in 1993, who remained jailed in the United States. Morsi also stated that he would work to release many of Egypt’s Islamists who had been imprisoned during the Mubarak regime. [121]

On July 10, 2012, President Morsi made a bid to reinstitute an Islamist-dominated Parliament, which included many Islamists, which had been overturned on June 14, 2012 by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt. On October 12, 2012 Muslim Brotherhood Murshid Mohammed Badie was quoted as saying, “The jihad for the recovery of Jerusalem is a duty for all Muslims,” adding that the liberation of the holy city “will not be done through negotiations or at the United
Nations.” Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood affiliated cleric Futouh al-Nabi Mansour was quoted as having “called on Allah to destroy the Jews and their supporters.”

In November, 2012, in what would come to be regarded as his most controversial move as President, Morsi delivered an executive order which expanded his presidential powers and provided his administration with complete immunity from any judicial review during the drafting of the new Egyptian Constitution. The new Constitution was ratified in December, 2012.

The provisions that Morsi inserted into the Constitution angered millions of Egyptians. Christians, Muslims, and human rights activists were particularly worried that the provisions were the first step toward the “Islamization” of Egypt. Minority groups including the Copts felt deeply concerned that they would become marginalized, politically and socially. Acting on the belief that Morsi’s constitution would implement “strict” Islamic practices, secular and liberal groups walked out of the Constitutional Assembly. On March 13, spokesmen for the Muslim Brotherhood, responding to a march on Cairo on International Women’s Day, the previous week, criticized a United Nations declaration condemning violence against women, arguing that it would lead to the “complete disintegration of Egyptian society.” In like fashion the spokesman criticized the declaration’s alleged aim of “granting girls full sexual freedom...giving wives full rights to file legal complaints against husbands accusing them of rape or sexual harassment...equal inheritance... full equality in marriage legislation... removing the authority of divorce from husbands” and “canceling the need for a husband’s consent in matters like: travel, work, or use of contraception.” [122]
On June 30, 2013, thousands of protestors, fueled by the belief that the Morsi and Brotherhood had “stolen” the election and was promoting an agenda opposed to democratic and liberal values, took to the streets of Cairo and demanded Morsi’s removal from office. Morsi was defiant. In June, 2013, he appointed Adel el-Khayet, a leading member of the Building and Development Party, the political arm of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya, governor of Luxor. El-Khayet had been sentenced to a year in prison after the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat. The appointment of el-Khayet provoked a serious public backlash. Al-Gama leaders issued a statement denying involvement in the 1997 Luxor/Hatshepsut massacre. Under pressure, El-Khayet resigned less than a week later. [123]

Over the next nine months massive protests continued against the Morsi regime. On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian Military high command, headed by General Abd Fateh el-Sisi, which had given the Morsi regime countless warnings about its abuse of power, forcibly removed Morsi from office and placed him under arrest. On July 5, 2013 Mohamed Morsi, along with Brotherhood supporter and fundraiser Khairat al-Shater, was arrested. On September 1, 2013, charged with having incited deadly violence, and for espionage in regard to his collaboration with radical Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Morsi was referred to trial by prosecutors. On September 23, the Sisi military government declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization. [124]
In the Egyptian presidential election of May 26-28, 2014, which was held without the participation of the banned Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom & Justice Party, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won 93.5% of the votes counted. In view of the fact that the candidates representing the Freedom & Justice Party had prevailed in every Egyptian election since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the result provided a rather startling portrait of the deep divisions that existed within the Egyptian electorate. In the elections in which Brotherhood members were allowed to vouch for the candidates of their party, the Freedom and Justice Party invariably prevailed. In the elections in which candidates for the Freedom and Justice Party were not present on the ballot, supporters of Sisi prevailed. What these results of the elections revealed were that a majority of the Egyptian electorate approved of the Muslim Brotherhood’s aim of transforming Egypt into an Islamic state, backed by the authority of Sharia’ law, and that a minority were sufficiently opposed to Brotherhood doctrine to be willing to empower a dictator.

What does this situation mean for the Muslim Brotherhood and for Egypt? The simplest and most obvious conclusion is that, despite the fact that the organization has been officially disbanded, despite the fact that the party that represents Brotherhood interests has been banned from engaging in the political process, and despite the fact that thousands of Brotherhood members have been jailed since General Sisi’s rise to power, a majority of Egyptians favored the
notion of a Brotherhood-inspired Islamist government in Egypt. The argument could be made, of course, that the Sisi government has succeeded so well in destroying the viability of the Brotherhood as a political force in Egypt that no resumption of political power on the part of the organization would likely be seen in the foreseeable future. What such a notion fails to recognize is the manner in which, since its inception in 1938, the Brotherhood has survived every attempt to destroy it.

Although President Nasser was extremely successful in suppressing the activities of the Brotherhood, he was unable to dismantle it entirely, and the efforts of the Mubarak regime produced a very similar outcome. Moreover, the speed at which the organization was able to revive itself and become a vibrant and powerful social and political force during the liberalizing years of the Sadat presidency and in the wake of its triumph over the Mubarak regime can be viewed as an object lesson in the resilience and resourcefulness of the organization.

The extraordinary survivability of the organization is largely attributable to the fact that, from the outset, the Brotherhood has pursued its stated aim of representing the interests of all Muslims, and the fact that its charitable and social programs have benefited millions of Egyptians amply demonstrates the fact that it has in that regard fulfilled its promise. But the organization’s charitable and social work represent only a single aspect of the Brotherhood’s impact on the modern world. From the beginning, the leadership of the Brotherhood has devoted itself to the most deeply conservative strains of Islam that support the notion that the Qur’an is not only the unique record of the Creator’s plan for the world, but that its teachings are the unassailable word of God. As interpreted by Brotherhood theorists, all non-Muslims are, by
definition, enemies of the faith, a belief that has been instrumental in promoting the notion that the democratic form of government that prevails in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere represent a threat to the very existence of Islam. Over the last half century, thanks in part to influential theorists like Sayyid Qutb, the idea that the United States and Europe are “at war” with Islam has become commonplace in Muslim countries the world over, and the perception of this supposed state of war has been deeply influential in promoting terrorist activity in Egypt, the Middle East, the United States, Europe, and Asia. There can be little doubt that the climate of opinion promoted by the Brotherhood had an effect on the thought and actions of Osama bin-Laden and the 19 hijackers who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.

Bearing in mind the results of the election of President Sisi, which suggests that if a free and open election were held in Egypt tomorrow, the party supported by the Muslim Brotherhood would easily win, and bearing in mind the extraordinary resilience of the organization, what are the chances that the organization will have no influence over Egyptian politics in the foreseeable future? The answer to that question may ultimately reside in the variety of challenges that Egypt and its people now face.

In 2015 the population of Egypt is approximately 83,400,000. With an annual growth rate of about 1.5% percent - low by the standards of the developing world - it is predicted that the population of the country will increase 50% by the year 2050, expanding its population to nearly 122,000,000 people. The question as to how Egypt will be able to feed that many people is made pertinent by the fact that, as of 2015, Egypt imports 40% of the food that Egyptians eat. Moreover, a full 60% of the wheat that Egyptians consume is grown elsewhere. Combine these
statistics with the fact that, despite the fact that Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in
Africa, oil consumption in Egypt now outpaces demand. A net exporter of oil on a modest level
in recent decades, it now consumes more than it produces, and the rising amount of consumption
of oil in Egypt comes with an added price. Since pricing gasoline at a rate that would require no
subsidies from the government would place gasoline out of the economic reach of the average
Egyptian, the government is compelled to devote a substantial amount of Egypt’s annual GNP to
lowering the price of gasoline at the pump. That portion of Egypt’s GNP amounts to an
extraordinary $14,000,000 per year (2014-2015) [125]

With these factors in mind, one can only imagine that Egypt’s social and political
problems will continue to get progressively worse in the future. Egypt’s massively growing
population, its increasing class division between the rich and the poor, the massive inflation of
the Egyptian Pound, along with its food and energy shortages, will undoubtedly provide greater
space for Islamist activism and anti-western sentiment in the future of Egypt. As reflected and
exemplified in its history, the Brotherhood has been able to continue to transform, change, and
modify its structure during times of repression and accommodation.

The challenges which the Brotherhood were forced to face during its many
transformations and adaptations, did indeed give it great strength and appeal to many of Egypt’s
some 83 million people today. When one looks at the presidential administration of Abd Fateh el-
Sisi, one can compare him to a modern day Gamal Abdel Nasser. Similarly to Nasser, Sisi since
his takeover of power in 2014, has sought to transform Egypt into both a modern and a ‘secular’
society. In a similar fashion to Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sisi has in essence ‘shut down’, persecuted,
and has made the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal and outlawed organization in Egypt today. Sisi
in many ways can also be called a modern ‘Arab Nationalist’ in terms of his goals of bettering relations with the United States and the ‘West’, along with providing little to no space for any sort of Islamic activism in Egypt. Sisi’s election would hold a two fold impact on Egypt and its citizenry. It would indeed anger millions of Muslims who believed that he had stolen the election from Muhammed Morsi, and by contrast many of Egypt’s Coptic Christians would breathe with a sigh of relief, as they saw Sisi and his Presidency as a vanguard of protection against the potential abuses and violence which could be incurred by the forces of an Islamist government. For many Coptics, Sisi with his highly modern and secular attitudes towards the Egyptian government and society, felt that they could confide in his leadership with full confidence.

As of last week President Muhammed Morsi was recently sentenced to twenty years in prison by a military tribunal court, and the Brotherhood has effectively gone underground just as it did in 1954 when it experienced its first major crackdown by President Nasser. Based on a careful analysis of its history over the last 60 years, it seems that Sisi’s persecution will likely culminate in a greater increase of terrorist groups in Egypt, along with greater violence between the government and its citizenry. The ‘massive’ dissatisfaction between the modern Egyptian nation and its largely poor and uneducated population today, is likely to lead to much greater social and political unrest. This form of unrest can potentially give greater strength and support to Islamist activism throughout the nation, resulting in greater support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. The key fact to remember, however, is that the Brotherhood with its many branches and factions, along with its connections to radical Islamist groups both domestic and international such as ISIS (The Islamic Sate of Iraq and Syria), and Al-Qaeda, has acted as a significant base and recruiter for many ‘anti-Western’ activities and
attacks in both Egypt, and the rest of the greater Middle East. As in the words of former President Mubarak who warned the George W. Bush administration of the upcoming disaster in Iraq, he would say that ‘many’ Bin Ladens would be made. This statement at once truly thought provoking and controversial seems to be very relevant to the political and social quagmire that the Egyptian Government is facing today with radical Islam. One can attempt to neutralize the main leadership of the Brotherhood along with many of its factions, but it seems more than likely that that ‘very’ act of persecution/elimination, will ultimately revitalize and contribute to the continuity and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics and the rest of the Muslim world today. Furthermore because of the Brotherhood’s extensive record in social work and humanitarian efforts, the organization will always likely hold some credibility and respect especially in many relief based incidents.

With this array of challenges on the horizon, and bearing in mind that a majority of Egyptians view the Brotherhood as being the primary vehicle for Islamist values in Egypt, and would favor it in a free election tomorrow, is it reasonable to assume that it will never return to power? If nothing else, the resilient history of the organization suggests that any such outcome would be paradoxical in the extreme.
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AJE - Al Jazeera English   [www.aljazeera.com]

AP - Associated Press   [www.ap.org]

BBC - British Broadcasting Company   [www.bbc.co.uk]

CBN - The Christian Broadcasting Network   [www.cbn.com]

CEFIP - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace   [carnegieendowment.org]
FOOTNOTES

[7] Euben and Zaman, p. 50]

[8] The 1923 Constitution remained in place until 1930. It was replaced by the Constitution of 1930, which continued as the the basis of Egyptian law until 1935, at which point, the 1923 Constitution was restored. In its renewed form the 1923 Constitution remain the basis for Egyptian law until it was replaced by the Egyptian Constitution of 1956.

[9] Kramer, p. 14-17. Also, “Here, as in Cairo, Banna was repulsed by what he saw as the domination of materialism and secularism, the abandonment of Muslim virtue, widespread imitation of Western moral decadence, and the galling sight of native Egyptians laboring in their own country for the profit of the foreign powers...” [Euben and Zaman, p. 50] About al-Banna’s approach to teaching: “He [al-Banna] saw teaching as a vocation - in the sense of a religious calling rather than just a profession: embracing the role of murshid (religious guide, teacher), Banna cast himself as a leader who, like his own teachers, instructs by argument and example; figures to his pupils much as a father does to his children; and commands the same kind of fierce loyalty, emotional attachment, and strict
obedience from his followers as does a Sufi shaykh from his disciples... [“Hasan al-Banna,” Euben and Zaman, p. 157]

[10] Derived from the word salaf, meaning “ancestors,” the term refers to the religious practice of the earliest followers of the Prophet Muhammad. The adherents of Salafism, which make up sizable minorities in Saudi Arabia and some of the Arab Gulf States, embrace a strict interpretation of Muslim belief and practice, based on foundational Islamic texts. Some commentators suggest that “Salafism” and “Wahhabism,” a conservative strain in Sunni Islam based on the writings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an 18th century Muslim reformer and purist, whose followers make up nearly a quarter of the Saudi Arabian populace, are essentially identical. Other commentators argue that the two schools should be viewed as being entirely separate. Al-Banna’s close relationship with al-Khatib strongly suggests that at this time al-Banna shared al-Khatib’s strict and puritanical interpretation of Muslim teaching. [Euben and Zamin p.p. 19-20]

In regard to al-Banna’s choice of a title, “Banna preferred to be called “murshad” [“guide” or “teacher”] rather than ra’is (president) or qa’id (commander), although as the organization grew, he came to be known as “murshad al-‘am,” literally “guide general.” Euben and Zaman, p. 50]
The Brotherhood was registered with the Egyptian government as an officially-sanctioned “welfare association” in 1930. Kramer, p. 32. About al-Banna’s organizational strategy: “From these modest beginnings [in 1928], Banna worked relentlessly over the next two decades to build a broad base of membership for the Society of Muslim Brothers, along with a complex structure that facilitated tight discipline within the organization and mobilized members for continual outreach and indoctrination. This cadre would serve as the foot soldiers for a wide variety of social welfare projects designed to improve the living conditions of ordinary Egyptians, such as establishing schools, providing sustenance for orphans as well as for the needy and sick, bringing electricity to villages, creating health clinics, and building mosques. For Banna, such efforts were not only essential to sociomoral reconstruction but also critical for generating grass-roots support and recruiting new Brotherhood members.” [Euben and Zaman, p. 51]

“Al-Banna began to get involved politically in the early 1930s...Al-Banna began the Brotherhood’s political course by forming a committee in July, 1932 in Isamailya to draft a letter to the Minister of [the] Interior suggesting steps that would eliminate legal prostitution in Egypt,” Rinehart, p. 39 Also, Kramer, p.p. 33-34. “In a remarkable move, high-ranking representatives of the local Coptic community formally refuted the charge [that al-Banna and the Brotherhood were fomenting sectarian violence] lending credibility to al-Banna’s claim that the
Muslim Brothers made every effort not to alienate the Copts and even actively to seek an understanding with them.”


[14] “Banna took as firm a grip of affairs as his time away from teaching would permit. He followed a regular routine: visiting the headquarters before school, after school, and in the evening. During these times, he attended to all pending business, and lectured to, or merely chatted with, the increasingly large number of visitors. The time between the sunset and evening prayer was usually set aside for formal lectures: mostly Qur’anic exegesis simplified for his first listeners, the poor of the district around the headquarters who were ‘without learning and without the will for it.’” Mitchell, p. 12. Also - The dispute over funds dispersed to the “Islamic Culture Society” did not discourage al-Banna from placing family members on the Brotherhood payroll. His young brother, Abd al-Rahman was head of the Cairo branch, took charge of the Brotherhood’s printed materials, and was dispatched on a mission to Syria in 1935. Al-Banna’s father would be appointed publisher of the Brotherhood’s magazine in 1936-7, and al-Banna’s brother-in-law, ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Abdim, would eventually be named secretary general of the Brotherhood itself. Kramer, p. p. 34-35 and p. 36.
[15] “In 1934, the stipulation that the Brotherhood not be involved in politics was dropped from the Brotherhood’s General Law of the Society,” Rinehart, p. 39. Also Kramer, p. 49-50

[16] About the transition of the Brotherhood into a political entity and its paramilitary organization: Marsot, 1978. p.p 233-234: “... by 1936 they [the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood] had both created paramilitary organizations...” Marsot maintains that Al-Banna was invested in “manipulating the religious affiliation of the population until religion became the quasi-exclusive domain of the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood]... [Al-Banna] changed his tactics to suit the political atmosphere of his day and to achieve his main objectives, which were to lay claim to absolute leadership over the country and to substitute his organization for all political parties [my italics] the immediate objective being to challenge and displace the [ruling party in Egypt] the Wafd.” About Palestinian casualties: Hughes, M. (2009) “The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939, The English Historical Review Vol. CXXIV, No. 507, p.p. 314-354. About the treatment of imprisoned Palestinians: Segev, p. 417. Also, Rinehart, p. 18

“... [Egypt] broke off diplomatic and commercial relations with German, sequestered German property and interned all German subjects who could not establish an anti-Nazi record. [The government] proclaimed a “state of siege” with the Prime Minister as Military Governor; placed the ports under British naval control; and imposed strict censorship of posts, telegraphs, and telephones, and the press, with British participation.” Kirk, p.p. 34 fl., quoted in Mitchell, p. 20.

“The elections called by the Wafd were considered appropriate for the first test of the Society’s electoral strength. Banna declared himself a candidate for the district of Isma’ilyya, the birthplace of his movement, but no sooner had he done so than Nahhas summoned him and called upon him to withdraw. Without much debate, he consented, but ‘at a price,” which included (1) freedom for the movement to resume full-scale operations; and (2) a promise of government action against the sale of alcoholic drink and against prostitution. Nahas agreed, and very shortly ordered restrictions on the sale of liquor at certain times of every day, during Ramadan, and on religious holidays. Similarly, he took steps to make prostitution illegal and immediately closed down some of the brothels. He also
permitted the resumption of some of the activities of the Society, including the issue of some of its publications and the holding of meetings.” Mitchell, p.p. 26-29 and p. 32.

[22] “Inspired in the first instance as an idea by the concept of jihad, formalized into an organization under the pressures of nationalist agitation, the secret apparatus was almost immediately rationalized [by the organization] as an instrument for the defense of Islam and the Society,” Mitchell, p. 32. Also “In early July the bitterness generated between the two mass parties exploded in a series of pitched battles between the youth of the two groups, as they attempted to break up each other’s meetings in Isma‘iliyya and Port Sa‘id. In one of these an exploding bomb nearly killed Banna,” Mitchell, p. 48. Also Kramer, p. 75.

[23] Gordon, p. 44. Also, “The [Muslim Brotherhood] secret apparatus by this time [1947] appears to have become fully structured, with appropriate rules delineating functions, commands, authority, and responsibilities, and appropriate symbols, oaths, and equipment.” Mitchell, p. 55

[25] NYT, “Egyptian Premier Is Slain By Cairo Student Terrorist,” December 29, 1948, p. 1. Also NYT, “Suicide Squadron In Egypt Reported,” February 4, 1949, p. 9. Also “The clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the British lead to a serious crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian government. This crackdown led to the arrest and imprisonment of many members of the Brotherhood,” Madu, Ifeanyi V., p. 60. NYT, “Moslem Brotherhood Leader Slain As He Enters Taxi In Cairo Street,” February 13, 1949, p. 5. Also “Banna had prophetically told his associates that the failure of the government to arrest him was his official death warrant,” Mitchell, p. 71. Also, “Banna went to his grave escorted by tanks and armoured cars... only the Copt, Makram ‘Ubayd Pasha, defied the government and broke the police lines surrounding the home of the deceased to join the immediate family, the only mourners permitted by the government to attend the funeral.” MMB [al-Mabahith], January 23, 1951 and MDA [“al-Da‘wa”], quoted in Mitchell, p. 71

[27] Zollner, p. 18. Also, “The court first methodically outlined all the evidence and documents presented to it. It rejected, as part of the evidence, some of the confessions of the accused because of the ‘improper” devices used to obtain them; it chastised the government, in fact, for violation of ‘the rights of citizens,” Mitchell, p. 77.

[28] “One of the factors involved in the situation was Hudaybi’s personal antipathy to violence and his conception of the battalion movement as an essentially futile endeavor.” Mitchell, p. 90

[29] “How serious al-Hudaybi was about this second condition is demonstrated by the fact that her announced his intention to resign when, four months after he entered office, the Secret Unit was still in existence.” Zollner, p. 23

[30] “By January, 1952, cordon and search operations were developing into small-scale battles. The largest of these, Operation “Eagle,” an attempt by the [British] army to disarm the Egyptian police in Ismailia... was a disaster.” French, p. 114
[34] “The Free Officers were not ideologues. Their ideology, to the extent that they had one, reflected the general views on nationalism and social reformism that crossed all political lines... Despite organizational links to Muslim Brotherhood and communist cells in the military, their movement, since its founding in late 1949, remained fiercely independent... Passionate voices attracted the young officers, Nasser in particular. But Nasser and the others disliked the dogmas of the left and of the Brothers [my italics], feared the extent of their political - and military - organization, and at the same time remained wary of internal rifts within these movements.” Gordon, p. 12

[36] The CIA project to depose Farouk, initiated by CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt Jr. and CIA Cairo Station Chief, Miles Copeland Jr., was named “Project FF” [“Project Fat Fucker”] Holland, p. 25
[37] King Farouk left behind much personal property, including an extensive collection of pornography. Farouk and his family would first settle first in Monaco, where they would be granted Monegasque citizenship, and finally to Rome, where Farouk would die at the dinner table at the Ile de France restaurant on March 18, 1965. Time magazine, September 8, 1952. Also AAN -“King Farouk’s Fabulous Wealth,” January 30, 2014  (Retrieved December 31, 2014)

[38] Aburish, pp. 35-39

[39] Corbin, p. 131. Also Manji, p. 147. Also Qutb, Sayyid “‘The America I Have Seen’: In the Scale of Human Values,” quoted in Von Drehle, David, Smithsonian, February, 2006., Gordon, p.p. 120-126

[40] Kramer, p. vii. Also “The nature of Islamic social justice [is] that it must embrace all the aspect of life and all varieties of endeavor; similarly it must include both spiritual and material values. Its political theory in the final resort is concerned with the implementation of the religious law,” Toth, p. 59

[41] Toth, pp. 76-77
[42] Kandil, pp. 32-35


[44] Kandil, p. 35. Also “The keystone of organized mob activity was a general strike declared by pro-regime trade union leaders on March 27. The leader of the transport workers Al-Sawi Ahmad Al-Sawi, planned and organized the strike in conjunction with the heads of major oil and tobacco unions... Nasser gave his assent, with the caveat that the CCR would not officially recognize the strikers,” Gordon, p. 136.


[46] Rogan, p. 288

[47] Toth, p. 79. Also, “The regime’s harsh crackdown on the Brotherhood provoked the rise of new schisms within the organization’s ranks by encouraging the ideological radicalization of some of its members, who reached the conclusion that any regime that could inflict such enormous suffering was irredeemably corrupt and could only be combated through force of arms,” Wickham, p. 28
[48] Hudaybi would die while under house arrest on November 11, 1973. See Zollner, p. 49

[49] Toth, p. 80. Also “The commentary [Fi Zilal al-Qur’an or, “In the Shade of the Qur’an”] allowed Qutb to explore the ways in which the original message of Islam, lived by the pious forebears, could now become the foundation for an all-encompassing modern ideology... According to Qutb, in the Qur’an, mankind had been given the blueprint for reinventing itself in the mold intended by the Prophet and, thereby, by God.” Strindberg and Warn, p. 81

[50] “Nasser was bitterly opposed to the Baghdad Pact, which he saw as a British plot to perpetuate its influence over the Middle East and to promote its Hashemite allies in Iraq over the Free Officers in Egypt,” Rogan, pp. 290-291


[52] “The cancellation of the Aswan Dam was the greatest diplomatic debacle of the Eisenhower era, and the West was totally unprepared to respond to Nasser’s reaction,” Smith, p. 694. See also Rogan, p. 300, Dawisha, p. 179
[53] Alexander, p. 94

[54] “From mid-1957 to mid-1967, about 17,000 to about 19,000 departed...[Egypt].” Beinen, p. 88

[55] Dawisha, pp. 181-182, p. 191, p. 209. For the killing of the imprisoned Brothers, see Toth, p. 80

[56] “The Soviets followed through on their offer to build the Aswan Dam, The money was provided in 1958, and construction began in 1960.” Smith, p. 694

[57] Jankowski, p. 139


[59] Aburish, p. 166

“In 1961, the regime implemented a wholesale reorganization of the institution... Al-Azhar was placed under the control of the state-run Ministry of Endowments... ensuring the complete domination of the religious establishment by the ruling government...,” Kumar, Gyatri, “From Co-optation to Compromise...” McGill Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. XII, 2010-2011.

Toth, pp. 88-89

Dawisha, p. 235

National Zeitung, (Munich), May 1, 1964.

Toth pp. 88-89
[67] Qutb, p. 11, “Here Qutb shows the influence of Pakistani Islamist, Abul A’la Maududi, for the central theme of this work is that the problem with the Islamic community, as Qutb saw it, was not so much the encroachment of the West, or autocratic government, but rather what he also refers to as the jahiliyya [utter decadence] of the world.” Toth, p. 70. “Qutb first encountered the writings of Maududi after they were translated into Arabic in the early 1950’s...” Jackson, p. 175.

[68] Halverson, p. 104

[69] Toth, p. 90

[70] Wright, p. 37

[71] Friedman, p. 263. See also Barker, p. 76 Note: Fifteen cargo ships moving north through the Suez Canal at the outbreak of the war were trapped at Great Bitter Lake, the widest point of the Canal. These ships, the “Yellow Fleet,” so-called for the eventual piling up of sand on their decks, along with sunken vessels, and underwater mines would keep the Canal closed to shipping for eight years, until May 24, 1975, when clearance of the Canal began. [Rogan, p. 387]
Cook, p. 114, Also, “Sadat, who ascended to the presidency after Nasser’s death in 1970, was an untested man with limited influence, no popularity and few supporters... Arguably, he retained his position at the regime’s upper strata, albeit without real power, because he was never perceived to be a threat,” Osman, p. 129

Wickham, p. 30, Osman, pp. 85-86

Cook, p. 131

“Here the contradictions inherent in participating in state structures [under the Sadat regime]... lead previous ambivalences in political thought to break open in the group’s [Muslim Brotherhood’s] theoretical writings,” Ranko, p. 100. See also, Tucker, p. 195, p. 930.

[80] “Sadat imagined al-infitah as laying the seeds of a democratic, capitalist, Western-oriented Egypt... ‘Nasser and I are the last pharaohs,’ he [Sadat] told Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, ex-editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram, recounts in My Conversations with Sadat...,” Osman, p. 130

[81] “In less than a decade the civic nature of the Egyptian state of the 1950s and 1960s was replaced by a quasi-Islamic one; and a liberal public atmosphere and discourse became predominantly religious and conservative.” Also, “The change can be measured in the increase in the proportion of women wearing the veil, from less than 30 per cent [in the 1970s] to more than 65 per cent...by the early 1990s...” Osman, p. 89-90, Murphy, p. 36

[82] Wickham, p.30, Murphy, p. 36, Bayat, p. 156
Wenner, Manfred W., “Modern Islamic Reform Movements, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 350. Also, “But the factor that really cemented the Brotherhood’s social re-emergence, and founded the Islamic movement’s social base, was its highly efficient infrastructure. This included a range of provisions targeted at the poor and needy; affordable health care in the form of ‘Islamic hospitals’, ‘non-corrupt’ food-distribution centers in poor neighborhoods, practical assistance in finding jobs (especially targeted at newly graduated Muslims), welfare benefits, innovative transport solutions in some of Cairo’s and Alexandria’s most crowded suburbs, accommodation for out-of-town students (in addition to lecture notes and study groups) and humanitarian activities in some of Egypt’s most deprived areas. Through these vehicles the Brotherhood developed a matrix of social services that the Egyptian government, crushed by macro-economic burdens, was unable to provide. The Brotherhood’s social infrastructure was both its most potent political instrument and its claim to legitimacy, especially after many years absence from the Egyptian street. At a time when the socio-economic consequences of al-infitah were eroding the regime’s legitimacy... the Brotherhood was positioning itself to the majority of Egyptians as ‘the provider’, a role the regime was incapable of fulfilling,” Osman, p. 93.
[84] About democracy and the reborn Brotherhood, Shiekh Abu Ismail stated: “If democracy grants sovereignty to the people, then we must mobilize the believing majority so that they are the decision makers, and at that time, personal opinion will not butt horns with the text of the shariah but rather will prostrate itself before it,” [my italics] [Wickham, p. 32. Also, “But al-infitah’s cardinal sin (and political failure) was that it severely diluted the Egyptian regime’s [Sadat’s] legitimacy. Since the 1952 revolution, the regime had based its legitimacy on popular consent...Only the people’s consent, their approval to be ruled, was the basis for governing. Al-infitah cracked that basis. The regime appeared to have abandoned its solidarity with the poor (a founding principle of the 1952 revolution) and to have allied itself with the rich,” Osman, p. 139

[85] Cook, p. 160, Darwish, p. 105

“... by August, 1976 it was clear that al-Takfir wal-Hijra was far larger than originally thought. It was then estimated to have around 500 members, and to be concentrating its activities in propagandizing and recruiting in the high schools and the universities.” Also, “First he [Sadat] was interested in bringing Egypt into the western camp in general and into an alliance with the United States in particular. This was occasioned in large part by his belief that only the United States had the resources and ability to aid the faltering Egyptian economy...Secondly, and at the same time, Sadat was also crucially dependent upon Saudi Arabia and its financial assistance to cover many current operating costs of the Egyptian government,” “Modern Islamic Reform Movements: the Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” Wenner, Manfred W., and Said Aly, Abdel al-Monein, Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer) 1982, p. 354-357. About Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem: “The Islamic press under [Brotherhood Murshid] al-Timisani launched criticism of the ‘dangerous humiliation’ that the peace process had made on Egypt.” [“Afraid for Islam; Egypt’s Muslim Centrists Between Pharaohs and Fundamentalists,” Baker, Daedalus, p. 47 and p. 53

[88] About Ali Hosseini Khamenei, a key figure in the Iranian Revolution, close confidante of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the current “Supreme Leader of Iran”: “Khamenei is a member of a clerical family... in Mashad... A frequenter of literary societies [Khamenei]... had translated works by Islamic thinkers including one by
Sayyid Qutb, a leading ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt...” Moin, p. 224.

[89] Moin, p. 246. Also, “The turning point...came in 1978. The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty alienated Saudi Arabia on [the] one hand, which in turn sharply curtailed its support to Egypt; on the other hand, the rift with Saudi Arabia relieved Sadat of one of the major constraints with respect to his policies toward the Brotherhood...” Modern Islamic Reform Movements, Aly and Wenner, p. 354. Also, In the wake of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed on March 26, 1979 Brotherhood Murshid Umar al-Tilmisani became ever more insistent on obtaining legal status for the organization as political party, but Sadat refused, allowing it only to register only as an “association” under the Ministry of Social Affairs. [Wickham, p. 30]

[90] Osman, p. 99. Also, “At almost exactly the same time, the Iranian Revolution gave the Brotherhood increased confidence and a new hope in the possibility of establishing an Islamic society in Egypt. To Sadat, these developments represented the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, especially to his own government. [“Modern Islamic Reform Movements...” Said Aly and Wenner, p. 355]
Wickham, p.46 [“From the beginning, Mubarak balanced accommodationist and repressive strategies, mixing the expected sweep of arrests in retaliation for Sadat’s 1981 assassination with surprising gestures of conciliation. On the one hand, members of the radical factions blamed for the assassination were arrested by the thousands. On the other hand, Mubarak attempted to reduce the Islamic movement’s ill feeling toward the regime; like Sadat a decade earlier, he aimed to distance himself from his predecessor. This effort began with the release of Supreme Guide Tilimsani and other Brotherhood members imprisoned during the crackdown of Sadat’s final years. The shuffle of Islamist prisoners between these two initiatives illustrates Mubarak’s early differentiation between radical and moderate groups.”] [Walsh, John, HIR, “Egypt’s...” p. 1] Also [“... Iran experienced an insurrectionary movement aimed at capturing the state power; Egypt, on the other hand, developed with a degree of relative openness, a pervasive Islamic social movement which operated and brought about significant changes within the civil society but failed to alter the political structure.”] [Bayat, CSISAH,
“Revolution...” p.142] Also, “An interesting indicator of the degree of external involvement in Egyptian Islamism lies in the distribution of Egypt’s major Islamic newspaper, Liwa al-Islam. In the early 1990’s, the newspaper printed about 95,000 copies each month. Almost half of these copies were sold outside of Egypt.” [Wickham, p. 101] Also, Ranko p.90


[96] “The recent troubles [between Islamist groups and the Mubarak administration] began in 1992, when a small war broke out between the state and the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic groups, as the loosely organized underground of the forces of political Islam call themselves. The armed bands treated the country to a season of wrath and troubles. It pushed their challenge [to the government] to remote, marginal parts of the country, provincial towns in Middle and Upper Egypt, the country’s poorest areas.” FA, Ajami, p. 76. Also, Barraclough, MEJ, p. 241] Also, “An exemplary activity [on the part of the Brotherhood] was their mobilization during the Cairo earthquakes in 1992...” Bayat, CSISAH, p. 165. Also, “... when the U.S. was hunting for a military alliance

[97] Ajami, FA, p.77. Also CSISAH, Bayet, p. 168. See also, [“Indeed, during 1993 alone, the confrontations between these Islamists [al-Gama’a al-islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad] and the government forces left 1,106 killed or wounded, and 17,191 arrested,”] Wickham, p. 214. See also Bayet, CSISAH, p. 155 and p. 165.]

[98] Barraclough, MEJ, p. 242. See also “[The Brotherhood] hounded the Copts and made no secret of their view that the best the Copts, a community of no less than six million people, could hope for in a would-be Islamic state was a protected but diminished status of a subordinate community.” [Ajami, FA, p. 78]

[100] Wickham, p. 215-216


[102] Bayet, CSISAH, p. 167, Wickham p.p. 84, 85-86


[104] “To begin with one of the strategic errors committed by al-Gama’a and Jihad was their failure to cultivate and sustain a strong social base of support. Instead of building bridges to the public at large and gaining popular support, al-Gama’a and Jihad, impatient and short-sighted, spent most of their energies and meager resources on trying to capture political power... Most importantly, however, they alienated and antagonized the pacific Egypt public by relying exclusively on shock tactics to jolt it out of its political slumber.” Gerges, MEJ, p.p. 592-593. Also, Wright, p.p. 257-258. Also “During the 1980s and 1990s, British authorities
granted asylum to a number of Islamic terrorists... All this happened under the assumption that if you allowed these people to operate in London... they would not be attacking Britain... terrorism expert Peter Neumann [author of Old and New Terrorism and head of the London-based Centre for the Study of Radicalization] explained,” CBNN, “London’s Islamic Radicals Speak Out,” February 16, 2010.


