

UVM ScholarWorks

Leaping into Darkness: On the Ground with the OSS in Yugoslavia

Item Type	thesis;article
Authors	Reilly, Caleb M
Download date	2026-05-09 13:17:14
Link to Item	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14849/3648

LEAPING INTO DARKNESS: ON THE GROUND WITH THE OSS IN
YUGOSLAVIA

A Thesis Presented

by

Caleb M. Reilly

to

The Faculty of the Graduate College

of

The University of Vermont

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
Specializing in History

May, 2023

Defense Date: March 10, 2023
Thesis Examination Committee:

Andrew N. Buchanan, Ph.D., Advisor
Melissa Willard-Foster, Ph.D., Chairperson
Boğaç A. Ergene, Ph.D.
Cynthia J. Forehand, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

ABSTRACT

The Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) agents were a critical piece of the Allied effort to defeat the Axis powers in Yugoslavia. Their reports influenced and informed policy. Their collection activities resulted in timely, accurate intelligence that provided accurate targets for strategic bombing runs. Their efforts to support and supply the two main resistance groups—the monarchist Chetniks and the communist Partisans—were a lifeline to the beleaguered fighters in desperate need of war materiel. Their mission, then, was seemingly straightforward: support the resistance group that was doing the most damage to the Axis occupiers, while remaining aloof to postwar political considerations inside Yugoslavia. Yet, that charge proved too simplistic to reflect reality.

The OSS agents who deployed into Yugoslavia faced longstanding ethnic conflicts that were too complex for them to comprehend, let alone the strategic decision-makers they informed with their reports. As agents navigated the violent country attempting to report the ground truth to officials in Washington, they came to believe that the strategists who sent them did not care for, nor understand, the Yugoslavs' plight. Up until this thesis, it has primarily been the strategists' lens through which readers have learned about the conflict. This thesis provides a look from the tactical level to the strategic level, with a focus on the OSS agents and their reports. In doing so, readers will gain a greater understanding for how strategic decisions affected tactical situations, and how OSS tactical actions and reports, in turn, provided strategists the valuable information needed to make their own consequential decisions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are just a few people that I need to express my deepest and most sincere gratitude for making this thesis a reality. The first, and most consequential to getting it started, is my thesis advisor, Professor Andrew Buchanan. Ever since he informed me that Yugoslavia was a potential topic for my thesis, I have buried myself into this messy, convoluted, and confusing history. It is a topic that I am passionate about, and I am unendingly grateful for his suggestion. Yugoslavia in World War II is an important, and relatively unknown, subject in World War II history.

The second person I am entirely indebted to is Dr. Kirk Ford, Jr. He has helped further my understanding of the OSS' role more than anyone else, and has been a valuable sounding board. On top of it all, he allowed and enabled me to comb through his personal archives, providing me reports, interviews, and records. Without him, this thesis would not be the same holistic examination of the OSS in Yugoslavia.

Finally, but certainly not least, is my wife, Kristina Reilly. She supported my galivanting across the ocean to better understand the Balkans. She held down the home front while I studied in New York, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi. She has undoubtedly made this a stronger thesis by herself studying and learning about the Partisans, Chetniks, and OSS. Her patience, understanding, and support were instrumental to this work. Thank you so much.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA.....	11
CHAPTER 3: HISTORIOGRAPHY.....	29
CHAPTER 4: FROM INSERTION TO TEHERAN.....	47
CHAPTER 5: AN INCONSEQUENTIAL REAPPRAISAL.....	74
CHAPTER 6: “FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH”.....	101
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION.....	129
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	135
APPENDIX A: SERBO-CROAT PRONUNCIATION GUIDE.....	143
APPENDIX B: LIST OF OSS MISSIONS TO YUGOSLAVIA.....	144

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“The postwar developments in Yugoslavia—in all of Yugoslavia, including Serbia—will issue mainly from the People’s Liberation Movement under Tito’s leadership, and that the only sound basis for an American attitude or policy toward Yugoslavia would be a full acceptance of the desirability of such developments.” –Louis Adamic, in a letter to the OSS, 2 August 1944¹

Early in the night of 9 April 1944, Agent Stephen Galembush stood in the troop door of a C47, staring into darkness. Wearing a British parachute, and packing an M1911 pistol, machine gun, and ten gold bars, he contemplated jumping into Axis-occupied Yugoslavia. Noting the ground flares, he was comforted knowing that the two pilots successfully navigated him to Chetnik-controlled territory, where he was to join another Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent as the team’s radioman after the previous was wounded. He stared at the red light, and when “the green ‘Go’ light flashed” he “was out the door.”² Surprised by the parachute’s smooth opening since this was the first time he ever used a British parachute, Galembush was pleased when he “saw the chute had indeed opened.” He fell without worrying where he was going because he “couldn’t see the ground clearly yet, so there was no point in steering the chute, [and] I just floated with it.” Shortly after 10:30 PM, he abruptly landed and “found [he] was pinned between two boulders.” As he tried to lurch free of the boulders, “gunfire opened up over me, firing came from two directions, so I pulled out my 45 [M1911 pistol] and machine gun.” He sat anxiously, listening for a friendly voice and keeping his head down.

¹ Louis Adamic, *Dinner at the White House* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1946), 275.

² Stephen Galembush, “Candidate for O.S.S. and the Rakeoff Mission,” typescript, in possession of author, 11.

Struggling to get free, Galembush's first thought was "what the hell am I doing here!"³ Attempting to gain his bearings, he realized that the gunfire was not necessarily directed at him, but it was around him as the rest of his gear landed in the rocky, mountainous ground. Finally he saw fuzzy outlines of men hurriedly running towards him, and he heard them yelling "Partisan! Partisan!" At this point, his confusion was not abated but was increased: who were the Partisans? He was expecting to hear "Chetniks," or perhaps a friendly American accent yelling a greeting. Instead, he realized that he was dropped in the wrong location and "was furious over the Pilot's blunder." He was also suddenly aware that he was no longer fighting alongside the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile's Army, the Yugoslav Army of the Fatherland (commonly referred to as "Chetniks"), but rather he was joining the Communist Partisans, who the Allies had just begun supporting a few months earlier.⁴ Galembush's war alongside the Partisans was only beginning, and the confusing start to it would be followed by months more of the same.

This is the story of the OSS agents sent into Yugoslavia to fight an irregular warfare campaign. Upon deployment, the agents found themselves amidst longstanding ethnic conflicts, convoluted local politics, confused alliances, and selfish actors more focused on gaining postwar power and influence than defeating the immediate enemy at-hand: the Axis occupiers. Their mission was to provide accurate reports from their experiences on the ground and forward those to their leaders in Washington, which ostensibly would be used to help develop and drive American policy in Yugoslavia. The agents, however, were but one source of intelligence: the secretive Ultra reports of German

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

military communications provided an additional source of intelligence. Ultra reports, however, were through the filtered lens of the German officers who wrote the messages. Thus, the intercepts carried with them their own downfalls because they reflected the German officers' biases which attempted to report situations in the greatest light to German superiors. Additionally, German officers were never present alongside the resistance group leaders and so they were unable to provide intelligence from within the resistance groups.

The OSS agents understood the complexities on the ground to a greater extent than any other Americans, although their own understanding was hindered by their personal surroundings and influenced by which resistance group to which they were assigned. OSS agents also felt the weight of strategic-level policy decisions amongst the Allies, especially between the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The effectiveness of OSS reports to influence Roosevelt thus depended on a whole host of factors, including the timing of the report, whether it supported British policy, and whether it had the support of senior OSS officers. But the OSS agents did not simply attempt to influence policy; in fact, they were just as much victims of high-level policy decisions as they were beneficiaries.

The foreign policy decisions made and the orders issued by the Allies in far-away locales, in generally safe, comfortable settings carried with them unknowable effects on the OSS agents on the ground in Yugoslavia. Oftentimes questions that seemed trivial to the strategic decision-makers carried grave consequences for the OSS agents.⁵ To the

⁵ For this thesis, three levels of warfare will be discussed: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level decisionmakers were the highest levels of the British and American governments planning the conduct of the entire war, namely Churchill, Roosevelt, and senior military advisors, like Major General William J. Donovan. Operational refers to specific operations that lasted for a set amount of time in a single

individual not engaged in active combat, changing from one resistance group to the other—both inside the same country—may have seemed to be a logical, pragmatic, and perhaps even inconsequential choice made based on who was causing the most harm to the joint enemy. To the OSS agent living alongside the resistance group, actively engaged in combat with multiple different enemies—including other resistance groups, Italians, Germans, Croatian puppets, Yugoslav quisling armies, and armed groups of bandits—this decision carried with it serious, potentially dangerous consequences. It resulted in scenarios in which OSS agents were forced to be at odds with their partner force, which was an incredibly dangerous situation to find oneself in when that resistance band was responsible for one’s security.

The OSS agents’ missions were married to British policy. This strategic decision was a consequence of the initial agreed-upon Allied strategy that gave the British primacy in the Balkans. It was also the result of the fact that British SOE agents were in Yugoslavia for nearly two years prior to the OSS, and theoretically were more prepared to recommend solid policy direction than were their “junior” partners.⁶ Roosevelt, OSS Chief Major General William “Wild Bill” Donovan, and the rest of the OSS were not always content with this arrangement, and at various points the policy differences between the Americans and the British were significant. These disagreements were a minor inconvenience that

geographic area and planned by field grade level officers, an example of which would include Operation HALYARD, which will be discussed further in this thesis. Finally, the tactical level involves individual decisions and actions taken by the OSS agents on the ground. The story of Galembush parachuting into Yugoslavia is an example of a tactical action.

⁶ Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1976), 119.

sometimes created awkward situations for the strategists, but at the ground-level brought major consequences that could not be ignored.

America's foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia was too simplistic to reflect the reality of the OSS agents on the ground. Perhaps to senior officials located outside of the maelstrom, the nuances were minor; to the OSS agent actively partnered with the Chetniks or Partisans, the changes were major. In Yugoslavia, there was no comprehensive American policy that addressed the various questions that arose for the OSS agents. American officials claimed their policy supported the Yugoslav resistance group that inflicted the most damage against the Axis, while remaining aloof to postwar policy developments, hoping this would enable Yugoslav self-determination. However, serving alongside the resistance groups without an eye to the future was impossible. Since specific details were never worked out by policymakers, an examination of how the OSS affected policy is difficult because it was an inadequate, unrealistic policy that produced far more questions than answers for the agents.

This thesis will focus on the consequential time period of August 1943 to the end of 1944. This period was critical for American involvement in Yugoslavia: it was then that the United States sent its first missions to both the Chetniks and Partisans; completely transitioned away from the Chetniks and exclusively supported the Partisans; then reneged and once again partnered with the Chetniks to save downed Allied airmen being held in safety by Mihailović's Chetniks in Serbia—much to the ire of Tito and the Partisans. Finally, in one more turnabout, the Americans completely removed their missions from the Chetniks in December 1944 and resumed exclusive support of the Partisans. This flip-

flopping strategy created innumerable headaches for the OSS agents with both resistance groups who had to explain decisions made by their nation's strategists in meetings without them, and in incomprehensible circumstances that favored one resistance group over the other. Despite suffering the most from these policy changes, the OSS agents and their reports provided key data points that informed and heavily influenced policy makers' opinions and decisions.

My methodology for researching the stories of the OSS in Yugoslavia was multifaceted. First, I visited the six countries that comprised the former Yugoslavia where I gained an invaluable education into the local, disparate cultures, walked numerous battlefields, and discussed wartime Yugoslavia with local Balkans historians. This study also relies on a variety of secondary sources, balancing the history between pro-Partisan and pro-Chetnik sources which gave me the widest possible lens through which to view the contentious decisions that resulted in Allied abandonment of the Chetniks. Archival research conducted at both the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, NY and in the William J. Donovan Papers in the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle Barracks, PA built on these secondary sources. Finally, thanks especially to historian Dr. Kirk Ford's generosity, I consulted multiple diaries, reports, letters, and unpublished manuscripts from OSS members. It is this group of sources—written directly by the men on the ground—that will be examined most closely.

This work is split into chronological chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion. Following the introduction, a background history of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the initial British support will provide a baseline of knowledge to the reader, as well

as a general understanding of how the Allied strategy evolved to where it was by August 1943. The next section will discuss the historiography and its evolution, including an analysis of how this study furthers the research of other historians. Then the thesis transitions to an analysis of American policy's effects on the lives of a select few OSS agents on the ground in Yugoslavia. Although each team's experience varied, there are common themes that were experienced by many agents that will necessarily be demonstrated by the selected teams. Every individual's story was important and profound, but telling every individual's story is outside the scope of this thesis. This is both for practical reasons—some teams produced larger, more in-depth reports, memoirs, and letters—and to ensure this thesis is concise.

The major Allied policy changes and events will define the limits of each chapter. Those sections will be from OSS insertion in August 1943 to the remarkable and abrupt change of support following the Teheran Conference in November-December 1943. The next section will examine OSS agents on the ground with the Partisans and Chetniks from Teheran to mid-July 1944, just prior to the final missions being sent to the Chetniks. Until May 1944, the OSS actively manned missions with both the Chetniks and Partisans despite the generally accepted knowledge they were fueling a civil war which decidedly hindered the Allies focusing solely on defeating the Axis. The last section examines the final OSS missions to the Chetniks, and how those missions affected the OSS agent's relationships with Tito's Partisans through December 1944. Through the individual experiences of various OSS agents gleaned from their memoirs and reports, it will be demonstrated that not only were the agents largely responsible for the changing attitudes towards the various

resistance groups, but that their tactical actions and reports were critical to influencing strategic level decisions at the beginning of American involvement. Conversely, while their reports ultimately shaped the back-and-forth policy developments causing confusion and discomfort to the policy makers, the agents themselves suffered the most from the resulting policy changes and guidance.

To provide clarity and ease of reference to OSS missions, I have created a table of the OSS missions to Yugoslavia from 1943 through the war's end which is in Appendix B. This information has never been consolidated in this manner, and while I cannot claim with absolute certainty that every single mission to Yugoslavia is included in the table, it is a good start based on all the reports that I could find and it provides a clear reference for the number of missions, their locations, and the dates they were in Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that most of the OSS missions went to the Partisans, which undoubtedly contributed greatly to their postwar strength when compared to the Chetniks.

An additional note of caution for this study is appropriate: the abrupt reversal in Yugoslav policy resulted in extreme emotional responses on both sides of the argument. The history is not only affected by this result; in fact, all aspects of studying World War II in Yugoslavia are affected by the policy's changes. As Sir F.W.D. Deakin, himself a former SOE operative with the Partisans, remembers in his memoir *Embattled Mountain*, "we were engaged in an hourly fight for our lives, shielded by the protecting sacrifice of our companions."⁷ It would be foolish to assume that relationship did not deeply endear Deakin to the Partisans alongside whom he fought. Deakin, writing some thirty-five years after

⁷ F.W.D. Deakin, *The Embattled Mountain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), xii.

Mihailović's execution by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije*, KPJ), notes that his "appreciation" for the Partisans was "unclouded by hindsight," which was a remarkable claim considering the effects of the distant time since his participation in the war, the subsequent events of the Cold War, and his own conservative politics and participation within the British government.⁸ This observation is not merely applicable to Deakin, nor is it applicable to agents who only served with the victorious Partisans. In *Embattled Mountain*, Deakin succinctly summarizes the problems historians face when studying Yugoslavia and trying to present the facts un-tinted by bias: the sources themselves, whether primary or secondary, were victims of the bias of the sources on which they rely. Agents loyal to the Chetniks were appalled that the United States abandoned Mihailović to be martyred for his cause following the war. Agents loyal to the Partisans were disgusted by the grotesque violence they witnessed caused by other Yugoslavs, including the Ustaše, quisling armies, and even the Chetniks. Both sides partook in shared hardship, creating deep bonds with their partner force. The war and its aftermath in Yugoslavia resulted in frustration for all who witnessed it.

This study attempts to mitigate the effects of those biases. Each diary entry, manuscript, report, or memoir is historicized and used cautiously based on when it was written. For example, while diary entries written during an agent's time in Yugoslavia may be viewed as providing the most realistic ground-truth, the entries were clouded by the strain of unrelenting hunger, the inability to receive a good night's sleep for months at a time, and constantly moving to avoid Axis armies. The events described in these diaries

⁸ Ibid.

are undoubtedly real and the immediate recollection is valid and useful, but I will omit use of blatantly biased language. Events are also compared with the official histories listed in other secondary sources for context. The agents' confusion, angst, and experience is important to record, and this thesis will attempt to share the experiences of those individuals in the most unbiased, straightforward way possible.

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF YUGOSLAVIA

*“Yugoslavia is a difficult country to understand. Its many nations, languages, and religions generate centrifugal tendencies. At the same time there exist powerful centripetal forces: the common South Slav origin of the majority of the population is the basis for many ethnic, linguistic, and cultural similarities; and there are also many shared historical experiences...Yugoslavia is, indeed, what its name means in all three of its South Slav languages: the land of the South Slavs.”*⁹

Yugoslavia was formed following the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and was originally called “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.” That name itself shows some of the competing ethnic interests that fought for influence within the fledgling nation.¹⁰ While those three groups were the most populous—Serbs were the majority, followed by Croats and Slovenes—there were other identities at work within the nation. Conflict over religion, ethnicity, and even culture fought against one other as one moved from north to south in Yugoslavia. Catholicism, Protestantism, Serbian Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, and Islam were all religions with sizable adherents inside the nation, although since the Serbs possessed a slim majority, Serbian Orthodox was the official religion. United in name alone, Yugoslavia struggled for the next twenty years, experiencing assassinations, *coup d’états*, economic problems, and infighting. As a result, Allied soldiers sent to Yugoslavia to fight the Axis alongside these various resistance groups stood little chance of successfully understanding the issues that mattered most to the Yugoslavs. Tensions within and without Yugoslavia grew throughout the 1930s, and

⁹ Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 1.

¹⁰ At the Slovenian National Museum, “The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs” is displayed prominently throughout the exhibits in an obvious challenge to the internationally-recognized name that put Serbs before Slovenes. This demonstrates a still-lingering ethnic rivalry, and is a small token of previous conflicts.

as they ended, the Yugoslav government was under enormous pressure from Germany to join the Tripartite Pact.

Yugoslavia was poorly managed, and it shunned external support. Dysfunction and mismanagement defined Yugoslavia during the 1930s. Led by a Prince Regent because the future King, Peter, was too young to lead the country at the time of his father's death, Prince Paul believed that his role was primarily as caretaker of Yugoslavia.¹¹ Therefore, many issues raised by the largest minority, the Croats, were never fully addressed. Yugoslavia's internal strife grew simultaneously as Europe inched towards war, with Germany exerting great pressure on Yugoslavia.¹² Paul visited Berlin in June 1939 in a German attempt to gain Yugoslavia's loyalty. Paul was non-committal, and Adolf Hitler again attempted to force Yugoslavia's loyalty in November 1940. Hitler was insistent on gaining Yugoslavia's loyalty because he wanted to shore up his southern border prior to invading the Soviet Union.¹³ Yugoslavia was in an exceptionally tenuous situation. Economic impotence, infighting, and little loyalty to the central government resulted in low national morale; combined with its strategic value of minerals, location, and other resources, Yugoslavia was ripe for invasion.¹⁴ With the French defeated and Great Britain too preoccupied with its own defense to provide meaningful support to the Balkan nation, Paul had little choice but join the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941. While this agreement gave the Axis a valuable ally to guard their southern flank and provide them with critical

¹¹ Srdja Trifković, "Prince Pavle Karađorđević" in *The Serbs and their Leaders in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Radan and Aleksander Pavkovic (Brookfield, USA: Aldershot England, 1997), 166.

¹² Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁴ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 22.

resources, Paul did secure some provisos, including Yugoslavia's sovereignty remaining intact.¹⁵ While generally a solid negotiation for the weak Yugoslavia, news of the agreement infuriated many Yugoslavian citizens, and disgruntled Serbian military officers staged a coup overthrowing the Yugoslav government two days later.

Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact was the final misstep to push the discontented Yugoslav citizens into rebellion, an event which the British wholeheartedly supported. In the time since the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established in Yugoslavia in 1938, British agents had supported and funded pro-Allied and anti-Axis propaganda, as well as stockpiled weapons and explosives for use in other European nations upon war's outbreak.¹⁶ While supportive of the coup on 27 March 1941, the SOE certainly did not control, nor did it instigate, the Regent's overthrow. Long-simmering tensions finally came to the forefront, and when the opportunity presented itself to install its own new government, a group of primarily Serbs completed their bloodless coup. As historian Stevan K. Pavlowitch notes, the British were "authorized to support any subversive measure against the government, even at the risk of precipitating a German attack...but in so doing they were merely pushing an open door."¹⁷ The British not only did not control the *coup d'état*, they also did not know about it beforehand.¹⁸ Previous investment in relationships with Serbians friendly to Great Britain provided little lasting loyalty to the British government, when, shortly after the coup, the newly installed Dušan

¹⁵ Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 40.

¹⁶ Heather Williams, *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941-1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 23-33.

¹⁷ Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 14. See also: Williams, *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*, 31.

¹⁸ Williams, *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*, 31.

Simović government declared Yugoslavia would honor its commitments under the Tripartite Pact.¹⁹ While Churchill praised the coup in an address to Conservative Central Council saying “the Yugoslav nation found its soul,” the events that transpired within the next month were decidedly not what the Allies envisioned for Yugoslavia.²⁰

In the ensuing month, an Axis coalition invaded Yugoslavia from all sides, easily overwhelming the disorganized and disunited Yugoslav defenses. Hitler was enraged upon hearing of the Yugoslavia coup and in a matter of hours, he ordered his generals to invade.²¹ Hitler was driven by deep-seated racism against Slavic peoples and had held them in extremely low regard since World War I. He was angered by the need to delay Operation Barbarossa to secure his southern flank—a loose end he believed was taken care of since Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite pact. Hitler wanted to punish the Serbs “with merciless brutality.”²² The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia began on 6 April 1941 with the bombing of its capital, and the cradle of Serb culture, Belgrade. Yugoslavia’s army was outmatched, and Germany accepted Yugoslavia’s total capitulation on 18 April 1941.²³

Effective and brutal, the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia was over within 12 days. Newly installed King Peter fled via Athens to Cairo before finally arriving in London where he established the Yugoslav government-in-exile.²⁴ The Axis powers then split Yugoslavia into several different puppet states, including a quisling Serbia led by Milan

¹⁹ Pavlowitch, *Hitler’s New Disorder*, 14-15.

²⁰ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. III* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co.), 168.

²¹ Pavlowitch, *Hitler’s New Disorder*, 16.

²² *Ibid.*, 16.

²³ In a twist of fate, and despite its quick end, Germany was nonetheless forced to delay its invasion of the Soviet Union by more than a month, which had further ripple effects forcing the Wehrmacht to contend with the brutal Russian winter prior to its military goals being accomplished.

²⁴ Williams, *Parachutes*, 40. King Peter never returned to Yugoslavia until his reinterment in 2012.

Nedić, the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*—NDH) led by the murderous Ante Pavelić, Macedonia controlled by Bulgaria, and the Adriatic Coast (Dalmatia) controlled by the Italians. In Peter's stead, Hitler and Benito Mussolini originally attempted to empower the Croatian Peasant Party's leader, Vladko Maček, but Maček turned down the offer to lead the NDH. They then turned to the Ustaše and its leader, Ante Pavelić. Believing that the fascist Ustaše would be supportive of Nazism, the Wehrmacht moved their invasion troops out of Yugoslavia to prepare for Operation Barbarossa and emplaced less-proficient occupation troops.²⁵ Judging that their Yugoslavia problem was finally solved, German planners turned their attention and resources east. Meanwhile, the Ustaše rapidly began their onslaught on non-Croat and non-Catholic Yugoslavs. What followed from the Ustaše's reign, Axis occupation, and competing inter-factional fighting was upwards of 1.75 million Yugoslavians dead by war's end, and a little-known Communist—Josip Broz “Tito”—in charge of the war-torn nation. Before examining how Tito's Partisans became victorious, it will first be necessary to examine the competing factions within Yugoslavia.²⁶

The rapid Axis invasion and the establishment of the NDH fueled mass chaos throughout Yugoslavia's various occupation zones. Unlike the quisling Milan Nedić, numerous Yugoslav Army officers and soldiers refused to accept Yugoslavia's capitulation as legitimate. These various groups took to the woods to resist the occupation and continue

²⁵ Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 50-51.

²⁶ The term “factions” is used because other traditional terms for militias in an insurgency—including “guerrillas,” “partisans,” and “insurgents”—do not fully grasp the holistic political and military nature of the Ustaše, Chetniks, and Partisans, all of which consisted of more than just armed militants. “Resistance group” will be used only in reference to the Chetniks and Partisans, as the Ustaše were a puppet faction of the Axis.

fighting using guerrilla tactics. Using the term “Chetnik” to describe themselves, these primarily Serb bands were unprepared for the requirements of fighting and sustaining a guerrilla war.²⁷ This unconventional warfare campaign was not planned prior to the war, nor were the fighters particularly prepared to fight under the leadership of Colonel (later General) Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, who at the war’s outset was a mediocre staff officer. Although various Chetniks bands swore allegiance to the King, Mihailović by no means controlled all the warlords using the “Chetniks” moniker.

Prior to Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the British were long on problems and short on hope. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin and Hitler were still in a dubious alliance, an Axis coalition firmly controlled much of the Balkans, and Germany occupied France. As Allied leaders looked for a hero, they found one in Mihailović who had escaped to the mountainous Ravna Gora region, where his resistance began. This action and further Chetnik resistance resulted in favorable Allied broadcasts, especially from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Recounting the initial fervor of public support Mihailović received in the West, historian David Martin notes that “the media’s early descriptions of Mihailović the man were tolerably accurate...however, the press inflated the story [of his accomplishments] to legendary proportions.”²⁸ This spirited media support, paradoxically, was not welcomed by Mihailović himself because it shone a greater

²⁷ Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 121. One of the leading theories of guerrilla warfare, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, written by Mao Zedong, was already published by the war’s outbreak. There is no evidence, though, that anyone within the Chetniks knew of, or referenced, the maxims described by Mao for running a guerrilla warfare campaign. However, even if they had known of the theory, since it was written by Mao and Mihailović was vehemently anti-communist, there is little reason to believe he would have taken the time to learn guerrilla warfare lessons from the Chinese Communist Party.

²⁸ David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1990), 33.

light on his resistance movement to the German occupiers. Wehrmacht troops thus began actively hunting the Chetniks, culminating in “Operation Mihailović” on the night of 6-7 December 1941 in Ravna Gora, from which Mihailović barely escaped. In an ironic coincidence, the BBC announced Mihailović’s promotion from colonel to brigade general on 7 December 1941, further increasing his value to the Axis, who three days later raised the bounty for him to 200,000 dinars.²⁹

While Mihailović received most of the publicity for the resistance within Yugoslavia, the other pro-Allied resistance group led by Tito—the Partisans, also known as the “National Liberation Army”—actively resisted the Axis occupation, as well, although they did not begin immediately. The Partisans waited to fight until called on by the Comintern in late June 1941, shortly following Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Prior to that, since the Soviet Union and Germany were in an alliance, the invaders of Yugoslavia were technically the Partisans’ allies.³⁰ On 4 July 1941, however, that changed and Tito broadcasted a call for resistance, which from that day forward was celebrated as the Communist party’s independence day. The decision to resist came sooner than the Partisan leadership had hoped for, but Operation Barbarossa’s initiation precipitated action. As one of Tito’s former military advisors, Milovan Djilas, recalled in his memoir *Wartime*, “very likely we would have begun our struggle somewhat later, but with less haste in getting organized and with a deeper, more self-reliant political outlook.”³¹ Guided by a

²⁹ Pavlowitch, *Hitler’s New Disorder*, 66. “Brigade General” was equivalent to the British or American “Major General” rank.

³⁰ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Tito: Yugoslavia’s Great Dictator, A Reassessment* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992), 30.

³¹ Milovan Djilas, *Wartime*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977), 5.

revolutionary fervor from the outset, a Partisans-Chetniks alliance against the common Axis enemies was unlikely to be successful, but Mihailović and Tito parlayed twice in the fall of 1941 and attempted to find common ground.

At the first meeting on 19 September, the leaders quickly realized that they could not come to any real, meaningful compromise on their core beliefs and direction for postwar Yugoslavia. Tito was fighting a revolutionary war to change Yugoslavia's government and social system; Mihailović was fighting for the Serbian monarchy and to essentially return to the status-quo at war's end. On 27 October—which was the second, and final, wartime meeting between Tito and Mihailović—further differences and problems arose between the two leaders. At this second meeting, Tito and Mihailović presented two proposals apiece. The Partisans demanded all-out resistance to the occupying forces, no matter the reprisals, and that Mihailović join the Partisans as the Chief of Staff. Mihailović demanded that the Partisan detachments fall under his command, and that they limit their attacks of type and scope as directed by Mihailović.³² These diametrically opposed demands were irreconcilable for both Mihailović and Tito; within a few days Mihailović's Chetniks and Tito's Partisans were openly at war. Within weeks Chetniks bands openly hunted Partisan bands, and vice versa.³³ This important development was a harbinger of the chaos, disorder, and dysfunction that defined the next nearly four years of warfare. It was under these circumstances that western Allies—at first the British SOE, followed two years later by the OSS—futilely attempted to direct the war solely against the Axis armies. Since Mihailović was the official representative of the

³² Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 147.

³³ *Ibid.*, 141.

recognized Yugoslav government-in-exile, he received the initial, unquestioned support from the British.

Initially, Mihailović was exactly what the British sought in a Yugoslavia resistance leader and served as a valuable recipient of British propaganda. Much of Mihailović's positive reputation was not due to his or the Chetniks' actions or battlefield acumen; rather, it was the result of the British responding to Soviet demands for a second European front. In fact, Mihailović did not do much active fighting but furiously sent multiple memorandums feigning action. His inaction was somewhat justified: German reprisals against the Serbian peasants—his greatest supporters—were so great that he hesitated to undertake action that may result in innocent Serbian blood spilled.³⁴ He was a valued Allied figurehead whose support by the British-recognized Yugoslav government-in-exile allowed him to receive more recognition than he deserved.³⁵ The British were likewise initially amenable to Mihailović's lack of action, as they directed him to maintain a low profile until they were better able to support him and his forces.³⁶ During the bloody year of 1942, the Allies supported the Chetniks with little more than sporadic supplies and propaganda—efforts which were meant to convince Stalin that the Allies were fighting along a second European front as much as it was to motivate the Chetniks. As the war evolved and Chetnik operations against the Axis did not increase, British strategists reevaluated if the Chetniks should remain their preferred faction.

³⁴ Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries That Doomed WWII Yugoslavia* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010), 58. For every German soldier wounded, 50 peasants were killed. For every German soldier killed, 100 Serbs were killed. The earliest and most horrific massacre came at Kragujevac in October 1941, in southern Serbia, where thousands of Serbs were killed in retaliatory action.

³⁵ Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 64.

³⁶ Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 143.

British planners re-examined their Balkans strategy to see how they could adapt to the changing ground situation. At first relying extensively on bombing campaigns to reduce German use of railways through the Balkans, the British sought to increase bombing effectiveness by deploying SOE agents.³⁷ A single SOE officer, named D.T. “Bill” Hudson, embedded with Mihailović. Hudson was the first Allied officer who infiltrated into Yugoslavia, and he arrived by submarine off the Montenegrin coast in Petrovać during the night of 20 September 1941. Although Hudson was given explicit instructions to link up with the Chetniks and Mihailović, he first encountered a band of Partisans and shortly thereafter personally met Tito.³⁸ Already, and even before the Allies fully appreciated the multi-faceted, dynamic nature of Yugoslav resistance, strategic level decisions to support one faction over the other created uncomfortable tactical situations for agents on the ground. Hudson was the lone British representative and was wholly dependent on his partner force’s good graces for his personal security and sustainment.

Hudson soon made his way through the Yugoslav countryside and linked up with Mihailović. As a Serb, Mihailović was far more swayed to inaction by the German reprisal killings of other Serbs and the ongoing Ustaše genocide of ethnic Serbs in the NDH than was Tito. When Mihailović and Tito met the second time on 27 October 1941, Hudson vainly attempted to mediate operational strategy, but the two resistance leaders were too far apart to find common ground.³⁹ Hudson’s presence and subsequent reports to the Allies were of tantamount importance because they provided the first Allied understanding of

³⁷ Barker, 112-113.

³⁸ Williams, 58-59.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

who the Chetniks and Partisans were, and their motivations for fighting. However, due to problems with his own radio, Hudson relied on Mihailović's forces to relay messages to the SOE. Hudson noted that Mihailović both refused to fight and complained bitterly that his lack of action was due to a dearth of supplies provided by the British.⁴⁰ Additionally, the few actions Mihailović undertook were often against the Partisans, thus not meeting the British intention for their sponsored resistance group in Yugoslavia.⁴¹ Hudson's own relationship with Mihailović was strained since November 1941 when he refused to resupply the Chetniks until he secured guarantees that the supplies would not be used against the Partisans.⁴² The Chetniks' lack of activity prompted the SOE to embed with Tito to determine his suitability for future support. Hudson claimed that most Partisans were not actually communists but also recognized that if they supported the Partisans, they effectively would be abandoning the government in exile.

While attempting to mediate between Mihailović and Tito, Hudson alienated himself from both. After finally leaving the Partisans in late November 1941, Hudson's wireless transmitter (W/T; "radioman") refused to accompany him due to his own Partisan sympathies, and when Hudson arrived back at Chetniks headquarters, he was coolly received by Mihailović. For the next six months, Hudson fended for himself in a community of benevolent Serbs. He had no way of contacting the SOE base in Cairo, and for security reasons Mihailović had also ceased radio transmissions.⁴³ SOE, and therefore the Allies, were unaware of any actions taking place in Yugoslavia during that period. The

⁴⁰ Barker, 114.

⁴¹ Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 111.

⁴² Williams, 64.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

signals intelligence, code-named “Ultra,” was not yet fully operational in the Balkans, and SOE attempts to infiltrate additional agents failed due to various complications, including poor weather and betrayal by local criminals.⁴⁴ One SOE agent and his partner were actually murdered by a Chetnik fighter who likely committed the act for a distinctly apolitical reason: personal financial gain, since the SOE agents carried gold sovereigns and various other currencies.⁴⁵ The life of an SOE agent was not for the faint-hearted, and the information they provided was increasingly costly.

By the summer of 1942, a valuable new source of intelligence was being rapidly incorporated into Allied war planners’ toolkit: Ultra. Ultra was a signals intelligence apparatus that relied on a complex system of decoding intercepted German messages. The Germans were never aware that their encrypted messages sent through Enigma machines were being decrypted by the Allies, and therefore made no efforts to disguise their transmissions.⁴⁶ The Ultra decoding program was highly secret, and only a select few knew of its existence. As with any intelligence, its full effectiveness required two aspects to be fulfilled: the first was that information about the enemy must first be understood and assessed; then, there must be a force available to act on that information.⁴⁷ These two factors were never fully met in Yugoslavia because there was never a large enough Allied ground force available to act on the information received. Additionally, since the source of information could not be betrayed to the Germans, Ultra intelligence was never provided

⁴⁴ Ibid., 65-66.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 68.

⁴⁶ Ralph Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 23.

to the resistance factions for fear of the secret getting out. Therefore, in Yugoslavia, Ultra only ever provided information to Allied supply-dropping and Adriatic naval operations elements, and was not directly given to the Yugoslavs, who were dependent on their own intelligence gathering methods for enemy information.⁴⁸ Ultra was used to somewhat guide policy in Yugoslavia, but not to the same extent as it was in other theaters due to its highly secretive nature and the lack of large Allied forces therein; because of that, there was a large amount of trust in, and need for, SOE and OSS agents in the country to provide the ground truth. Ultra and Allied agents worked in concert guiding policy, but the agents' intelligence was their most valued contribution to Allied war efforts in the Balkans.

After Hudson, the British continued attempting to emplace more SOE agents in Yugoslavia throughout 1942 because of the perceived high value of their reports. However, the information SOE agents provided, even when used in concert with Ultra reports, was so limited and sometimes contradictory that it "painted an equally incomplete picture."⁴⁹ By the end of 1942, then, the Allies were effectively blind to the happenings within Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ Throughout this year, too, the Allies were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to provide any meaningful logistics and armament support to either the Chetniks or Partisans because of the ongoing North Africa campaign. This resulted in a great amount of pro-Chetnik propaganda by the British, which did very little practically for the resource starved Mihailović.⁵¹ By the time the next SOE agent was successfully dropped into Yugoslavia

⁴⁸ Ibid., 325.

⁴⁹ Jay Jakob, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), 115.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 116.

⁵¹ Barker, 114. For an in-depth analysis of the pro-Chetnik propaganda in 1942, see chapter 5 of *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans* by Heather Williams. She notes that the pro-Chetnik propaganda paradoxically hindered Mihailović's efforts because it shone a light on his actions, making him more

on Christmas Day 1942, pro-Mihailović sentiment within strategic British levels were waning while pro-Partisan interest was gaining momentum.

As the strategic situation in the Mediterranean evolved, British senior leaders re-evaluated their policy of exclusive support for the Chetniks. An influential SOE brief provided by SOE-Cairo chief Brigadier C.M. Keble, Major Basil Davidson, and Captain F.W.D. Deakin to Churchill convinced the Prime Minister that limiting support exclusively to Mihailović severely hindered their ability to apply pressure in the Balkans against the Axis forces.⁵² Churchill approved of sending additional agents to Yugoslavia to report on Partisan activity, and Deakin went to represent the SOE with Tito, landing in the midst of an epic battle for survival during the fifth German anti-guerrilla offensive in May 1943.⁵³ Deakin recalled that the forced march to escape the enemy lasted two months, and served as “an initiation, physical and mental, into another war” where they “fought for survival in the cruelty of mountains which would yield respite and refuge only to those who could scale and dominate them with more secret knowledge than the foe.”⁵⁴ The romantic language of survival reminiscence aside, Deakin’s placement alongside the Partisans as they desperately fought the Germans powerfully demonstrated to him the Partisans’ commitment to victory over the Axis that those with Mihailović did not so clearly witness. Thus, Deakin was immediately endeared to the Partisans, while the representatives with Mihailović were provided information to support their departure from the Chetniks.

susceptible to German anti-guerrilla retribution. What Mihailović desperately needed was materiel support, which never came in meaningful amounts.

⁵² Kirk Ford, Jr., *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1992), 10.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁵⁴ Deakin, *Embattled Mountain*, 11.

The valuable intelligence provided by Hudson, and then later Colonel S.W. “Marko” Bailey, ultimately confirmed British suspicion spurred by Ultra transcripts that Mihailović was not nearly as active against the Axis forces as their own propaganda asserted. Salacious claims of Chetnik collaboration with the Italians were intriguing, although the deals were not of great concern to the British who believed that they were made by independent Chetnik bands acting of their own accord to increase their weapons stores.⁵⁵ What did concern the British, though, occurred 28 February 1943 during a speech delivered to Mihailović’s followers at a christening in Lipovo, Montenegro. There Mihailović railed against the lack of British support and said, “as long as the Italians remained his sole adequate source of benefit and assurance generally, nothing the Allies could do would make him change his attitude towards [the Italians].”⁵⁶ Mihailović also listed his enemies in order of precedence as being the Partisans, Ustaše, Muslims, and Croats—nowhere did he explicitly state that the Germans were an enemy to the Chetniks.⁵⁷ Demonstrating the effectiveness of human intelligence reports over that received by Ultra transmissions, Bailey’s report of this speech “hit the British Government like a bombshell.”⁵⁸ Bailey also insisted that “the time [had] come to treat Mihailović firmly. He must be made to realise that we can make or break him. In return for the former, we demand

⁵⁵ Ford, *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance*, 9.

⁵⁶ Telegram, The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations Of The United States (FRUS): Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II*, 1943, Vol. II, 987.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 987.

⁵⁸ Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 93.

frank and sincere cooperation.”⁵⁹ More than a few in the British government were amenable to discontinuing support for Mihailović following this speech, and it strengthened Keble’s argument for sending representatives to the Partisans.

Up to the summer of 1943, the SOE was the only Allied organization in Yugoslavia. That changed once OSS chief William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan was finally able to cobble together the personnel to support independent OSS missions to Yugoslavia. The Americans acquiesced to British primacy in the relationship to Yugoslavia based on their longer tenure there, and presumably better understanding of the situation on the ground. In June 1942, Donovan and then-SOE head Sir Charles Hambro established coordination and cooperation between the OSS and SOE, as well as geographical zones of interest for each organization.⁶⁰ This was again agreed upon just over a year later when the OSS was making final preparations for inserting its own forces into Yugoslavia, but there was one important proviso that caused tension between the two organizations at the strategic levels that trickled down through the operational and tactical levels: the SOE would control all communications from the American agents.⁶¹ This was an attempt by the British to ensure that the fledgling American spy agency did not subvert British policy, or worse, push its own American agenda for postwar Yugoslavia.

The boisterous Donovan was not amenable to SOE communications demands. Although the OSS had agents ready to deploy to Yugoslavia at the beginning of the summer

⁵⁹ S.W. Bailey, “British Policy towards General Draža Mihailović,” in Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, eds., *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 73.

⁶⁰ Williams, 80.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 152.

of 1943, Donovan continued negotiating with the SOE before ultimately acquiescing to British communications control.⁶² In July, an agreement was reached, and the OSS agents made their final preparations before jumping into Yugoslavia. This preparation included not only gathering all the equipment possible that they could bring alongside them, but it also included briefs by the British intelligence agents in Cairo. Those briefs left much to be desired, as the intra-SOE conflicts regarding which Yugoslav resistance group to support was, even at that time, highly contentious. As OSS Agent Melvin O. Benson recalled, the brief he received was not of great help because “reliable information about the Partisans at that time was very meager.”⁶³ The OSS officers, despite their best efforts to make themselves ready, really did not know what they were getting themselves into.

On the night of 18 August 1943, OSS Agent Walter S. Mansfield parachuted into Bailey’s mission with the Chetniks, and three days later Benson parachuted to link up with the Partisans. Thus began the OSS’ own fateful entry into the Yugoslav fray. Up to this point, the British had not effectively grasped the full situation on the ground and did not have a firm understanding of the internal conflicts that tore at ethnic, religious, and ideological schisms of the guerrillas simultaneously engaged in a civil and existential conflict. The first OSS agents’ mission was to report on Axis movements and activities, as

⁶² Ford, *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance*, 15.

⁶³ Letter from Melvin O. Benson to Dr. Kirk Ford, 23 October 1971, in possession of author, Ford’s Collection. A note on Ford’s collection: Dr. Ford began studying the OSS in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s and since then built up a wealth of information, correspondence, and documents based on his personal interaction with various government entities and the former OSS Agents. Dr. Ford generously shared many of these documents and reports with me. Any document cited in this thesis from his personal file—like letters or private reports—will be cited using “Ford’s Collection” to denote where I obtained the information. All of the OSS reports cited herein came from Ford, but the NARA citation is used to further other scholars’ research efforts. In the case of REPARTEE which did not carry a NARA citation, its source is listed as “Ford’s Collection.”

well as faction dynamics, while remaining aloof to postwar political aims of the resistance movements. They were to attempt to place themselves in highly dangerous, emotional struggles alongside partners in desperate life or death situations without developing a fondness for their partner forces. To the policymakers, this was possible. To the few agents who deployed to Yugoslavia, it was impossible.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORIOGRAPHY

“I would like to request your opinion of just what our foreign policy is with regard to General Mihailović, General Tito, and the Greek Andarte movement. We in the Middle East are involved in a so-called Allied Military Mission in these three camps and our Allies, though they may at times be confused, have very definite foreign policies as concerns the present and future relationships with these three movements. If the United States has like policies, I have not as yet heard them.” –Lieutenant Colonel Paul West in a telegram to Brigadier General William J. Donovan, 9 November 1943⁶⁴

The history of Allied participation in World War II in Yugoslavia is full of contradictory interpretations between the “Children of Light” and the “Children of Darkness.”⁶⁵ The Children of Light camp encompasses those historians with a favorable view of the Partisans; the Children of Darkness includes those who viewed Mihailović’s Chetniks positively. The moniker alone underscores the fact that even historians charged with presenting the recollection of events have difficulty in the task, and the resulting themes of the history of the conflict has shifted with time. These biases are not necessarily purposeful, however, because the events themselves were clouded in missteps, mistakes, and miscommunication on all fronts.

In an obscure book published in 2009 called *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia*, historian Marcia Christoff Kurapovna summarizes the pitfalls historians face when researching and writing

⁶⁴ Telegram from USAFE Chief Operations Officers Lieutenant Colonel Paul West to OSS Director William J. Donovan, 9 November 1943, Box 100A, Donovan Library, United States Army Heritage Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, PA.

⁶⁵ The application of the terms “Children of Light” and “Children of Darkness” originated with Basil Davidson in his 1980 book *Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War* which details his experiences in the SOE, although there was a book called *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* which was published in 1945. That book, however, was a philosophical and religious defense of democracy. Therefore, Davidson was the first to apply the terms to the Yugoslavia situation. The terms were further used extensively by Heather Williams in *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*. This thesis will also use the terms, not only in the Historiography, but in later chapters because it provides a vivid description of the two sides of the history.

on Yugoslavia's struggles during World War II. Unlike most military histories, Kurapovna attempts to write about the "behind-the-scenes battles of ally against ally" where there was "a complete and utter lack of trust." She eloquently elaborates on this dynamic:

This narrative [*Shadows on the Mountain*] describes, in a complicated nutshell, how a Royal government (Great Britain) betrayed a Royalist government (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) to exclusively support a Communist government (that of Tito) against the wishes of an ally and a Democratic government (the United States) in order to keep another Communist government (that of Stalin) from gaining control, while that Communist government (of Stalin) betrayed its own Communist partners (the Yugoslav Partisans) to support the Royalist government (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), which was then supported by this nominal Soviet ally, but later cut off, and all the while those Royalists officially remained an ally of the Communist government, though actively despising it.⁶⁶

Kurapovna recognizes the complexity of Yugoslavia's first civil war that have not wavered with time, and the rest of *Shadows of the Mountain* duly falls into the Children of Darkness by portraying the Chetniks in an overly positive lens. What the Children of Darkness rail against, however, is years of Children of Light domination beginning almost immediately at the end of World War II.

Complex geopolitics are largely responsible for the Children of Light narrative being prevalent throughout much of the Cold War. With the Partisans' victory and subsequent heavy-handed takeover of Yugoslavia after Axis defeat on 13 May 1945, Tito's Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) was firmly in control of the nation, and brutally suppressed the "collaborationist" Chetniks.⁶⁷ With that suppression went the opposite

⁶⁶ Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), xii.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that the war in Yugoslavia ended a week after the Victory in Europe (VE) Day. This is important because it is a data point that demonstrates the added complexity and unsettled nature of World War II in Yugoslavia. See Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 266. He describes the actions of the KPJ's secret police as "[exercising] vengeance against all its enemies through massive liquidations and extra-legal settlements of accounts."

viewpoint, which accurately demonstrated that the Partisans and Chetniks both had “live and let-live” policies negotiated on the local level by individual commanders with Axis forces. As the first OSS agent to Mihailović, Walter F. Mansfield, recalled, these often took the form of “a friendly truce” between the Chetniks and Axis because “the local commander told [Mansfield] that his only hope of throwing out both the Germans and the Partisans was to avoid annihilation by making a truce with the Germans until sometime when he [the local Chetnik commander] could gain strength.”⁶⁸ As Mansfield later noted in his testimony, these “live-and-let-live” policies were commonplace in guerrilla warfare the whole world over, having witnessed similar acts even in China.⁶⁹ Guerrillas in desperate need of respite, or safe passage, made deals with local guards—often through bribes—to save each group the trouble of fighting the other. Said Mansfield, those agreements were “true of guerrilla warfare all the world over.”⁷⁰ So while Tito’s postwar claims presented tales of salacious collaboration between Chetniks and the Axis, Mansfield’s testimony demonstrated that there was a nuance with which this “collaboration” should be remembered that was not given by Tito’s regime. This nuance was also prevented by the Tito-Stalin split, further complicating the clear-cut anti-communist stance of the United States and Great Britain that otherwise defined the Cold War.

⁶⁸ David Martin, *Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich, Proceedings and Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 222. Prior to Mihailović’s execution by Tito’s regime in 1946, supporters of Mihailović—many of them airmen who were rescued by the Chetniks, as well as some OSS agents who worked alongside him—held its own “trial” in the United States meant to gain international support for Mihailović’s release. This was conducted just like an actual trial, with lawyers asking questions of witnesses who swore to tell the whole truth. *Patriot or Traitor* provides the transcripts of that “trial.”

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 244.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Despite Tito's actions to suppress the opposition in subsequent years following World War II's end, in 1948 he split from Stalin's sphere of influence. This seismic event resulted in a scramble by leaders in the West to bring Tito into their fold, thereby themselves propagating the Children of Light narrative. Walter Roberts, falling into the Children of Light camp, recognized the effect that the Tito-Stalin split in *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945*. Roberts noted that between 1945 and 1948, Churchill's gamble on supporting Tito in hopes that he would remember from whence support came seemed like an unadulterated failure. In 1946 and 1947, Yugoslav delegates frequently spoke Russian at international meetings where they "often outdid the Soviets in their anti-Western rhetoric."⁷¹ Stalin, however, was never truly comfortable with the outspoken Yugoslavian leader who refused to subordinate himself. Viewing Tito as a threat, Stalin attempted to drive a wedge through the KPJ. This unsuccessful attempt resulted in Yugoslavia leaving the Comintern's (Communist International) successor, the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) on 28 June 1948.⁷² This massive event not only shook communist nations, but it resulted in a speedy rapprochement on behalf of the United States and Great Britain. Not only did Churchill's wartime decision for support suddenly seem vindicated, but the stage was also set for Western historians to remember the Allies participation in World War II Yugoslavia fondly. The Children of Light narrative thus took primacy.

A firm member of the Children of Light was one of its earliest and most influential participants: Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean. Maclean, himself a member of Churchill's

⁷¹ Walter Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 324.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 325.

Conservative Party in Parliament, was a swashbuckling Scotsman who regarded himself as one of the great and influential leaders of the Allies during the whole war. To provide balanced credit to Maclean, some of this high self-esteem was certainly warranted. Bluster and bravado aside, Maclean did parachute at night into Partisan held territory near Jajce during a time when the Germans were actively fighting the Partisans. Jajce is not a paratrooper's dream location to jump into: full of rocky outcroppings, rolling hills, and heavily forested, a wrong landing could and often did result in broken ankles or worse, capture by one of the nearby German patrols.⁷³ Landing in the countryside as Britain's first general officer sent to Yugoslavia in September 1943, Maclean was overcome by pride: pride not just in his personal situation, but because he recognized that he was at the beginning of the struggle alongside "revolutionaries fighting for life and liberty against tremendous odds."⁷⁴ Thus primed and in awe, Maclean moved a few miles and met Tito.

Maclean was starstruck when he met Tito. Recalling Napoleon, Maclean believed he was staring into the "alert blue eyes" of "one of the keys to our problem."⁷⁵ The love affair between the British and Partisans which had up to that point only been simmering, was about to boil over following Maclean's report at the end of his first trip into enemy territory. Perhaps somewhat disingenuously, this "blockbuster" report was heavily based on secondhand reports. Nonetheless, its impact closely paralleled the impact that *Eastern Approaches* had on the history of Yugoslavia during World War II. Quantifying the impact of *Eastern Approaches* is difficult to state, but the fact that it is the only book on wartime

⁷³ Fitzroy Maclean, *Eastern Approaches* (London: The Reprint Society, 1949), 234.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

Yugoslavia that has been in continual print since initial publication demonstrates its broad and enduring appeal.⁷⁶ *Eastern Approaches* was published after other Children of Light memoirs written by SOE agents within five years of the war's end, including *Irregular Adventure* by Lawrence Christie and *Twelve Months with Tito's Partisans* by William Jones. Although it was not the first, it was the most impactful, and it supported books written by Yugoslav Communists who fought alongside the Partisans.

One of the most prolific Yugoslav communist writers was Milovan Djilas. Djilas personally never published any of his books directly into English, but many of them were translated. One, entitled *Wartime*, was published in 1977 and detailed his experiences as one of Tito's most trusted subordinates during the war. His recollections are vivid, detailed, and provides his "memories of the Yugoslav revolutionary war and [his] part in it."⁷⁷ The story that follows is a compelling and inspiring recollection of the struggles that the Partisans endured during the war, not just against the Axis, but against other Yugoslavs, their Allied partners, and finally with their ideologically most similar supporter: the Soviet Union. Recalling that Stalin enjoyed needling Tito, Djilas wrote that Stalin's praise for the Bulgars over the Partisans who were "unfit for serious front-line fighting" pushed Tito too far, and "without humbling himself...[Tito] shouted that the Yugoslav army would soon show that it had gotten rid of its weaknesses."⁷⁸ Djilas detailed the fallout between Tito and Stalin in a manner written only by someone who was personally present to see the

⁷⁶ Dimitris Livanios, review of *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*, by Heather Williams, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, August 2004, 531.

⁷⁷ Milovan Djilas, *Wartime*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 437.

events unfold. What is perhaps most incredible about *Wartime* is that Djilas wrote it nearly 25 years after his own break with Tito.

Djilas, one of Tito's closest and most trusted advisors during World War II, fell out of favor with the Yugoslav Communist Party (then called the Legion of Communists) in January 1954. Detailing his break with Tito, Djilas notes that it was largely due to Tito's "autocratic and intractable style" conflicting with his own ideas.⁷⁹ The break between the two prominent Yugoslav Communist leaders was not an isolated news event; in fact, Tito remarked that it was "the most important event since the confrontation with the Cominform in 1948."⁸⁰ Djilas' and Tito's publicized split added weight to *Wartime*: despite spending a quarter of a century *persona non grata*, Djilas *still* was firmly in the Children of Light camp, demonstrating the force of Tito's personality, Djilas' admiration for Tito's wartime leadership, and it ultimately showed that Djilas was still proud of his wartime service.

Tito's hold on Yugoslavia's chapter of the history of World War II was no accident: much like he purposely did not appoint a successor to lead Yugoslavia following his death, he instituted changes that "insured that no one who came after him would command such power as he held."⁸¹ As was demonstrated by Djilas' own imprisonment for speaking out and publishing articles against Tito, any criticism from within Yugoslavia's borders was quickly squashed. Likewise, Yugoslavia did not allow anyone into the archives who they deemed would write a version that challenged the approved narrative. Similarly, criticism from Western publishers was also minimized due to Yugoslavia's valuable position as a

⁷⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Tito: The Story from Inside*, trans. Vasilije Kojic and Richard Hayes (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 154.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 169.

perceived bulwark against the Soviet Union. Unlike many World War II histories where researchers were able to comb through archives for major Allied actions, since all Allied activities were conducted by either the Special Operations Executive (SOE) or Office of Strategic Services (OSS), archives took longer to be opened for public research. This did not stop a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) member from conducting his own research into the CIA's predecessor, the OSS.

R. Harris Smith wrote the seminal *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* without the use of the still-closed OSS archives. While discussing this work with his former colleagues in the CIA, he recalled that "former employees made it clear at the outset that the classified OSS archives would not be available to [him]."⁸² With that handicap, Harris still cobbled together an entire chapter on the OSS in Yugoslavia through private investigating and personal interviews, becoming the first major publication to cover the subject in 1972. Smith's Yugoslavia chapter, entitled "Of Communists and Kings" provides a balanced account of the war, using memoirs, newspaper articles, published diplomatic documents in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and British publications to form the backbone of his research. The interesting development that Smith introduces readers to is the schism between the various Allies.

The SOE, OSS, Partisans, and Soviets were ostensibly allies fighting against the Axis occupiers. However, there were numerous occasions where these allies actively worked against the other. The competition between the SOE and OSS frustrated OSS agents attempting to gain their own information from within Yugoslavia, even going so far

⁸² R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), xi.

as requisitioning “every small vessel that OSS requested” which effectively prevented them from inserting agents along the coast.⁸³ He also notes that the OSS did not fully embrace the Partisans in the manner the SOE did. In fact, “many Yugoslavs were hired and trained by OSS and then abruptly dismissed because of suspected political sympathies for Tito.”⁸⁴ The intra-Allied fight continued over who was providing the most support, with a Partisan political commissar “[persuading] his men and the peasants that [the supplies] came from Russia.”⁸⁵ The commissar’s actions, multiplied across the country, were successful, as Smith notes that “Partisan enthusiasm [for the Soviet Union] seemed out of proportion to the extent of Moscow’s niggardly aid.”⁸⁶ This intra-allied competition hindered their collective war effort, certainly, but was devastating to the Chetniks. Without regular support, the Chetniks were forced to gather all their war materiel, food, and other logistics support using irregular means.

In his exhaustive study based on research that spanned a dozen years, Jozo Tomasevich details much of these illicit activities by the Chetniks. In *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*, Tomasevich delves deep into the issues and controversy surrounding the Chetniks. Possessing extensive language capabilities, Tomasevich conducted this research without the use of OSS or SOE archive records and instead used archives in Germany, Italy, and even Yugoslavia. He personally met with Tito on one occasion, demonstrating that Tito both knew of Tomasevich’s research, and

⁸³ Ibid., 135.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 147.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

approved of it.⁸⁷ Understanding Tito's tight control over the historiography of the conflict, *The Chetniks* perpetuated the Children of Light narrative. However, and much different than other studies, Tomasevich understood there were differences between various bands of chetniks.

Draža Mihailović was the leader for the recognized resistance group representing the Yugoslav government-in-exile. As a proud Serbian officer, he used the moniker "Chetnik" to associate his movement with the long lineage of Serbian warriors defending Serbia from outside invaders. The name "chetnik" was originally used by Serbians who resisted Ottoman rule in the early 1800s. Meaning "guerrilla fighter," it was a name that represented a proud history of the militant Serbian society.⁸⁸ However, as Tomasevich notes, there were many thousands of chetniks fighting throughout the Yugoslav countryside. This included the quisling supporters of Milan Nedić, the resistance of Mihailović, and then the multiple gangs who did not coordinate with anyone and roamed the countryside committing violent acts against whomever, whenever they pleased.⁸⁹ As Tomasevich notes, this caused more than a little confusion, and this confusion over who were "good" and "bad" chetniks continued throughout the war. At war's end, the nuance of the "bad" chetniks was eliminated. If one supported the Chetniks and their version of the events, he was a "Child of Darkness."

⁸⁷ Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), vi.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 115. To distinguish between Chetnik bands associated with Mihailović, I capitalize "Chetnik." For unassociated bands over which Mihailović possessed no control, the lower-case "chetnik" is used.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 156.

The first Child of Darkness was David Martin. Martin was one of the “very few” journalists who “swam against the stream” of support for Tito in 1944, and he found that “it was virtually impossible to get anything into print which was in any way critical of Tito.”⁹⁰ Martin undertook the effort to understand what was happening in Yugoslavia for a story in the fall of 1943 but was disturbed by the completely one-sided support for the Partisans. Believing it to be his role as a journalist within a democracy to provide the facts, he chose to investigate claims of collaboration against Mihailović. This effort was hampered as well by sealed archives and official records, and Martin realized that the other side of the story was stubbornly suppressed.⁹¹ Nonetheless, he persisted in his efforts. What he discovered convinced him that Mihailović was unfairly treated and betrayed by the Allies when they abandoned him in favor of the Partisans. His personal status as a socialist immediately stated at the beginning of his book undoubtedly hurt its chances of wide dissemination in the burgeoning Cold War politics.⁹² But the suppression of other Children of Darkness works prevailed much longer.

The title of Martin’s work represents the same theme as other Children of Darkness narratives: the belief that Mihailović was betrayed is an unavoidable reality if one attempts to prove that supporting the Partisans was incorrect. In 1990—a decade after Tito’s death, and at the beginning of Yugoslavia’s dissolution—a former SOE agent published his own memoirs called *The Rape of Serbia*. In it, author Michael Lees records his “experiences and conclusions [which] are sharply at odds with what might best be

⁹⁰ David Martin, *Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailović* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), xi.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, xii.

⁹² *Ibid.*, xiii.

described as ‘the British Yugoslav Establishment view’ or, perhaps more aptly, ‘the victor’s history.’”⁹³ Lees emotionally places the blame for Mihailović’s abandonment on a Communist conspiracy led by a few well-placed individuals within the SOE—including, and especially, James Klugmann. Klugmann was a “brilliant...professional, totally dedicated [to communism], and enormously hardworking.”⁹⁴ At the center of this conspiracy to undermine the Chetniks, Klugmann was allegedly “the anchor pin” and “was in a key position” to heavily influence the reports on Yugoslavia—both for giving credit of Chetnik actions to the Partisans, and for presenting evidence to make it seem like Mihailović’s Chetniks were, in fact, collaborating with the enemy.⁹⁵ These scandalous claims against Klugmann are common in many publications dealing with Allied support.

In *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*, Heather Williams expertly traces the changing policy, also addressing the origins of the conspiracies surrounding the reasons for why it changed. Basil Davidson oversaw the Yugoslav SOE desk. His assistant was none other than James Klugmann. The two were members of the British Communist Party, and Williams notes that their mere presence and postwar activism “have probably done more than anyone else to fuel the flames of conspiracy theories.”⁹⁶ Herself neither falling into the Children of Light or Darkness camps, Williams attempts to remain above the fray by examining Great Britain’s reasons for supporting any resistance movement within Yugoslavia, ultimately concluding that Great Britain’s support exacerbated the civil war,

⁹³ Michael Lees, *The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power, 1943-1944* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1990), xv.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁹⁶ Williams, 115.

causing more harm to Yugoslavs than remaining outside of the conflict, and that by supporting resistance movements Great Britain hoped to allay concerns of their Soviet allies desperate for help against the Germans.⁹⁷ Williams focused her efforts most intensely on the SOE because the British initially and predominantly set Allied policy in the theater.

Kirk Ford's *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945* was the first in-depth study of the OSS in Yugoslavia. Ford recognizes that while the SOE and its policies guided American policy, the OSS persistently sought to insert its own agents for the valuable intelligence they provided. Under Donovan's leadership and with Roosevelt's approval, the OSS expanded its missions in Yugoslavia to both the Partisans and Chetniks. Contending that OSS agent Linn M. "Slim" Farish's initial report, which coincided in timing with that of Maclean and arrived right before the Big Three (Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill) met at the Teheran Conference in November-December 1943, "had little, if any, impact on the course of Allied policy [because] its true significance lay in the fact that it supported a strategy to which the Allies, particularly the United States, were already committed."⁹⁸ Farish's report and presence in Yugoslavia was particularly impactful, however, because he personally went to Washington, DC to debrief planners on what he witnessed in the approximately six weeks that he initially spent partnered with the Partisans.⁹⁹ Ford discusses some of the intra-Allied conflict and competition the Americans felt, and notes that Donovan believed the British policy was driven "by the considered long-range political necessity of the British in the Balkans rather than the immediate and

⁹⁷ Ibid., 244-246.

⁹⁸ Ford, *OSS*, 35.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

vital military problem here or its relation to over-all Allied operations.”¹⁰⁰ Intra-Allied conflict and competition negatively affected strategy, much to the detriment of the Yugoslav participants.

As the war progressed in 1944, the United States begrudgingly acquiesced to British strategic demands that all Allied support for the Chetniks be transitioned to only supporting the Partisans. As Andrew Buchanan notes in *American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II*, Donovan did not quietly sit back and willingly “serve as ‘juniors’ in what was in fact a ‘British political mission.’”¹⁰¹ Additionally, Tito was seen by the Americans to be stubbornly independent, revolutionarily dynamic, and would not subordinate himself to either Stalin or the US wishes.¹⁰² Seeking to install a moderate official to balance Tito’s radicalism, US policymakers developed the Shepherd Project which put forth a promising Croatian politician named Ivan Šubašić. American grand strategists were grasping for straws putting forth Šubašić, however, as he possessed little actual influence, and his unlikely plan to create “an alliance between the royal [Yugoslav] government in exile, the Partisans, the Croatian Peasants Party, and the Chetniks” had little chance of success.¹⁰³ While the British tepidly supported American efforts to install the moderate Šubašić throughout the first half of 1944, a more egregious break in Anglo-American strategy occurred in August of that same year.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 33-34.

¹⁰¹ Andrew Buchanan, *American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 245.

¹⁰² Ibid., 247.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 252.

Operation HALYARD was a daring rescue mission that partnered the OSS with the Chetniks, once again. This epic rescue mission that saved nearly 500 downed airmen is covered in *Operation Air Bridge* by Miodrag D. Pesic. Despite the mission's massive operational success, Pesic notes that "not many stories about those events [during Operation HALYARD] have been either written or published in our country [Serbia] until now [2003]" because the "long-lasting communist regime" suppressed its publicity.¹⁰⁴ Falling firmly within the Children of Darkness camp, Pesic derides the SOE and its members' "subversive activities against [Mihailović] and to their contribution and involvement in decision-making process of abandoning both the General and the Serbian people by the Allies."¹⁰⁵ For a number of years, and although many Allied airmen spoke out in favor of Mihailović and the Chetniks for saving their lives, the story of Operation HALYARD was long relegated to a small footnote in history, the heroic exploits of those OSS agents to save downed airmen but a minor blip in the grand scheme of the war. Another book, *The Forgotten 500*, provided a historical portrayal that also contributed to the increasing number of Children of Darkness chronicles brought to the forefront following Tito's death in 1980 and the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Operation HALYARD did not signal a change in Allied strategy, but instead was a short-lived operation that still resulted in the abandonment of Mihailović, despite his efforts.

In one of the most recent histories on the Allies in Yugoslavia, Halik Kochanski notes in *Resistance: The Underground War Against Hitler, 1939-1945* that Mihailović was

¹⁰⁴ Miodrag D. Pesic, *Operation Air Bridge: Serbian Chetniks and the Rescued American Airmen in World War II* (Belgrade: Serbian Masters' Society, 2003), 9.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

left with few options once the OSS departed his headquarters in December 1944. Faced with a brutal winter and little options for food, Mihailović turned “to the only people” who could help him, which was the Germans.¹⁰⁶ In return for this sustenance, Mihailović guarded the German retreat north out of Yugoslavia from Partisan attacks. Kochanski contends that Mihailović’s choices were taken out of desperation, and that Mihailović was not a collaborationist. When Mihailović was captured in March 1946, and subsequently tried and executed, Kochanski notes that he was held responsible primarily for the actions of “bands of men who called themselves chetniks...some of whom had collaborated closely with the occupying forces, and others who had done so temporarily in order to obtain weapons.”¹⁰⁷ Kochanski clearly falls well within the Children of Darkness camp, which puts *Resistance* in line with the growing amount of post-Yugoslavia literature that derides the decision to abandon Mihailović as immoral, much as David Martin had first submitted in 1946. The polarized conflict between “The Children of Light” and “The Children of Darkness” has dominated the historical accounts of the work of the Allies in Yugoslavia, and it is only recently that nuanced examinations of the OSS activities there are starting to be explored.

Researching the Allies in Yugoslavia is a difficult task. The break-up of Yugoslavia has resulted in the need for one to visit multiple national archives in Slovenia, Croatia, or Serbia. The fact that the United States and Great Britain each played such a significant role means that to tell the whole story, one would also need to conduct research

¹⁰⁶ Halik Kochanski, *Resistance: The Underground War Against Hitler, 1939-1945* (New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 2022), 750.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 824.

in archives throughout the United Kingdom and the United States. The only historian to successfully do this research thus far is Slovenian historian Blaž Torkar with his groundbreaking study *Mission Yugoslavia* in 2020. Torkar possesses the requisite language skills, as well as the ambition, to write “the most detailed overview of OSS operations in Yugoslavia to date” because he conducted archival research in the Balkans, the United States, and Great Britain.¹⁰⁸ Torkar notes that, even within the former Yugoslav republics, there is remarkably little interest in the Allies during the Second World War in Yugoslavia. He regards the reasons for this as twofold: the brutality and proximity of the Yugoslav break-up in the 1990s has drawn more interest from local historians, as have social issues. Since Torkar is both a lecturer at the Military Schools Center of the Slovenian Armed Forces, and a military historian, his interest in and ability to study resistance against the occupiers and the role of the Allies in supporting these movements from multiple areas is a valuable contribution to the history and its transformation.¹⁰⁹ His opinion is also unique, as he regards the decision to support the Partisans over the Chetniks as prudent because his research has demonstrated that the Partisans were the most active anti-Axis force in the country, but he also recognizes that the Allied abandonment of Mihailović was an aberration of policy decision-making.¹¹⁰

Torkar and Ford each provide valuable histories and summaries of Allied policymaking and tracing the actions of OSS agents during the conduct of the war. Missing in the historiography, however, is an examination of how the decisions to support one

¹⁰⁸ Blaž Torkar, *Mission Yugoslavia: The OSS and the Chetnik and Partisan Resistance Movements, 1943-1945* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2020), 2.

¹⁰⁹ Blaž Torkar, interview by author, 3 June 2022.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

resistance group over the other affected OSS agents forced to carry them out. Both Ford and Torkar also contend that the OSS' efforts were secondary in importance to either geopolitics or Ultra transcripts. However, that interpretation does not fully recognize the weight given to OSS agents for both policy development and intelligence gathering. Ultra transcripts were filtered through the lens of the Germans sending the reports, and their timeliness was not always reliable. When partnered with SOE teams, OSS messages were filtered through British codes. Donovan doggedly attempted to insert independent OSS missions to provide the US policymakers with unfiltered reports written by Americans. The decision to emplace OSS agents with Mihailović in August 1944 was widely unpopular with their British, Soviet, and Partisan Allies, and Roosevelt would not have risked causing a fissure in the Anglo-American alliance if OSS agents' reports were not deemed especially important and helpful for American military strategists.

The gap in the history of the OSS in Yugoslavia that this study will fill is in telling the story focusing on the men at the far end of policy. While instrumental in initially setting it, as the war progressed and their concerns were reported, OSS agents grew increasingly frustrated at their inability to change the decisionmakers in Washington's minds. While OSS agents were nonetheless still valuable in the Allied war effort by passing along important, timely, and accurate intelligence, by searching for and rescuing downed Allied airmen, and by delivering war materiel to their partner forces, the OSS agents' ability to truly change Allied policy was severely diminished by the end of the war. Military strategists and political leaders valued their input, but when reports suggested a departure

from the Partisans near the end of 1944, geopolitical realities took greater importance and the OSS agents did not hold the same amount of sway they did in October 1943.

CHAPTER 4: FROM INSERTION TO TEHERAN *AUGUST 1943—DECEMBER 1943*

“This was possibly as interesting an assignment as anyone could ask for in this war. The fight these people have put up is almost beyond belief. The hardships they have withstood, and are now withstanding, are almost unimaginable. Some are frightened concerning their political beliefs but I believe that people who have fought like they have are entitled to whatever they can get out of life afterwards.”¹¹¹

– Major Linn M. “Slim” Farish

“We can't fight Jerry with bare feet, brave hearts and radio London.”¹¹²

– Lieutenant George Musulin

Introduction

This chapter will cover approximately four months from the initial OSS insertion into Yugoslavia in August 1943 through the Teheran conference in November-December of that same year. It will first briefly explain some of the forces OSS Chief William Donovan fought against before examining the OSS Agents with the Chetniks, then the Partisans, and finally examine what their final reports stated and the effect that those reports had on strategic decision-makers at the Teheran conference.

The first American agent parachuted into Yugoslavia on 18 August 1943, although this was much later than OSS Chief William Donovan initially desired. As early as July 1942, Donovan implored the Joint Chiefs of Staff to allow his organization to establish mission bases throughout the Near East to “render important aid to the cause of the United Nations in this vital area.”¹¹³ Donovan envisioned multiple roles for the agents, including

¹¹¹ Letter from Linn Farish to John G. Winant, 15 January 1944, Box 196 John Winant Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum (FDR), Hyde Park, NY.

¹¹² Musulin Report, 28 May 1944, OSS/CIA Files, Ford Collection. In the 1970s, a CIA representative sent Ford a series of reports and correspondence that they declassified to aid in his studies. This was included in that tranche. Later Musulin’s first trip was recorded as “REPARTEE” because it fell under the SOE mission of the same name.

¹¹³ Memo to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 25 July 1942, Roll 105, Donovan Papers, USAHEC.

collecting “strategic information,” “countering efforts of the Axis” to establish their own spy networks, and setting up an organization for “resistance, sabotage, and guerrilla work.”¹¹⁴ Acknowledging the United States did not have primacy in the region, Donovan frequently deferred to the British as leaders in the area of operations, limiting support to “reinforc[ing] the Near East...if desired and requested by the British” and ensuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) knew that he was not trying to undermine their ally before a “prior agreement [with] the British” could be made.¹¹⁵ Donovan was forced to fight with his own military bureaucracy because the Coordinator of Information (the short-lived precursor to the OSS) was a newly established organization, and there were many who feared it would undermine their own mission, thereby stealing funding and influence.¹¹⁶ Those concerns notwithstanding, with Roosevelt’s backing, Donovan forged on, seeking to increase what became the OSS’ influence and reputation. Concluding his argument, Donovan noted that the investment of a “relatively small” force “might very well [produce] substantial” dividends, especially “with the full support of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State.”¹¹⁷ Ultimately, Donovan received the approval necessary for establishing an OSS base in North Africa for missions in the Mediterranean Theater, but the relationship with the British continued to cause friction for the OSS Agents.

When referencing the table in Appendix B, readers will note that most of this chapter’s missions were not given named titles. The reason for that is the nature of the initial missions to the Chetniks and Partisans were not to then provide materiel support or

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Times Books, 1982), 163.

¹¹⁷ Memo to JCS, 25 July 1942, USAHEC.

actively work to find greater intelligence sources; rather, these missions were exploratory to determine the nature of the two different factions. For that reason, Seitz's, Musulin's, and Farish's missions are separated from the rest of the missions to Yugoslavia shown on the chart, the vast majority of which conducted intelligence gathering, rescued airmen, and provided supplies to the Partisans.

Contacting the Chetniks

The first two OSS agents to parachute into Chetniks' territory were Captain Walter F. Mansfield and Lieutenant Colonel Albert B. Seitz.¹¹⁸ There are ample first-person records from both: Mansfield's typescript diary and his postwar sworn statement provided his point of view, and Seitz's memoirs published eight years following his service in Yugoslavia augment his official report submitted upon redeployment. Although Lieutenant George Musulin arrived during Mansfield's and Seitz's tour and eventually became an instrumental individual, he will not be the focus of this chapter because his influence within the OSS did not rise until 1944.

Mansfield was not privy to the strategic-level maneuvering, but he certainly felt its results. Because the British had been operating inside Yugoslavia since the fall of 1941, they provided SOE and OSS agents their intelligence briefings before being inserted into the country. Mansfield recalled that these SOE briefings consisted of "long lectures on the

¹¹⁸ In the United States Marine Corps (USMC), Marines use the entire rank's title in third-person references (e.g., a lieutenant colonel will always be referred to as "lieutenant colonel," just as a gunnery sergeant will be called "gunnery sergeant" or, familiarly, "gunny"). Soldiers in the Army, on the other hand, will often shorten official titles and rank (e.g., lieutenant colonels may be referred to simply as "colonel" and a sergeant first class will often just be called "sergeant"). Sometimes Seitz is referred to as "Colonel Seitz" by Mansfield; he was not promoted to colonel during the war, and this is just a culturally accepted shortening of Seitz's official title.

latest situation intelligence wise in Yugoslavia, both on the side of Mihailović and on the side of Tito.”¹¹⁹ Despite preparing to join the Chetniks, Mansfield was told by British officers “that they were thinking of switching [support] from Mihailović to Tito, and in the meantime were backing both of them.”¹²⁰ The reason for the switch was because “he [Mihailović] was not carrying on activities and operations to the extent they [the British] would like and was not doing the sabotage work they wanted,” and Mansfield was later told that some “of [Mihailović’s] leaders were allegedly collaborating in some areas.”¹²¹

Once he parachuted into Yugoslavia, Mansfield was the only American representative to the Chetniks for nearly a month. He partnered with SOE agents, some of whom arrived just a month prior. After a long month as the sole American, Mansfield was joined by his new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Albert Seitz. Seitz and Mansfield did not know each other, meeting for the first time on the drop zone the night Seitz parachuted into Yugoslavia. Demonstrating how alone the Americans felt in enemy-occupied territory, Seitz recalled that Mansfield “was greatly pleased to see another American, as was I.”¹²² Mansfield and Seitz were accompanied throughout their stay in Yugoslavia by Borislav Todorović, a Chetnik who spoke English and eventually became the Yugoslav government-in-exile’s military attaché at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington. Their mission was to “[inform] competent American authorities about the true situation in Yugoslavia, with a view to obtaining aid for the fighters of General Mihailović’s army

¹¹⁹ Walter F. Mansfield, “Testimony to the Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich” in *Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich* by David Martin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution University Press, 1978), 208.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 209.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 209-210.

¹²² Albert B. Seitz, *Mihailović: Hoax or Hero?* (Columbus, OH: Leigh House Publishers, 1953), 5.

which was fighting the common enemy under the most difficult conditions, and practically without aid from the outside.”¹²³ During the approximately six months they were in Yugoslavia, they spent the first three with Mihailović, and the rest attempting to depart.

The OSS agents went to Mihailović’s headquarters to provide American strategists with firsthand reports from inside Yugoslavia written by Americans. They had “almost daily” contact with Mihailović those first three months, leaving his side only to conduct “operations away from staff headquarters.”¹²⁴ These missions were of a fact-finding nature, where the OSS and SOE agents attempted to ascertain the nature of Mihailović’s Chetniks, and learn about the situation inside of Yugoslavia. As they toured Chetniks territory, Mansfield and Seitz gathered as much information as they could. The main pieces of intelligence that they recorded included the number and condition of Chetniks troops inspected, the number of enemy troops encountered—including Germans, Italians, and quisling chetniks— geography, and the attitude of Yugoslav peasants towards the Allies and Mihailović. In his diary, Mansfield noted differences in morale, recognizing that some units were clothed in “captured German uniforms” denoting that they had most likely killed the previous uniform’s owner, pilfered them from captured supplies, or acquired them some other way.¹²⁵ They examined various locations for their suitability for future Allied use, and whether they “would make good airports.”¹²⁶ No piece of information was too small to record, since they were to provide a full report once evacuated from Yugoslavia.

¹²³ Letter from Borislav J. Todorović to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 28 February 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The President's Official File, Part 3, Box 364, FDR Library.

¹²⁴ Mansfield, “Testimony,” 212.

¹²⁵ Walter R. Mansfield, Field Diary of Captain Walter R. Mansfield, Typescript, from handwritten notes, in possession of author, 35-36.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

Although some of their information-gathering mission teetered on the mundane, it was always dangerous and exhausting work that involved travel over great distance on foot or horseback, often within close proximity to Axis troops. And, in an incredible act of trust that later endeared Mihailović to Mansfield and Seitz, Mihailović told Seitz that “I should go where I pleased, talk to whom I pleased and when I pleased, and gave Capt. Todorović a letter with unlimited authority to gather what information and facts I believed necessary, without hindrance or delay.”¹²⁷ This complete freedom and endorsement by Mihailović to explore Chetnik-held territory, and speak to anyone they desired, was not replicated by OSS representatives to the Partisans.

When inspecting troops, the OSS agents had to not only note how many men they were reviewing, but also their uniforms and level of morale. They gained an understanding of the level of support for the Chetniks’ movement. They needed to ascertain why the peasant or fighter supported the Chetniks: in some cases, they were loyal to Mihailović and old Serbia, whereas in other cases it was “difficult to tell whether peasants follow Chetniks because of affirmative beliefs, or because no one [*sic*] else in area [was] trying to win them off.”¹²⁸ All of this information was important for the OSS agents to record so that they could write a well-informed report, but also provide the most holistic information when they were debriefed once out of Yugoslavia.

Most importantly, Seitz and Mansfield needed to understand Mihailović’s motivations, loyalties, and intentions, and communicate it to policymakers. In this they were thwarted by the mission’s senior representative, SOE Brigadier Charles Armstrong.

¹²⁷ Seitz, *Mihailović*, 44.

¹²⁸ Mansfield, *Field Diary*, 35.

In Seitz's first meeting with Mihailović, he ascertained that Mihailović was profoundly affected by previous German massacres of Serbs. Mihailović believed that "he must, unless a strategic objective was indicated, refrain from operations which would call down too much Serbian blood in reprisal by the Germans."¹²⁹ While this intrigued Seitz, and he believed it would be of interest to the OSS and SOE desks in Cairo, Seitz was soon told by Armstrong that he was "there simply to give an Allied illusion to the Yugoslavs. The Mission was British and the whole show would remain a British show...if and when [Seitz] was accorded an audience with the Minister [he] would be accompanied by Colonel [Bailey]...I was even forbidden to address Mihailović directly in French. Further, any message destined for my people in Cairo would be subject to the Brigadier's censorship."¹³⁰ This order from Armstrong countered Seitz's own orders, and Seitz attempted to refute it through radio contact with his leadership in Cairo. To Seitz's surprise, Cairo affirmed Armstrong's claims, other than saying that Armstrong would be required to send all of Seitz's messages verbatim to Cairo after first reading them himself.¹³¹

Many of the OSS and SOE agents personally liked the other, but in the case of the senior British representative and the senior American representative to the Chetniks, their relationship was sour almost immediately. This friction at the ground level undoubtedly affected the reports sent to senior leaders, but it was also representative of the strategic relational friction between the British and Americans experienced by Donovan trickling

¹²⁹ Seitz, *Mihailović*, 11-12.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13. "The Minister" is how Seitz often refers to Mihailović throughout his memoir, a nod to Mihailović's official title as "Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces" for the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Additionally, Mihailović spoke no English, but was a fluent francophone, as was Seitz.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

down to the tactical level. Seitz admitted that he did not understand Britain's postwar goals in Yugoslavia since the United States "had no stake in [Yugoslavia] except to help kill [and] pin down the Germans...any talk of post war politics before the Germans were driven out seemed sacrilege."¹³² Different postwar intentions of the two Allied nations thus made life on the ground for Seitz and Mansfield more difficult than it already was. This friction hindered the OSS Agents' mission, but did not halt it.

Todorović expounded on Seitz's claims that it "was strictly a British show" and that he believed Seitz "did not approve" of the British officers' actions or policies.¹³³ Despite this, Todorović claimed this strained relationship "did not prevent Captain Mansfield from sending accurate, factual reports that often put British policy and its support of the Partisans in an unfavorable light."¹³⁴ Nonetheless, Seitz and Mansfield believed that their written reports were brushed off by their British counterparts in Cairo because the British "declare[d] that the Americans lacked knowledge of Yugoslav affairs."¹³⁵ Ultimately frustrated by the lack of receptiveness, Seitz knew that "with telegrams, no matter how detailed, we avail nothing [because] our superiors in Cairo refer every little matter to the British."¹³⁶ Seitz's solution, therefore, was to leave Yugoslavia and "go there [Cairo] in person, explain everything, and show undeniable proof. Or go to Washington."¹³⁷ Seitz instinctively knew that their messages would not be fully appreciated until they could personally interact with Washington officials.

¹³² Ibid., 12.

¹³³ Boris Todorović, *Last Words: A Memoir of World War II and the Yugoslav Tragedy*, ed. J. Stryder and Andrew Karp (New York: Walker and Company, 1989), 262.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 263.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 264.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Their fact-finding mission essentially concluded in late December 1943 when Seitz and Mansfield then split up to find their own ways out of Yugoslavia. While this seemed counterintuitive because of the dangers they would face without the other, the reason for the split was to ensure that their report made it to their leadership if one of the two died. Seitz also had an opportunity to link up with Partisan fighters, which he knew would provide intelligence of great value since he would be the first American to see both. Not wanting to depart the Chetniks completely, Mansfield volunteered to remain. “After much discussion the night before,” Mansfield recalled in his diary on 24 December 1943, “Col. Seitz and I decided he would go with Wade while I stayed behind to clear matters up with the Minister.”¹³⁸ Parting ways, Seitz left with a contingent of SOE agents to meet with Partisans on their way out of Yugoslavia, while Mansfield waited to coordinate departure through the mechanism provided by the Chetniks. Essentially, by increasing their own personal risk, they doubled the chances that their personal report on what they witnessed and learned would make it out of Yugoslavia; they also increased the amount of intelligence they could collect. This decision was risky, but the agents understood that it was their duty to provide the most robust information to their leadership as possible.

Prior to examining the first mission to the Partisans, it is necessary to mention the personal toll that being in Yugoslavia took on the OSS Agents. A prescient example for this was recorded by Mansfield. His diary covered everything from the terrifying, to the boring, to the personal. As a representation for the homesickness all the OSS agents undoubtedly felt, Mansfield repeatedly lamented the lack of word from home: “God how

¹³⁸ Mansfield Field Diary, 54. Wade was one of the SOE officers accompanying the OSS Agents. “Col.” Is the common abbreviation for “colonel”.

I'd like to see some mail" he wrote on 16 October; again on 9 December he noted "we are all desperate to get mail from home;" and again on 20 December Mansfield was happy to receive a courier carrying clothes for them, "but disappointed because no mail."¹³⁹ Mansfield was not just curious about what was happening at home due to homesickness, he eagerly awaited notice that his wife had given birth to their first child. On 2 January, he wrote that "by this time, of course, I may be the father of a bouncing daughter!"¹⁴⁰ Mansfield's deeply personal recollections provide a powerful example of the lives that the OSS agents left behind. While they could not forget their loved ones, it was in their best interest to try because otherwise they may lose control of their emotions, which was unacceptable in the presence of a partner force expecting composure.

Contacting the Partisans

The first officer to parachute into Partisan territory was Captain Melvin O. Benson on 22 August 1943, which was four days after Mansfield reached the Chetniks.¹⁴¹ Benson was later joined by Major Linn M. "Slim" Farish, who eventually wrote the American-corollary to the highly influential "blockbuster report" by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean. Additionally, during the approximately four months between insertion and the Teheran Conference Major Louis Huot spearheaded an ambitious supply operation to the Partisans. Huot is a key individual analyzed during this section, as he not only personally experienced Partisan propaganda, but was swayed by it. He also encouraged Farish to depart from Tito's

¹³⁹ Ibid., 31, 48, and 53.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴¹ Ford, *OSS*, 16-17.

headquarters so that his report could be submitted in time for the major Allied conferences, timing which proved beneficial to the Partisans' cause with the Allies. One other OSS agent's memoirs will also be consulted here: Major Franklin Lindsay, who did not personally enter Yugoslavia until May 1944, but provided a helpful explanation for why Farish wrote his initial report using such glowing language to review the Partisans.

Like Mansfield, Benson was the only American on the ground until he was joined by Farish on 17 September 1943. Farish went to Yugoslavia to provide a higher rank counterpart to the SOE's senior representative to the Partisans, Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, although he was still significantly junior in rank to Maclean. Unlike Armstrong and Mihailović, Maclean and Tito shared a very high rapport. Despite elevating Farish to the position of Maclean's American chief of staff, Maclean's subsequent management of the relationship demonstrated that he did not value, nor require, Farish's involvement in his parleys with Tito.¹⁴² Shortly after his arrival, Farish went to Glamoč which was "a village lying in a mountain valley some forty miles" away.¹⁴³ Maclean ostensibly sent Farish to Glamoč because he was an "expert airfield designer" working "in his peace-time occupation" as an engineer.¹⁴⁴ While building an airfield that could potentially provide Allied airplanes a runway to supply materiel and evacuate downed airmen was undoubtedly important, it fell outside the intention of the OSS' mission to learn about the Partisans. In reality, Farish and Benson's departure from Tito's headquarters provided Maclean sole access to Tito while Farish was stuck "with a radio which didn't work and a wireless

¹⁴² Maclean, *Eastern Approaches*, 237. Ford suggests "that the British, while inviting OSS participation in Yugoslavia, wished to keep a very short rein on Donovan's men." Ford, *OSS*, 22.

¹⁴³ Maclean, *Eastern Approaches*, 253.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

operator who couldn't fix it."¹⁴⁵ Maclean's actions underscore British attempts to maintain control over the relationship and mission to the Partisans, just like they had done with the Chetniks. Prior to Maclean and Farish's arrival, however, SOE control over Benson was not nearly as tight.

Benson quickly faced a politically sensitive situation when he landed in Yugoslavia, for which he was given no prior awareness or preparation: the Italians surrendered on 8 September 1943, resulting in a rush to Italian occupied territory and garrisons to commandeer weapons, materiel, and food. Benson, with no guidance, decided his actions based on his best interpretation for what his leadership would have wanted from him. He dutifully accompanied the Partisans in their rush to beat quislings, Ustasha, Germans, and Chetniks into Italian-occupied territory, attending the surrender alongside Tito and acting more as an observer than a mediator or participant.¹⁴⁶ The mere presence of OSS agents at the center of the action and negotiation was valuable for the OSS, and Donovan specifically assessed, selected, and trained agents who would act in accordance with their commander's intent.¹⁴⁷ Sometimes, one's understanding of the commander's intent combined with his own eagerness resulted in unexpected, but significant, effects.

¹⁴⁵ Benson Report, 22 June 1944, OSS/CIA Files, Ford Collection.

¹⁴⁶ Ford, *OSS*, 17.

¹⁴⁷ In today's military, "the commander's intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. Commanders convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation's purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state...it describes the broader purpose of the unit's operation in relationship to the higher commander's intent and concept of operations. Doing this allows subordinates to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and, most importantly, why the mission is being conducted." The definition of "commander's intent" was undoubtedly different in 1943, but the sentiment remained the same. I am providing the definition for the benefit of individuals less familiar with Army doctrinal terms, to provide a common understanding of its use in the context of this thesis. See Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019), 1-10.

Meanwhile, Major Louis Huot, a logistics officer assigned to the OSS' newly established base in Bari, Italy, was frustrated with the lack of OSS action and saw an opportunity to provide immediate assistance to the Partisans. Without the approval of the SOE, and without even coordinating with Maclean's team in country, Huot ran an idea for a logistics operation, called Operation AUDREY, up the OSS chain of command for approval.¹⁴⁸ Huot knew that "one small wooden schooner sailing across the Adriatic would take more medical supplies and clothing and weapons and food to the besieged guerrillas [Partisans] in one night than fifty of the biggest bombers could ferry over in three weeks."¹⁴⁹ Huot's statement underscores an important development from the Partisans winning the race to disarm the Italians on the coast: control of the coast provided far greater opportunity for logistics support from the Allies than did airdrops. Ultimately, Tito's Partisans controlled the Dalmatian coast and Mihailović's Chetniks did not. The greater logistical support enabled more offensive action by the Partisans than the Chetniks, especially in the war's waning years. In the two and a half months of Operation AUDREY, it is estimated that over 6,500 tons of supplies were shipped across the Adriatic to the Partisans.¹⁵⁰ Comparatively, during this same time period, Mihailović received exactly one airborne shipment of "16 canisters of demolitions, 8 British rifles, 1 German Mauser with a broken stock, [and] 1 captured Italian mortar [but] there was no ammunition for either the rifles or the mortars."¹⁵¹ The difference in supplies, at this stage of the war, was not due to a lack of support for Mihailović, since Allied support did not officially transition to

¹⁴⁸ Huot Report, 9 November 1943, Box 100A, Donovan Collection, USAHEC.

¹⁴⁹ Louis Huot, *Guns for Tito* (New York: L.B. Fischer, 1945), 2.

¹⁵⁰ Ford, *OSS*, 28.

¹⁵¹ Martin, *Ally Betrayed*, 222.

exclusively back the Partisans for another three months, but was actually due to the simple fact that it was easier to move greater amounts of supplies by ship than by airplane. Huot, through his own force of will and motivation, eventually worked through numerous logistics hurdles and leveraged relationships to arrange a personal meeting with Tito outside of any British influence on 23 October.

The trek to reach Tito in Jajce—a small village located in the mountains of western Bosnia—was grueling and dangerous. It also resulted in Huot being exposed to the effective propaganda arm of the Partisans. The KPJ was outlawed in Yugoslavia in 1921 and was quite proficient by the war's outset at covertly organizing and recruiting additional members to the party.¹⁵² Conversely, Mihailović was always the legitimate representative of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, so he was never as proficient as the Partisans in clandestine communication, recruitment, and propaganda. The result was the Partisans effectively used events and interactions to further their revolutionary fervor and morale more than the Chetniks ever did. Huot was impressed not only by the security exercised by the “hirsute” Partisans “who needed only a jug of corn likker [*sic*] to pass for a primitive Kentucky mountaineer,” but also by the fact that the Partisans employed combat forces that were “almost one-third” women, thereby demonstrating the whole-of-community revolutionary efforts to free Yugoslavia from the invaders.¹⁵³ He was especially impressed by the procession of combat reinforcements, because despite consisting of men and women, “they had become soldiers without sex [and] as I watched them file by I found

¹⁵² Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, 6-7.

¹⁵³ Huot, *Guns*, 214-215.

them rather terrifying.”¹⁵⁴ After the journey finally concluded at Tito’s headquarters in Jajce, Huot was exposed to the Partisan leader’s revolutionary fervor and intentional messaging—neither of which failed to impress the American.

Huot was immediately captivated by Tito and remained so during his short stay at the Partisan headquarters. Huot noted that Tito’s appearance was a “striking... impression of dynamic power only in part attributable to his figure. Compact, broad-shouldered, deep-chested and flat-bellied, there was strength—plain physical stamina—implicit in every line of him.”¹⁵⁵ Tito welcomed Huot, and over the following day and a half was wined and dined, and enjoyed exclusive access to the Partisan commander. It was during this time that Tito convinced Huot that “[he] was planning no Communist revolution for his country;” rather, “he was working out the pattern of a new and democratic popular front movement which would embrace all the elements in his community capable of resisting the invader.”¹⁵⁶ Tito said that they would continue fighting their revolutionary struggle to free themselves of the king, and once that was done, the Partisans “will not tell the people what postwar regime they will have; we [will] ask them.”¹⁵⁷ Standing in his way, however, were the Chetniks, who Tito claimed would rather his “throat cut” than establish a “joint headquarters.”¹⁵⁸ Huot, undoubtedly flattered by the sole access to Tito, attempted to ascertain Tito’s motivations, much as Seitz and Mansfield were charged with doing with Mihailović.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 215.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 236-237.

¹⁵⁷ Huot Report, 27 October 1943, USAHEC.

¹⁵⁸ Huot, *Guns*, 237-238.

When Huot asked Tito for his manifesto, or guiding ideology, that he handed out to Yugoslavians for recruitment, he was surprised by the answer. Tito told Huot that they ask for volunteers, and they motivate peasants to join the struggle with their simple motto: “smrt fascizmu!” which means “death to fascism!”¹⁵⁹ Huot then learned of the succeeding month’s planned conference that would ultimately unite Yugoslavian Partisan resistance movements under the blanket organization of the Partisans, but would include delegates “from every part of Yugoslavia. It will be more representative than any gathering we have yet been able to hold...[an aide to Tito] said ‘we are organizing ourselves as you, in your early days, organized the thirteen original colonies.’”¹⁶⁰ Undoubtedly impressed, and personally excited to be part of the beginning of the Balkans-equivalent to his own nation’s, Huot recalled that “it was a night to remember.”¹⁶¹

The meeting to which Tito referred was second meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (*Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije*—AVNOJ II) held on 29 November 1943. It was at AVNOJ II that the KPJ established the framework for running the country. Importantly, it was the first meeting that gave each substate of Yugoslavia an individual identity, while maintaining federal control. In Yugoslavia, this was a feat that had never been accomplished up to that point.¹⁶² What this meant was that a peasant from Macedonia no longer had to identify himself as a Yugoslav, but instead could be a Macedonian first, then

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 243.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 244.

¹⁶¹ Huot Report, 27 October 1943, USAHEC.

¹⁶² Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 114.

a Yugoslav. This was truly a revolutionary development, and it increased the wider appeal of the Partisan movement. Comparatively, Mihailović attempted to gain support for the status quo underneath the Serb monarch which for the preceding two decades had resulted in the Serbs privileged over the smaller nations, and rampant dysfunction. Huot recognized the strength of the Partisan message and anxiously returned to Bari the next day so that he could report on his new understanding.¹⁶³

On his return, Huot was potentially provided one last potent demonstration of anti-Chetnik propaganda. Huot recalled that, nearby Jajce, in an area supposedly controlled by the Partisans, his party was unexpectedly met by an alleged Italian soldier who narrowly escaped an ambush by Chetniks, who were at that moment looting his truck and wanted to warn of the impending danger. Huot, comforted by his Partisan escort who confidently slapped his machine gun, watched as they prepared a plan of action. Prior to their attack, however, “two cheerful-looking young Partisan officers” arrived in a “little Opel car...from the direction of the hold-up and stopped beside us.” They had, unexpectedly, come upon the Chetniks, “leapt out of their little car and opened fire immediately at what was fairly long range for their sub-machine guns, failing to bring any of the marauders down but effectively dispersing them into the bush without horses or booty.”¹⁶⁴

Huot did not doubt the veracity of the Partisans’ stories, but there are reasons to question whether the Partisans were actually attacked by Chetniks. First, the uniforms worn

¹⁶³ The important issue of the KPJ acknowledging state identity was first introduced to the author in an interview with Evgenij Litovski, 28 May 2022. CPT Richard Rainer, commander of ABBEVILLE, also asserted this in his final report. See Final Report—Rainer, Abbeville Mission, 14 November 1944, RG 226, E 154, B 25, Bari—SI—Pro—36, NARA.

¹⁶⁴ Huot Report, 27 October 1943, USAHEC.

by Chetniks, Ustasha and criminal bands—as previously noted—were a hodgepodge mixture of enemy and friendly uniforms. There was simply no certain way to claim, based on uniforms alone, that the attack came from Chetniks. Second, Huot did not personally witness the attack. In fact, all that he saw of the attack was an out-of-breath “Italian” soldier, and two “cheerful-looking” Partisan officers who had just allegedly escaped death and claimed that they effectively scattered the Chetniks without themselves being wounded. Finally, Huot claims that the Chetniks’ horses were taken away by farmers and other Partisans stopped by to search “the surrounding hills” but otherwise there were no remnants of the firefight.¹⁶⁵ Considering Huot explicitly described the events leading up to the attack, and then the rest of the trip, it was odd that he did not include even a small description of the aftermath. The Partisans were experts in propaganda and carefully choreographed meetings and interactions; considering that, Huot’s “near-miss” with a Chetnik ambush could have been the final attempt to prove to him that the Partisans were the only organization worth supporting. Whether a ruse or not, however, Huot returned to Bari convinced that he was attacked by “General Mihailović’s men” and the Partisans were the only resistance movement worth supporting.¹⁶⁶ Meeting Farish on the way to Bari, Huot implored him to “prepare a full report, and perhaps continue on to Cairo and Washington to report to the interested departments of the Government of the United States on his experiences and their significance.”¹⁶⁷ Farish’s return and subsequent report came on the eve of the first conference of the Big Three at Teheran.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Farish submitted his report, through Huot, on 29 October 1943 and it covered his “personal observation in the field with the National Army of Liberation [Partisans] during the period from 17 September to 27 October 1943.”¹⁶⁸ The report was highly favorable to the Partisans. It provided a level of prominence to the movement not yet seen by the American leadership when he claimed their contact extended to “liberation groups in all the adjoining countries” and he was “quite certain that the manner in which the movement develops, [and] the way of life which they decide to adopt, will have a great effect upon all the Balkan states and probably upon the greater portion of Europe.”¹⁶⁹ By writing this, Farish’s message to the strategic planners clearly stated that the Partisans were not only an important partner in defeating the Axis, but their loyalty was necessary due to their influence on the rest of the continent.

For Roosevelt, the idea of increased influence in the Balkans was surely appealing.¹⁷⁰ Downplaying the communist influence on Partisan leadership and ideology, Farish also excitedly claimed that his experience felt like he was in “an environment and under similar beginnings [that] the United States were [*sic*] established.”¹⁷¹ The revolutionary fervor of the Partisans inspired the OSS agents who witnessed it, and that revolutionary fervor was certainly a different aspect than experienced by those with the royalist Chetniks attempting to maintain the *status quo ante*. “This movement,” Farish reported, “had the background of indomitable will and courage with which to build to great

¹⁶⁸ Preliminary Report on a visit to the National Army of Liberation, Yugoslavia, Major Linn M. Farish, 29 October 1943, Box 100A, Donovan Papers, USAHEC. It can also be found in its entirety in *FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943*, between pages 606 and 615.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Buchanan, *American Grand Strategy*, 244.

¹⁷¹ Farish Preliminary Report, 29 October 1943, USAHEC.

things.”¹⁷² Near the end of Farish’s glowing review, he claimed that “cold, hungry, and inadequately armed men will surely remember from whence aid came when they were fighting for their very existence.”¹⁷³ Any earlier concerns that they were supporting a communist revolution were allayed by this statement: for the Allies, then already partnered with a communist nation in the Soviet Union, the idea of a future ally in the Balkans, regardless of its ideology, was alluring. Farish’s glowing report, and the first OSS report on the Partisans, arrived just in time for Roosevelt to read and digest before heading to Teheran, and well before Seitz’s and Mansfield’s report was even written.

The Blockbuster Reports and their Aftermath

Farish and Maclean sent their pro-Partisan reports on 29 October 1943 and 5 November 1943, respectively. Both were immediately of immense importance, and Maclean’s report was subsequently referred to as “the blockbuster” report.¹⁷⁴ Maclean’s report stated that all aid to the Chetniks must cease, and Allied support should exclusively be sent to the Partisans.¹⁷⁵ Maclean personally delivered his report to Senior Civil Servant Sir Alexander Cadogan and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Churchill received it shortly thereafter with plenty of time to digest it before the Teheran Conference. Likewise, Roosevelt received Farish’s Preliminary Report of the Partisans prior to his arrival at Teheran. Noting the significance of this timing, Ford writes that “the timing of [the Farish report’s] submission, both in terms of the Teheran Conference and Maclean’s own report,

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Williams, 182.

¹⁷⁵ Ford, *OSS*, 33.

is important. Also, Farish was the first OSS officer to come out of the country to deliver a personal report, something no observer—British or American—with Mihailović’s forces would do for almost four months.”¹⁷⁶ In this case, the tactical reports clearly affected the strategic decision-making process. The problem, however, is that both reports were largely embellished accounts that overstated the agents’ involvement.

OSS reports were important and valuable to the policymakers in Washington because they were supposed to be first-hand accounts from agents that personally experienced what they wrote. The intelligence gleaned was meant to be clear, concise, accurate, and most importantly: personally witnessed. When Farish wrote “from personal experience,” the strategists did not question it because they had nothing else with which to compare it. In the case of Farish and Maclean’s influential reports, the experiences they “personally witnessed” were certainly less profound than their reports claimed. As another OSS agent, Franklin Lindsay, recalled, in “only six weeks...Farish had returned to Italy filled with the urgency of convincing the American government of the importance of the Partisan movement [but] he had not been outside Partisan headquarters, so he had been exposed only to the enthusiastic rhetoric of the Partisan leadership and to the propaganda of the skillful Agitprop section.”¹⁷⁷ While only Farish knew precisely why he embellished to the extent that he did, Lindsay surmises that Farish “was convinced that a new order would emerge at the end of the German occupation, and that it somehow would be a blend of Western democracy and Soviet communism. He was aware of the leading role of the

¹⁷⁶ Ford, *OSS*, 35.

¹⁷⁷ Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito’s Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 25.

Communists but believed that the broader political spectrum of the [Partisans] would provide the freedom for the political system he foresaw.”¹⁷⁸

Farish was an exceptional OSS agent, both for his experiences and the reverence afforded to him by peers, superiors, and partners, but also because he was a worldly idealist who believed that he needed to do whatever possible in his power to make the world a better place. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, Farish published *The True Strength of America*, an idiosyncratic work that laments that “for the second time within the century, international relationships between nations have failed, with the result that the earth is again afflicted with the pestilence of widespread warfare.”¹⁷⁹ Farish desperately wanted the future, postwar world to be something different than what society had produced up to that point, and he believed it was his sacred responsibility to do whatever he could to help make the future brighter. Since the United States was not yet in the war, he leveraged his relationship with the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, to get a commission into the British Army where he served in Iran until transferring first to the US Army, and eventually the OSS, in 1943.¹⁸⁰ Quickly volunteering for service in Yugoslavia, he undoubtedly saw an opportunity to join in the revolutionary fervor alongside the Partisans, who themselves were attempting to forge a new society in Yugoslavia. This background provides an additional explanation for why Farish believed that the report he submitted needed to be written in the way it was.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 25-26. In his memoir, Seitz devotes an entire chapter to his friendship with Farish, with whom he attended British parachute training in British Palestine prior to their insertions into Yugoslavia. It is notable that Seitz did not begrudge Farish’s report in this chapter saying that Farish “did a magnificent job inside” Yugoslavia and lamented his death in August 1944, writing “I knew I had lost a great friend.” Seitz, *Mihailović*, 85.

¹⁷⁹ Linn M. Farish, *The True Strength of America* (Bismarck, ND: Bismarck Tribune, 1941), 8.

¹⁸⁰ Letters between Farish and Winant, Box 196 John Winant Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY.

A more sinister explanation for Farish's actions point to the Venona releases in 1995 which implicated Farish as a Soviet asset.¹⁸¹ Those in the Children of Darkness argued that men like Farish unfairly favored the Partisans over the Chetniks because they were under malign control by their Soviet handlers. However, this line of reasoning does not garner as much legitimacy once one delves deeper into the claims against Farish. For one, Farish was apparently implicated as a Soviet source on two occasions, although extensive searching in secondary sources and Freedom of Information Act searches does not result in any concrete evidence that showed exactly the nature of Farish's illicit relationship with the Soviets. Secondly, Farish's final report in June 1944 was a glaring indictment against the Partisans. If he was under Soviet control at the time of his first report seven months prior, he still would have remained under their control by the second report's submission. Finally, America was allied with the Soviet Union during at this time. It is a logical conclusion that Farish, who himself abhorred war and wanted the brighter future to begin as soon as possible, provided his country's ally, the Soviet Union, with militarily important intelligence to help the war end. Farish is an intriguing individual, and was undoubtedly an active idealist, but it is an unlikely leap to claim that the man who published a book on why the United States should take the lead in a new, brighter future just two years prior would suddenly turn his back on that same country. Farish's motivations for his blockbuster report are debatable; the great impact it had on Roosevelt is much less so.

The Teheran Conference was the first meeting between the Big Three, and was the nail in the coffin for Mihailović and the Chetniks. It was at Teheran that the Big Three

¹⁸¹ John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 349.

chose to cease supporting the Chetniks morally and logistically, and exclusively back Tito's Partisans. Demonstrating the importance of Farish's report, Roosevelt personally handed a copy directly to Stalin. Himself embellishing, he reportedly told Stalin that it was "a most interesting report from an American officer who had spent six months in Yugoslavia in close contact with Tito."¹⁸² Actually, Farish spent just six weeks alongside Tito. Nonetheless, the word of the American agent was treated with such gravity that, with Maclean's blockbuster report, the Allies left Teheran exclusively supporting Tito. This remarkable change in policy was in stark contrast to the first two years of British propaganda that supported Mihailović, which in October 1941 declared he was the only legitimate resistance movement within Yugoslavia.¹⁸³ It was also an abrupt turnaround for Churchill, who just seven months earlier cabled Roosevelt that "I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailović will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help."¹⁸⁴ This split sparked an on-going debate on whether it was the right, or moral, choice to abandon Mihailović.

Ardent supporters of the Partisans—"the Children of Light"—and supporters of the Chetniks—"the Children of Darkness"—each believed that the policy change was appropriate or not, depending on their camp. This argument was already detailed in the *Historiography*, but it is worth briefly revisiting to examine it in a deeper context. The decision to cease support for Mihailović was largely based on reports highly biased towards the Partisans, with no equivalent reports having yet arrived from the Chetnik

¹⁸² Louis Adamic, *Dinner at the White House* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 150.

¹⁸³ Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 144.

¹⁸⁴ Cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 April 1943, *FRUS: Cairo to Teheran*, 184.

representatives. It is not up for debate, then, that this major policy decision was made with only one side of the issue having yet been reported. Conversely, the Children of Light would remind readers that Mihailović essentially dug his own grave with his speech in front of Hudson on 28 February 1943, where he omitted the Germans from his list of enemies—an incredibly damning action in front of a British representative. Since that point, the British had attempted to goad Mihailović into further action against the Axis with little success. While the Children of Darkness would correctly claim that both sides made “live and let live” policies at the local levels, Tito never claimed—at least, not in front of any SOE or OSS witness—that the Germans and Italians were not a threat and instead he was primarily fighting his fellow countrymen. Additionally, multiple warlords—criminal bands—used the moniker “chetniks.” These chetniks were not affiliated with, nor did they answer to, Mihailović’s organization. Nonetheless, criminal chetniks attacking Partisans informed OSS agents who fought whom. Finally, the British did, initially, ask Mihailović to conduct minimal activities against the enemy, but when Allied goals evolved, Mihailović failed to keep up with the changes.¹⁸⁵ Since the Allies were fighting in the Balkans through a partner force, the Big Three had little choice but move forward on the concrete evidence they possessed; namely, the blockbuster reports.

Conclusion

The first OSS agents into Yugoslavia blazed new trails for the American efforts in the Balkans. They dealt with poor weather, a lack of food, and no security for months at

¹⁸⁵ Tomasevich, *The Chetniks*, 142.

a time. On top of that, they were operating in a country which few had previously experienced and understood. These men were tasked with the impossible: ascertain the ground-truth in Yugoslavia from individuals fighting for their own survival, without concern for future political developments therein. Adding to the friction these agents experienced, their own allies, the British, actively blocked or undermined American efforts to conduct their own missions. Despite these obstacles, the actions of and information gleaned by the OSS agents in the first few months they were in Yugoslavia resulted in immensely influential reports that changed the war's course in the Balkans.

**CHAPTER 5: AN INCONSEQUENTIAL REAPPRAISAL:
IN THE SHADOW OF TEHERAN TO A REASSESSMENT
*DECEMBER 1943–JULY 1944***

“Can we, as Americans, abandon these people? I ask this question as I know we have no ulterior purposes in this war, we have no post war concessions, no desires for power of any kind in Europe. We desire only to beat Germany and Japan thoroughly and effectively, as quickly as possible. Would it not be better to arm the Serbs with our arms to fight and kill Germans in Serbia, rather than to arm only Partisans and run the chance of a Serbia armed by Germany to fight Partisans?”¹⁸⁶ –Albert Seitz

Introduction

In the wake of the Teheran Conference, which resulted in significant policy decisions concerning Yugoslavia, American military planners re-examined their previous policies in Yugoslavia and transitioned support from Mihailović *and* the Partisans—both of whom, up to that point, were credited with fighting the Axis occupiers—to just the Partisans. This transition was readily apparent to agents on the ground who listened to radio broadcasts and created uncomfortable situations for OSS agents attached to the Chetniks who were suddenly forced to explain to their own partners what their country was doing. For these questions, they possessed no sufficient answers, nor could they comprehend what their leadership was trying to do.

The friction experienced by strategic Allied military planners as they revamped their respective nations’ policies made its way to agents at the tactical levels, for whom the changes were not just uncomfortable, but dangerous. Donovan, ever the advocate for greater OSS influence, grew increasingly uncomfortable with the decision to give exclusive support to the Partisans. Donovan knew that establishing intelligence sources with the Chetniks was no small feat, and re-establishing contact would be just as difficult, if not

¹⁸⁶ Seitz Report, 5 May 1944, Box 100A, Item 5, Donovan Papers, USAHEC.

more so, if that relationship was abandoned. Following the war's end, Donovan remembered that the OSS was an effective intelligence agency because of its "meticulous and discreet work of collecting and sifting information."¹⁸⁷ He believed that "the art [of collecting intelligence] consists simply in collecting the pertinent information about a given subject, putting all such facts together in their most logical pattern, and then evaluating the situation in light of these arranged facts."¹⁸⁸ Donovan further believed that "the operation of clandestine intelligence...is a highly professional pursuit" and "the problem of placing and maintaining agents in foreign countries with proper safeguards both for the agents themselves and for the information which they secure, is most complex...clandestine intelligence covering all the world is no small undertaking."¹⁸⁹ Donovan knew that removing all representatives from the Chetniks would result in a far greater task of re-establishing contact with Mihailović's forces, and gaining their consent to re-establishing relations, after what surely would be an acrimonious departure by any American agents previously partnered with him. Thus, Donovan fought vigorously to maintain agents with the Chetniks, despite causing a potential rift amongst the most senior strategists.

At first, Donovan was successful. OSS agent George Musulin remained with the Chetniks for the first five months of 1944, and Mansfield was there through February, although the latter spent his time primarily attempting to extract himself from the country. As the months wore on, additional teams of OSS agents were prepared to travel to

¹⁸⁷ Memo written by Donovan, 28 October 1945, Box 54, Donovan Papers, USAHEC.

¹⁸⁸ Memo for Senator Chan Gurney (the Chairman for Committee on Armed Services) from Donovan, undated post-World War II memorandum prior to the CIA's formation in 1948, Box 66A, Document 70, Donovan Papers, USAHEC.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

Yugoslavia, to join both the Chetniks and the Partisans. Churchill, in an emphatic plea to Roosevelt, lobbied to stop this practice in the name of securing the alliance. Roosevelt's prior authorization to Donovan to continue supporting the Chetniks irked Churchill more than a little. In a personal cable to Roosevelt in April 1944, Churchill vigorously objected to the OSS inserting "a small Intelligence Mission ... to General Mihailović's Headquarters" which was "approved by you [Roosevelt]." Churchill explained that "we [the British] are now in process of withdrawing all our missions from Mihailović and are pressing King Peter to clear himself of this millstone [Mihailović]...if, at this very time, an American Mission arrives at Mihailović's Headquarters, it will show throughout the Balkans a complete contrariety of action between Britain and the United States...I hope and trust this may be avoided."¹⁹⁰ In an abrupt reversal, and with little explanation, Roosevelt responded two days later saying "my thought in authorizing the OSS Mission to the Mihailović Area was to obtain intelligence and the mission was to have no political functions whatever. In view however of your expressed opinion that there might be misunderstanding by our Allies and others, I have directed that the contemplated mission be not repeat not sent."¹⁹¹ Clearly, Roosevelt was influenced by Donovan's insistence that intelligence gleaned from the Chetniks areas was important, but the alliance was more so.

It is interesting to note that Roosevelt differentiated between sending a mission to Mihailović and the "Mihailović Area." This demonstrated that Roosevelt heard Donovan's recommendation on the importance of collecting intelligence from a wide swath of Serbia

¹⁹⁰ Cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, 6 April 1944, *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. III. Alliance Declining, February 1944–April 1945*, ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

controlled by the Chetniks. More important to Roosevelt than any tactical or operational level intelligence from the Chetniks was outweighed by his need to maintain and nurture the strategic-level anti-Axis coalition with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. From Teheran through August 1944, then, the US did not send in any additional teams to Mihailović, thereby excluding any potential human intelligence gleaned from Chetniks territory in Serbia, except from Mansfield and Musulin.

The haggling by Roosevelt and Churchill resulted in telegrams going back and forth, with perhaps a small amount of tension felt by each as they negotiated on opposite sides of the Atlantic. For the OSS agents living with the Chetniks and Partisans in occupied enemy territory, these short telegrams carried with them large consequences that were significantly more dangerous. This is not to say that there was sinister intent behind Roosevelt's and Churchill's negotiations to create dangerous situations for the respective agents in Yugoslavia; rather, it must be noted that their waffling policy in the spring of 1944, informed by OSS and SOE reports, created dangerous situations, and added to friction for the OSS agents on the ground. The leaders did not understand the fallout OSS agents with the Chetniks would experience because this was an unprecedented situation, and they had to balance their decisions among numerous factors.

Roosevelt's decision hindered Mihailović's war efforts since it meant he no longer had the benefit of American representatives through whom he sent reports to the government in exile. The real catastrophic event for Mihailović, however, occurred in May when King Peter II officially abandoned Mihailović. With an eye for postwar influence, and worried about Tito's growing power, the Allies negotiated for Ivan Šubašić, the former

Ban—“leader”—of Croatia, to be made the Yugoslav Prime Minister, hoping he would become a moderating force to Tito.¹⁹² Churchill happily informed Roosevelt of this change in a telegram originally sent to Tito on 18 May 1944, that said “King Peter II dismissed Monsieur Purić’s [Šubašić’s predecessor] administration, which included General Mihailović as Minister of War.” Churchill further implored Tito to accept these changes by reminding him of the importance “to the common cause [against the Axis] and to our relations with you that these changes should be given a fair chance to develop in a favourable way”—undoubtedly Churchill meant favorable to the British postwar goals for Yugoslavia.¹⁹³ Šubašić’s appointment was a new beginning for Yugoslavia: the beginning of the end of Mihailović’s influence, and the first official recognition of Tito’s growing influence in postwar Yugoslav politics.

At this point, OSS reports no longer guided or greatly influenced strategic policy decisions. Farish’s blockbuster report was a useful tool for Roosevelt to determine the way forward at Teheran, but by early 1944, the Allies’ strategy was to support the Partisans. Any instigation for deviation by the OSS was largely ignored from that point forward. Their value as intelligence sources, however, was still highly regarded and became one of the main negotiating points for keeping the OSS agents with both Chetniks and Partisans. For the agents themselves, this strategic level intention was divorced from reality, as conflict with their partners—whether the Chetniks or Partisans, Russians or British—were proximate and held greater sway on their reality.

¹⁹² Buchanan, *Grand Strategy*, 253.

¹⁹³ Telegram originally sent to Tito from Churchill on 18 May 1944, forwarded in its entirety by Churchill to Roosevelt, *FRUS: The Complete Correspondence III*, 131-132.

“The Journey that was Never to be Forgotten”: Leaving the Chetniks

While the policymakers were negotiating and plotting future strategy, the OSS still had agents with the Chetniks throughout the first months of 1944. Despite the strategy on the brink of a major change, it was not a simple task to remove the agents from Yugoslavia. This section will cover Seitz’s experiences as he evacuated from the country, because he had the unique opportunity of partnering with both the Chetniks and Partisans. His experiences will be evaluated because they provide an insightful example of the danger faced by OSS agents at the tip of the changing strategy. In addition to Seitz and Mansfield, Lieutenant George “Gov” Musulin partnered with the Chetniks for intelligence collection. After providing intelligence reports for approximately five months, Musulin was airlifted out of Yugoslavia in May 1944, and eventually became an instrumental actor alongside the Chetniks during Operation HALYARD.¹⁹⁴

Having been with the Chetniks since the early fall, both Seitz and Mansfield found themselves stuck inside Chetnik-held territory in December 1943, unaware of the massive policy changes about to be announced. Mansfield recalled hearing some upsetting reports from the BBC that “Cordell Hull agrees with British policy announced in House of Commons that while aid will be given to all groups in [Yugoslavia] more aid presently given to [P]artisans because they are doing more fighting against the Germans. This comes as quite a surprise and disappointment because we do not believe our Govt. has all the true [facts].”¹⁹⁵ Mansfield’s diary entry from 9 December 1943 is more than a month after

¹⁹⁴ George S. Musulin, “Testimony to the Commission of Inquiry of the Committee for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich” in *Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich* by David Martin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution University Press, 1978), 250-251.

¹⁹⁵ Mansfield, Field Diary, 48.

Farish's blockbuster report was submitted, and the BBC report undoubtedly caused consternation for not just Mansfield and Seitz, but for the Chetniks and their supporters. Giving the Partisans credit for actions taken by Chetniks was the BBC's policy since "late September [when] all reports over BBC consisted only of statements by Tito as to what he said and did."¹⁹⁶ By January 1944, these reports even gave credit to the Partisans for Chetniks' anti-Axis operations. Mansfield personally recalled being in a town "occupied by Chetnik forces" where he spent the night, but heard that same evening that the town "was occupied by Partisans."¹⁹⁷ On other occasions, "Chetnik commanders would tell me laughingly or sarcastically that BBC was announcing that such and such a city had been taken by the Partisans, and here they [Chetniks] were completely in charge of it."¹⁹⁸ Mansfield shared in the frustration of the Chetniks since he was partnered with them, and did not appreciate their not getting credit for their own actions. As the war progressed and enthusiasm for the Partisans took over all moral and logistical support, the OSS agents with the Chetniks experienced further confusion and danger as a result.

Seitz left Mansfield on the morning of 23 December to better ensure their mission's report made it to Washington. Seitz's party consisted of a few other SOE agents, and a handful of Chetniks. They were guided by an individual who knew where Partisan strongholds were, and Seitz hoped to contact the Partisans to continue his fact-finding objectives. Believing that "the Partizans [*sic*] would not be too unfriendly [because of] all the Allied aid they were receiving," Seitz told Mihailović through a "long letter" that

¹⁹⁶ Mansfield, "Testimony," 237.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 238.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

explained contacting the Partisans was not only his “duty, [it was] also possibly to his advantage for me to be on my way.”¹⁹⁹ Linking up with an unfamiliar element in a combat scenario is incredibly risky, and as Seitz’s team neared a suspected Partisan strongpoint, he “pinned American flags on the shoulders of the Yugoslavs so the Partizans [*sic*] wouldn’t execute them as Chetniks.”²⁰⁰ This experience vividly details the efforts OSS agents took to ensure their own safety. Operating alongside an allied partner force, the Chetniks, Seitz had to ensure that another allied partner force, the Partisans, did not start fighting them. The simple act of pinning flags worked, and Seitz’s team was admitted into the Partisan stronghold at approximately two in the morning on 27 December 1943.

Immediately, Seitz noticed a difference between the Partisans and the Chetniks. He recalled “an air of tenseness and vigilance combined with a kind of slovenly discipline which set these people apart from the Chetniks” who contrarily possessed “easy courtesy and professional discipline.”²⁰¹ Additionally, Seitz was not treated as hospitably by the peasants under Partisan rule: in just two and a half months, he lost forty pounds which he took to mean less support for the Partisans by the Serbs in the Sandžak than the Serbs in Serbia-proper had for the Chetniks.²⁰² Seitz also did not trust the Partisans’ intentions, nor did they trust his. This resulted in an uncomfortable experience as Seitz sought to negotiate his way to the coast under security from the Partisans.

¹⁹⁹ Seitz, *Mihailović*, 87.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

²⁰² Seitz, *Mihailović*, 89. The Sandžak is a mountainous area on the border between southwestern Serbia and northeastern Montenegro.

Seitz's stay with the Partisans was, overall, far more negative than his experiences were with the Chetniks. When moving between towns, Seitz recalled that upon arrival at a new village the Partisans "would enter the mayor's office and destroy all property records...the able bodied were impressed into the brigades [i.e. forcibly drafted into the Partisans' army] and corn, potatoes and live stock requisitioned."²⁰³ Seitz also believed that the Partisans' lack of transparency was deceitful, and "contributed to [his] impression that much lying was being indulged in."²⁰⁴ Growing anxious to depart Yugoslavia yet continually rebuffed, Seitz nevertheless pressured the Partisans to take him to the coast. He finally reached his limit when he learned that they "were being held for information and our radio." Responding harshly, Seitz informed the Partisan commander "that either he would furnish us guides or we would go alone and to hell with him."²⁰⁵ The ensuing trip to the coast included numerous battles, both with Germans and with Chetniks. The proximity to Partisans' enemies perhaps accounted for their higher level of vigilance and tenseness that Seitz previously noted, but their other actions in battle did not build Seitz's confidence in the Partisan movement.

In one larger battle, the Partisans executed a "beautiful encircling movement."²⁰⁶ It was during this encirclement that Seitz was first introduced to Partisan propaganda, although he was not nearly as taken with it as Huot was five months prior. Noticing that four Partisan fighters were maneuvering on his party, they soon heard "the scary whine of over range bullets suddenly change to pops, which means someone has your range and isn't

²⁰³ Ibid., 91.

²⁰⁴ Seitz Report, 5 May 1944, USAHEC.

²⁰⁵ Seitz, *Mihailović*, 93.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 95.

missing you by more than a few feet.”²⁰⁷ After a harrowing escape, Seitz confronted the senior Partisan commander who was busy gloating about his victory. While Seitz congratulated him on the victory, he also recounted the incident where ““your four men were recognized who shot at our party’ ...and I showed him a hole in the left pocket of my battle dress [shirt]...I continued, ‘the loss of one of our party considering the fact that Chetniks were reportedly attacking us would have been wonderful propaganda, wouldn’t it?’”²⁰⁸ In this case, Partisan propaganda still intended to paint the Chetniks in a most negative light, but instead of incorporating an OSS agent to perpetuate it, the valuable propaganda would have come from the death of the OSS agent supposedly by Chetnik bullets. Seitz’s dangerous journey “that was never to be forgotten” with the Partisans continued until they reached Berane, Montenegro, where they were forced to wait for extraction by airplane for weeks.

During the wait, Seitz’s negative experiences with the Partisans continued. Essentially kept prisoner by the Partisans, the Partisan guard refused to allow the “little Serb waitress to enter with our breakfast...without written approval of the brigade commander.” By this time “being righteously angry and damnably hungry, we threw the guard down the top half of the steps and he jacked a shell into his gun...he wisely didn’t point it at us as I had the mouth of my Colt [M1911 pistol] trained on his stupid face.”²⁰⁹ If there was any doubt in Seitz’s mind who the Americans should support, encounters like this certainly placed him in full support of Mihailović. When he was finally extracted on

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 94. Seitz differentiated between Partisans and other fighters because they almost always wore caps with red stars prominently emblazoned on the front, no matter what other uniform items they possessed.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 95-96.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 120.

15 March—nearly three months after first deciding to leave Yugoslavia—Seitz wrote his final report and lobbied on behalf of Mihailović, speaking with American military leaders in Bari, Italy; Cairo, Egypt; and Washington, DC.²¹⁰

In his final report, Seitz pushed for continued support of Mihailović's Chetniks. He said that not only were they "a source of intelligence" in the Sandžak and Serbia, where the Partisan presence was minimal, he believed that "with arms, [Chetniks] will fight Bosche [Germans] to some extent and it will serve to keep the Partisans from over-running Serbia with resultant bloody civil war."²¹¹ Claiming that the United States has little postwar interest besides "only [beating] Germany and Japan thoroughly and effectively, as quickly as possible," Seitz then rhetorically asks, "would it not be better to arm the Serbs with our [*sic*] arms to fight and kill Germans in Serbia, rather than to arm only Partizans [*sic*] and run the chance of a Serbia armed by Germany to fight the Partizans[*sic*]?"²¹² Not only was Seitz concerned about postwar Partisan intentions, he worried that Chetniks, given no outside support, would choose instead to go to the Germans for help rather than face the Partisans alone. This was certainly a questionable line to include in his post-mission report on a unit that he was trying to prove was not actively collaborating with the enemy. While Seitz's and Mansfield's other intelligence recommendations—on future airfield sites, partner force unit sizes and dispositions, weather patterns, etc.—were useful and used by military planners, their strategic recommendations were largely ignored. It is also interesting and important to note the verbiage used by Seitz because he clearly

²¹⁰ Ibid., 127-128.

²¹¹ Seitz Report, 5 May 1944, USAHEC.

²¹² Ibid.

differentiated between Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia. This differentiation was mirrored by Mihailović's own prejudices as a Serb attempting to maintain Serbian-dominated monarchy and demonstrated the lack of holistic recruiting efforts by the Chetniks. This was in stark contrast to the Partisans, who conversely attempted to recruit from all ethnic and religious groups and gave them broader appeal.

The First Missions to the Partisans

This subsection will examine the experiences of some of the first OSS agents deployed to Yugoslavia to work alongside the Partisans. These men, too, were trailblazers, just like the initial fact-finding missions were, but their tasks were different. The first account is that of Major John W. Urban who commanded a company in the OSS Operational Groups (OGs). The "new Operational Groups were organized by target countries...and consisted of 32 men with language qualifications dropped behind the lines in uniform with directives to carry out both espionage and sabotage operations in concert with the resistance." The OGs "merged" Special Intelligence and Special Operations activities, but always in uniform, unlike the Special Intelligence agents who often worked clandestinely.²¹³ The second experience examined will be of Agent Stephen Galembush who was with the RAKEOFF mission. Prior to these two stories, the guidance from the OSS published on 31 January 1944 provided to agents prior to insertion will be examined to demonstrate the differences in mission objectives at this stage of the war.

²¹³ Smith, *OSS*, 28-29.

The first missions to the Partisans blazed new trails as agents were no longer deployed specifically to collect intelligence. While that was still an aspect of their mission, they also were instructed to assist with various offensive operations. The directive told OSS agents to:

Provide (to the Partisans): arms, ammunition, medicine, other necessary supplies and money in order to stimulate further activities against the Germans [...] equipment to executive missions of denying Yugoslav copper [...] and of interrupting vital communications and destroying supplies in transit to Germany and Axis forces [...] to study covering the methods and points of attack of the Bor mines [...] and information as to the strategical importance of communication lines.²¹⁴

For a comparatively small manpower and monetary investment, the OSS created strategic effects by enabling their partner forces to fight their battles with materiel and air support. The OGs ensured the Partisans took lead, and “all operations in which the British or Americans participated had to be cleared through Partisan HQ at least 48 hours prior...to keep the British and American forces from taking too large a part in the operations in Yugoslavia.”²¹⁵ Interestingly, and as a demonstration of the inability Army orders to keep pace with the abrupt reversal in strategy, the OG’s guidance still advised them to “attach liaison officer to the headquarters of the guerrilla groups (Chetniks and Partisans) in order to attempt to direct these efforts solely to assisting in the defeat of the Axis powers.” They also needed to focus on “sending the Partisans needed supplies, coordinating their efforts and those of the other Allies [because] Tito considers himself the head of an Allied

²¹⁴ Memorandum from OSS Cairo Concerning Over-All Program for Strategic Services Operations in the Balkans, 31 January 1944, Donovan Papers, Box 68C, USAHEC.

²¹⁵ John W. Urban, “The Operations of Unit A, 3d Contingent, Operational Groups, Office of Strategic Services, in Yugoslavia, 19 January to 6 September 1944: Personal Experience of the Unit Commander,” Military History Committee (Fort Benning, GA: The Infantry School, 1946-1947), 14.

Army...Tito wants none of our troops nor demolition groups within his country.”²¹⁶ This innocuous sounding last line in the directive made managing the OSS agent and partner forces relationship, and determining exactly their role inside the country, challenging.

Ordered to support the Partisans primarily logistically, Urban deployed to the island of Vis on 19 January 1944. He commanded “a group of Americans who were specially organized, trained, and equipped for guerrilla fighting.” The combined force included eight American officers and approximately 40 American enlisted men, and approximately 100 members of the British Commandos.²¹⁷ Their arrival on the island of Vis early in the morning of 20 January “bolstered morale” of the island’s residents, for it was “tangible evidence that assistance was on the way.”²¹⁸ Urban experienced the exact opposite experience of the Partisans upon arrival as Seitz, however, because his “first impression of the Partisans was quite reassuring...although the people are of medium height, they are solidly built, and are in excellent physical condition...[they are] well-versed in the fine points of mountain fighting.”²¹⁹ Urban was also struck by the presence of women in the ranks alongside the other male soldiers.

Much like Seitz, Farish, and Huot, Urban was surprised to see women fighting in combat units. “It was a common sight to see a small number of women clad in makeshift uniforms, carrying rifles or carbines, marching with a formation of troops, or to see a woman standing guard at some prominent point,” Urban recalled, “and the American

²¹⁶ Strategic Service Operations in the Balkans, 31 January 1944, USAHEC.

²¹⁷ Urban, “The Operations,” 6.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

troops were initially shocked” by female presence.²²⁰ It is worth noting that the presence of women in fighting units was, for the Americans, a complete cultural anomaly and beyond their wildest imaginations prior to deployment to Yugoslavia. Female presence often ultimately served to instill a revolutionary fervor in the minds of the Americans because it demonstrated that the country was fighting so desperately for its survival that every able-bodied person felt they needed to volunteer to serve. It was later determined by multiple OSS agents that some of the women were not willing volunteers but were conscripted into combat units by the Partisans.²²¹ This revelation is not necessarily surprising, though, as many draftees—whether male or female—are not pleased by the more mundane tasks of serving in an Army, and it should be noted that many of the women fought alongside the Partisans because they believed in the cause. The revolutionary fervor demonstrated by these women steeled in the Americans their resolve to support the Partisans in the struggle for independence that felt distantly akin to their own nation’s humble beginnings less than 200 years earlier. Once the shock over female presence was overcome, the Americans and British began work fortifying the island.

By the end of January, the OGs bolstered the defensive posture of Vis and hundreds of additional American and British soldiers, and thousands of Partisans, flooded the small island garrison. At the time, the Allies believed that the Germans would attack Vis, although the attack never materialized. Since their mission was primarily to support the Partisans, the OGs improved the island defenses by delivering “trucks and gasoline, mines, barbed wire, demolitions, artillery pieces, mortars, and much other vital equipment

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid., 8. See also: Seitz, *Mihailović*, 120.

with which to set up an adequate defense on Vis.”²²² Vis was vital, as it was the only inhabitable Dalmatian Island in Allied hands, so it needed to be defended it at all costs. In a few weeks their efforts transformed Vis “from a weak island base to a strong fortress capable of withstanding an assault by a large force.”²²³

The strategic foothold gained, Urban’s mission transitioned to one of tactical intelligence gathering missions. As the commander of a comparatively large force of Americans, Urban frequently sent out small numbers of American agents alongside British and Partisans while he remained at the garrison. To keep the Partisans in the lead, the Partisans always outnumbered the Americans. This upheld Tito’s wishes previously mentioned in the OSS Over-All Guidance for the Balkans, and it also meant that the United States created operational level effects with far fewer Americans required since they enabled the Partisans. In a paradoxical tactic, however, Urban’s men frequently made operations seem like they were conducted primarily by Americans.

After one close firefight, the patrol’s leader successfully ambushed and killed all four members of the German patrol. Prior to departing, the patrol searched the German bodies for intelligence and procured their weapons. This was a common practice among guerrillas who always needed more weapons and ammunition, and frequently employed a hodgepodge assortment of American, British, German, and especially Italian arms. Following the search, the patrol leader slyly “dropped K-ration boxes, an American bayonet, and [an American] man’s steel helmet, so that the Germans would know it was an American operation, thus reducing the likelihood of retaliation against the civilians in the

²²² Urban, “The Operations,” 12.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 13.

town.”²²⁴ Ironically, the Americans downplayed their role supporting the Partisans externally, but gave it greater weight in contact with the enemy in an attempt to save citizens from harsh German reprisals. While this was effective, and conducted with the intention of supporting Tito’s wishes, he later would personally minimize the amount of logistical support given to him by the Americans and incorrectly claim that the Soviets provided him most of the support. Urban’s unit also provided the OSS with a unique capability: foreign volunteers with different language capabilities filled its ranks.

Unit A, which Urban commanded, consisted of native-born Americans, but also foreign troops who volunteered for service. Because of their different backgrounds and language capabilities, these men were often pulled from various units in the regular army where they served in roles such as drivers, cooks, and infantrymen, and were placed into the OSS in regions where their native language skills could best be exploited.²²⁵ On more than one occasion, the disparate languages in Unit A proved invaluable.

The different language abilities possessed by the men in Unit A created opportunities for the Americans to gather intelligence more effectively, and it was also used to lower the risk to the soldiers during battles. After learning from the Partisans that one of the German island outposts was staffed with Poles “impressed into the German Army,” a Polish officer in Unit A implored the Polish conscripts to surrender through a loudspeaker, lowering their morale. When that was unsuccessful, another soldier fluent in

²²⁴ Ibid., 20.

²²⁵ Barry M. Katz, “The OSS and the Development of the Research and Analysis Branch,” in *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), 43. See also: Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983), 162.

German “told the Germans that they were completely surrounded and were greatly outnumbered, and that there was no chance for them to escape.” When the Germans “were told they were surrounded by British, American, and Partisan forces, they lost all semblance of order.”²²⁶ After additional military demonstrations followed by some air raid feints and a short firefight, most of the Germans manning the post surrendered. In this case, the OGS’ tactical acumen, language skills, and effectively working through the Partisans allowed it to take the German base with considerably fewer losses than the Germans.²²⁷ While Urban’s American soldiers were well-prepared for their tasks and worked well with both the Partisans and British, not all in the OSS were as fortunate.

Some OSS agents parachuted into Yugoslavia not aware of even some of the most basic facets of their mission, including who their partner force was. Agent Stephen Galembush parachuted into Yugoslavia on 9 April 1944, intending to join the Chetniks.²²⁸ Galembush parachuted into Yugoslavia exactly one day after Roosevelt apologetically canceled all future OSS missions to the Chetniks to maintain unity within the Alliance, and was surprised to learn that he landed in Partisan controlled territory. The most positive interpretation for why Galembush was not informed about his new partner force was because he was rapidly needed to replace a wireless transmitter for a team that was already in Yugoslavia, so there was not the necessary time to give him a brief to fully prepare him. However, Galembush’s situation was not unique: the SPIKE mission report notes that two additional agents parachuted into Macedonia “very poorly prepared and briefed” and that

²²⁶ Urban, “The Operations,” 17.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Stephen Galembush, “Candidate for O.S.S. and the Rakeoff Mission,” typescript, in possession of author.

“there was evidence of disregard and a great lack of interest shown by [OSS-Bari] in preparing these men for their mission.” The reasoning was due to an over-emphasis on security, which was “carried to ridiculous extremes.”²²⁹ These efforts by Bari to protect OSS agents from malign foreign intelligence agencies paradoxically put them in dangerous situations, for which they were unprepared. For Galembush, his cool response to the gunfire around him upon landing saved his life. If Galembush was disgruntled by his initial foray into Yugoslavia, his fortunes soon changed for the better when he met his team leader, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Holt Green.

Green and Galembush were immediately valuable to the Allied war effort because of their intelligence reports, but also because of their efforts to rescue downed airmen returning from Ploiești, Romania. The Ploiești Oilfields accounted for forty percent of Romania’s GDP, and most of the oil produced went to fuel the Axis war effort. Previous attempts to bomb Ploiești met mixed success, but as the Allies gained proximate airfields in Italy, they launched more sorties to destroy the strategically important oilfields. These flights crossed the mountains in western Yugoslavia on their way east, and if they were disabled by the fighting while over the airfields, they often could not rise above the mountains returning west to Italian airfields. Thus, airmen had little choice but to abandon their planes over Partisan or Chetniks held territory and hope that they would be found by them before the Germans.²³⁰ As the bombing missions increased in frequency, so, too, did the number of downed airmen. Recovering downed airmen became a major aspect of Galembush’s mission, but initially they supported the Partisans with extra supplies. Green

²²⁹ SPIKE Summary Report, Undated (early 1945), RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-39, NARA.

²³⁰ Gregory A. Freeman, *The Forgotten 500* (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2007), 10-11.

was happy to have Galembush on his mission since his previous radioman was injured, and they quickly developed a solid rapport.²³¹ In their first meeting, Green gravely warned Galembush “to be friendly with the Partisans, but to trust no one.”²³² This prescient advice helped Galembush multiple times.

While Galembush and Green generally got along fine with the Russians and Partisans, there were a few occasions that severely undermined their relationship with their partners. Galembush recalled: “from the day I parachuted into Yugoslavia to the present, I noticed a pattern that began to disturb me. All of the patrols that came and went, including those Partisans assigned to us, were carrying used rifles, almost antique looking...[so] I made plans to look into this at the earliest opportunity.”²³³ Leveraging a friendly relationship he had built with a young Partisan orphan, Galembush learned that “all of the new weapons were being stored in locked barns on different farms” because “the Partisan Army...was storing the equipment to be used at war’s end to take over the whole country.”²³⁴ An incensed Green immediately brought up the issue with the Partisan general commanding the base. Green “laid down the law, and had taken charge. There would be no nonsense from the General or his staff from that point on.”²³⁵ Much like Seitz did his best to remain aloof to postwar Yugoslav politics, Galembush himself claimed he did not possess a strong opinion towards communism, the Partisans, or the Chetniks. He and Green did, however, want to ensure that their efforts to support the war against the Axis were

²³¹ Galembush, “Candidate,” 16.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., 25-26.

²³⁴ Ibid., 28-29.

²³⁵ Ibid., 30.

bearing fruit. Green took the uncomfortable responsibility to chasten his partner force commander—the same one responsible for his food, security, and livelihood—which was certainly a tense and unenviable job. Donovan’s insistence in the rigorous training for OSS agents was once again fruitful, as Green leveraged his rapport with the Partisans to ensure that this open, direct conversation occurred with no negative backlash on the OSS agents. There is cause to question Galembush’s and Green’s assertions for the reasoning behind the weapons stores, however.

The fact that the Partisans kept a store of extra weapons and ammunition should not be a surprise, and because of that it is worth mentioning an alternate explanation that Galembush might not have understood. In another report, that of the REDWOOD team, which was co-located with RAKEOFF for several weeks, commander Rex Deane noted that the Germans were fifty miles away from the Partisan base, and neither the Germans nor Partisans tried to advance against their enemy for multiple months.²³⁶ Deane also noted that, when it came time to depart from the small Montenegrin town of Kolasin, the Partisans had multiple storehouses, of which Deane was given full access to inspect, where he noted that “the proportion was 60% American food, clothing, arms and 40% British shoes, arms, and ammo and food.”²³⁷ While the RAKEOFF mission was an “SO” (Special Operations) mission focused on ordering supply drops and relaying actionable intelligence to the Partisans, REDWOOD was itself a purely “SI” (Special Intelligence) mission with the charge to observe and report any and all items of various degrees of importance so that the Allied high command better understood the whole picture. For whatever reason, Green and

²³⁶ REDWOOD Summary Report, 31 January 1945, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-55, NARA.

²³⁷ Ibid.

Galembush were not officially made aware of the Partisans' stores and Deane was. Perhaps the storehouses were to enable the Partisans to rapidly expand as new recruits arrived and the poor state of the weapons held by most Partisans was the result of a pragmatic decision based on the principle of "if it isn't broke, then don't fix it." While the storehouses created a rift between RAKEOFF and the Partisans based on questionable precedent, the Russians co-located with the American teams actively attempted to thwart RAKEOFF's efforts.

In June, Galembush's radio messages started getting jammed. After ruling out German jamming due to the mountainous terrain, Green and Galembush determined it must be coming from either within the monastery walls, or very close by. Developing a plan to detect the source of the jamming, Green sent dummy messages using their "ignore" code. Meanwhile, Galembush snuck around until he discovered that the source of the jamming "was the two Russians, and on the ground between them was what I recognized to be a radio jamming device...I was damned mad, and not just a little confused."²³⁸ This problem was not easily solved, but Green leveraged his Partisan partner force commander who held more sway with the Russian soldiers. The Partisan general kicked the Russians out of his camp, and the Partisan general informed "his superiors that he would not accept any Russian's [*sic*] in his command."²³⁹ This incredible event underscores two important factors: the first is that, in this instance, the Partisans sided with the American OSS agents *against* the Soviets. While the Soviets and Partisans often shared a greater level of rapport, this was clearly not the case for the RAKEOFF mission. Secondly, since the Partisan commander banned the Soviets from his base, it demonstrates that the Partisans enjoyed a

²³⁸ Galembush, 35.

²³⁹ Galembush, 36.

level of independence from the Soviets that was not fully appreciated by the Western Allies both during or immediately after the war. It was this independent spirit that also led to the Tito-Stalin break a few short years later.

Galembush and Green had numerous issues with both the Partisans and Russians while in Yugoslavia. The friction between Tito and the Allies was felt acutely by them at the tactical level, as was the friction between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. This manifested itself in disagreements over how weapons should be used and blocking radio transmissions. Galembush and Green dutifully reported their operational issues with their allies to their higher headquarters, but by this time it was far too late for any strategic changes to occur.

Conclusion

Throughout 1944 more than 80 OSS agents deployed into and out of Yugoslavia.²⁴⁰ Linn Farish personally deployed twice more, once for two months between January and March, and finally for two months before departing in late June 1944. By this time, Farish had, finally, personally experienced the same issues with the Partisans as others detailed in this chapter. Due to his character and extensive experience with the Partisans, Farish was widely “regarded both by us and the British as the most capable and experienced of” the OSS agents in Yugoslavia.²⁴¹ As famed reporter, CL Sulzberger, recorded, “Slim [Farish] is first class” and realized that affiliation with either the Chetniks or Partisans mattered not because he “like[d] the Yugoslavs...[and developed] empathy

²⁴⁰ See Appendix B for specifics on personnel, timing, and mission locations.

²⁴¹ SO Progress Report, 1-15 August 1944, 15 August 1944, Entry 99, Box 20, Folder 105, NARA.

with the people, [but] not their ideologies.”²⁴² Also by this time, however, Farish’s opinion of the Partisans was profoundly different from his blockbuster report. His final report summarizing his service in Yugoslavia will be used to summarize this chapter, as it personally recounts the failures and disappointments wrought by the shift in policy felt by all in the OSS—one that he was instrumental in setting in motion.

By the time of Farish’s final extraction from Yugoslavia, he was exhausted from his wartime experiences. Lamenting the grueling existence “in a perplexing whirl of external and internal politics, [OSS agents] have endeavoured [*sic*] to maintain their balance and to report objectively on conditions as they saw and experienced them...[but] the situation in Yugoslavia has, from the beginning, been terribly confusing, and almost beyond the comprehension of an impartial outside observer.”²⁴³ Farish then detailed that both the Chetniks and Partisans have accused the other of the same sort of treachery: collaboration, attacking the other instead of the Axis, claims of no support from the Allies; in effect, both sides viewed the other as their main enemy. Yet, when Farish was surrounded by “poorly clothed, barefoot and hungry peasant farmers, some of them badly wounded...I couldn’t tell who was Left or who was Right, who was Communist or Reactionary. Somehow those terms that one hears used so glibly on the outside did not seem to fit the actual circumstances.”²⁴⁴ Farish desperately wanted the strategic leaders to understand the situation and competing forces the OSS agents balanced, but clearly knew they could not fully grasp the complexities of the missions assigned to the agents.

²⁴² CL Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954* (Toronto, Ontario: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 244.

²⁴³ COLUMBIA Summary Report, 16 June 1944, Donovan Papers, Box 100A, USAHEC.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Farish attempted to provide an example that tied in the strategic level actions of the Allies with what he witnessed on the ground. The result was a vivid tragedy:

What a very peculiar set of circumstances these facts bring out! Rifles stamped “US Property”, firing W.R.A. Ammunition, flown by American airmen in American aircraft being fired at by people who have rescued other American airmen and who were doing everything to make them comfortable and return them to safety. If I am confused, what must be the state of mind of the people of Yugoslavia.²⁴⁵

Farish confirmed RAKEOFF’s suspicion that American-supplied arms were used against Chetniks. He recognized that the Allies themselves also did not present “an united front to [the Yugoslavs]” and that the missteps between Great Britain, Russia, and the United States only served to exacerbate the conflict between the Partisans and Chetniks.²⁴⁶

Then, in a rebuke to his nation’s leaders for their failure to capitalize on the political capital of being American, Farish admonished the fact that “the one great power that I feel might have prevented” the carnage was never used. He was referring to the power of the United States’ reputation, noting that its name was “mentioned in the same breath with God in Yugoslavia.”²⁴⁷ Instead, in an attempt to once again maintain comfortable harmony with the United States’ and her allies, Farish witnessed “‘Russian’ aid dropped to the Partizans [*sic*] from ‘Russian’ planes, yet the planes were again the old C-47s and the goods were largely American packed in American containers dropped by American parachutes.”²⁴⁸ These frustrating experiences convinced him that “it does no good to say that we are not interested in Yugoslavia”—which Seitz, Galembush, and numerous others themselves claimed—“because we are, in a most material and effective manner...at one

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

time I worried because America was not getting the proper recognition for her participation in supply operations. Now I wonder—do we want it.”²⁴⁹ Clearly defeated, Farish accomplished with his report what none of the other OSS agents could because of his extensive experience in Yugoslavia and reputation. He effectively summarized the feelings felt by all OSS agents while admonishing what he perceived as strategic mistakes: he expressed frustration with the unrealistic mission to remain apolitical; his anger with allies more focused on postwar influence than on defeating Germans; and perhaps most importantly, he described the sheer exhaustion he felt after being immersed in the wanton destruction and violence wrought by the war in Yugoslavia. It should be noted that Farish’s final report was an indictment against the Partisans and the Soviets; if he was under their hostile foreign control, as the Children of Darkness intone, this report could never have had the same tone and critical language.

In a nod to the value the OSS placed in Farish’s knowledge on the struggle, not only did William Donovan see the report, but he personally forwarded it to General George C. Marshall, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Roosevelt’s top military advisor. Although still holding enough sway to inform the strategists, the final Farish report was too late to affect any strategic change, and his powerful report was an inconsequential reappraisal.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Farish never returned to Yugoslavia on another mission. Being “frightfully over-tired and wrought up” after his final trip, he volunteered for service with the OSS in Greece. However, on the night he was supposed to parachute into the country, his plane crashed into the side of the mountain, and all aboard were killed. See Sulzberger, 245.

It is worth wondering what change, at this point, could have realistically arisen from Farish's and other OSS efforts. Once the decision was made at Teheran by the Big Three to support the Partisans' anti-Axis campaign, any additional significant changes by the Americans would have been nigh impossible to implement as Roosevelt had far more issues to balance than simply the state of the war in Yugoslavia. Working to maintain an alliance while managing, supplying, and leading through a war that encompassed the entire world required a completely different decision-making process than Farish or the other OSS agents used for their own tactical and operational level decisions. Whether the OSS agents understood this or not did not allay their frustration at the carnage they found themselves surrounded by while in Yugoslavia, and the sincere wish that their policymakers could somehow enact a policy to alleviate the suffering.

**CHAPTER 6: “FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH”:
FINAL MISSIONS TO MIHAILOVIĆ AND DETERIORATING RELATIONS
WITH THE PARTISANS²⁵¹
AUGUST – DECEMBER 1944**

“Men going in the field should know where their authority reaches politically. It is easy enough for rear bases to tell us we are merely to answer all questions by saying we are only concerned with military intelligence, but to do so in all cases is to make ourselves look rather foolish.”²⁵²

–D.L. Rider, Commander, ASH Mission

“These officers and the members of their teams - and our officers and men with BLO units -are deserving of the highest praise. They have lived and worked under dangerous and difficult conditions. They have suffered not only the physical abuse which life within enemy-held territory entails but have, also, been subjected, at times, to the discomfort which is, inevitably, the reflection of strained relationship of higher echelons.”²⁵³ –Report on the IAMM, 27 DEC 1944

Introduction

Though by the end of May 1944 there were no OSS missions remaining with the Chetniks, American policy was no clearer than before. Farish lamented the shortcomings in the supply operations, and these problems continued to compile: as the frequency of bombing runs to the Ploiești oilfields increased, so, too, did the number of airmen shot down over both Chetnik and Partisan-held territory. The American solution was to send in a rescue mission, code-named Operation HALYARD. Additionally, and in line with Donovan’s intention to build the largest intelligence network possible, the US simultaneously sent the RANGER Mission to Mihailović strictly to provide intelligence to the United States on Serbia. The result was a policy in contravention: though the Allies

²⁵¹ HACIENDA Report, 28 September 1944, RG 226, E 144, B 69, F 615/A, NARA.

²⁵² ASH Supplemental Report, 24 November 1944, RG 226, E 154, B 23, BARI-SI-PRO-27, NARA.

²⁵³ Independent American Military Mission (IAMM) to Marshal Tito, Final Report of Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., to Major General William J. Donovan, 27 December 1944. RG 226, E 159, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-51, NARA.

claimed they were united in exclusive support to the Partisans, these two missions represented a remarkable break between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia, and created additional confusion for the OSS agents.

The Chief of the Special Intelligence section of the OSS in Bari, Robert P. Joyce, practically begged Colonel John E. Toulmin for further policy clarification. In a memo on 25 August 1944, Joyce informed Toulmin of an interaction he recently had in Rome with American political advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Robert Murphy, where Joyce “stated to him that it would be very helpful for us in OSS who deal with Yugoslavia to have a more complete picture of our policy relating to that country and to have more complete knowledge of what is happening in the political and diplomatic field.”²⁵⁴ Murphy unhelpfully responded to Joyce that “there was no change in American policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia...our government stands on its policy of allowing the peoples of Central Europe and the Balkans to decide themselves what form of government they want.”²⁵⁵ Joyce reminded Murphy that the extensive support provided to Tito rather than Mihailović merely strengthened Tito’s postwar position—and therefore decreased the policy that true self-determination could be attained—and that “dispatching an OSS intelligence unit to General Mihailović would probably be interpreted (and certainly made by Mihailović to appear) that the United States was providing him with at least moral support in his struggle against the Partisans. In other words, there appeared to

²⁵⁴ Memorandum subject “American Policy toward Yugoslavia” written from Joyce to Toulmin, 25 August 1944, RG 226, E 190, B 113, F 360, NARA. At the time of the memorandum, Toulmin was the Deputy Strategic Services Officer in Bari.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

be in this sense a definite parting of the ways” in Allied policy in Yugoslavia. Murphy merely “admitted that this might be true.”²⁵⁶

Like Joyce, Churchill vigorously disagreed with the break in policy, and wrote Roosevelt upon hearing of the HALYARD and RANGER missions. On 1 September 1944, Churchill summarized his thoughts in a message to Roosevelt:

I see that General Donovan has sent an American mission to General Mihailović [...] We are endeavoring to give Tito the support and, of course, if the United States back [*sic*] Mihailović, complete chaos will ensue. I was rather hoping things were going to get a bit smoother in these parts, but if we each back different sides, we lay the scene for a fine civil war. General Donovan is running a strong Mihailović lobby, just when we have persuaded King Peter to break decisively with him and when many of the Chetniks are being rallied under Tito’s National Army of Liberation [Partisans]. The only chance of saving the King is the unity between his Prime Minister, the Ban of Croatia, and Tito.²⁵⁷

Churchill, incredibly and probably somewhat disingenuously, elevated the severity of the break by saying that chaos would ensue in the future if this break were to happen. Contrary to the actual events on the ground, which was recognized as a civil war as early as November 1941, chaos was the rule in Yugoslavia. While the break in policy was an added layer of confusion, it was by no means the impetus for chaos in Yugoslavia.²⁵⁸ Additionally, Churchill’s claim to Roosevelt that “many of the Chetniks” were being rallied under the Partisans also demonstrated a lack of understanding of the different bands—warlords—using the chetniks moniker, as Mansfield, Seitz, and Musulin all witnessed in Serbia an unshakeable loyalty to Mihailović by the Chetniks. Giving him due credit, however, Churchill did accurately point out that sending separate American missions to the

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, 1 September 1944, *FRUS: The Complete Correspondence III*, 306.

²⁵⁸ As early as November 1941, Yugoslavs protested the burgeoning Civil War, publicly marching through the streets of Čačak, Serbia. See Unknown Curator, 2022, Belgrade, Serbia: Belgrade Military Museum.

Chetniks in the crucial period of the fall of 1944 only fueled the civil war, as the Partisans were transitioning from guerrilla warfare campaigns to fighting conventional battles. Conceding the strategic misstep that he made for operational level intelligence, Roosevelt quickly recalled the OSS mission, telling Churchill “the mission of OSS is my mistake...I am directing Donovan to withdraw his mission.” To Donovan, Roosevelt said “in view of British objection, it seems best to withdraw mission to General Mihailović.”²⁵⁹ Roosevelt, not wishing to stress his relationship with Churchill over Yugoslavia any further, quickly retreated from Donovan’s advocated mission.

Donovan knew, however, that it was far easier for Roosevelt to tell Churchill the OSS missions would be withdrawn than it was logistically to evacuate the OSS agents already deployed. Additionally, while there were still downed airmen with the Chetniks, or making their way to the designated airfield first in Pranjani, Serbia, it was unthinkable to leave the airmen stranded. The RANGER mission, therefore, was recalled, but HALYARD was allowed to remain until 27 December 1944. Incredibly, with Mihailović full-well knowing he was not going to be supported following HALYARD’s completion, worked alongside the OSS agents. Mihailović’s decision to continue working with the Americans was incredible because he received nothing in return, and hindered his own fighting forces in the process: the Americans only provided enough food, clothing, and medicine for the downed airmen, and the Serb peasants often gave the airmen what little they could, to their own detriment. The downed airmen, in return and once on the plane, frequently left their jackets and shoes as a show of goodwill to the Serbs.²⁶⁰ Tito, on the

²⁵⁹ Cable from Roosevelt to Churchill, 3 September 1944, *FRUS III*, 308-309.

²⁶⁰ Kurapovna, *Shadows on the Mountain*, 151.

other hand, continued his rapid abandonment of the Americans and British in favor of the Soviet Red Army. The stressed relationship between Americans and Partisans was felt acutely by the OSS agents on the ground.

On 12 August 1944, Churchill and Tito met in person in Naples, Italy. Tito was exfiltrated by the Allies in May 1944 during an operation by the Germans to destroy the Partisans. Tito and Churchill both were enamored by the other. Milovan Djilas recalled that “Tito could not contain his respect and enthusiasm for Churchill” when telling his entourage about the meeting. Likewise, Churchill’s “eyes were filled with tears when he met” Tito, captivated by the same leader who had a similar effect on Churchill’s colleague, Fitzroy Maclean, just a year earlier.²⁶¹ The “bromance” did not last very long, however, because Tito “levanted”—in Churchill’s words—to a meeting with Stalin without telling anyone where he was headed just a few days after meeting with, and receiving public praise from, Churchill.²⁶² This act demonstrated that Tito did not feel beholden to the West for the Partisan’s success, and he eagerly went to the Soviet Union to negotiate the operational plans for the liberation of Belgrade by the Red Army. For the Children of Darkness in the Western Allied headquarters, it was a stark reminder that, despite Farish’s claim that the Partisans would remember from “whence support came,” Tito not only did not remember, but he did not care.

Logistics and intelligence operations alongside the Partisans continued through this period, although the Partisans became more restrictive and less amenable to their American intelligence partners, as by this time the Partisans were transitioning to

²⁶¹ Djilas, *Wartime*, 401.

²⁶² Williams, *Parachutes*, 230.

conventional warfare and able to conduct much of their own intelligence. The greatest asset the OSS agents provided to the Partisans came in supply drops. Outside of calling in the necessary supply drops, the Partisan leadership had little need for the Americans. The agents, for their part, were supposed to both collect intelligence and provide supplies. Being limited by the Partisans created rifts between the OSS agents and many of their partners, a rift that was not felt by those partnered with the relatively weaker Mihailović. This chapter will examine some experiences of each that demonstrate this, before concluding with the situation in Yugoslavia at the start of 1945.

The Final Chetnik Missions

As the number of Allied airmen shot down over Serbia grew with the frequency of bombing missions to Ploiești, the OSS saw an opportunity to execute a rescue mission of those protected by Chetniks. Needing someone with an established relationship with Mihailović to reduce any friction between the US and Chetniks, the OSS ordered Lieutenant George Musulin back to Serbia on 8 July. Musulin's previous departure just over a month prior in May 1944 "brought tears to the eyes of the General [Mihailović] who at that time urged him [Musulin] to be sure to come back; that he liked the Americans, wanted to help evacuate airmen and hoped that he would see subject [Musulin] again soon."²⁶³ In the business of Special Operations, relationships carried great weight. Musulin's strong rapport with Mihailović, and Mihailović's willingness to assist with evacuating airmen, meant that Musulin was the ideal choice to spearhead Operation

²⁶³ Memorandum of Support for Musulin to Proceed on Operation HALYARD written by Lt. B.R. Deranian (Acting SO Chief, Bari), 1 July 1944, Musulin Correspondence File, Ford's Collection.

HALYARD. Originally scheduled to parachute into Serbia between 20-26 July 1944, the insertion did not occur until the night of 2/3 August.²⁶⁴ The delayed insertion was caused by protests from the British who did not want the US to send in a mission to the Chetniks, and who actively thwarted OSS attempts to insert Musulin's team.

To minimize friction between the Allies, the Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater established the Air Crew Rescue Unit (ACRU) under command of the Fifteenth Air Force. The reason for this was "to make it possible to send a team to Mihailović territory for the evacuation of airmen there without its being considered in the same light as other teams representing organizations engaged in intelligence work or activities of a subversive nature."²⁶⁵ Additionally, Musulin's orders clearly directed that he was "not authorized to make any military or political commitments [*sic*] on behalf of the United States of America or other Allied nation, or to make any commitments or promises for the furnishing of supplies or other material aid to any political or military group." Musulin's team was also "not authorized to engage in any operations against the enemy except as may be necessary for your own defense or in order to accomplish your mission."²⁶⁶ The author of these orders did not understand the very personal nature of the work that Musulin was engaged in by partnering with Mihailović, and somewhat naively expected him and his team remain aloof to the plight of the Chetniks. The final delay in Musulin's insertion was caused by the British officers. On numerous attempts, British

²⁶⁴ Coded message No. 390 from Mihailović to OSS HQ, 19 July 1944, Musulin Correspondence File, Ford's Collection.

²⁶⁵ "Report by 1st Lt. George S. Musulin on the Activities of the HALYARD Mission in Connection with the Evacuation of Airmen from Mihailovich (Chetnik) Territory between 5 July 1944 and 27 August 1944," 26 September 1944, Musulin Correspondence File, Ford's Collection.

²⁶⁶ "Orders," 8 July 1944, Musulin Correspondence File, Ford's Collection.

pilots thwarted HALYARD's efforts: they flew to the wrong area, they tried to drop the team into a Partisan firefight, and they brought Partisans—who were presumably upset with the HALYARD mission—on the flight. Finally, Musulin insisted on being flown in an American plane, piloted by Americans, with no Partisans on board.²⁶⁷ The HALYARD team finally successfully parachuted into Yugoslavia on the night of 2/3 August.

Operation HALYARD began with an assessment. Upon arrival in Pranjani, the men of HALYARD—Musulin, Master Sergeant Michael Rajacich, and W/T Operator Arthur Jibilian—were faced with far more individuals than they anticipated. Originally, they expected no more than 50 would be met, but instead there were nearly 250 downed airmen, in various states of sickness and wearing tattered clothes. Mitigating the issues they could with money and the few supplies they brought with them, and by ordering an air drop for additional medical supplies on 6 August, Musulin's team then cleared a landing strip that could support C-47s. Once constructed, evacuations began in earnest on the evening of 9/10 August 1944.

Originally, all evacuations were going to be under cover of darkness. Discovering that night landings on the short, crudely constructed runway were extremely dangerous, only one sortie of four C-47s landed, evacuating just 48 airmen. Musulin insisted the planes come back the following morning with fighter escorts to prevent nearby German units from massing against the Chetniks and American airmen. The following morning, 6 C-47s,

²⁶⁷ Kurapovna, 144-146. See also Gregory A. Freeman, *The Forgotten 500* (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2007), 186-188. The British knew of the mission because the only radio possessed by Mihailović sent messages through the British system. See "Report by 1st Lt. George S. Musulin on the Activities of the Halyard Mission in Connection with the Evacuation of Airmen from Miahilovich (Chetnik) Territory between 5 July 1944 and 27 August 1944," 26 September 1944, George Musulin Correspondence, Ford Files.

escorted by 20 P-51 Mustang fighters, arrived and continued evacuating until all 241 Airmen were evacuated.²⁶⁸ Knowing there were additional downed airmen throughout Serbia who needed additional time, HALYARD remained in Yugoslavia until nearly 500 Allied Airmen and US Citizens trapped in Yugoslavia were successfully evacuated.²⁶⁹

Although a highly successful operational rescue mission, HALYARD was not without its issues. One of those was caused by Musulin himself on 10 August. Noticing two Chetniks in dire medical condition, Musulin approved their evacuation to Bari for further treatment. While this may have otherwise been overlooked, Partisans at the Bari airfield noticed when the Chetniks were removed from the aircraft and objected to the OSS leadership.²⁷⁰ On the next evacuation mission on 27 August when 60 additional airmen were evacuated, Musulin was removed from Yugoslavia and replaced by another Serbian-American, Captain Nick Lalich. Lalich recalled an additional issue that required HALYARD to move operations further west into Bosnia because “our airport and evacuation was menaced by approaching Partisans.”²⁷¹ The Partisans never approved of the mission and preferred that the airmen be brought by Chetniks to American agents in Partisan headquarters so that they could oversee the evacuations. This was unfeasible, however, since the airmen “were unfit for this kind of walking in Yugoslav mountains” and some were unable to move except on a stretcher.²⁷² Mihailović worked alongside the

²⁶⁸ Musulin Legion of Merit Citation, 11 October 1944, Musulin File, Ford’s Collection.

²⁶⁹ HALYARD Report, 31 December 1944, 10 January 1945, RG 226, OSS File No. XL-5727, NARA. There were three US citizens rescued during Operation HALYARD. These were American citizens who were living in Yugoslavia since the Axis invasion that had been unable to depart the country using other means prior to HALYARD.

²⁷⁰ Freeman, 237.

²⁷¹ HALYARD Report, 31 December 1944, 10 January 1945, RG 226, OSS File No. XL-5727, NARA.

²⁷² Ibid.

Americans the entire mission, despite not receiving any materiel or logistical support for his efforts. When Lalich departed on the final flight on 27 December, he provided Mihailović his personal carbine since he never received enough support “and other material to fight this war.”²⁷³

The simple act of providing Mihailović his personal weapon demonstrates the level of rapport developed between Lalich and Mihailović. It also demonstrates the very personal nature of the work in which the OSS men were engaged. The Allied policy, which OSS agents vainly attempted to alter during the fall of 1944, of supporting the Partisans exclusively did not mesh with the OSS agent’s own personal experiences with the Chetniks. Understandably, then, in subsequent years and following Mihailović’s execution for collaboration, American Airmen and OSS Agents alike vociferously objected to America’s labeling Mihailović a traitor. Prior to HALYARD’s evacuation, the RANGER intelligence mission also parachuted into Yugoslavia strictly to collect intelligence.

As noted earlier, intelligence officer Robert Joyce knew that the RANGER mission would most likely be spun in ways politically expedient to either the Partisans or Chetniks. He was right, as RANGER’s arrival to Mihailović was eagerly welcomed by the Chetnik leader, and vigorously protested by Tito. In a letter to American “responsible military and political authorities” on 14 September 1944, Tito noted the incongruence in Allied policy because keeping a mission with Mihailović “does not comply with statements made by Prime Minister Mr. Winston Churchill...or by other responsible Allied personalities.” He continued his protest by noting that supplies and war materiel supposedly brought by the

²⁷³ Nick Lalich, “50th Anniversary of the HALYARD Mission Commemoration,” (speech, Chicago, IL, 31 May 1994), <http://www.generalmihailovich.com/2006/08/captain-nick-lalich-oss-officer.html>.

United States during the RANGER or HALYARD missions “were captured in the latest battles on the Valjevo-Uzice sector during the defeat of the Nedich and Mihailović Chetniks.”²⁷⁴ Tito also wrote that Mihailović publicized the presence of “Lt. Colonel Robert McDowell, to prove that the United States agree [*sic*] to his policy towards the movement of the [Chetniks].” Finally, Tito also surmised that the RANGER and HALYARD missions “assume[d] the character of interference in our internal affairs and might influence the development of civil war.”²⁷⁵ Unsurprisingly, Tito requested that the US “should as soon as possible [withdraw] from the traitor Mihailović and that every kind of support to his chetniks [*sic*] should be cancelled.”²⁷⁶ McDowell’s orders to evacuate duly arrived, but McDowell and the OSS initially thought they were a mistake.

Despite being ordered to depart Yugoslavia at soonest available opportunity, McDowell did not depart until 1 November 1944 for a variety of reasons. The first reason was because OSS-Bari questioned whether the orders were a mistake. Attempting to provide McDowell cover to continue operating unhindered by strategic politics, Bari commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Green informed Donovan that “there may be some delay. McDowell made 6 attempts before he finally succeeded [getting into Yugoslavia] and getting out will probably be just as difficult.” He then thought that Roosevelt may have mistakenly ordered the withdrawal “because he had only incomplete or erroneous information [since] the team was very carefully established as an intelligence

²⁷⁴ Letter from J.B. Tito to USA Military Mission, 14 September 1944. The Chetniks undoubtedly used American-supplied weapons to fight the Partisans, but they certainly did not come from either the RANGER or HALYARD missions, as those missions were not even allowed to provide medical support to the Chetniks who were assisting with HALYARD, let alone military supplies.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

unit only, and could not be called a ‘Mission to Mihailović.’” Finally, he reminded Donovan that “valuable intelligence reports have already been received from him [McDowell], and it is much to be regretted [if] we are to lose this source of military, political, and economic intelligence at this time.”²⁷⁷ McDowell and the rest of the RANGER team was first approved by Roosevelt in June 1944, and the belief that it could be so quickly recalled seemed beyond possible by the OSS Commander in Bari, as well as for McDowell and his team.

Another reason McDowell’s departure was delayed is because they were ordered to depart through Partisan held territory. Noting the nature of the civil war raging between the Chetniks and Partisans at that time, it made sense that they would be hesitant to attempt to depart through the Partisans area—hesitation that was validated by the experience of one of McDowell’s subordinates, First Lieutenant Ellsworth R. Kramer.

To increase the reach of RANGER, McDowell split his team and sent them to other locations throughout Chetnik held territory. Kramer’s experience was especially harrowing. He witnessed savage battles where “German tanks had joined in the battle [between Chetniks and Partisans] and killed both sides,” and he “saw men die because of the lack of medical supplies.”²⁷⁸ He had the unique opportunity of interviewing German Army officers in the surrounding area, at the direction of McDowell, “to work subversive or black operations” encouraging the Germans to surrender. He was surprised to see German officers not only willing, but eager to surrender to him and go to “American prisons under American custody.” If Kramer could guarantee that, then he believed that

²⁷⁷ Message from Green to Donovan, 16 September 1944, RG 226, Entry 99, Box 40, Folder 200, NARA.

²⁷⁸ Kramer Chronological Report of RANGER, 31 October 1944, RG 226, E 99, B 28, F 140B, NARA.

“practically the whole German Balkan force would collapse.” Kramer did not have this authority—nor did anyone on the RANGER mission—so this potential surrender never materialized.²⁷⁹ As his mission continued, so, too, did the precarity of his own position.

On 13 October 1944, while in Kruševac, Kramer faced a series of difficult decisions.²⁸⁰ He wrote that “I could not get away, and the Russians were but a short distance [within 20 km] away, and I had to choose between being captured and killed by the Partisans, being a prisoner of the Germans for the duration of the war, or relying on the mercy of the Russians.”²⁸¹ Two out of three of the aforementioned forces were allies of the United States, but that did not matter to Kramer because he was ordered to collect intelligence alongside an enemy of all three, making his position untenable. On top of that, he was ordered by McDowell to depart his current location and rendezvous with him in eastern Bosnia. To reach McDowell, Kramer needed to cross through Partisan-held territory. His Chetnik partner force commander advised him that he “would never make it [through Partisans territory] alive.”²⁸² Before Kramer could leave, though, the Russians and Germans simultaneously sent messengers to parlay with the Chetniks who were planning to attack German positions in Kruševac.

The negotiations were tense. The Russians wanted to arrest the German officer, but Kramer refused to allow it because of his own experiences speaking with Germans and always being allowed to leave. Once the German officer refused to surrender to the

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Kruševac is in south-central Serbia, approximately 200 km southeast of Belgrade, and 230 km northwest of Sofia, Bulgaria.

²⁸¹ Kramer Chronological Report, 31 October 1944, NARA.

²⁸² Ibid.

Russians and returned to prepare his own troops to fight, the Russian informed Kramer that the Chetniks could take any German prisoners, but that “he wanted the White Russians”—traitorous Russians fighting alongside the German Army—“for him and his troops to do with as he saw fit.”²⁸³ Once the attack commenced, the Russians detained Kramer and attempted to disarm him, but he protested and they relented. He informed the Russians that by disarming him, “they were making an Allied officer a prisoner of war” which would be a dangerous precedent for an ally to set. In this way—getting detained by the Russians—Kramer met the Russian general in charge of the advancing army.

Kramer’s time with his allies, the Russians, was anything but cordial. They disarmed him, interrogated him, and belittled him. Although he was told “you are not a prisoner,” he “was still under armed guard.”²⁸⁴ He waited under guard until dark when the Russian guards brought him back to where his personal effects were, but his most valued items—his two jackets—were both stolen, meaning that despite the colder weather of the mountainous region in the fall, he no longer had any protection from the elements. Ordered to drive one of the Russians’ Lend-Lease Ford vehicles, and under guard by two Russians armed with American-provided Tommy Guns, he was told to simply drive in a northeasterly direction. Finally arriving at their destination, Kramer was immediately “interrogated until 2:30 in the morning by a Russian intelligence officer” whom he spoke to “through an interpreter in French.” The interrogator then accused Kramer of being a spy, accusations to which Kramer vigorously denied. Kramer successfully calmed down the

²⁸³ Kramer later witnessed approximately 100 “White Russians” marched away from him, and then heard machine gun fire. He presumed they were all executed as traitors. Kramer Chronological Report, 31 October 1944, NARA.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

Russian interrogator by informing him that he had great respect for the Russians, and “that the Russians were our Allies and well disciplined. This seemed to please him.”²⁸⁵ Despite not being a prisoner, Kramer was decidedly not given any freedom by his Russian allies and was transported against his will into the American mission in Sofia, Bulgaria.

After arriving at the American mission, Kramer was finally placed on a plane and sent back to Bari, where he arrived in the evening of 18 October 1944. Although that night he had his “first complete night’s sleep in seven weeks,” and after surviving a harrowing four days with his Russian allies, Kramer believed that he was finally safe in Bari. However, RANGER’s presence with the Chetniks did not only cause issues for Kramer with the Russians—who were genuinely confused by his presence and did not believe that he was not a spy—but it also created problems with another American ally, the Partisans.

On the morning of 20 October, “officers at Bari” told Kramer “that it would not be safe for me to stay in that vicinity, and that I should leave for Caserta. The reason I was advised that it would be unsafe for me to remain in Bari was due to the fact that the Partisans had guaranteed the safety of the lives of the officers with the American Mission to Serbia, but in the field had sent a death warrant and orders to kill me.”²⁸⁶ American strategists and senior political leaders authorized the RANGER mission despite the dangers it posed to the OSS agents who executed the mission, and it was the agents who were put most in peril by the decision. However, due to the competing politics of the war, and the strained policies between the Allies, Kramer’s life was threatened by his own allies.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

The remaining members RANGER finally evacuated on 1 November 1944 on one of HALYARD's flights out of an airfield in eastern Bosnia. McDowell was in serious trouble with his supervisors, and was threatened to be court martialed for disobeying the order to depart sooner, although he claimed that he had legitimate factors that delayed his departure from the country.²⁸⁷ From an operational intelligence standpoint, RANGER was successful. It resulted in timely and accurate intelligence on enemy movements within Chetnik-held territory. From a strategic standpoint, it was an unqualified failure. McDowell, in his report submitted on 23 November 1944, provided a balanced examination of the Chetnik and Partisan movements, and argued that "a long and bloody civil war is inevitable between Partisans and [Chetniks] unless the Allies intervene and set up effective machinery for genuinely free elections and free expression of democratic rule by the majority of the population."²⁸⁸ The Allies did not intervene in postwar Yugoslav elections, and when the OSS agents witnessed Partisan-led elections that were far from free or fair, they were further disenchanted by the Partisan movement. Those experiences, and the personal frustration felt by the agents, are important to remember because they were active participants in the war and wanted to believe their service furthered the greater good. It is also important, though, to remember that Roosevelt balanced strategic-level decisions on how to manage the war, and made concessions with the other Allied leaders. In the case of elections, Roosevelt chose a strategy of non-intervention to ensure that he did not alienate America from the Soviets or the Partisans. RANGER's mere presence in Yugoslavia created an ever-increasingly more difficult environment for the agents attached

²⁸⁷ Unpublished McDowell manuscript, in possession of author.

²⁸⁸ RANGER Report, RG 226, F McDowell Mission Reports, NARA.

to the Partisans. The friction caused by Roosevelt's decision of non-intervention was further felt by the agents in Yugoslavia, through its immediate headquarters in Bari.

Friction between higher headquarters and subordinate units is always present, and the friction between OSS agents in Yugoslavia and their headquarters in Bari was no exception. What was exceptional, though, was that OSS-Bari was accused of being infiltrated by pro-Partisan sympathizers, and the R&A (Research and Analysis) section in Bari was believed to be actively blocking pro-Mihailović reports from leaving theater from the earliest moments in the war. Proving especially biased, two influential OSS Agents in Bari, Captain George Wuchinich and Major F.N. Arnoldy, were both removed for their actions suppressing pro-Mihailović reports and court-martialed for their actions. The Partisans also employed their own spies, often as secretaries, including Erna Pazdera and Lidia Medved. Their presence has contributed to the Children of Darkness angst.²⁸⁹

Peril with the Partisans

Throughout the summer of 1944, the OSS sought to establish its own independent mission with the Partisans in order to funnel lend-lease equipment separately from the British missions. The chance came in August, when a suitable senior OSS officer was found in Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, and because the British Military Mission was “recognized as an official military mission” and passed “from the stage of special ops to that of regular ops [operations].”²⁹⁰ Sending the Independent American Military Mission

²⁸⁹ See “Transcript of Mr. Eli Popovic,” Ford’s Collection. See also: Report of Activities in Yugoslavia from 15 December 1944 to 25 January 1945, 14 February 1945, RG 226, E 154, B 54, NARA.

²⁹⁰ Status of OSS Personnel on Military Mission to JANL [Yugoslav Army of National Liberation], 8 August 1944, RG 226, E 190, B 114, F 372.

(IAMM) to the Partisans enabled the United States to “carry out functions beyond the normal scope of SI [special intelligence] and will undoubtedly handle many matters that pertain to supplies for the Partisans and clearance of SO [special operations] projects.”²⁹¹ Essentially, IAMM’s purpose was to provide the OSS with a direct line to Tito and his corps commanders, a separate communications link to OSS-Bari, and the ability to conduct its own intelligence collection and special operations missions inside Partisan-held territory. In August 1944, Huntington and Donovan personally informed the British lead, Fitzroy Maclean, and Tito in Caserta, Italy.

Maclean and Tito both welcomed the announcement of the IAMM to the Partisans—at least to Donovan’s and Huntington’s face. In the car ride to Tito’s Caserta headquarters, Donovan told Maclean that IAMM was going to be established under Huntington’s command-and-control, to which Maclean replied that he thought the idea was “splendid and is what should be done. I only ask that if any personnel is [*sic*] withdrawn I be given reasonable notice. Some of your chaps are doing splendid work.”²⁹² Upon arrival at Tito’s headquarters and working through Maclean as interpreter in German, Donovan informed Tito of the proposed changes. Donovan told Tito

That the mission was to be an independent military mission paralleling the British and Russian missions and cooperating with them; that the objectives of the mission were aid to the Marshal [Tito] in fighting the common enemy—Germany. That specifically we were interested in the Marshal’s aid in the penetration of enemy countries in furtherance of intelligence activities [...] that a large percentage of the supplies being received by the Marshal are of American origin (the Marshall nodded at this point) [...and] it should be understood that this mission is purely military in character. It is to serve no political ends. We are neither making nor

²⁹¹ Independent American Military Mission to Partisan Headquarters, 30 May 1944, RG 226, E 190, B 114, F 372, NARA.

²⁹² Memorandum of Conversations with Brigadier Maclean and Marshal Tito, 10 August 1944, RG 226, E 190, B 114, F 372, NARA.

requesting political or territorial commitments of any kind. We will serve any group which can aid us in our struggle against the enemy.²⁹³

Huntington later recorded that Tito “was pleased, too, that I was to be with him.”²⁹⁴ While Tito may have been pleased about the additional Allied mission to his headquarters, Donovan also informed Tito about the HALYARD and RANGER missions, news of which Tito was distinctly less enthusiastic.

Although at the meeting Tito merely nodded his head, and quipped about the negative experience the teams were sure to endure while with Mihailović, he seethed about it. Starting in mid-September he made life for the OSS agents with the Partisans more difficult. During the summer of 1944, all that was necessary “for an American officer to do to get any information whatsoever” from the Yugoslavs was to ask, giving a full description of the information needed, “and within the shortest possible time the report [would] be delivered.”²⁹⁵ By September, though, this was no longer the case as the Partisans severely clamped down on intelligence sharing.

After RANGER and HALYARD’s insertion, Tito was stricter with OSS agents than previously. In stark contrast to OSS agents’ experiences in the spring, agents were completely denied entry to Yugoslavia for several reasons. For some, it was because they were of Yugoslav heritage. Lieutenant Eli Popovic, who previously served alongside Farish with the Partisans and was at one time highly regarded by Tito, was specifically disallowed

²⁹³ Ibid. Emphasis on “Germany” in original.

²⁹⁴ Independent US Military Mission to Marshal Tito, Mihailovich Military Observers Unit, Establishment of Headquarters on Vis and Placement of Infiltration Outposts, 11 August 1944, RG 226, E 190, B 114, F 372, NARA.

²⁹⁵ Memorandum to Maj. F.N. Arnoldy, Chief Yugoslav Section from LT Clifford O’Rourke, 14 May 1944, RG 226, E165, B 6, F 53, NARA.

from returning to Yugoslavia for fear that he would attempt to incite negative sentiments towards the Partisans since he was Serbian.²⁹⁶ For others, they were simply refused entry into Yugoslavia because of the missions to Mihailović. The OSS-Bari commander's bi-weekly situation report on 30 September 1944 stated that "considerable difficulty was encountered with the Partisans concerning movement of personnel in Yugoslavia and other restrictions imposed by various Corps Headquarters. Apparently most of the difficulty originated with the Partisan knowledge of an American team working in Mihailović territory."²⁹⁷ Though Tito did not make it known at the meeting with Donovan and Huntington, he took issue with the insertion of the additional missions to the Chetniks. In response, he tightened the restrictions on the OSS agents.

The leader of the CUCKOLD mission to Partisan-held territory in Slovenia, Major Franklin Lindsay, noticed a major change for the worse in Partisan attitude in mid-September, directly corresponding with Tito's memorandum imploring the United States to withdraw its missions from Mihailović. In his final report, Lindsay noted that "in general, relations between the Mission and the Partisan Staff were good before the middle of September and bad after. The examples of non-cooperation, and bad faith and obstructionism became so numerous that it is impossible to explain them as carelessness or ignorance." Much like Kramer experienced at the hands of the Russians, Lindsay recalled that "during one period all Allied personnel were under informal house arrest, and on several occasions Partisans...told us they had been forbidden to have any contact with

²⁹⁶ Philip Hart, "Heroes of the OSS: Eli Popovich," *Serb World USA*, November-December 1987, 12.

²⁹⁷ Progress Report of Yugoslav Desk, 15-30 September 1944, 30 September 1944, RG 226, E99, B22, F 112, NARA.

[the Allies].”²⁹⁸ In addition to the problems caused by the Mihailović missions, Franklin noted that other factors negatively influencing the Partisans relationship towards the Americans included fewer supplies than they anticipated, the encroaching Red Army made the Partisans feel less dependent on the Americans and British for support, and there was distrust of Allied postwar intentions for the Balkans.²⁹⁹

These issues negatively affected CUCKOLD’s effectiveness at gathering intelligence for OSS-Bari, and coordinating logistics drops for the Partisans. Although Lindsay maintained “the best” relations with their assigned Partisan liaison officer, relations with the rest of the Partisans in the Fourth Operational Zone (Slovenia) were far less congenial. The Partisan political commissar lamented to Franklin that “our relations had not been completely satisfactory and [he] implied that the blame was with the Partisans.”³⁰⁰ While the relations with their immediate partner provided the foundation for Lindsay’s team to maintain shelter and other living requirements, the deteriorating status of the relationship between the Partisan leadership and the American leadership caused by the HALYARD and RANGER missions resulted in CUCKOLD gathering “about ten percent of [intelligence] potentially available.”³⁰¹ This was undoubtedly frustrating for Lindsay and his team since they were in Yugoslavia to do an intelligence gathering mission. Despite these issues, CUCKOLD remained in Slovenia for nearly seven months,

²⁹⁸ Report of Operations, SF Military Mission, Sub-Mission to Fourth Operational Zone, Yugoslav Peoples [sic] Army of National Liberation, 15 January 1945, RG 226, E 190, B 167, F 1200, NARA.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

continually attempting to gather additional intelligence, rescue downed airmen, and move OSS agents north into Austria, although the latter was never successfully accomplished.

Further south in Macedonia, Serbian-American Corporal Steve Silianoff—who was also SPIKE’s interpreter—was permitted by the Partisans to visit his uncle, but was always accompanied by OZNA representatives.³⁰² This hindered his attempts to collect intelligence from individuals with whom he came in contact on these trips, but did not completely prevent it. Attempting to ensure Silianoff did not arrange any illicit nighttime intelligence meetings, the OZNA escort “slept in the same room with Steve, or just outside the door... The Partisans said this close guard was necessary because there were still a lot of enemies of the Partisan regime around who might want to kill Steve to stir up trouble between the Partisans and the Americans.” In other thinly veiled threats to Silianoff’s life, some of the Partisans “told Steve that they know he was spying on them and that he had better go easy or else he might accidentally get shot.”³⁰³ These aggressive anti-American actions by the Partisans understandably shook the faith in even the staunchest champions of the Partisans within the OSS.

The leader of the HACIENDA mission, Lieutenant John Hamilton, initially participated in Operation AUDREY and was a longtime supporter of the Partisans.³⁰⁴

Assigned to the northern sector of the Air Crew Rescue Unit (ACRU), Hamilton was in

³⁰² The OZNA (*Odjeljenje Za Zaštitu Naroda*) was “the Partisan equivalent of the German Gestapo. Its members include civilians and also enlisted men and officers.” SPIKE Mission to Yugoslavia, undated, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-39.

³⁰³ SPIKE Report, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-39, NARA.

³⁰⁴ John Hamilton was a *nom-de-guerre* used by the famous actor, Sterling Hayden. Hayden used the moniker to disguise his identity, lest he become a target for American propaganda, thereby preventing his participation in the OSS war effort. As a reminder, Operation AUDREY was the logistical support mission spearheaded by Louis Huot in the fall of 1943 that ran significant amounts of supplies to the Partisans on the Dalmatian coast.

Northern Yugoslavia from 20 August through 23 September 1944, so his operation took place entirely simultaneously with HALYARD, but in Partisan-territory. In his report, Hamilton recalled that he had previously “worked with the Partisans for nine months prior to [HACIENDA]...where an exceedingly favorable impression of the Partisans was gained [by himself]. As a result of this mission, most of these impressions have been reversed.”³⁰⁵ Included in the reasons for his change of heart were the method in which leaders and officers were appointed which were based on their commitment to the Communist Party, rather than their leadership abilities; the lack of the Partisans ability to truly control any territory, since “Partisan territory [was] ‘free’ simply because the enemy [did] not care to use it at that time;” and finally, because there existed “everywhere a feeling of burning hatred among the people, for their own people of a different religion, race, or position. There [were] innumerable conflicting organizations. Atrocities have been committed on a wholesale scale...that surpass an American’s credulity.” Rather than unite the country, Hamilton believed that the Partisans would only serve to bring more hardship on the Yugoslav peoples, ominously predicting that “the bloodshed there will be endless.”³⁰⁶ Instead of a democratically elected government, what the OSS agents witnessed were sham elections with only Partisan-approved communist contestants on the ballot.

In many areas of Yugoslavia, OSS agents reported witnessing elections that were neither free, nor voluntary. In the cases of at least WILLOW, SPIKE, and REDWOOD missions, agents witnessed the ways in which the Partisans ran their elections. As Captain

³⁰⁵ Report on the movements of the HACIENDA Mission and observations as a result thereof, covering the period from 17 August 1944 to 24 September 1944, 28 September 1944, RG 226, E 144, B 69, F 615/A, NARA.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

Charles Grimm reported in WILLOW's summary, the Partisans were working against history and a tradition of political turmoil in Yugoslavia to establish a democracy. The team commander believed that establishing a new representative government was "possible, but not probable" and because the Partisans were "the most powerful fighting and political faction in Yugoslavia," the only way free elections would occur was if the Allies "establish[ed] and control[led] an honest plebiscite so all people, rich or poor, [felt] absolutely safe to walk into a voting poll and cast a ballot for the type of government his hearty [*sic*] desire[d]."307

The commander of the SPIKE mission, Major Scott R. Dickinson, noted that the elections were carried out by a traveling commission that nominated 10 Communist Party officials to the ballot, of which 6 would be elected. Not everyone was eligible to vote, and "those on the OZNA blacklist were not permitted to vote." When it came time for the citizens to vote, "they did not know the names of the nominees until they were given the ballot." While the party officials touted the high turnout, Dickinson noted that "anyone who was eligible to vote and did not received a visit from the OZNA representative and was questioned as to his patriotism. In this way a very high percentage of eligible voters voted."308 The REDWOOD mission noted that, in his area of operations, the only ones eligible to vote were already "Partisans, of course." Sardonicly, he added, "so there is the answer to that;" "that" being the question of how the Partisans ran elections.309

³⁰⁷ Report of Captain Charles B. Grimm, 8 Sept 1944 to 15 Nov 1944, RG 226, E 154, B 23, BARI-SI-PRO-21.

³⁰⁸ SPIKE Report, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-39.

³⁰⁹ REDWOOD Team Report, 31 January 1945, RG 226, E154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-55.

On the question of elections, and specifically addressing Grimm's suggestion that the Allies run elections in Yugoslavia, it should be noted that this was well out of line with Roosevelt's intention for the postwar world. As noted in the Four Freedoms speech, Roosevelt believed in a local nation's right to run itself.³¹⁰ Even though, in the eyes of the OSS agents, the Yugoslav elections were in no way fair and free, it was out of character, and outside of policy, for Roosevelt to order that elections be run by an outside entity. In this case, Grimm's recommended course of action completely ignored the guiding wartime policy of the United States' previous four years.

Conclusion

By mid-September 1944, the OSS reached its high-water mark for number of teams deployed to Yugoslavia. There were at least 20 teams comprising no less than 71 agents to the Partisans, and another two comprising at least eight agents to the Chetniks. At no point before or after would there be as many OSS agents in Yugoslavia than at that moment. This date coincided with several important developments. The first development was the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill, where Roosevelt quickly backed away from the RANGER mission. The second was when Tito sent his harshly worded letter to Roosevelt demanding the teams with Mihailović be removed. Finally, in this same month Tito met with the advancing Red Army to determine an operational plan for the liberation of Belgrade. At this point, OSS influence started to wane. Up until then, the agents were valuable as intelligence gatherers, military trainers and advisors, and for

³¹⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," (speech, Washington, DC, 6 January 1941), <https://www.fdrlibrary.org/four-freedoms>.

coordinating supply drops. Following September, as the Partisans transitioned to conventional warfare, the OSS agents' greatest value to the Partisans was in coordinating supply drops. When the given supplies were not as robust as expected, OSS agents witnessed their influence with the Partisan leaders rapidly decrease. For the American strategists, however, the OSS agents still provided invaluable intelligence.

The OSS agents were exceptional intelligence gatherers. This was due to three reasons: OSS-Bari emphasized choosing the right personnel for missions, the agents themselves were dedicated to defeating the Germans, and in most cases, OSS agents established solid rapport with their partners. Frequently, reports mentioned choosing the "right" person for the job based on previous performance and knowledge of Yugoslavia, especially in the cases of George Musulin, Linn Farish, John Hamilton, and Robert McDowell. These, and the other agents, did not pursue postwar political objectives. In some cases, like with Eli Popovich, their questions about what made the Chetniks collaborators resulted in their ejection from the country. In many other cases, though, the Partisans instinctively trusted the Americans more than the British because they did not believe the United States had any postwar intentions of running Yugoslavia.³¹¹ Finally, the American agents were better at establishing rapport with their partners. While rapport is not the end-all, be-all in unconventional warfare, it is oftentimes the conduit through which more important negotiations, relationships, and agreements are built. The Americans were, perhaps instinctively, better at this than either the Russians or the British. While the Partisans never trusted the Americans more than the Russians, they frequently told the

³¹¹ The exception to this, of course, is the failed Shepherd Project, which will be addressed in the Conclusion chapter.

American agents how impressed they were by the American efforts and willingness to endure shared hardship alongside the Partisans. All was not perfect for the agents, however.

From mid-September 1944 on, when Tito insisted OSS agents be removed from Mihailović's headquarters, the relationship between the Americans and the Partisans were strained. This sometimes resulted in dangerous situations for the Americans, but in all cases, at the least, not as much intelligence was gathered as could have been which many agents lamented the missed opportunity. Additionally, relationships with the Russians were strained from the start, resulting in interrogations, accusations, and brief imprisonments. The OSS agent's life in Yugoslavia was hard before the HALYARD and RANGER missions, and while those missions provided some tactical and operational success through the intelligence gathered, they were ultimately strategic missteps that were felt most acutely by the men on the ground.

Ultimately, despite the deteriorating relationships between the Americans and their partner force, the OSS still produced valuable, timely intelligence. The acting chief of the Y Desk, Arthur Cox, noted in his progress report of 30 November 1944, that "although the number of personnel in Yugoslavia has been considerably decreased, particularly with reference to SO [special operations] personnel, and although the coverage of the country is not so extended, there has been a considerable increase in the quantity of intelligence received, and in several instances, an improvement in quality."³¹² It was this factor more than any other: the fact that the OSS agents managed to continue doing their job to such a high level of proficiency, despite a lack of helpful, holistic guidance from

³¹² Record of Intelligence received by the Y Desk for the period November 15 – November 30, 30 November 1944, RG 226, E 99, B 22, F 112, NARA. The "Y" stands for "Yugoslavia."

their leadership, and an impossibly complex situation on the ground, that the OSS continued operating in Yugoslavia through the war's end, when many of its members transitioned to establishing the American mission in Yugoslavia for the postwar world.

In his last report as commander of IAMM, Colonel Ellery C. Huntington applauded the work of the remaining OSS teams, and informed OSS Chief Major General William J. Donovan that they no longer required such a large personnel investment. "Following the Russian advance...[and] Partisan action and enemy withdrawal," Huntington wrote, "the need for continued military intelligence from Serbia, Vojvodina, Macedonia, and most of Dalmatia and Montenegro, largely disappeared. As a result, certain OSS teams have been withdrawn and coverage, for now—from the point of view of military intelligence—is, or will shortly be, limited to Slovenia, Croatia, and Western Bosnia."³¹³ Informing Donovan that OSS intelligence teams, focused solely on military matters, have essentially worked themselves out of a job, Huntington then informed Donovan of the issues his team overcame during his nearly four month tenure, lauding the men under his command for handling wide-ranging issues that resulted in hundreds of downed airmen rescued, thousands of intelligence reports submitted, and the strategic victories achieved by a comparatively small American force working through the Yugoslavs. The OSS' personnel investment in Yugoslavia, and the value it added to the Allied war effort there, steadily declined in September 1944 and their mission was not of the same importance in January 1945 as it was in October 1943.

³¹³ Independent American Military Mission (IAMM) to Marshal Tito, Final Report of Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., to Major General William J. Donovan, 27 December 1944. RG 226, E 159, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-51, NARA.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: A LEGACY AS SHROUDED IN MYSTERY, MISINFORMATION, AND CONFUSION AS THE MISSION ITSELF

*Frankly, I have not had the slightest interest to revive or review the tragic story of General Mihailović. He is but a sad footnote in history. The loser in the great game of power politics.*³¹⁴ –George Musulin

*US Officers that I knew seemed to be very interested in winning the war—there seemed to be little or no thought given to the situation after the war.*³¹⁵ –Melvin O. Benson

The war in Yugoslavia continued until 13 May 1945, nearly a week after VE Day. OSS agents were there until the very end, although most missions were removed from the country by January 1945. The remaining missions were relegated to searching for downed Allied Airmen and intelligence operations—although the harassment and hinderance imposed by the Partisans and the effects of tension between the Big Three continued to trickle down and make the OSS agents' jobs more difficult. A large factor that contributed to the higher level of respect by the Partisans, even when less amenable to the OSS agents, was the perception that the United States would remain outside of national politics, which was true for the most part. The exception to this was the Shepherd Project.

The Shepherd Project was the United States' attempt to increase its own influence in Yugoslavia, while also moderating Tito. To spearhead the Shepherd Project, the United States chose Ivan Šubašić to lead their efforts. Šubašić was a self-aggrandizing ethnic Croat with far less influence inside Yugoslavia, and even Croatia, than he claimed, but who was highly regarded by the Americans and effectively on their payroll.³¹⁶ Šubašić was supposed to act as prime minister on Tito's cabinet, which Tito himself agreed to, although the

³¹⁴ George Musulin in a letter to Dr. Kirk Ford, 13 June 1972. Ford's Collection.

³¹⁵ Melvin O. Benson in a letter to Dr. Kirk Ford, 23 October 1971. Ford's Collection.

³¹⁶ Buchanan, *American Grand Strategy*, 253.

agreement reflected an “almost unconditional acceptance of Partisan demands.”³¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, Šubašić’s limited influence at the beginning of his tenure in the fall of 1944 steadily dwindled until he was completely sidelined by Tito following the war.³¹⁸ The Shepherd Project did not play a large role in the OSS agents’ experiences in Yugoslavia because the Partisans never believed it truly threatened their future claim to power over the country. In this, the OSS agents benefited from strategic decisions made that did not match the reality as those on the ground saw it because the OSS were highly regarded for their professional efforts to stay out of politics.

It is important to know that the OSS effort in Yugoslavia was experienced by a small group of highly trained, highly motivated men who attempted to conduct an important mission. This mission was not well-defined, nor was it particularly well-resourced, nor were the men specifically prepared to conduct it. Of the first six Americans to parachute into Yugoslavia in the fall of 1943, just one spoke Serbo-Croatian. On a fact-finding mission, this was a major handicap, to say the least. Yet, it did not stop them. They figured out ways to work through the difficulties they encountered. Whether it was speaking to their partner force officers in a common second language—a tedious task, to say the least!—or spending large chunks of their downtime personally studying and practicing Serbo-Croat while in Yugoslavia, the OSS agents figured out ways to complete their missions and provide recommendations on the best information that was available to them at that time. Unsurprisingly, not all of their assumptions and conclusions were correct,

³¹⁷ Hull to Murphy, 8 July 1944, *FRUS 1944*, 4, 1387.

³¹⁸ Buchanan, *American Grand Strategy*, 254-255.

and especially in the case of a few like Farish and Hamilton, their initial opinions changed based on later experiences.

Somewhat successfully, the OSS agents clung to their government's official policy of working to defeat the common enemy of the Axis, which later morphed into exclusively the Germans. While the policy was far too simplistic, and did not provide the nuanced understanding the OSS agents craved, it was perhaps its simplicity that enabled the OSS to be so successful in proving that they and the US government simply did not have any postwar imperialist aims in Yugoslavia. It is worth wondering if this fact which, at the time undoubtedly frustrated and made the agents' lives more difficult, somewhat paradoxically aided them in building personal relationships with the military leaders with whom they were partnered. When asked why the United States was there, the standard line of "defeating the Germans" was all that they had to cling to, but it was also enough.

The work was dangerous and exhausting. Numerous OSS agents had near-misses with death or injury: at one point, all three officers of Operation AUDREY were reported as missing in action in the last three months of 1943.³¹⁹ About a year later Linn Farish died in a plane crash attempting to infiltrate into Greece. Captain Charles O. Fisher of the MAPLE mission went missing during a battle in December 1944, and was shot upon capture by the Germans.³²⁰ Postwar recovery missions for the remains of OSS agents killed in action continued into the 1970s by OSS agents hoping to understand where their friends went. While in Yugoslavia, all the OSS agents witnessed inconceivable horrors which left invisible scars that many carried throughout the rest of their lives. Some, like Musulin,

³¹⁹ AUDREY Summary Report, 1 April 1944, RG 226, E 116, B 6, F 6.

³²⁰ Lindsay, *Beacons*, 326.

simply buried those memories deep, refusing to talk about their experiences. Others, like Hamilton, resorted to drugs and alcohol to dull the pain. Others, like Huot, simply vanished into history, with none of his comrades really knowing what happened to him.

As they returned to America, most of the OSS agents left the armed service. It appears they were simply in the war to defeat the Germans, and once that task was complete, they left the military, proud of their service, but ready to move on to the next goal—whether that was starting a business or going to college. Mansfield returned to the United States and earned his law degree, eventually becoming a Judge on the Southern District Court in New York. Benson used his knowledge of foreign affairs to aid in his work in the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Musulin was one of the founding members of the CIA. The agents, by and large, completed their mission and returned to the US where they continued their lives.

Tito led Yugoslavia until his death in 1980. During that time, Tito split with the Soviet Union and re-established relations with them time and again. He championed the non-aligned movement of smaller nations, encouraging them to resist both the Soviet Union and the United States, and instead to pool resources and band together. Although his forceful personality was instrumental in establishing the United Yugoslavia, first at AVNOJ in 1943, he built the nation on a three-pegged stool: Tito, the Army, and the People. As Milovan Djilas noted, this was by design: he never wanted any successors to claim the same influence he had during his lifetime.³²¹ Just like a stool with only two legs, Yugoslavia was likely to fall once its third leg—Tito—was removed from its foundation.

³²¹ Djilas, *Tito*, 18.

Yugoslavia erupted into Civil War during its break-up in the late 1980s and continued into the mid-1990s. Many of the same issues that fueled the flames of civil war between 1941 and 1945 were still present: Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholics all fought to establish primacy in their nation; Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians fought each other, reestablishing brutal concentration camps and committing war crimes; internal strife pitted neighbor against neighbor in some of the worst violence in the last decade of the 20th century. In the end, the idea of Yugoslavia was best left as an idea, as the disparate groups of South Slavs were too fiercely independent and loyal to their own identity than they were to a larger federalist state. These same issues plagued Yugoslavia fifty years earlier when OSS agents, largely ignorant of local realities, were sent by officials in Washington to find the true nature of the resistance groups, report the facts back in coded messages, and then continue assisting the anti-Axis war effort.

Policymakers latched onto Farish's blockbuster report, because it fit preconceived notions about the fighting on the ground in Yugoslavia. It provided a clean route forward and required a relatively small investment in manpower and supplies. The OSS agents were enamored by the reverence Farish's blockbuster report received, oblivious to the other strategic factors that pushed it into prominence, and subsequent missions sought to garner such influence on the strategic decision-making process. Unfortunately for them, that level of influence was never again achieved by the OSS.

Their roles shifted to providing much-needed supplies to the Partisans in their anti-Axis campaign, which grew more important as the Partisans themselves transitioned to a conventional army with conventional goals. They provided safe travels for hundreds

of downed airmen out of Yugoslavia, thereby greatly assisting the strategic bombing missions to Ploiești. The intelligence they provided was extremely valued, but more for the operational opportunities the intelligence provided—like critical bombing targets, morale of German troops, etc.—rather than guiding strategic partner force decisions which were no longer up for debate. Following Teheran, strategic machinations put the weight of support primarily behind the Partisans, and no matter what came after that decision, Roosevelt and the other officials in Washington were more concerned by holding together the Allies than worrying about relatively minor problems faced by the OSS on the ground.

Of course: the problems were not minor to the OSS agents on the ground. In their reports, correspondence, and diaries, we see that these men were fully invested in defeating the Axis inside Yugoslavia, and doing their best to end the war as quickly as possible. They felt much of the same heartache from the war as the Yugoslavs, because they lived with, fought alongside, and became friends with the Yugoslavs. Their lenses through which they viewed the problems in Yugoslavia were decidedly narrower than officials in Washington, but because of that they saw the war more viscerally. Seeing the war in color, the OSS agents were intimately aware of the great effects of seemingly small decisions by policymakers. Because of that unique perspective, the OSS agents' stories and experiences were exceptional, and an important chapter of the United States in World War II.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archives

Ford's Collection, Clinton, MS

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

Berle, Adolf A.

Berle Papers

Committee for Fair Trial for Draja Mihailivich (*sic*)

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The President's Official File

OF 364 - Yugoslavia, Government of

OF 364 - Yugoslavia, Government of -> Box 2 -> 364a - Miscellaneous, 1933-1945

OF 364 - Yugoslavia, Government of -> Box 2 -> 364b - Endorsements, 1933-1945

OF 4485 - Office of Strategic Services

The Grace Tully Collection

Donovan, William J., 1942 and undated

The President's Secretary's Files, 1933-1945

Office of Strategic Services

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Donovan, William J., 1941-1943

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Donovan, William J., March 1944-September 20, 1944

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Donovan, William J., September 22, 1944-April 10, 1945

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Mansfield Mission to General Mihailović, August 1, 1944

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - Mansfield Mission to General Mihailović - Exhibits, August 1, 1944

Office of Strategic Services - Reports - "The War This Week", March 26, 1942-January 7, 1943

Yugoslavia

Sumner Welles Papers

Europe Files, 1933-1943

Winant, John G.

Farish, L.M.

National Archives

Office of Strategic Services, Record Group 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services, 1919-2002.

U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center at Carlisle Barracks

William J. Donovan Papers

Books

Adamic, Louis. *Dinner at the White House*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946.

———. *Liberation. Death to fascism! Liberty to the people! Picture story of the Yugoslav people's epic struggle against the enemy--to win unity and a decent future, 1941-1945*. New York: United Committee of South Slavic Americans, 1945.

Dedijer, Vladimir. *The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs During World War II*. Translated by Harvey L. Kendall. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992.

Lees, Michael. *The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-1944*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1990.

Newspapers, Magazines, and Speeches

Kemp, David. "In dock of history over bloodletting in Balkans." *The Herald*, 25 August 1992. <https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/12545987.in-dock-of-history-over-bloodletting-in-balkans/>.

Lalich, Nick. "50th Anniversary of the HALYARD Mission Commemoration." Speech, Chicago, IL, 31 May 1994. <http://www.generalmihailovich.com/2006/08/captain-nick-lalich-oss-officer.html>.

Serb World USA

The New York Times

Voice of Canadian Serbs

Interviews of Balkans Historians by the Author

Dimitrijević, Boyan. Interview by author. Belgrade, Serbia. 27 May 2022.

Litovski, Evgenij. Interview by author. Skopje, Macedonia. 28 May 2022.

Previsić, Martin. Interview by author. Milton, Vermont and Zagreb, Croatia. 22 March 2022.

———. Interview by author. Zagreb, Croatia. 2 June 2022.

Ristanović, Rade. Interview by author. Belgrade, Serbia. 27 May 2022.

Torkar, Blaž. Interview by author. Kranj, Slovenia. 3 June 2022.

Published Diaries, Memoirs, and Legal Documents

Bailey, S.W. "British Policy towards General Draža Mihailović." In *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, eds. Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg. New York: Macmillan, 1975.

Churchill, Winston, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, v. 1: Alliance Emerging, Oct. 1933-Nov. 1942*. Edited by Warren F. Kimball. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

———. *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, v. 2: Alliance Forged, Nov. 1942-Feb. 1944*. Edited by Warren F. Kimball. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

———. *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, v. 3: Alliance Declining, Feb. 1944-Apr. 1945*. Edited by Warren F. Kimball. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Davidson, Basil. *Partisan Picture*. Bedford: Bedford Books, Ltd., 1946.

Deakin, Frederick W. *The Embattled Mountain*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Djilas, Milovan. *Memoir of a Revolutionary*. Translated by Drenka Willen. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1973.

———. *Wartime*. Translated by Michael B. Petrovich. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

- . *Tito: The Story from Inside*. Translated by Vasilije Kojic and Richard Hayes. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980.
- Farish, Linn M. *The True Strength of America*. Bismarck, ND: Bismarck Tribune, 1941.
- Hayden, Sterling. *Wanderer*, Paperback ed. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, Inc., 1998.
- Huot, Louis. *Guns for Tito*. New York: L.B. Fischer, 1945.
- Lawrence, Christie. *Irregular Adventure*. London: Faber & Faber, Limited, 1947.
- Lindsay, Franklin. *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- Maclean, Fitzroy. *Eastern Approaches*. London: The Reprint Society. 1951.
- Maček, Vladko. *In the Struggle for Freedom*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1957.
- Martin, Ralph G., Edd Johnson, Stoyan Pribichevich, and John Talbot. *The Yugoslav Struggle Through American Eyes*. New York: The United Committee of South-Slavic Americans, 1944.
- Mitchell, Ruth. *Chetnik Tells the Facts about the Fighting Serbs, Mihailović, and "Yugoslavia."* Arlington, VA: The Serbian National Defense Council, 1943.
- The Trial of Dragoljub-Dražica Mihailović*. Belgrade: The Union of Journalists Association of the Federative Peoples of Yugoslavia, 1946.
- Todorović, Boris. *Last Words: A Memoir of World War II and the Yugoslav Tragedy*. Edited by J. Stryder and Andrew Karp. New York: Walker and Company, 1989.
- U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943*, 2. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964.
- . *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran*, 3. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943.

Unpublished Diaries, Memoirs, and Manuscripts

Deakin, F.W. "Britain and Jugoslavia, 1941-1945." Paper presented at the conference on

Britain and European Resistance, 1941-1945, at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, December, 1962. Typescript, in possession of author.

Galembush, Stephen. "Candidate for OSS and Rakeoff Mission." Typescript, in possession of author.

Lindsay, Franklin A. Papers. Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

Mansfield, Walter M. Field Diary of Captain Walter R. Mansfield. Typescript, from handwritten notes, in possession of author.

McDowell, Robert H. "The Key Role in Southeastern Europe during World War Two of the Serbs and Their Commander General Draža Mihailović despite Their Abandonment by Churchill and Roosevelt." Typescript, in possession of author.

Urban, John W. "The Operations of Unit A, 3d Contingent, Operational Groups, Office of Strategic Services, in Yugoslavia, 19 January to 6 September 1944: Personal Experience of the Unit Commander." Military History Committee. Fort Benning, GA: The Infantry School. 1946-1947.

Secondary Sources

Barker, Elisabeth. *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*. London: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1976.

Beloff, Nora. *Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia & the West since 1939*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

Bennett, Ralph. *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989.

Biber, Dušan. "Failure of a Mission: Robert McDowell in Yugoslavia, 1944." In *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou 194-217. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992.

Brown, Anthony Cave. *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*. New York: Times Books. 1982.

Buchanan, Andrew. *American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean During World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2016.

Crowe, David M. *Crimes of State Past and Present: Government-Sponsored Atrocities and International Legal Responses*. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge. 2013.

- Dragnich, Alex N. *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers. 1992.
- Dimitrijevic, Bojan B. *The Royalist Resistance in the North-Western Serbia, 1941-1945*. Translated by Bojan B. Dimitrijevic. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute for Contemporary History, 2012.
- Ford, Kirk, Jr. *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1992.
- Hehn, Paul N. *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia, 1941-1943*. New York: East European Quarterly, Boulder, 1979.
- Israeli, Raphael. *The Death Camps of Croatia: Visions and Revisions, 1941-1945*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 2013.
- Jakub, Jay. *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 1999.
- Jones, William. *Twelve Months with Tito's Partisans*. Bedford, England: Bedford Books Limited. 1946.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2000.
- Kimball, Warren F. *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1997.
- Kurapovna, Marcia Christoff. *Shadows on the Mountain: The Allies, the Resistance, and the Rivalries that Doomed WWII Yugoslavia*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010.
- Kochanski, Halik. *Resistance: The Underground War Against Hitler, 1941-1945*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2022.
- Livanios, Dimitris. Review of *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans*, by Heather Williams. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, August 2004, 530-536.
- Martin, David. *Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich*. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946.

- . *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1990.
- McCormick, James M. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 5th ed. Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2008.
- Nikolic, Kosta. *The Serbian Political Emigration in Western Europe, 1945-1956*. Translated by Nenad M. Peles. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute of Contemporary History, 2011.
- Pavlovic, Vojislav. "The Perception of Tito's Regime in the United States, 1943-1961." In *Association Internationale d'Etudes du Sud Est Européen Revue*, 335-355. Bucharest: AIESEE, 2014.
- Pavkovic, Aleksander and Peter Radan, eds. *The Serbs and their Leaders in the Twentieth Century*. Brookfield, USA: Aldershot England, 1997.
- Pavlowitch, Steven K. *Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008.
- . *Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, A Reassessment*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1992.
- Pesic, Miodrag D. *Operation Air Bridge: Serbian Chetniks and the Rescued American Airmen in World War II*. Translated by Svetlana Gacesa. Belgrade, Yugoslavia: Serbian Masters' Society, 1997.
- Pirjevec, Jože. *Tito and His Comrades*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. 2018.
- Roberts, Walter R. *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 1973.
- Shepherd, Ben. *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2012.
- Smith, Bradley F. *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers. 1983.
- Smith, R. Harris. *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1972.

- Tomasevich, Jozo. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2001.
- . *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1975.
- Torkar, Blaž. *Mission Yugoslavia: The OSS and the Chetnik and Partisan Resistance Movements, 1943-1945*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2020.
- Trew, Simon. *Britain, Mihailović and the Chetniks, 1941-42*. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998.
- US, Department of the Army. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019.
- Waller, Douglas. *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*. New York: Free Press. 2011.
- Wheeler, Mark C. *Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940-1943*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1980.
- Williams, Heather. *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.
- Yeomans, Rory. *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941-1945*. Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press. 2013.
- Zedong, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Los Angeles, CA: U.S. Marine Corps. 1961.

APPENDIX A: Pronunciation Guide for Serbo-Croat Names

Letter	Pronunciation
c	“ts” as in “cats”
č	“ch” as in “cheese”
ć	“tch” as in “catch”
s	“s” as in “sold”
š	“sh” as in “sugar”
z	“Z” as in “zoo”
ž	“zh” as in “azure”
j	“Y” as in “yell”
nj	“ny” as in “canyon”
g	“g” as in “go”
dj	“J” as in “justify”
ai and aj	“y” as in “kayak”

*Special thanks to Blaž Torkar for his assistance ensuring this pronunciation guide was correct and complete.

APPENDIX B: LIST OF OSS MISSIONS TO YUGOSLAVIA

Unnamed Missions	Commander	Members	Start Date	End Date	Notes	Citation					
Initial Chemiks Mission	LTC Albert B. Seitz	CPT Walter F. Mansfield; LT George Musulin	18-Aug-43	9-Mar-44	Seitz, Mansfield, and Musulin all split from the other and departed Yugoslavia on different dates	Seitz Report, 5 May 1944, Box 100A, Item 5, Donovan Papers, USAHEC					
Initial Partisans Mission	MAJ Linn M. Farish	CPT Melvin O. Benson	22-Aug-43	27-Oct-43	Farish was promoted to LTC at some point between his first mission in 1943 and his death in September 1944.	Preliminary Report on a visit to the National Army of Liberation, Yugoslavia, Major Linn M. Farish, 29 October 1943, Box 100A, Donovan Papers, USAHEC					
OSS Operational Groups to Vis	MAJ John W. Urban	40 American Enlisted; 8 American Officers	19-Jan-44	6-Sep-44	This was the only Operational Group mission analyzed for this thesis. There was at least one other that occurred along the Dalmatian Coast in concert with Urban's unit, but I was unable to find its report.	Urban, John W. "The Operations of Unit A, 3d Contingent, Operational Groups, Office of Strategic Services, in Yugoslavia, 19 January to 6 September 1944: Personal Experience of the Unit Commander." Military History Committee. Fort Benning, GA: The Infantry School, 1946-1947.					
ABBEVILLE	CPT Richard F. Rainer	RM3c Stanley Kazianuskas (W/T)	9-Aug-44	14-Nov-44	Partisans	4th Brigade	Macedonia	Notes	Rainer accompanied the Partisans as it stood up 4th Brigade. "Brigade" is a misnomer, as it never had more than 200 members during ABBEVILLE.	Citation	NARA, RG 226, Final Report—Rainer, Abbeville Mission, E 154, B 25, Bar—SI—Pro—36
ALTMARK	CPT Nels J. Benson	One unnamed radioman	10-Jun-44	10-Oct-44	Partisans	4th Corps	Croatia			NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARL-SI-PRO-37	
ALUM	CPT Dan Desich	One unnamed radioman; one other native-Yugoslav "handyman" member	27-Nov-43	25-Jul-44	Partisans	7th Corps	Slovenia	W/T and Desich both fluent in Serbo-Croat; highly regarded intel gathering team		NARA, RG 226, E 110, F 2, B 3	
ARROW	CPT John A. Blamnik	MSG Joseph Bradshaw, Jr and SGT Arthur Kern	1-Aug-44	19-May-45	Partisans	6th Corps	Croatia; Slovenia	Originally ACRU; Later an intelligence gathering missions		NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARL-SI-PRO-49	

ASH	CPT Donald L. Rider		11-Sep-44	18-Nov-44	Partisans		Vojvodina	Witnessed deteriorating relations between Partisans and Russians due to poor Russian treatment of Yugoslavs	NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 23, BARI-SI-PRO-27
AUDREY	MAJ Louis Huot	LTR E.S. Thompson; CPT Hans Toife	1-Oct-43	Dec-43	Partisans		Dalmatia	Toife took command of AUDREY in OCT 43 after Huot returned from Tito's HQ	NARA, RG 226, E 116, F 6, B 6
CALIFORNIA	MAJ Richard Weil	CPT Drew (weather officer);	27-Feb-44	9-Jun-44	Partisans	5th Corps	Bosnia		NARA, RG 226, E 165, F 49, B 6
COLUMBIA	MAJ Linn M. Farish	2LT Eli Popovich; SP(X) Arthur Jhoian (W/T)	15-Apr-44	15-Jun-44	Partisans		South Serbia and Macedonia	All PAX evacuated 15 June 1944 and mission was dissolved. Mission brought COLUMBIA team throughout large swaths of territory in Yugoslavia covering 600-800 miles, collecting intel and finding downed Allied Airmen. Four downed airmen greatly assisted: Lt Epp, Lt Gillette, SGT Hardick, and SGT Hulsey. They were evacuated with COLUMBIA.	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677 August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105
CUCKOLD	MAJ Franklin Lindsay	2LT Gordon Bush; CPL James L. Fisher (W/T); PFC Edward D. Weeks; SGT Welles	14-May-44	7-Dec-44	Partisans	4th Operational Zone	Slovenia	Weeks initially dropped to FLOTSAM, but then marched overland to join CUCKOLD	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677 August 1944; Entry 99, Box 20; Folder 105
DEPOSIT	1LT Everett M. Greaser	CPL Edward M. Papienski	19-Feb-45	14-May-45	Partisans	5th Corps	Montenegro; Bosnia	Greaser brought in and out of Yugoslavia during his tenure with DEPOSIT	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105

DUNKLIN	LTJ(G) T.A. Pfeiffer (USNR)	1SG Walter Muselin and PFC Louis Freund (24 JUL 44--15 AUG 44); T/SGT Richard Fehrenbach (25 OCT 44 -- 5 FEB 45); SP(X)2/c Theodore Zaloga (8 FEB 45 -- 4 MAR 45; 25 MAR 45 -- 23 MAY 45); SP(X)2/c Theodore Korolchuk (4 MAR 45 -- 23 MAY 45); 2LT Edward Welles (25 MAR 45 -- 23 APR 45)	24-Jul-44	24-May-45	Partisans	8th Corps, 8th Corps later formed the nucleus of 4th Partisan Army	Montenegro; Croatia; Dalmatia; Bosnia	Moved all over Yugoslavia; was with Partisans as they transitioned to large scale operations in spring 45; assisted rescuing downed Allied airmen while in Split	NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 25, BARI- SI-PRO-35
DURAND	CPT Rex D. Deane		20-Feb-45	20-May-45	Partisans	HQ, Croatia	Croatia	"Report was written under extreme pressure" because Deane only had four days before he returned to Washington, DC. DURAND report covers why Partisan spies inside OSS-Bari was so damaging to OSS missions	NARA, RG 226, Washington History Office Op-23, E 99, B 33, F 175
FLOTSAM	CPT James Goodwin	MSC George F. Hobson; SP(X)2c Romeo Gaudet (W/T)	20-Jan-44	26-Jun-44	Partisans		Slovenia	CPT Goodwin was evacuated 22 July for discussion and will "return today" (~11 AUG 44)	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 660, F 985; NARA, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105
FUNGUS	CPT Conrad "George" Selvig	2LT Nels J. Benson (transferred later to ALTMARK)	4-Dec-43	11-Oct-44	Partisans	8th Corps; 11th Corps	Bosnia; Croatia	Primarily intel and logistics coordination; transferred to Allied Crew Rescue, which became ALTMARK	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 660, F 985; NARA, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105

GEISHA	CPT Robin S. Nowell	T/SGT Joe Veselinovich	19-May-44	14-Oct-44	Partisans	6th Corps	Croatia	Joint SOE/OSS Mission; located, identified, and improved "crash-landing areas" for Allied bombers; here a "company" had 30-40 fighters; a "battalion" had 3 companies; a "brigade" had 4 battalions; and a "division" had 3 brigades, totaling 3,000 men	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 660, F 985
HACIENDA	2/LT John Hamilton	PL/SGT John Hamicker (USMC); SP(X)3/c Joseph Rajacic (USMC; W/T)	17-Aug-44	24-Sep-44	Partisans	6th Corps, 10th Corps	Croatia, Slavonia	Allied airmen rescue mission; convinced Hamilton that Partisans were bad; John Hamilton was <i>nom de guerre</i> for famous actor Sterling Hayden	NARA, RG 226, E 144, B 69, F 615/A
HALYARD	1/LT George Musulin; CPT Nick Latich	MSG Michael Rajacic; SP(X)3/c Arthur Jibilian (W/T)	2-Aug-44	27-Dec-44	Chetniks		Serbia, then Bosnia	1/LT George Musulin was first commander but kicked out of country for sending back Chetniks to Bari. This was the second of three named OSS missions to the Chetniks.	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105
IAMM	COL Ellery C. Huntington	LTC Charles Thayer; MAJ Reid; LT Callahan (Intel); SGT Yeiser (Intel); LT Vicinich; CPT Bulnski (Medical Officer); CPT Orlandi (Logistics); LT Lichtenberger (Communications)	11-Aug-44	15-Apr-45	Partisans	HQ	Croatia; Serbia	Other OIGs: LTC Charles Thayer and MAJ Franklin Lindsey. In April 1945 it transitioned more to a peacetime mission from Thayer to Lindsey. IAMM encompassed all independent OSS SI missions to Yugoslavia from inception on 11 AUG 44 through war's end	NARA, RG 226, Col Huntington's Final Report on Allied Military Mission, Belgrade, E 159, B 25, BARI- SI-PRO-51

MARPLE	CPT Charles O. Fisher	1LT Quinn, Bob Plan, SGT Thabit	27-Aug-44	Jun-45	Partisans	Slovenia; Syrta	Fisher was killed by Germans on/about 26 DEC 44. Plan remained the only member of the mission through war's end.	Torkar, <i>Mission Yugoslavia</i> , 103.
MULBERRY	CPT John Goodwin				Partisans		Ford, <i>Yugoslav Resistance</i> , 188.	
PALM	Charles Martin	Milton Carsen, Daniel Marshall (both joined 21 FEB 44)	2-Feb-44	24-Mar-45	Partisans 3rd Naval District	Dalmatia	Observed enemy shipping movements; supported naval supply operations;	NARA, RG 226, 5, PALM, Bari-OSS, EG 1, E 165, F 51, B 6
RAKBOFF	LTJ(G) Holt Green (USNR);	SP(X) Stephen Galenbush (W/T)	19-Jan-44	7-Apr-44	Partisans 2nd Corps	Montenegro	Holt Green left 7 April; Galenbush changed missions and moved to another location to help evac airmen	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 116, F 392, CASERTA-OSS-OP-47
RANGER	LTC Robert McDowell	CPT John Miodragovich; Lt. Mike Rajacich; LT Ellsworth R. Kramer; SGT Michael Deyak (W/T)	4-Sep-44	20-Oct-44	Chetniks	Serbia	Recalled almost immediately; delayed for a long time due to confusion over the orders and poor weather. Kramer arrived on 4 SEP and immediately was dispatched to other Chetnik-controlled areas to gather more intelligence; eventually captured by Russian Army and evacuated from Bulgaria to Italy. This was the third of three named OSS missions to the Chetniks.	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO Field Reports Book II, E 99, F 140B, B 28, NARA, RG 226, F McDowell Mission Reports
REDWOOD	LTC Rex D. Deane	PFC Edward Papirski (W/T); Michael Weston (<i>non-de-guerre</i> ; Yugoslav POW released when Italy capitulated--left OSS for Partisans shortly after insertion)	9-May-44	2-Jan-45	Partisans 2nd Corps	Montenegro; Serbia	Primarily an intelligence collection mission; parachuted into Yugoslavia with 3 man weather team who passed on meteorological data to Allied Air Forces for their bombing runs.	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 660, F 985

RELATOR	CPT Eugene O'Meara	SGT Ging (British W/T-- left in June); CPL Gouldburn (W/T; arrived in June); CPL Crawford (W/T; arrived in late July)	10-Apr-44	7-Oct-44	Partisans	8th Corps	Bosnia	MAJ Randolph Churchill commanded RELATOR briefly during June 1944	NARA, RG 226, E 190, B 660, F 985; NARA, RG 226, Final Report-- O'Meara (RELATOR Mission), E 154, B 25, BARI-SI-PRO-38
REPARTTEE	2LT George Musulin		19-Oct-43	30-May-44	Chetniks	2nd Ravno- Gorski Corps; 1st Ravno- Gorski Corps	Serbia	Musulin was evacuated; was with BLO named Peter Maynard. This was the first of three OSS "named missions" to the Chetniks. Joined LTC Albert Seitz and CPT Walter Mansfield, although Musulin was a separate intelligence gathering mission, hence the different mission name. A Chetnik Corps consisted of approximately 1,230 men, with mobilization potential of 12,000. REPARTTEE was most likely the British SOE mission name.	Musulin Report, 28 May 1944, OSS/CIA Files, Ford Collection.
SPIKE	MAJ Scott R. Dickinson	CPT Richard F. Rainer; RM3c Stanley Kaznanskas (W/T); SSG Steven Bizic; CPL Steve Silanoff (interpreter) and Ted Zaloga (W/T) arrived on 15 AUG 1944	23-Jun-44	Jan-45	Partisans	Macedonia HQ	Serbia; Macedonia	Arrested by OZNA multiple times; mission eventually split and Rainer and Dickinson moved to separate teams. Bizic was evacuated due to poor health in August 1944.	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105
TOLEDO	Robert S. Phillips				Partisans		Croatia	Ford, <i>Yugoslav Resistance</i> , 189, Torker, <i>Mission Yugoslavia</i> , 47.	
WALNUT	CPT Robert Weiler		12-Sep-44	Mar-45	Partisans	6th Corps	Bosnia	NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 25, F 1	

WILLOW	CPT Charles B. Grimm	MSG Thomas F. Bede, PFC. Maljo Ivanovic,	8-Sep-44	15-Nov-44	Partisans	Serbian Partisan HQs	Serbia	Infiltrated with Huntington and IAMM	NARA, RG 226, E 154, B 23, BARL- SI-PRO-21.
VIS	ILT Sidney S. Kendall		10-May-44	14-Jul-44	Partisans		Croatia	Mission Completed and dissolved on 14 JUL 44	NARA, RG 226, MEDTO 2677, August 1944, E 99 B 20 F 105