Presentation Title

Life Settlements in the U.S.: An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Effects

Presenter's Name(s)

Colin E. SerraFollow

Abstract

Ever since the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, the life settlement industry has experienced relatively rapid growth. With this growth, however, have come many regulations attempting to safeguard sellers in the market. This paper analyzes the effects of life settlement provider bond requirement and broker compensation disclosure regulations on the total life settlement transactions in each state. This is done through a time fixed effects multiple regression model, which is run on annual panel data covering three years. In addition, the structure and participants of the market are explored, and the theoretical economic significance of certain types of regulation is examined. Regression results show that estimators for the selected regulations are not statistically insignificant at any conventional level when controlling for relevant variables.

Primary Faculty Mentor Name

Dr. Jane Knodell

Secondary Mentor Name

Dr. Richard Sicotte

Status

Undergraduate

Student College

College of Arts and Sciences

Program/Major

Economics

Primary Research Category

Social Sciences

Abstract only.

Share

COinS
 

Life Settlements in the U.S.: An Empirical Analysis of Regulatory Effects

Ever since the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, the life settlement industry has experienced relatively rapid growth. With this growth, however, have come many regulations attempting to safeguard sellers in the market. This paper analyzes the effects of life settlement provider bond requirement and broker compensation disclosure regulations on the total life settlement transactions in each state. This is done through a time fixed effects multiple regression model, which is run on annual panel data covering three years. In addition, the structure and participants of the market are explored, and the theoretical economic significance of certain types of regulation is examined. Regression results show that estimators for the selected regulations are not statistically insignificant at any conventional level when controlling for relevant variables.