Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-2008

Abstract

Kim argues that weak and global supervenience are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience. I investigate what weak and global supervenience relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience are equivalent to strong supervenience. I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.

Comments

This is an author's manuscript of an article published in Philosophical Studies. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9002-y

DOI

10.1007/s11098-006-9002-y

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